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This thesis examines governance processes shaping policy-induced residential relocation in a 
differentiated polity. It has been known since the post Second World War slum clearance that 
demolition and residential relocation present some of the most complex forms of planning 
intervention. Whilst intended for the benefit of the wider community, when mismanaged, housing 
demolition and relocation may incur heavy psychological costs of enforced relocation and the 
social cost of the destruction of healthy communities. 
Launched in 2002, Housing Market Renewal (HMR) was the largest housing demolition initiative 
devised in the UK since the post Second World War slum clearance. Its key feature was the high 
degree of responsibility devolved to new sub-regional partnerships, the Pathfinders. The 
government did not provide standards nor guidance for residential relocation process or its 
outcomes. Pathfinders were entrusted to develop their strategies in response to their circumstances 
and contexts. Between 2002 and 2011, HMR partnerships demolished over 30,000 homes and 
acquired an additional 15,000. This caused approximately 50,000 residents to move from their 
homes. Yet research about residential relocation remains limited in several ways. 
Since the 1960s and 1970s, residential relocation has been examined as a matter of social and 
political debates, focusing mainly on negative residential relocation outcomes long after the 
process was over. This was no different in the case of HMR. HMR attracted the attention of critical 
gentrification research. This body of research argues that the gentrification in HMR is orchestrated 
by the state as the key actor and presents relocation outcomes as predominately negative.  
This study challenges that stand. Drawing on governance theory this research argues that 
understanding cross tenure residential relocation in the context of a differentiated polity entails an 
ability to grapple with disparate matters, such as institutional complexity, governmental 
fragmentation, multiplication of agencies and complex webs of relationships. Distinctively, it 
focuses on procedure and works towards devising a theoretical vehicle that shows how governance 
has a profound impact on relocation delivery.  
The thesis uses a sociological approach to research underpinned by grounded theory as qualitative 
methodology. The key primary source of data are over 40 face-to-face interviews conducted with 
important stakeholders from public, private and community sectors in two pilot studies, a 
qualitative survey of ten Pathfinders and an in-depth case study of Bridging Newcastle Pathfinder 
between 2007 and 2011.  
The findings show that cross tenure residential relocation in a differentiated polity is delivered by a 
complex network of actors from public, private and community sectors. Residential relocation 
practices vary on project scale and are shaped by interaction of five distinct processes. The 
relocation outcomes are the result of a network operation, differ on sub-regional, local authority, 
project and household level and are both positive and negative.  
The thesis recommends further exploration of „governance of relocation‟ as a model for 
researching residential relocation in other differentiated polity contexts and provides 
recommendations for future policy design. 
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JRF – Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
LA – Local authority  
LAA – Local Area Agreement 
LDF - Local Development Frameworks 
LDP - Local Development Plans  
LDS - Local development Scheme  
LSP – Local Strategic Partnership 
MBC – Metropolitan Borough Council  
MSP – Manchester Salford Partnership 
NAO – National Audit Office  
NCC – Newcastle City Council  
NDC – New Deal for Communities 
NH – NewHeartlands (Merseyside) 
NRA - Neighbourhood Renewal Assessments 
ODPM – Office for Deputy Prime Minister - replaced by DCLG, 2006 ODPM, 1997-2001 
PfP – Places for People  
PIA – Partners in Action (Oldham and Rochdale) 
PPG – Planning Policy Guidance 
PPP – Public Private Partnership  
RDA – Regional Development Agency  
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RNS – Renew North Staffordshire 
R&RT – Resettlement and Relocation Team  
RR – Residential Relocation  
RRO – Regulatory Reform Order  
RSL – Registered Social Landlord 
SCI - Statement of Community Involvement 
SEU – Social Exclusion Unit 
SRB – Single Regeneration Budget  
TSY – Transform South Yorkshire 
TV – Tees Valley Living 
UDP - Unitary Development Plans 
UK – United Kingdom  
UL – Urban Living (Birmingham-Sandwell) 
USA – United States of America  
UTF – Urban Task Force  
YHN – Your Homes Newcastle  




Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Importance and Relevance of Residential Relocation Research 
Examination of policy-induced residential relocation is critical. Residential relocation presents one 
of the most complex aspects of urban regeneration and development. Achieving synergies between 
demolition, residential relocation and new building comes with extreme difficulties in managing 
the interests and actions of different stakeholders (Cole & Flint, 2007:2). The risk of incurring 
social, economic and environmental damage is high (Carmon, 1999; Pacione, 2005; Power & 
Mumford, 1999). Whilst residential relocation may result in improvements in living conditions for 
the wider community as well as relocatees, failures have been known to cause heavy psychological 
costs of enforced relocation and social costs of community destruction (Carmon, 1999). Therefore, 
policy-caused residential relocation raises fundamental questions about the interaction of the state 
with its communities and individuals. For this reason, it is deemed important to examine the way 
emerging practices of cross-tenure residential relocation in differentiated polities evolve and shape 
residential relocation outcomes. This thesis focuses on the specific issue of planned housing 
demolition and consequent residential relocation and in order to achieve this it takes a sociological 
approach.  
In the 2000s, housing clearance and demolition forcefully re-emerged as important state policy 
strategies to renew the decayed neighbourhoods and low demand housing markets of Western 
Europe and the USA. In the USA, HOPE VI was established in 1993 to redevelop the „most 
severely distressed‟ public housing projects in the nation (Popkin et al., 2004). In Canada, 
demolition of the country‟s largest public housing estate near downtown Toronto, has attracted lots 
of attention (Cahuas & Dunn, 2010). On the other side of the Atlantic, in 1997 the Dutch 
government launched a highly ambitious restructuring programme to tackle the problems of early 
post-war neighbourhoods in which low-cost social rented apartments often dominated the housing 
stock (Kleinhans & Van Der Laan Bouma-Doff, 2008:565–566). France was no different; in 2003 
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the French government launched an ambitious urban renewal programme aiming to demolish 
250,000 social housing units in 300 of the most deprived neighbourhoods by 2013 (Lelevrier, 
2010).  
In England, the Housing Market Renewal (HMR) initiative was launched. In 2002, the programme 
proposed demolition of around 60,000 homes as part of a strategy to renew weak and failing 
housing markets in the North of England and the Midlands. Between 2002 and March 2011, HMR 
partnerships acquired and demolished over 30,000 properties, refurbished around 108,000 and 
completed 15,000 new homes (Audit Commission, 2011a:4). Whilst a certain percentage of the 
demolished properties were vacant, HMR has also engaged in the demolition of occupied 
properties (Cole & Flint, 2007). The intervention required relocation of residents from dwellings 
earmarked for clearance. This author‟s estimate1 is that at least 50,000 people were relocated from 
their properties as the result. 
What North American and continental European neighbourhood restructuring programmes had in 
common was a focus on the demolition of social (or public) housing and new building of mixed-
income housing (Kleinhans & Kearns, 2013).  
Differently from these programmes, the English HMR initiative engaged in demolition of 
neighbourhoods that were already mixed tenure and aimed to alter their tenure ratio. This meant 
that residential relocation in the HMR framework affected residents of not one, but three different 
tenures: owner-occupiers, social as well as private tenants. The tenure difference meant a different 
institutional context for each tenure. However, HMR was set up to „think big‟ (Ferrari, 2007), 
programme designers envisaged a „tenure blind approach‟ to housing on the sub-regional level 
(Cole & Nevin, 2004). The guidance or standards for residential relocation were not provided. Yet, 
research about residential relocation in the HMR framework remains limited. 
Similarly to the current neighbourhood restructuring programmes in Europe and the Hope VI 
programme in the USA (see Uitermark et al., 2007; Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Wyly & Hammel, 
2004; Lees et al., 2008), HMR has attracted the attention of critical gentrification research (see 
Cameron, 2006; Allen 2008). In this paradigm, residential relocation is conceptualised as 
„displacement‟ – an unintended consequence of housing market shifts. Peculiarly however, 
regardless of the mechanism assumed to cause housing market change in various branches of 
gentrification studies (market, state or its powerful coalitions), or of the immediate cause of 
                                                     
1
 Estimate based on vacancy rates and average household size in the intervention areas. 
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relocation (e.g. rent increase or planned demolition), the „displacement‟ outcomes seem to be the 
same: negative (in aggregate) and harmful to the affected residents. Residents are seen as victims 
of structural forces they can do little to influence. Whilst it is important to take into consideration 
possible negative outcomes, gentrification seems to be a totalising narrative (Kearns & Kleinhans, 
2013) that conflates different types and causes of relocation (e.g. relocation due to housing rent, 
price and tax increase, planned demolition) wherever and however these occur. 
An emerging body of research on neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation in 
Western Europe and the USA has recently begun to contest the „displacement‟ arguments put 
forward by gentrification studies. Various authors from both sides of the Atlantic present evidence 
that residential relocation outcomes can be both positive and negative and depend on a myriad of 
factors. For instance, T. Allen (2000) argues that residents‟ „biographical‟ and „socio-
psychological‟ personality traits have a significant impact on the perception of residential 
relocation outcomes. Kleinhans and Van Der Laan Bouma-Doff (2008), Kleit and Manzo (2006) 
and Goetz (2002) point out that residents‟ attitudes pre-relocation have a significant impact on the 
way residential relocation outcomes are perceived. In the UK, research focused on the examination 
of residential relocation outcomes provides evidence contrary to that of HMR critics. For instance, 
in the case of Liverpool, the city that has been famously used as a stepping-stone for the 
gentrification critique of HMR (Allen, 2008), Steele (2010) reports high levels of satisfaction with 
the replacement homes among relocatees: „Housing association tenants (95%) and private rented 
tenants (91%) were most satisfied with their new home compared to owner occupiers (77%)‟ 
(Steele, 2010:2).  
However, neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation studies face a conceptual 
problem. Relocation studies have traditionally restricted themselves to focus on residential 
relocation outcomes. This has left a curious silence surrounding the institutional context, 
residential relocation process and governance arrangements (Kearns & Kleinhans, 2013; 
Rosenfeld, 2013). As the result, contemporary neighbourhood restructuring and residential 
relocation studies struggle to explain why residential relocation outcomes turn out to be mixed 
(beyond residents‟ perceptions about them, differences in residents‟ personality traits or their 
personal context).  
Comparing residential relocation experiences in the Netherlands and the USA, Curley and 
Kleinhans have boldly argued that the majority of the literature „is connected to an outdated 
institutional context of urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s‟ (Curley & Kleinhans, 2010: 371). 
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The conceptual framework for examining a policy-induced residential relocation process and 
delivery mechanism shaping its outcomes is missing.  
This research aims to address this gap. Distinctively, it focuses on procedure and works towards 
devising a theoretical vehicle that shows how governance has a profound impact on relocation 
practice and, in turn, on its outcomes.  
1.2 The Case of the Housing Market Renewal Initiative  
Housing Market Renewal is an important case for examination of contemporary residential 
relocation practice, not only because of its scale and rarity but also because of its distinctive 
features, such as its focus on the operations of the housing market rather than housing conditions 
per se, scale and cross-boundary working, devolution of central power, emphasis on partnership 
working and mixed tenure relocation (Cole & Nevin, 2004, Ferrari & Lee, 2010; Leather et al., 
2007); issues that have not yet been explored in the context of relocation research. 
Covering selected areas of 26 local authorities, HMR is known as the second largest housing 
demolition initiative in the UK after the post Second World War slum clearance. HMR aimed to 
renew weak or failing housing markets in the North of England and the Midlands through a mixed 
approach to clearance, redevelopment and refurbishment of the existing housing stock (Cole & 
Nevin, 2004, Nevin & Leather, 2006). Housing demolition and clearance presented an important 
part of the HMR strategy. Approximately one-third of the government‟s £2.2 billion HMR budget 
was invested in housing clearance, demolition and property acquisition (Audit Commission, 
2011a). By April 2011, 30,000 homes were cleared, only about half of the 60,000 demolitions 




The spatial organisation of the HMR programme was unique, when compared to many previous 
regeneration programmes in the UK (Cole & Nevin, 2004:19). HMR intervention areas were 
identified through research carried out by Birmingham University and subsequent analysis by the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) of the sub-regions where the problems 
of low demand and abandonment were most acute (Audit Commission, 2011). Therefore, the 
boundaries of the Pathfinders did not follow established administrative contours; they were sub-
regions covering weak or failing housing markets across two to six adjacent local authorities, as 
                                                     
2  HMR was initially planned to run between 2002 and 2018. In April 2011, the HMR initiative was prematurely 
discontinued by the Conservative Government.   
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identified through the raft of studies (Cole & Nevin, 2004:19). The selected areas typically 
included old neighbourhoods that had been de-industrialised in the past few decades and had 
experienced long periods of economic decline (Leather et al., 2007:4). The Pathfinders‟ 
intervention was organised in series of projects in each local authority.  
The new Pathfinder administrative bodies were sub-regional strategic partnerships made up of 
central, regional and local stakeholders that involved joint work over a number of adjacent local 
authority areas (Leather et al., 2007:41). An additional feature that set HMR apart from 
contemporary urban restructuring policies elsewhere as well as previous British housing initiatives, 
was a high degree of responsibility devolved to sub-regional partnerships – the Pathfinders 
(Leather et al., 2007). However, all Pathfinders faced potential contradiction. They were non-
statutory bodies and did not possess powers with which to enforce implementation of their 
strategies. In order to achieve their HMR goals, Pathfinders needed to establish links, develop 
relationships and influence partners with the necessary statutory powers (Cole & Nevin, 2004:34). 
Each Pathfinder was required to define their own governance structure and membership according 
to the goals adopted in their local context. This raises important questions about the way relocation 
was delivered in the HMR framework as well as questions about accountability over residential 
relocation. 
Namely, the delivery of residential relocation alongside other operational aspects of HMR was 
assumed to be thought through at the sub-regional or local level, as appropriate. In contrast to the 
preceding British housing policies replete with guidance notes, in the case of HMR, „government 
requirements and guidance have been kept to a minimum‟ (Leather et al., 2007:4). HMR was 
expected to develop organically, in response to changing market conditions. Therefore, the account 
of HMR residential relocation in this research provides an important source of information about 
situated residential relocation practice in a differentiated polity. 
1.3 Residential Relocation in HMR Research  
Housing Market Renewal generated significant controversy. Effectively it split the research 
community in England between academics supportive of the initiative and others critical of it. The 
supportive academics argued that the devolution of state power to Pathfinders, presented „a radical 
change in the relationship between the central government and those localities undergoing 
changes‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:viii, ix); this method promised responsiveness to local 
circumstances and residents‟ needs. HMR critics argued that, on the contrary, by devolving power 
to the sub-regional partnerships, HMR was „a more top-down approach compared to other recent 
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regeneration initiatives‟ in England (NAO, 2007:6) and that it was characterised by inequalities in 
power and capital (Webb, 2010).  
Residential relocation has not been given much attention by HMR supporters. Their work focused 
on examining and advancing HMR implementation on a large scale (Leather et al, 2007; Cole & 
Nevin, 2004; Cole, 2008; Ferrari, 2007). With the exception of Cole and Flint‟s (2007) report 
examining „some of the issues about support for residents in HMR Pathfinders during the clearance 
and relocation process‟ (ibid., p.1), residential relocation was seen as a short-term disruption of 
individual households necessary to achieve housing market growth. However, residential 
relocation has been a bête noire of the HMR critics. HMR‟s goal to renew low-value housing 
markets attracted the attention of critical gentrification research, which conceptualised as harmful 
the „displacement‟ of low-income residents (Allen, 2008; Cameron, 2003, 2006; Macleod & 
Johnstone, 2012).  
In the UK, perhaps more than in other countries, the debate about gentrification has moved from 
the „traditional‟ argument that displacement is driven by market forces, to claims that gentrification 
is now a deliberate strategy of state-funded urban regeneration policies (see e.g. Atkinson, 2004; 
Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Lees, 2008, Lees et al., 2008). Termed „state-led‟ or „state-sponsored‟, 
this type of gentrification, according to Hackworth and Smith (2001), represents an extension of 
the global reach and power of capital in promoting gentrification and involves an enhanced role by 
the state. Residents affected by demolition and relocation are more often than not presented as the 
victims of powerful actors and structural forces that they can do little to influence.  
The recent wave of research in the UK has tied gentrification more explicitly to the agenda and 
language of „urban renaissance‟ (Atkinson, 2002; Lees, 2008). According to Lees, „urban 
renaissance‟, and HMR as part of it, is „an aggressive, revanchist ideology designed to retake the 
inner city for the middle classes‟ (Lees, 2008: 2449) – an ideology by which the low-income 
residents are vengefully displaced to make room for the state‟s favoured middle class (Macleod, 
2002; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). Unlike other gentrification researchers, the 
critical gentrification theorists (see Slater, 2010) acknowledge the existence of a wide range of 
actors involved in HMR conception and delivery, but only to argue that the state is the one that 
controls them (Allen, 2008, Macleod & Johnstone, 2012).  
This thesis challenges this stand. The use of state-led gentrification and critical gentrification 
perspective implies that residential relocation outcomes on the household level can be understood 
simply as the result of a structural shift in state activity, which takes place on a grander scale. It 
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implies a view of politics and policy as something travelling linear fashion through democratic 
arenas to the point of implementation and producing identical results at household level. This 
thesis argues that this perspective is too simplistic. A research system that focuses on the way that 
central and local government (or Pathfinders in this case) operate fails to account for the much 
more complex (and interdependent) bargaining and negotiating process that takes place at 
neighbourhood level. Understanding of „displacement‟ (or residential relocation) in gentrification 
studies is inevitably a selective one, which sacrifices the institutional detail of cross-tenure 
relocation and obscures the work taking place on a day-to-day basis as the residential relocation 
process is delivered. Understanding such issues necessitates an engagement with disparate matters 
such as institutional complexity, the delegation of tasks and contracting out, the multiplication of 
agencies and complex webs of relationships.  
1.4 Theoretical Considerations: Governance Theory  
This thesis suggests that the emergence of a governance perspective (Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1997; 
Kickert et al., 1997) provides an opportunity to develop a theoretically informed approach and a 
better grounded examination of the complexities of cross-tenure residential relocation in 
differentiated polities.  
In the UK, the term „governance‟ has been mainly used to describe a gradual shift from a system of 
hierarchical government to a more fragmented polity (Hudson & Lowe, 2009), also termed a 
differentiated polity (Rhodes, 1997). In the process of political and economic changes initiated by 
Conservative administrations from 1979 and continued (for rather different reasons) under Labour 
since 1997, the universalistic welfare state has been eroded by neo-liberal reforms (Kearns & 
Paddison, 2000:846). According to governance theorists, a differentiated polity has arisen, where 
multiple actors from private, public and community sectors are involved in policy design and 
delivery and „the municipal council as the sole organism that proposed and disposed policies and 
services has been replaced by a network of agencies‟ (Booth, 2005:262, 268).  
The governance debate in the UK has focused on the transformation of local government 
(Lowndes, 2005). According to Davies (2005:312), two dominant but seemingly contradictory 
strands of governance literature that seek to conceptualise the change that took place since 1979 
dominate British academia. The first is „governance orthodoxy‟ and the second are the „governance 
sceptics‟.  
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The „governance orthodoxy‟ model, chiefly advocated by Rhodes (1997), considers that the 
government is no longer supreme, but depends on myriad public and private actors to deliver its 
policies. Hence, governance refers „to self-organising, inter-organisational networks characterised 
by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state‟ 
(Rhodes, 1997:15). This conceptualisation „replaces the zero-sum concept of power in [the 
hierarchical] Westminster model‟ (Rhodes, 1997:9) with a relational concept of horizontal 
transactions. There is no dominant party that can coerce decision-making; policy outcomes are the 
result of the cooperation or non-cooperation of network members (Kickert et al., 1997).  
On the other hand, „governance sceptics‟ argue that despite government attempts to involve a wide 
range of stakeholders and promote local networks in the form of partnerships, political power 
continues to be centralised (Davies, 2004:30). According to Davies (2003, 2004a), Bache (2003) 
and Marinetto (2003), far from disengaging, or empowering other actors, the national state is 
actually augmenting its power over local politics. John and Cole (1998:384) argue that the 
influence of central government does not stop at the level of the local authorities. Through a 
system of partnership networks, it manages to influence local businesses and the private sector as 
well. 
The debate between „governance orthodoxy‟ and the „governance sceptics‟ is nuanced and 
theoretically elaborate. Lowndes (2005) suggests that these narratives offer internally coherent 
accounts of local government transformation in the UK, but that they fail to capture the different 
trajectories of change and continuity that characterise English governance. The reality, she argues, 
lies somewhere between the two poles depending on each particular case (Lowndes, 2005). These 
two extremes open up creative spaces. Amid them, institutional entrepreneurs build the „rules of 
the game‟ to respond to their specific contexts. This thesis thinks in the creative spaces between the 
extremes of „governance orthodoxy‟ and „governance scepticism‟ to examine governance 
processes shaping the experiences of neighbourhood restructuring-induced residential relocation. 
1.5 Methodology  
The aim of the research is to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation practice 
and explain how these processes affected residential relocation outcomes based on the case of the 
Housing Market Renewal initiative in England. The research has three objectives:  
1) to examine how residential relocation is delivered in differentiated polity  
2) to identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and responsibilities, and  
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3) to evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation practice and 
residential relocation outcomes.  
Governance is an interpretive art (Rhodes & Bevir, 2003, 2006). According to Rhodes and Bevir, 
the starting point of an enquiry must be to unpack the meanings, beliefs, and preferences of actors 
in order to then make sense of understanding actions, practices, and institutions rather than to 
impose a pre-set model. In order to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation in 
HMR Pathfinders this research employed an inductive research strategy. Grounded theory was 
used as methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Qualitative methods are deemed the most suitable 
in this case as they provide a refined close up of the residential relocation process in real time.  
The complexities of the research aim and objectives required a multi-scale examination: one that 
considers residential relocation practice at national, sub-regional and local levels. The examination 
of how residential relocation was delivered in the HMR framework was conducted on four levels: 
1) National level (ten Pathfinders operating at the time of inquiry)  
2) Pathfinder level (Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder) 
3) Local Authority (two BNG local authorities, Newcastle and Gateshead) 
4) Project level (three BNG Pathfinder Projects involving large scale residential relocation). 
Four primary methods were used to support different scales of inquiry: pilot studies, a qualitative 
survey (ten Pathfinders), an in-depth case study (selected representative Pathfinder and its projects) 
and a literature review. These methods are supported by a number of data collection techniques: 
semi-structured interviews (face-to-face and phone; individual and group), observation and site 
visits, and secondary data analysis. Semi-structured interviews represent the key source of data in 
this research. In total 44 interviews have been conducted comprising over 40 hours of recorded 
interview material with the representatives of the national agencies, the Pathfinders, their partners 
responsible for the relocation aspects, as well as community representatives affected by residential 
relocation. In the course of the research six out of ten Pathfinders (operating at the time of inquiry) 
were visited. 
In order to explore how residential relocation was delivered, and identify the residential relocation 
processes shaping residential relocation outcomes, a qualitative survey was conducted with 
representatives of ten Pathfinders responsible for residential relocation delivery (that operated at 
the time of inquiry). This inquiry was supported by two pilot studies and face-to-face interviews 
with the actors responsible for HMR at the national level, representatives of English Partnerships 
Housing Corporation (later Homes and Communities Agency), the National Audit Office, the 
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CABE (the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment) and e-mail correspondence 
with Nevin and Leather Associates, the Audit Commission and the DCLG. 
An in-depth inquiry into residential relocation processes, identification of the actors delivering 
them and their roles and responsibilities is based on a case study of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead 
Pathfinder and its three primary intervention areas (three projects). The respondents include 
representatives from private, public and community sectors: the Pathfinder Board and Team, 
Newcastle City Council and Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council (several departments), 
leaders of the community groups in the Scotswood and Walker neighbourhoods, private 
developers, local ALMOs and Registered Social Landlords. 
In order to ensure a maximum level of generalisability within the limits of the study as well as its 
qualitative methodology, it was deemed imperative to select a partnership that was typical of others 
based on the general governance structure it adopted. BNG, like seven other Pathfinders (out of 10 
at the time of inquiry), adopted „strategic partnership‟ as their overall governance structure. At the 
time of selection BNG was the second most advanced Pathfinder in terms of the number of 
demolitions and property acquisitions. Between 2002 and 2008 it had demolished 1,560 properties, 
and that number reached a total of 3,000 by March 2011 (BNG, 2011). 
The examination was conducted in three stages, for three months at the beginning of 2008, the end 
of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. This meant that the residential relocation delivery and the 
governance processes shaping it could be examined in real time, and linked to residential 
relocation outcomes presented by the relocated residents. 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
The thesis is organised in the following way. Chapter 2 presents the context of this study, the 
Housing Market Renewal initiative, in more detail. It explores how HMR came into being, presents 
the research evidence that underpins it and discusses the way housing demolition re-emerged as an 
important housing strategy. The chapter addresses some of the main issues HMR aimed to tackle, 
its goals and the way the initiative was planned to be delivered at sub-regional levels. The Chapter 
concludes by presenting some key debates about HMR implementation challenges and the 
importance of researching residential relocation in this framework. 
Chapter 3 engages with the research related to residential relocation in the UK since the nineteenth 
century. The first section examines the way housing demolition emerged as a state intervention in 
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England in the nineteenth century and the research about the first housing demolition launched 
after the foundation of the welfare state, the post Second World War slum clearance. This is 
followed by examination of the literature critical of HMR, with special attention given to critical 
gentrification studies that emerged to examine potential „displacement‟ in this context. Special 
attention is given to examining the concept of „displacement‟ as defined in governance theory and 
argumentation for the need for its replacement in the case of planned demolition caused residential 
relocation. The chapter concludes by providing a definition of the residential relocation concept 
used in this research.  
In Chapter 4, I consider in more detail the ideas about governance that inform this research. The 
first section provides a definition of the term „governance‟. The next section presents a historical 
overview of change of modes of governing in Britain from a unitary state to a more fragmented 
polity. Section four provides a definition of differentiated polity under the New Labour 
government and links it to the HMR goals and objectives. Section four engages with the 
governance debate in the British literature. Section five presents the two lines of governance theory 
used to describe the perceived changes in British governance: governance orthodoxy and 
governance sceptics (Davies, 2005). Rather than imposing a model, the chapter asks whether 
policy implementation (and residential relocation as its integral part) emerged from a network 
system of loosely interlocked actors, in which each had discretion to act in autonomous ways 
(governance orthodoxy), or whether relocation was determined by a more top-down system where 
central government had the power to steer the networks for its benefit (governance sceptics). This 
issue is important because, depending on the nature of governance, government can either impose a 
single policy line or can facilitate the development of locally tailored strategies. It has a 
fundamental influence on the way residential relocation may be delivered in a differentiated polity. 
Chapter 5 presents the methodology, methods and techniques of data collection used for this 
research. It presents grounded theory as a qualitative inductive strategy used to bridge the 
conceptual gap identified in residential relocation studies. The chapter also presents the research 
design, strategy and process that have been developed to answer the research aim and objectives of 
the research.  
Chapter 6 is the first of the three chapters that present the results of the empirical enquiry 
conducted for this study. Here the Pathfinders‟ approach to residential relocation at the HMR level 
is discussed. The chapter shows that the Pathfinders developed distinct strategies for residential 
relocation that differed at a project level. The evidence shows that residential relocation differs 
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between Pathfinders, between local authorities within a Pathfinder, and between projects within a 
local authority. The chapter identifies residential relocation processes typical for HMR Pathfinder 
relocation practices. It presents a conceptual model for residential relocation process analysis built 
on governance theory and extensive empirical research. The „Relocation Matrix‟ is an amalgam of 
emerging residential relocation processes identified in the HMR framework. In the next chapter, 
the Matrix is used to facilitate an in-depth examination of governance processes shaping residential 
relocation in the BNG Pathfinder, to identify actors involved and analyse their work together.  
Chapter 7 presents an in-depth case study of the Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder. Based 
on the conclusions of Chapter 6, it examines residential relocation in three primary intervention 
areas (three projects): Scotswood, Walker (both in Newcastle) and Bensham and Saltwell (in 
Gateshead). The chapter shows distinct approaches that developed to deliver residential relocation 
in different projects and their effects on the residential relocation outcomes in each case. 
Chapter 8 identifies the actors delivering each of the five residential relocation processes identified 
in Chapter 6, in the case of the Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder. It shows that the 
residential relocation in HMR in general and BNG in particular depended on the co-operation of a 
myriad of actors on a project scale, actors coming from different backgrounds. The chapter then 
examines the delegation of responsibilities related to residential relocation delivery in the BNG 
Pathfinder and maps the networks shaping residential relocation, based on interaction of the 
indentified actors. The chapter then evaluates identified governance arrangements as they relate to 
residential relocation outcomes. 
Chapter 9 is the conclusion of this thesis. Here, each of the three research objectives are answered; 
by doing so the chapter reflects on the work done in the thesis as a whole. Based on the evidence 
collected, analysed and presented in this study, the concluding chapter argues that mixed tenure 
residential relocation in the context of differentiated polity was delivered by complex networks of 
actors. The thesis concludes by recommending further exploration of „governance of relocation‟ as 
a network governance model, in order to enable greater in-depth understanding of residential 
relocation delivery in other contexts of differentiated polity. 




Chapter 2: Housing Market Renewal: the HMR Initiative Background 
and Launch 
2.1 Introduction 
Housing Market Renewal (HMR) was launched with an aim to tackle the problems of „low housing 
demand‟ in the north of England and the Midlands. The initiative caused lots of controversy as the 
theoretical concept of market restructuring was translated into practice. This chapter explores the 
ways Housing Market Renewal came into being, its theoretical underpinning, key principles and 
conceptualisations shaping HMR as an intervention, HMR goals and implementation strategy. The 
chapter sets an overall policy context for the study and shows the relevance and importance of 
looking into aspects of residential relocation in this framework.  
Chapter 2 is organised in the following way. The first section examines the re-emergence of the 
„low housing demand‟ debates in England in the 1990s. The next section presents some key 
explanations of the low housing demand research that led to policy action. The third section 
engages with the specific evidence marshalled to support the development of Housing Market 
Renewal initiative. It discusses some of the implications the research had on the conceptualisation 
of residential relocation in the HMR framework. The HMR initiative launch, goals and 
implementation are discussed next. The chapter concludes by presenting some key challenges in 
HMR implementation in general and residential relocation in particular. 
2.2 Re-emergence of Low Demand for Housing Debate  
The development of the Housing Market Renewal programme followed a re-emergence of national 
debate about the causes of low housing demand in decayed post-industrial neighbourhoods in the 
north of England and the Midlands (Nevin, 2010). In the UK, the rates of housing demolition had 
been running low since the post Second World War slum clearance was abandoned in the early 
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1970s (Balchin & Rhoden, 1998:221). Therefore, the reports about council stock demolitions in the 
mid-1990s attracted the attention of the research community. In 2004, Bramley et al. presented 
evidence that demolitions had increased from 3,700 properties per year in 1990 to over 10,000 in 
2001 (Bramley et al., 2004:217) (see Figure 2-1: Demolition of Local Authority Housing in 
England 1990/1-2001/2). Similar results were reported in a DETR (2000a) study.  
These studies showed that the demolished properties were not slums or estates in particularly bad 
physical condition, they were often traditionally designed terraces or housing less than a decade 
old (Bramley et al., 2004:63). In some city areas RSLs
3
 and local authorities were increasingly 
unable „to find tenants for even modern and well maintained properties, including (notoriously) 
some brand new property‟ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:23): waiting lists were non-existent. Rather than 
clearing sub-standard or uninhabitable properties (like in the case of the post Second World War 
clearance), the demolition of good council stock was a reaction to an increasing trend of population 
                                                     
3 Registered Social Landlord or RSL, is an alternative term for a „housing association‟ in the UK. RSLs are private, non-
profit making organisations that provide low-cost social housing for people in need of a home. Although independent 
they are regulated by the state and commonly receive public funding. They are now the UK‟s major providers of new 
housing for social (as well as in some cases private) rent.  
Figure 2-1: Demolition of Local Authority Housing in England 1990/1-2001/2  
 
Source: Bramley et al., 2004:217 
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leaving certain regional and local areas in England. Demolition of social housing in the 1990s 
resulted in renewed interest in „low housing demand‟ research. 
The studies showed that low demand was affecting not only social tenure, as previous research 
argued (see Power, 1987) but that low housing demand was a cross-tenure problem (Bramley & 
Pawson, 2000). A series of papers and reports between 1997 and 2001 presented evidence about 
volatility in tenancy turnover, significant falls in waiting lists for social housing, increasing 
vacancy rates in social and private rented sectors and hyper-deflation in house prices (see for 
example Bramley, 1998; Holmans & Simpson, 1999; Cole, Kane & Robinson, 1999; Keenan, 
1998; Lee & Murie, 1997; Murie et al., 1998; Nevin et al., 2001; Pawson & Bramley, 2000; 
Webster, 1998). 
Bramley, et al. (2000) and Nevin (2001) showed that the areas affected by low demand were 
mainly comprised of neighbourhoods that had been de-industrialised in the past few decades and 
experienced long periods of economic decline. They found that people continued leaving their 
neighbourhoods even when the economic circumstances of their local authority improved. At the 
same time it was revealed that the areas in question were the recipients of substantial investment 
through different urban regeneration policies and interventions (Cole & Nevin, 2004; Leather et al., 
2007). This suggested that housing quality was not the core of the problem causing lack of 
desirability of available properties. Over the period 1999-2002, research evidence on the scale of 
the problem of low housing demand accumulated and concern grew amongst housing policy-
makers about the causes of the problem and potential solutions (Leather et al., 2007:6).  
2.2.1 Causes and effects of low demand and reasons for policy intervention  
The significant characteristic of HMR was that the need for policy intervention emerged from a 
variety of academic voices pointing out in their own way the problems northern regions faced. At 
this point, it is useful to bring to attention the fact that „low housing demand‟ is an economic, 
theoretical concept (Squires, 2009). The literature about low housing demand varied, and as with 
any academic debate, far from being groomed and ready for policy action, the low-demand 
literature was characterised by a variety of opinions, presenting competing reasons and causes of 
„low demand‟ for housing.  
Several explanations of the causes and effects of low demand are available. Their comprehensive 
reviews and analyses are out of the scope of this study. For this reason, I opt for one of the possible 
categorisations: Bramley‟s (Bramley, 1998a, 1998b; DETR, 2000a, 2000b). This is because it 
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underpinned the research leading to the launch of HMR. According to Bramley the causes of low 
demand can be placed in three categories: economic restructuring, changing housing preferences 
and social processes at the neighbourhood level.  
2.2.1.1 Economic restructuring and migration 
The restructuring of local and regional economies has been used as the principal explanation for 
the occurrence of low demand for housing (Bramley, 1998a, 1998b, Holmans & Simpson, 1999; 
Murie et al., 1998; Power & Mumford, 1999; Webster, 1998). Bramley showed that most of the 
low-demand (social housing) localities coincided with areas where traditional manufacturing, 
industry and mining had been in decline since the 1960s and 1970s, „a position which worsened 
dramatically in the 1980s‟ (Nevin et al., 2001:7). These regions have typically experienced long 
periods of economic decline, as job patterns shifted and people moved away to take up new 
opportunities (Leather et al., 2007:4), thus contributing to decreased housing demand. The effect of 
this was the emergence of housing abandonment and housing surpluses. 
Webster (1998) pointed out that big cities in the north of England and the Midlands lost two-thirds 
of their manufacturing employment since 1979, compared to a national loss of around a third. In 
the 1990s this resulted in a population loss of 40,000 people annually (Lowe, 2004:127). While the 
quantification of the population loss was self-explanatory, there was less consensus about the 
reasons or direction of out-migration. According to Holmans and Simpson (1999) people were 
leaving for the South, a part of the country that enjoyed a better economy; others suggested that an 
inter-regional urban-rural shift was more prominent (Champion et al., 1996). While the reasons for 
the population loss were debated, there was much more consensus about where the regions were 
that lost the most population. The evidence suggested that the areas that had lost the most 
population were: Tyne and Wear, Teesside, Yorkshire conurbations, as well as Merseyside and 
Greater Manchester, and cities in the East Midlands (Bramley, 1998a, 1998b). The population loss 
differed depending on the region. For example, a DoE report (1996:24) showed that inner areas of 
Manchester and Newcastle lost 19% and 21% of population between 1971 and 1981, and 10% and 
8% between 1981 and 1991.  
2.2.1.2 Changing housing preferences 
According to low-demand literature, the movement of population was also encouraged by changes 
in people‟s house-type preferences. Suburban property types, such as houses with gardens, seemed 
to be more favoured than smaller terraced houses or flats in the inner cities. „Changing housing 
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aspirations‟ (DETR, 2000a, 2000b) or preferences (Nevin et al., 2001) have been cited as 
significant factors in decreased demand for housing in low-demand affected areas.  
Different authors gave different explanations for such a shift in „housing aspirations‟. Some of the 
explanations that were most cited were: a generous supply of housing (private and social) in 
suburban greenfield areas and a planning approach that favoured peripheral development (Power & 
Mumford, 1999); accessibility of lower-priced private properties in the north of England and the 
Midlands (Bramley, 1998a; Murie et al., 1998; Power & Mumford, 1999); accessibility of low-
interest mortgages; and availability of Housing Benefit that boosted movement from the public to 
the private-rented sector (DETR, 2000a; Nevin et al., 2001). 
The change of preferences was seen to disproportionally affect the old terraced housing, properties 
that were built in the nineteenth century to house an industrial labour force. With industry gone, 
some authors pointed out the asymmetry between labour and housing markets. According to 
Ferrari and Lee the changing demand debate referred to the way in which housing in older 
industrial urban cores had been built to service a different economic era (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:74). 
Consistent with the theoretical underpinning of the low-demand debate, urban economists argued 
that some British cities and regions were the legacy of historic development and economic 
agglomeration that has occurred in response to a number of economic signals that no longer exist 
(Ferrari & Lee, 2010:74). Terraces were seen as an obsolete market product that there was no 
demand for. 
2.2.1.3 Social processes at neighbourhood level 
One of the reasons quoted the most in the research that led to the design of Housing Market 
Renewal policy and the arguments for demolition, concerns the appearance of surplus housing due 
to low demand (DETR, 2000a; Nevin et al., 2001). The argument was that, when surplus housing 
becomes vandalised and later squatted by drug abusers and petty criminals, an increase in 
antisocial behaviour further contributes to low housing demand. These effects stigmatise and fuel 
abandonment of the area. According to the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU, 1998) such areas became 
epicentres of the social residualisation process as those households that could afford to rapidly left 
the area. The remaining population, according to this conceptualisation, is the one that cannot 
afford to live anywhere else. 
Some authors observed that the spiral of decline in some inner-city neighbourhoods was highly 
localised, and that it operated at a micro level within individual streets (Lee & Murie, 1997; Lowe, 
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Keenan & Spencer, 1998). City Challenge and Single Regeneration Budget allocations attempted 
to rectify this situation in the late 1990s as the funds were targeted at finding relief for the socio-
economic problems of these neighbourhoods (Kleinman and Whitehead, 1999). However, 
Kleinman and Whitehead (1999) showed that these interventions did not stop the abandonment of 
the areas. They argued that successful economic regeneration in the absence of significant 
improvements to the quality of the urban environment, in fact, increased residential volatility, as 
residents were „empowered‟ – but only to move out of the poor quality neighbourhoods they lived 
in. 
2.2.2 The rise of the low demand issue in the policy arena  
One of the key features of the debate around low and changing demand was an agreement that 
problematic market conditions were the result of a complex interplay of national, regional, sub-
regional and local factors (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:45). None the less, references to the problem of 
„low demand‟ in the academic literature, according to Bramley et al. (2004), implied that weak or 
declining housing markets result in various negative consequences which all call for public 
responses (Bramley et al., 2004:76).  
The Social Exclusion Unit Report (1998) officially highlighted the problems of low demand for the 
first time. It emphasised that „surplus housing [was] a growing problem and in some areas [led] to 
near abandonment‟ (SEU, 1998:27). This work mainly considered causes of the phenomenon and 
subsequently raised concern amongst the policy makers about the potential solutions to the 
problem. In 1999, Planning Action Team 7 (DETR, 1999a) pointed out that the existing body of 
research on the issue was not sufficient to draw conclusions as to the geographical scale, tenure 
spread, cause and effects of the phenomenon.  
At the governmental level this low demand debate was informed by two studies, one focusing on 
the national level (DETR, 2000a, 2000b) and one on the regional level (Nevin et al., 2001). 
Housing Market Renewal intervention areas were identified through research carried out by 
Birmingham University and subsequent analysis by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) of the sub-regions where the problems of low demand and abandonment 
were most acute (Audit Commission, 2011a). The research comprised the evidence base for HMR 
and informed the approach adopted in the programme. For this reason it is briefly presented in the 
next section. 
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2.3 HMR Research Evidence Base: DETR report and CURS research 
The detailed report of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) 
research named „Low demand housing and unpopular neighbourhoods‟ (DETR 2000a) and the 
subsequent M62 Corridor Study (Nevin et al., 2001) are two key documents underpinning the 
Housing Market Renewal approach (Cole & Nevin, 2004; Leather et al., 2007). They formed what 
is considered to be the main research evidence that led to the creation of Housing Market Renewal 
in 2002. The M62 Corridor Study provided major inputs to a submission to the 2002 Spending 
Review proposing the introduction of Housing Market Renewal Areas and the creation of a 
Housing Market Renewal Fund (Leather et al., 2007; Nevin, 2001; Nevin, et al., 2001), The DETR 
(2000b) proposed some general guidance for tackling the problems of low demand. The ensuing 
Select Committee Report (2002) supported the creation of a Housing Market Renewal Fund (Cole 
& Nevin, 2004:12). 
2.3.1 Low-demand housing and unpopular neighbourhoods 
The first low-demand research at the national scale was commissioned by the DETR (2000a, 
2000b). The key contribution of the DETR study was to assess the national coverage of the low-
demand problem and the fact that it was affecting different housing tenures. The DETR (2000a, 
2000b) research demonstrated that low demand was a cross-tenure problem (DETR, 2000a, 
2000b). It estimated that 377,000 local authority housing units had been affected by low demand, 
followed by 92,100 registered social landlord (RSL) units (in the social sector as a whole around 
469,100 properties were affected) and 375,000 privately owned dwellings in England (DETR, 
2000a:48). This was a departure from the previous research that mainly defined low demand as a 
problem experienced by social landlords with particular neighbourhoods or dwelling types, 
referred to as „difficult-to-let‟ housing (Power, 1987). The DETR research did not undertake a 
detailed spatial analysis of how the problem affected neighbourhoods. 
The DETR study provided data on how widespread the problem was nationally and regionally on 
local authority scale. The exercise was based on the concept of „Housing Market Area‟ (HMA) 
(DETR, 1999, 2000a).
4
 While HMAs do not follow local authority boundaries by definition, in the 
absence of available data, the DETR research based its results on a postal survey of the local 
                                                     
4 The „Housing Market Area‟ is an area within which most households seeking to set up home or move to a different 
home would look for housing opportunities. It is closely related to concepts of „Travel to Work‟ or „Local Labour Market 
Area‟, which define zones within which people working in particular places tend to live. The corollary of this pattern is 
that the forces of demand and supply in the housing market tend to work themselves out within the HMA (DETR, 
2000a:40). HMAs are not confined to local authority areas. 
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authorities. Therefore, in the DETR study HMAs were conceptualised as local authority areas
5
 (see 
Figure 2–2: Mixed tenure ‗low demand‘ for housing in England). Maps below show the geography 
of low demand according to the DETR study. They show that local authorities suffering from low 
housing demand were concentrated in the north of England and the Midlands (black colour).   
Figure 2-2: Mixed tenure ‘low demand’ for housing in England  
Percentage local authority low demand housing Percentage private sector low demand 
housing 
  
Source: DETR, 2000a:53 Source: DETR, 2000a:54 
 
DETR reports formed a basis upon which it was possible to begin to chart some of the factors 
underpinning the problem locally. However, because of the acknowledged data limitations, one of 
the main recommendations of the DETR research (1999, 2000a) was to take the analysis of the 
occurrence of low demand onto a smaller neighbourhood scale. Part of the research output, the 
Good Practice Guide (DETR, 2000b) recommended further development of research and use of a 
wider range of indicators to map and monitor unpopularity and contribute to profiling 
neighbourhoods in a way which could distinguish different kinds of problem area (DETR, 
2000b:Ch.2). 
                                                     
5 This means that for the purpose of the research it was assumed that a local authority area was self contained. This of 
course was a crude estimation, taking in consideration that, for instance, Manchester focused most of its housing 
development outside of its own LA boundaries.  
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2.3.2 Risk of housing market change and sub-markets  
The suite of regional analyses undertaken by the University of Birmingham‟s Centre for Urban and 
Regional Studies (CURS) between 2000 and 2003, gave a more in-depth view of low demand at 
regional and local levels. „CURS work was to develop a diagnostic tool that could help to clarify 
the scale and extent of the problem and which could help policy makers to develop and prioritise a 
programme of interventions‟ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:47). 
First and most influential among them, the M62 Corridor Study (Nevin, 2001; Nevin et al., 2001) 
was commissioned by a consortium of local authorities, RSLs, and the National Housing 
Federation. Nevin et al. (2001) introduced a more dynamic term: risk of housing market change, or 
the risk of housing market failure. This dynamic dimension of low demand phenomena suggested 
that certain areas that were not in the most critical state at the time of research could deteriorate. 
While the key part of the rationale for a strong policy intervention was the prevalence of empty and 
unused residential property, the concept of the risk of low demand pointed to the danger of some of 
the areas being abandoned in the future (Nevin, 2010:716). This had an impact on the 
conceptualisation of the intervention areas. 
The basic calculation of risk in the M62 Corridor Study combined indicators known to be 
associated with low demand for housing: the proportion of economically inactive population, the 
proportion of the economically active population that was unemployed, the population over 65 
years of age, the proportion of dwellings that were flats and terraced houses (Ferrari & Lee, 
2010:49–50). Subsequent studies introduced refinements. The „3 stage process‟ gave an indication 
of the extent to which properties within the area may be considered to be at risk of low demand 
(see Figure 2-3: CURS Three stage risk index (high risk)). The concentration of particular dwelling 
types and socio-economic characteristics implied that there may be significant housing market 
problems in identified local authority districts and those markets should be monitored for change 
(Ferrari & Lee, 2010:51). CURS‟ studies „formed the backbone of analytical approaches that 
simultaneously examined geographical scale and the possibilities of market change over time‟ 
(Ferrari & Lee, 2010:43). 
  





Figure 2-3: CURS Three stage risk index (high risk)  
 
Source: Adapted from Leather, Murie, Roberts and Ferrari (2004) 
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2.3.3 Implications of the research evidence base on relocation in the HMR framework 
The idea of using evidence to inform policy is not a new idea. What was new at the time of the 
launch of HMR, however, was the emphasis the British government had given to the evidence-
based policy approach since 1997. As part of the Blair government‟s reforming and modernising 
agenda, the aim had been to try to shift away from ideologically driven politics and towards 
rational decision-making (ODI, 2005). Housing Market Renewal was one of the first urban renewal 
policies crafted in this way under New Labour.  
In the case of HMR, the government did not provide the meticulous guidance that characterised 
preceding British policy. The studies presented and informed the specific approach taken in the 
HMR programme. The conceptualisation and selection of HMR intervention areas had been shaped 
by research evidence about low demand (Cole & Nevin, 2004:5).  
The intervention that caused relocation in the HMR framework is clearance and demolition (as 
well as acquisition of the properties for this purpose). Ferrari and Lee (2010:96) point out that, „in 
seeking to reshape local housing markets, demolition was seen as highly necessary, right from the 
start of the low-demand debate, and certainly in the construction of the evidence base from HMR 
and the dissemination period during the launch of the programme‟. They continue by saying that, 
„while the market analysis contained in the DETR (1999a, 2000a, 2000b) and Nevin et al. (2001) 
did not assert to be a route map to the bulldozer, demolition was discussed enthusiastically during 
this period as a primary tool and a means of addressing what was perceived to be the “last chance” 
to get regeneration and renewal right in the areas of HMR‟ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:96). 
For this reason, consideration of the implications of this research evidence on HMR design and 
residential relocation practice is deemed ever more important. The purpose here is not to argue for 
and against demolition. The study focuses on the process of residential relocation. This process 
commences only after the decision to demolish has been approved. The aim here is to point out 
issues the implementers needed to deal with as a result of specific conceptualisation of HMR. 
The DETR report findings and re-conceptualisation of the low-demand problem as a „cross tenure‟ 
problem had a significant impact on the selection of the intervention areas. In order to ensure that 
all tenures were included without „discrimination‟, HMR designers envisaged a „tenure blind‟ 
approach (Cole & Nevin, 2004). However, as a result of the conceptualisation of low demand as a 
cross-tenure issue and an all-inclusive approach to selection, intervention areas were of mixed 
tenure. 
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Introduction of the concept of properties „at risk‟ (Nevin et al., 2001) moved the attention away 
from the properties that were already vacant to those areas that were inhabited and at risk of being 
abandoned. This in turn meant relocating residents of different tenures from neighbourhoods 
earmarked for demolition. These issues, along with some other practical implementation issues, 
had not been considered in the research that led to the launch of HMR. In this way, indirectly, the 
research introduced novelty in the residential relocation practice – cross-tenure relocation that has 
little precedence in the UK and abroad.  
The key influence of the CURS research was in the conceptualisation of the geographical footprint 
of HMR intervention areas – the Pathfinders. The studies showed that low-demand areas or those 
„at risk‟ do not comply with administrative borders and may flow over several neighbouring local 
authority areas. HMR intervention areas – the Pathfinder areas – were conceptualised as sub-
regions covering weak or failing housing markets of two to six adjacent local authorities.  
The definition of HMR intervention areas in turn influenced the structure of Pathfinders, the 
administrative bodies entrusted to deliver the initiative. Pathfinders were established partnerships 
of two to five adjacent local authorities. Among other practical interventions, residential relocation 
needed to be delivered in this potentially novel and complex context. While the theoretical and data 
limitations and assumptions were clearly stated, and the market meticulously studied, the research 
underpinning HMR did not consider the practical implementation of theoretical concepts it rested 
upon. Most importantly for the present study, the issues relating to residential relocation or 
governance on sub-regional level were not considered nor developed. Without going into 
discussion about the extent to which research evidence needs to provide practical solutions, here it 
is deemed important to note that these were the issues that were left to the sub-regional 
partnerships to tackle.  
2.4 Housing Market Renewal Launch  
Housing Market Renewal had a rapid genesis (Ferrari & Lee, 2010). In 2001, the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) identified the areas which were to participate in the programme 
using local authority housing statistics returns (DETR, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b). These returns 
showed that 161 local authorities in England as a whole suffered from at least some low demand 
for housing. At first, 23 authorities that seemed to have the most severe problems of low demand 
based on DETR research (DETR, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b) were chosen to make their submissions to 
the government (NAO, 2007:29). The Audit Commission (2012) points out that the Pathfinder 
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areas were first identified through research carried out by Birmingham University and subsequent 
analysis by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).  
In March 2002, the final report of the Select Committee enquiry into empty homes made strong 
calls for a market renewal strategy. After considering the available research and submissions by 
local authorities, on 10th April 2002 the government announced nine sub-regional areas which 
would have the opportunity to work with government to establish Pathfinder projects (News 
Release, 2002/0154:10 April 2002). Pathfinders were established in Newcastle and Gateshead, 
Hull and East Riding, South Yorkshire, Birmingham and Sandwell, North Staffordshire, 
Manchester and Salford, Merseyside, Oldham and Rochdale and East Lancashire (see Table 2-3: 
HMR Pathfinders with the list of local authorities). 
A resource of £24 million was made available from the Capital Modernisation Fund for their initial 
work in 2002. In February 2003, HMR became a part of Sustainable Communities: Building for 
the Future and the nine Pathfinders received an additional £500 million. Three further partnerships 
were subsequently added and received funding from 2006. These were Tees Valley, West 
Yorkshire and West Cumbria. Pathfinder areas encompassed parts of 26 local authority areas, 
while a further 13 made up the three additional partnerships. Between April 2002 and April 2011 
HMR Pathfinders received funding totalling £2.2 billion pounds from the public purse and 
attracted an additional £1 billion of private funding (Audit Commission, 2011a). 
About 900,000 homes and two million people were included in the Pathfinder areas which 
included about half of the one million low-demand properties in England based on 2002 estimates 
(Audit Commission, 2011a). 
2.4.1 HMR Goals  
HMR is most commonly referred to as the initiative that had a goal to renew weak and failing 
housing markets in the north of England and the Midlands. According to the Audit Commission 
(2011a), HMR goals were deliberately broad to allow the Pathfinders to define their own sets of 
objectives that suited their local circumstances and market dynamics. However, this also allowed 
for metamorphosis of HMR initiative goals at the governmental level during the time of its 
implementation between 2002 and 2011. 
The original submission to the Comprehensive Spending Review defined Housing Market Renewal 
as a philosophy that integrated housing, planning and regeneration strategies to produce a process 
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of renewal that reversed the negative socio-economic trends that caused decline of housing markets 
within a sub-region (Cole & Nevin, 2004:9). At the time of the first national evaluation of HMR, 
Leather et al. (2007) saw Pathfinders as partnerships that were „seeking to revive the housing 
markets in their areas, to make these areas attractive to a wider range of households including those 
with choice about where they live, to contribute to the creation of sustainable communities in these 
areas, and to contribute to their longer term economic prosperity through improvement of the 
quality of housing offered‟ (Leather et al., 2007:viii). For the Homes and Communities Agency 
(HCA) the success of the programme was determined by the extent to which the Pathfinders had 
closed the gap between the housing markets in the Pathfinder areas and the relevant regional 
housing markets (NAO, 2007:22).  
Ferrari and Lee (2010:114) note that „changes in the emphasis and focus of HMR policy have been 
detectable throughout its short life … and have affected its evolution‟. Pathfinders were free to 
interpret HMR goals and to develop strategies for market recovery that suited their specific 
circumstances and contexts. According to Cole and Nevin (2004), at the heart of this decision was 
the recognition of the distinctiveness of each of the nine Pathfinders (see sections on Pathfinder 
key facts). As a result, each one of the Pathfinders had their own sub-regional goal. For the 
Bridging Newcastle and Gateshead Pathfinder (BNG) this was ‗creating great places to live‟ 
(BNG, 2011); the Manchester Salford Pathfinder goal was to „support the economic growth 
potential of the Manchester City region‟ (MSP, 2012); while the NewHeartlands (NH) mission was 
to „deliver sustainable communities in the NewHeartlands area‟ (NH, 2008). Moreover, as 
Pathfinders‟ intervention consisted of a series of local projects and development schemes, goals 
were defined for each one of them separately. In BNG for example, the goal for one of its primary 
intervention areas (Walker Riverside Regeneration) was: „Over the next 10-15 years, to gradually 
improve the local environment, housing, shops, schools, transport, education, and health services to 
make Walker a vibrant local economy and location of choice for families to live, stay and work, 
now and in the future‟ (NCC, 2007a:1). 
Review of the Pathfinders‟ annual reports and business plans from 2003 till 2011 showed that 
HMR goals changed at the sub-regional level and the partnerships also developed their local 
strategies. In other words HMR goals evolved on three scales, national, sub-regional and local, 
each seeking to adjust to the emerging circumstances and relevant prompts and contexts. 
This brings us to question the manner in which HMR funding and implementation was envisaged, 
and the issues that ultimately caused residential relocation in this framework. 
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2.4.2 The HMR Fund and Interventions  
The Housing Market Renewal Fund was made available on the basis of evidence suggesting a 
strong connection between housing market weakness and a progressive cycle of urban decline 
(Cole & Nevin, 2004:ix). The majority of the programme was related to capital expenditure and 
physical renewal (Cole & Flint, 2007:7). Although it was recognised that housing market weakness 
was not solely a product of deficiencies in the quality of or demand for housing, HMR funds could 
not be used to directly fund non-housing improvements.  
Therefore, the Pathfinders were expected to implement HMR and achieve the (various and 
changing) goals they set for themselves through a series of interventions related to the physical 
change of local housing markets. According to the NAO (2007) a set of interventions was available 
to HMR Pathfinders. These are presented in the table below. 
Table 2-1: Pathfinders interventions in the housing market  
 the acquisition of land and property  gap funding for new housing for sale 
 site preparation and reclamation  award of renovation and environmental 
improvement grants  the clearance of surplus and obsolete property 
 assistance with new build  enhanced neighbourhood management 
service for neighbourhoods in transition 
awaiting clearance 
 renovation and refurbishment programmes 
 environmental improvements 
Adopted from NAO (2007:12) 
As thinking about the programme developed, the Audit Commission became involved in the 
capacity of „critical friend‟ to the Pathfinders (Cole & Nevin, 2004:24). Whilst there was not – 
implicitly or explicitly – any uniform yardstick against which Pathfinder strategies were being 
measured (Cole & Nevin, 2004:37) the outputs the Audit Commission focused on were quite 
straightforward and related to physical intervention: the number of demolished properties, the 
number of new builds (and converted properties), the number of refurbished ones, the number of 
acquired properties and the land acquired (see Table 2-2: HMR original total funding and outputs 
per year 2002-2011).  
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Table 2-2: HMR original total funding and outputs per year 2002-2011 
 
Source: Audit Commission, 2011a:9  
The NAO‟s taxonomy of HMR Pathfinders‟ interventions and the Audit Commission‟s focus, 
indicate that regardless of the complexity and change of HMR goals, partnerships‟ work on the 
ground focused on housing improvements and involved physical intervention into the built 
environment.  
Housing clearance and demolition were central to achieving the aims of the Housing Market 
Renewal programme. The acquisition and demolition interventions aimed at large-scale change 
were possibly what really marked HMR out as different to previous approaches (Ferrari and Lee, 
2010:97).  
As it can be seen in Table 2-2: HMR original total funding and outputs per year 2002-2011, 
demolition and acquisition (for demolition) activities together comprised around a third of the 
HMR budget. Demolition allowed for a „clean start‟, acquisition allowed demolition. These 
interventions when conducted in the inhabited areas caused residential relocation from properties 
earmarked for demolition.  
However, it is important to point out that residential relocation was not acknowledged as one of 
Housing Market Renewal‟s goals, interventions or outputs, nor was funding for relocation 
sufficiently considered at the outset. 
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2.4.3 HMR Implementation Strategy  
Housing Market Renewal strategy emerged without a restrictive framework being designed by 
central government to be imposed on the target areas (Cole & Nevin, 2004: 28). There was little 
policy making at the government level and a relatively light touch from a small HMR team at the 
ODPM (Cole & Nevin, 2004:23-24).  
The HMR approach was in sharp contrast to English urban renewal initiatives in the previous 30 
years that had been „replete with guidance notes, templates and regulatory advice from the outset‟ 
(Cole & Nevin, 2004:23-24). The HMR programme was hinged on an approach of „learning by 
doing‟. It was expected to develop organically, in response to changing market conditions. The key 
feature of the HMR programme was a high degree of responsibility devolved to form new sub-
regional partnerships (Leather et al., 2007). Pathfinders were given the freedom and responsibility 
to translate a national strategy and idea into something tangible, meaningful and deliverable at the 
local level (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:70). The devolution of central power to lower tiers of government 
was seen as a good way to increase sensitivity to local circumstances and responsiveness to 
housing market change that was considered to be missing in British planning around that time (e.g. 
Barker, 2006).  
This broader framework was planned to „allow the Market Renewal Strategy to plan for the 
provision of a target population and shape urban form according to likely migration patterns, 
demographic change and fluctuations in income and wealth‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:9). According to 
Cole and Nevin, at the heart of this decision was the recognition of the distinctiveness of each of 
the nine Pathfinders (see next section).  
However, the implementation strategy for HMR also meant that no guidance was provided for 
specific implementation issues. No guidance was provided in regards of residential relocation and 
local governance issues that are the key focus of this study. The Pathfinders were entrusted to 
develop these on their sub-regional level.  
2.5 HMR Pathfinders  
The term „HMR Pathfinder‟ or „Pathfinder‟ refers to both a geographic area of intervention and an 
administrative body, a partnership established to implement HMR. The next two sections present 
some of the key characteristics of Pathfinders as geographic areas and Pathfinders as partnerships. 
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2.5.1 The Pathfinder areas: key facts 
As mentioned earlier, the Pathfinder areas did not follow administrative borders. Pathfinders all 
operated on a sub-regional level. They covered weak and failing housing markets in parts of two to 
five neighbouring local authorities (Audit Commission, 2011a). Table 2-3: HMR Pathfinders with 
the list of local authorities lists the Pathfinders by name, the year of establishment and the local 
authorities each Pathfinder included.  
Table 2-3: HMR Pathfinders with the list of local authorities  
Nine original Pathfinders established in 2002  
Pathfinder name  Alternative name Local authorities  Abbreviation  
Bridging Newcastle 
Gateshead 
- Newcastle and 
Gateshead  
BNG 





















- Manchester and 
Salford 
MSP 
NewHeartlands  Merseyside Liverpool Sefton and 
Wirral 
NH 
Partners in Action Oldham and Rochdale Oldham and Rochdale PIA 
Elevate East 
Lancashire  
- Blackburn with 
Darwen, Hyndburn, 
Burnley, Pendle and 
Rossendale  
EEL  
Three Pathfinders added in 2006 




Stockton on Tees 
TV 




West Cumbria - Allerdale, Barrow in 
Furness and Copeland 
WC 
Source: Audit Commission, 2012.  
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
43 
 
A geographical footprint of the original Pathfinders demonstrated a high degree of correlation with 
those areas identified as „at risk‟ in the CURS report on changing demand. However, the final 
boundaries were subject to a degree of negotiation between local authorities and the ODPM‟s 
Market Renewal team (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:57). This resulted in the inclusion of areas that were 
not envisaged for intervention based on research. 
Ferrari and Lee (2010:66) point out that the negotiations „would have had to account for local 
political priorities and sensitivities‟. For instance, the NAO (2007) report found that many of the 
projects included in the Pathfinder areas were in fact so called „off-the-shelf‟ schemes that the local 
authorities had previously identified but had not been able to implement due to a lack of funding 
(NAO, 2007:17), or areas where regeneration efforts had failed previously. 
Their inclusion points to the fact that the Pathfinders needed to deal with at times complex local 
histories and relations between the stakeholders, especially between the existing community and 
the local authority in question. As will be shown in the empirical chapter, these contextual nuances 
had a significant influence on the residential relocation approach and delivery in HMR. Figure 2-4: 
Map of HMR Pathfinder Areas, shows the location of HMR Pathfinders and their geographical 
coverage.  
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The system of Pathfinder selection was one of the reasons HMR intervention areas differed 
substantially from one another. While the majority of the Pathfinders consist of two authorities (i.e. 
BNG, GW, UL, MSP, PIA), others are made up of four (TSY) to five local authorities (TVL). 
Consequently, Pathfinders differed in size. For instance, TSY, the largest Pathfinder, covered 
14,286 hectares, while UL less than a quarter of that, at 3,295 hectares. The difference in 
Figure 2-4: Map of HMR Pathfinder Areas  
 
Source: Audit Commission, 2012.  
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geographical size did not equate to population size; at 161,296 UL had more than half of the TSY 
population. HMR intervention areas also varied in number of households and household spaces see 
Table 2-4: Pathfinders: area, population, households and household spaces. 
Table 2-4: Pathfinders: area, population, households and household spaces  
 
Source: Leather et al. 2007:15 (based on Census 1991 and 2001). 
Different contexts dictated variance in the types of settlements covered and reasons for HMR 
intervention. Some of the Pathfinders tended to cover relatively freestanding or isolated settlements 
and local economies in their entirety (e.g. Renew North Staffordshire, Elevate East Lancashire and 
Hull) while others are a part of much wider conurbations, such as in Birmingham, Sandwell, 
Manchester and Salford (Leather et al., 2007:13). Cities such as Newcastle, Manchester, Liverpool, 
Sheffield and Birmingham, have been the focus of successive government regeneration initiatives 
prior to HMR. In contrast, in places such as North Staffordshire and East Lancashire the collapse 
of the urban infrastructure and the more testing prospects for inward investment raised issues about 
„catch-up‟ costs of regeneration, particularly in relation to transportation and environmental 
improvement (Cole & Nevin, 2004:37). 
While the Pathfinders had different starting points and different contexts, they all „exhibited 
housing market weakness, manifested in the presence of neighbourhoods with property prices 
lower than average, high vacancy rates, high population turnover, low demand for social rented 
housing, low sales values and, in extreme cases, housing abandonment and failure of the market for 
owner occupation‟ (Leather et al., 2007:4).  
Population loss and abandonment were two of the key issues HMR wished to tackle. According to 
Leather et al., over the ten-year period between 1991 and 2001, the Pathfinders‟ population fell by 
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an average of 6%. While all suffered population loss, the degree of this loss was different across 
areas. The Pathfinders that suffered the largest population loss were NewHeartlands and Bridging 
Newcastle Gateshead (9%), followed by Manchester and Salford (8%). Population loss resulted in 
housing abandonment in the most extreme cases. Vacant properties were a significant measure of 
market weakness, both for particular property types and tenures, and for wider neighbourhoods 
(Leather et al., 2007:56). The Pathfinders had a higher rate of vacancy than the regional and 
national average. At the time vacancy levels in England as a whole were around 3%; the 
Pathfinders‟ average was 7.5%. The vacancy rate similarly to other indicators was quite different 
across HMR intervention areas. For example, Manchester and Salford Partnership (MSP) had over 
11% of vacancy in its intervention area, while Renew North Staffordshire‟s vacancy stood at 
exactly half of MPS‟s, at 5.6% (Leather et al., 2007). 
The unpopularity and abandonment of the properties in the Pathfinder areas was linked to 
prevalence or „oversupply‟ of one type of dwelling (DETR, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b; Nevin et al., 
2001). Flats and old terraces built around a hundred years ago were found to be less popular than 
other types of property available in the same localities. Terraced housing was the prevailing 
dwelling type in the majority of Pathfinders (e.g., EEL (68%), NH (55%), GW (54%) and PIA 
(50%)) and comprised 47% of all properties (in comparison to 26% in England as a whole). The 
situation was a bit different in Transform South Yorkshire where semidetached homes formed the 
majority and in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Tyneside where flats
6
 were the prevalent property 
type.  
Clearance and demolition was seen as an important strategy to reduce the number of so-called 
„unpopular properties‟ or properties that were in „oversupply‟ and replace them with other types. 
This intervention caused residential relocation. The next sections aim to present some of the 
Pathfinder areas‟ characteristics that are deemed particularly important for examining residential 
relocation delivery. The data presented is based on the 2001 Census, because it was this data that 
informed the choice of the Pathfinders and defined the intervention initially.  
2.5.1.1 Pathfinders’ tenure composition  
Pathfinder intervention areas covered old neighbourhoods built for workers in traditional 
industries. This is the reason the prevalent type of dwelling was the terraced house. In the 
                                                     
6 These are pairs of single-storey flats (also called Tyneside flats) within a two-storey terrace, a common type 
of Victorian housing in urban England. Their distinctive feature is their use of two separate front doors onto the street, 
each door leading to a single flat. 
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nineteenth century, when the majority of the housing in Pathfinder areas was built, properties were 
privately rented. After the Second World War this housing was transformed into council housing. 
From the 1970s onwards, the council stock has been sold off to the occupiers through „Right to 
Buy‟ and transferred to the Housing Associations and ALMOs7 who took over the maintenance 
and management of the stock for the local councils. Consequently, Pathfinder intervention 
locations contained a patchwork of housing tenures, mostly inhabited by economically 
disadvantaged people.  
Figure 2-5: Tenure by Pathfinder Intervention Area, 2001 presents the tenure ratio in each of the 
nine original Pathfinders in 2001. It shows that in 2001, when the data was collected, there were 
three main and two secondary tenure categories present in the Pathfinder areas. These are: owner 
occupiers, social housing tenants and private tenants. The first group is further subdivided into the 
owner occupiers (outright) and those with a mortgage, while social tenancy is divided into housing 
provided by local authorities and housing associations.  
Figure 2-5: Tenure by Pathfinder Intervention Area, 2001 
 
Source: Leather et al., 2007:30 (Based on Census 2001). 
In general terms, in the Pathfinder areas collectively, the proportion of owner occupiers was much 
lower (48%) than in England as a whole (69%). At the same time, the proportion of local authority 
                                                     
7 An Arms Length Organisation, commonly referred to as ALMO, is a non-profit company that provides housing services 
on behalf of a local authority. ALMOs are usually set up by the local authority to manage and improve all or part of its 
housing stock. Ownership of the housing stock itself normally stays with the local authority. 
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tenants was over twice the 27% national average. Levels of renting from housing associations, at 
10%, were also higher than the national average (6%).  
Individual Pathfinder intervention areas differed significantly from the overall picture. Figure 2-6: 
Pathfinder intervention area tenures mix (census 2001), presents a breakdown of tenure types in 
individual Pathfinders based on the 2001 Census data. For instance, Elevate East Lancashire (65% 
owner occupation combined) was the closest to the national average of 69%, reflecting the 
historically high level of home ownership in this area. Five areas, Renew North Staffordshire, 
Partners in Action, Gateway, Urban Living, and Transform South Yorkshire, had around 50% 
owner occupation. Finally three, New Heartlands, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead and Manchester 
Salford Partnership, had around 40% owner occupation (Leather et al., 2007:29). 
Figure 2-6: Pathfinder intervention area tenures mix (census 2001)  
Pathfinders Percentage of tenure in the pathfinder intervention areas (%) 
















14.5 25.4 39.4 7.7 13.0 
Elevate East 
Lancashire 
31.1 33.5 10.9 8.8 15.8 
Gateway Hull 17.6 34.4 28.1 5.3 14.6 
Manchester Salford 15.0 21.0 31.3 12.0 20.7 
Newheartlands  
(Merseyside) 
16.7 25.0 17.0 21.8 19.5 
Partners in Action  21.6 31.6 28.0 7.5 11.3 
Renew North 
Staffordshire 
24.2 29.0 25.4 8.0 13.4 
Transform South 
Yorkshire 




24.5 24.2 22.6 13.6 15.1 
Source: Leather et al., 2007 based on the 2001 Census.  
The tenure mix within the individual Pathfinder areas was not homogenous either. Individual 
projects within each Pathfinder differed significantly from the overall Pathfinder picture. For 
example, in the case of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead, three priority intervention areas each had a 
quite different tenure mix from that of the BNG averages. The Scotswood scheme area was 46.9% 
owner occupied housing, 30.3% of all housing belonged to the local authority, 10.5% to housing 
associations, and 9.6% to private landlords. In Walker, another BNG development project within 
the same Pathfinder local authority (Newcastle), the tenure ratio was different. Here, around 80% 
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of the housing was socially rented when the neighbourhood was chosen as a BNG intervention 
area. In Bensham, a BNG priority scheme in Gateshead, private renting seemed to be particularly 
high, at around 29%, with pockets of 40 to 60% of this tenure. Here, for example, owner 
occupation was quite high in comparison with Scotswood and Walker in Newcastle, standing at 
48% of the total housing.  
HMR market failure was partly attributed to the ratio of the tenures being wrong for the issues 
HMR wished to address. One of the main HMR goals was to adjust the tenure mix in favour of 
owner occupation, a tenure that seemed to help communities be more sustainable. Demolition and 
clearance were important strategies of achieving tenure mix change in the Pathfinder areas. 
Therefore, residential relocation affected tightly bound communities and housing arrangements 
irrespective of the nature of ownership. No other policy in the UK has embarked on the demolition 
of mixed tenure neighbourhoods on a scale comparable to HMR. In addition, no other policy has 
attempted to do this with so little residential relocation guidance.  
2.5.1.2 Selected economic indicators and population characteristics 
In order to understand what section of the population was affected by HMR interventions in 
general and by residential relocation in particular, it is important to explore some of the economic 
indices as well as population characteristics within the Pathfinder areas.  
The overall economic activity in the Pathfinder areas was significantly lower (53%) than in 
England as a whole (64%). It was the lowest in Manchester Salford Partnership (47%) and 
NewHeartlands (48%) Pathfinders. While Gateway Hull, Transform South Yorkshire, Partners in 
Action and Elevate East Lancashire were better off (around 56%) they were still much less 
economically active than England as a whole. Figure 2-7: Pathfinder intervention areas: 
population aged 16-74 economic activity shows that the unemployment in the Pathfinder areas was 
much higher than the national average in 2001 (when the evidence was collected). Given the low 
levels of economic activity, it is not surprising that average incomes in the Pathfinder areas were 
significantly lower than those for surrounding areas and the regions within which they were 
located. Average incomes for the majority of Pathfinder areas fell in the range of 80-85% of the 
regional average.  
 
 




Figure 2-7: Pathfinder intervention areas: population aged 16-74 economic activity 
 
Source: Leather et al., 2007:27. (Based on Census, 2001) 
However, explanations differed for such low economic performance in the Pathfinder areas. While 
some Pathfinders had large proportions of students (MSP), in others the reason for economic 
hardship may have been high concentrations of the disabled and unemployed people on benefits 
(BNG), or a high proportion of black and ethnic minority (BME) population (UL, 84.8%). On 
average, the proportion of white British people in the Pathfinder areas was close to or higher than 
the national average. For example, in Gateway white British people made up 97.7% of the 
population, followed by RNS, NH and BNG with around 93% each. At 11%, the proportion of 
people in the Pathfinder areas, who were permanently sick or disabled in 2001 was almost twice 
the national average. BNG and NH had the highest proportion of this group. While the age 
structure and household composition data suggests that the proportion of retired people aged 60-74 
in Pathfinder areas was much lower compared to the national average, the household composition 
data points to a high proportion of single parents in NH (14.3%).  
The common denominator, however, was that for different reasons the population found in the 
Pathfinder areas was economically challenged. The Pathfinder areas were seen as the result of a 
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residualisation process: in other words, people lived in the Pathfinder areas only because they 
couldn‟t afford to live anywhere else. Clearly, as with other indices the reasons for this varied 
between the individual Pathfinders. The characteristics of the population in the Pathfinders suggest 
that different issues needed to be dealt with in the process of relocation. Clearly this raises 
questions about the resources and strategies Pathfinders needed to develop in order to relocate the 
residents from the areas earmarked for demolition. 
2.5.2 The Pathfinder partnerships  
The new Pathfinder administrative bodies were sub-regional strategic partnerships made up of 
central, regional and local stakeholders that involved joint work over a number of adjacent local 
authority areas (Leather et al., 2007:41). Each Pathfinder comprised a Pathfinder Board and Core 
Team. HMR partnerships were the only public bodies eligible to bid for HMR funding. HMR 
resources were supposed to be used creatively to initiate development, foster partnerships, fund 
new ways of doing things and attract private funding. 
Figure 2-8: HMR Pathfinders position and links with central, regional and local 
government 
 
„Department‟ refers to DCLG  
Adopted from NAO, 2007 (Red emphasis added by the Author) 




Pathfinders were introduced into a maze of institutions already operating in HMR areas. Figure 
2-8: HMR Pathfinders position and links with central, regional and local government shows the 
position of the Pathfinders in relation with the regional and local agencies. The objectives were to 
ensure that HMR met its market renewal objectives in terms of the operation of sub-regional 
housing markets, and to balance and synchronise the already existing programmes, policies and 
streams of funding with that of HMR. 
However, all Pathfinders were faced with a potential contradiction. Pathfinders were non-statutory 
bodies and did not possess powers with which to enforce implementation of their strategies. In 
order to achieve their HMR goals, Pathfinders needed to establish links and develop relationships 
with a number of different partners in the public and private sectors for each HMR objective (Cole 
& Nevin, 2004:34). In order to deliver demolition and residential relocation Pathfinders needed to 
influence partners with the necessary statutory powers (Cole & Nevin, 2004:34). This requirement 
clearly put emphasis on the „ability‟ of each of the Pathfinders to develop such relationships in 
each specific sub-region. 
In addition, „no guidance has ever been issued to the Pathfinders which set out Government 
expectations in respect of Governance‟ (ECOTEC, 2007). Each Pathfinder was required to define 
their own governance structure and membership according to the goals adopted in their local 
context. As a result the Pathfinders‟ governance structures differed from one partnership to 
another. As will be shown in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this issue had an important impact on the way 
residential relocation was planned and delivered in the HMR framework.  
2.5.2.1 Pathfinder boards  
Pathfinder boards were the main governing bodies of HMR sub-regional partnerships. They were 
strategic bodies set up by each Pathfinder to collaboratively make decisions about key aspects of 
HMR implementation and attempt to draw partners in to achieve the main HMR goals in their sub-
regional constituencies. In other words these were strategic bodies that were normally not involved 
in the day-to-day delivery of the programme. Interventions such as residential relocation were 
normally not on the boards‟ agendas, unless residential relocation halted the development plans for 
any reason. According to ECOTEC (2007) the functions that the Pathfinder boards tended to cover 
were:  
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 Strategic Development 
 Market Intelligence  
 Communication  
 Financial Management 
 Monitoring and Evaluation  
 Partnership Development  
 Advocacy (ECOTEC, 2007:4). 
The Pathfinders‟ boards varied in size as well as in membership. Appendix 1 Pathfinder board 
membership shows some of the key stakeholders that were normally represented on the Pathfinder 
boards according to NAO (2007). Key partners in all Pathfinders were the local authorities and 
their local strategic partnerships. Regional Development Agencies, and national agencies such as 
the Housing Corporation and/or English Partnerships (latter merged into Homes and Communities 
Agency) were present at all boards. Pathfinder boards varied in inclusion or non-inclusion of the 
private sector. For instance, MSP, GH and PIA had private sector developers on their board while 
others did not report these actors on their board in 2009. At the local level the variation was in the 
inclusion of the housing associations, and agencies such as the police, Strategic Health Authority, 
and New Deal for Communities.  
2.5.2.2 Pathfinder governance structures 
Governance form follows function. In the absence of central government guidance the Pathfinder 
structures evolved at the sub-regional level in response to their specific context as well as the goals 
the Pathfinders set themselves. 
Pathfinders‟ governance arrangements changed frequently as they were adjusted to the local 
circumstances. At the time of inquiry there were four major governance arrangements that 
Table 2-5: Pathfinders’ governance structures by type  
Governance type  Pathfinders (survey results) 
Strategic partnerships  1. Transform South Yorkshire  
 2. Gateway – Hull & East Riding  
 3. Partners in Action – Oldham-Rochdale 
 4. Urban Living  
 5. New Heartlands (Merseyside) 
 6. Bridging Newcastle Gateshead  
Informal unincorporated 
partnership 
7. Manchester Salford Pathfinder 
Company limited by guarantee 8. Elevate East Lancashire  
Merged with regional regeneration 
partnership  
9. Renew North Staffordshire 
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Pathfinders operated by. As is shown in Table 2-5: Pathfinders‘ governance structures by type, the 
majority of the Pathfinders adopted „strategic partnerships‟ as the governance structure. However, 
there were three additional types of governance forms existing across the Pathfinders at the time of 
writing. These are: Informal unincorporated partnership, Company limited by guarantee, and a 
Merger. 
2.5.2.2.1 Strategic partnership 
Adopting a form of „strategic partnership‟ (SP) as a Pathfinder‟s governance structure was 
government‟s suggestion, not a directive. None the less, six out of nine original Pathfinders 
adopted this form. For this reason, special attention is given to SP. In general terms, „strategic 
partnership‟ is a form of macro-partnership that aims to join existing partnerships in an area (in the 
Pathfinder‟s case, a sub-region) and provide strategic direction. This local governance structure 
was devised by the New Labour government and initially designed for the Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSPs) (Bailey, 2003). The form was later adopted for the purposes of HMR 
Pathfinders. The advantage strategic partnership governance structure was thought to be able to 
secure was a more advanced stage in the development of urban policy in England. Namely, at the 
beginning of the 2000s, England‟s urban regeneration landscape was overpopulated with a 
multitude of small partnerships. Bailey (2003:444) points out that these „partnerships were set up 
often in very localised areas under a series of piecemeal and unfocused policy initiatives‟. For 
instance, in BNG, the sub-regional „strategic partnership‟ form was adopted as the preferred 
mechanism to bring together Newcastle and Gateshead councils as well as an existing array of 
centrally funded agencies, existing partnerships, the private sector and local people. The objective 
was to align their work and resources and ensure that a collaborative approach was taken to renew 
the housing market. 
In the case of HMR Pathfinders in general and BNG in particular, the „strategic partnership‟ 
governance form was adopted from the Local Strategic Partnerships model. This model has four 
main characteristics (see DTLR, 2001:10). When applied to the case of HMR Pathfinders these 
characteristics are the following: 
1. Pathfinders bring together at a sub-regional level the different parts of the public sector as 
well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors so that different initiatives, 
programmes and services support each other and work together; 
2. Be a non-statutory, non-executive organisation; 
3. Operate at a level which enables strategic decisions to be taken and yet is close enough to 
individual neighbourhoods to allow actions to be determined at the community level; 
4. Be aligned with low and weak demand boundaries at a sub-regional level.  
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2.5.2.2.2 Informal unincorporated partnership 
The Manchester Salford Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder (MSP) was the only Pathfinder that 
adopted informal unincorporated partnership as their governance structure. The word 
„unincorporated‟ means that the founding members have not constituted the group in a formal 
manner and it is run informally. Such a partnership is not recognised by law as a legal body. 
Members have a contractual rather than statutory relationship; they have all have agreed or 
„contracted‟ to come together for a particular purpose. Unlike an incorporated partnership (e.g. a 
limited company) an unincorporated partnership has no legal rights because it is not perceived as a 
separate entity, unlike a limited company. An informal, unincorporated partnership has no 
existence or personality separate from its individual members. The individual members are legally 
responsible for the acts and omissions of the entire association. 
2.5.2.2.3 Company limited by guarantee  
Elevate was the only Pathfinder that adopted the „company limited by guarantee‟ governance 
structure (English Partnerships, 2005). It is owned by its local authorities. The design of this type 
of structure came about as a result of local circumstances. According to the Audit Commission 
(2009)  
„The Elevate Pathfinder has been acknowledged as one of the most complex in terms of 
political and geographic make-up. The reason for this is because it covers four district 
councils, one unitary and one county council, making it essential for governance and 
delivery purposes to establish an effective and accountable delivery mechanism. The 
separate and short-term decision-making and planning processes across the various 
partnership boundaries required the establishment of a new legal entity that was local 
authority owned but with sufficient autonomy and flexibility to plan and respond to the 
manifest challenges and emerging opportunities across the sub-region‟ (Audit 
Commission, 2009). 
2.5.2.2.4 Merger 
In 2007, Renew North Staffordshire (RNS) merged with the North Staffordshire Regeneration 
Partnership (NSRP). NSRP itself runs as an unincorporated body. This meant that the strategic 
decision-making had become part of the regional agency‟s responsibility and had been taken away 
from RNS. This is the only Pathfinder that ceased to exist as an independent body. 
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2.6 Conclusion: residential relocation the forgotten nemesis of HMR  
This chapter presented the background of Housing Market Renewal, an initiative that reintroduced 
large-scale housing demolition and clearance in England. The chapter also showed that HMR was 
designed differently from preceding housing policies developed in the UK. It was down to sub-
regional partnerships, the Pathfinders, to formulate their sub-regional strategies and manner of 
HMR implementation in the year following the announcement of the Sustainable Communities 
Plan. No precise template for this was provided. The programme was expected to develop 
organically, as programmes were adjusted to meet changed market conditions, and as a result of 
Pathfinder experiences elsewhere (Cole & Nevin, 2004:5).  
According to Ferrari and Lee (2010) interventions aimed at large-scale change, such as through the 
acquisition and demolition of properties, were possibly what really marked HMR out as different 
from previous approaches (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:97). Most importantly for the present study, HMR 
devised a cross-tenure approach which meant that the programme caused relocation of residents 
across different tenures: owner occupiers, social and private tenants. 
However, residential relocation was not listed as one of HMR‟s goals or interventions at the 
national or Pathfinder levels. No guidance was issued to set the standards for residential relocation 
delivery and outcomes. Residential relocation was also not considered in the research leading to 
the launch of HMR. The authors of the M62 Corridor research, for instance, envisaged a „tenure 
blind‟ approach in order to include all properties in the intervention areas irrespective of ownership 
(Cole & Nevin, 2004; Nevin, 2010; Nevin et al., 2001). However, the issue complexities that this 
approach would cause in terms of residential relocation from these areas were not accounted for. 
Several authors have pointed out the challenge HMR presented in terms of implementation 
generally. As early as 2004, Cole and Nevin pointed out that „there [was] a need for a greater 
degree of clarity at the national, regional and local level about what the Market Renewal 
programme [was] trying to achieve‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:x). Ferrari and Lee argued that „the 
ambition and rhetoric of the programme created confusion as to how precise interventions would 
bring about perceived improvements in the market, which in turn confused the degree to which 
HMR was accountable, and how Pathfinders should consult‟ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:125). Related to 
this point was the lack of guidance as to the way in which Pathfinders‟ governance structures were 
to be set up. As shown above the Pathfinders‟ governance structures developed on sub-regional 
level and differed markedly.  
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The issue that seems especially important when considering residential relocation is that the 
Pathfinders did not have statutory power to intervene in the built environment; in other words they 
could not directly demolish housing nor relocate residents. These issues needed to be attended to 
through collaboration with partners that possessed this power. This raises questions about the way 
relocation was delivered at the Pathfinder level as well as questions about accountability over the 
intervention. Examination of the way the Pathfinders responded to the complex demands of HMR 
intervention is at the heart of this study. 
The next chapter looks into the way the issue of residential relocation was conceptualised and 
researched in the HMR framework as well as the research that preceded it.  




Chapter 3: Residential Relocation  
3.1 Introduction 
In the UK, the demolition of older housing has been an active policy area since the late 1880s, 
when the government first authorised the statutory demolition of unsanitary slums (Power, 2008). 
Therefore, the Housing Market Renewal (HMR) initiative is part of an extensive history of ideas 
and ways of conducting urban renewal and research about residential relocation. This chapter 
presents an overview of the literature on policy-caused residential relocation in Britain. The focus 
is on state policy planned housing demolition and residential relocation caused specifically by this 
type of intervention. The chapter is organised in two main sections: first, an overview of the 
policies planning mass housing demolition and inducing residential relocation; second, a definition 
of the terms displacement and residential relocation. The historical overview is divided into three 
main sections. First, an overview of the way demolition and clearance came to be part of state 
intervention in the UK in the nineteenth century; the interwar slum clearance; and the post Second 
World War slum clearance and its critique. Second, the 35 years in which mass demolition was 
abandoned as state intervention in the UK. Third, the re-introduction of mass clearance with the 
Housing Market Renewal programme in 2002. In each of the sections five key questions are 
addressed: (1) Who were the key actor/s shaping residential relocation according to the available 
research? (2) What was the process like? (3) What were the residential relocation outcomes? (4) 
What was the tenure of the residents affected by residential relocation? (5) What was the term used 
by researchers to describe residential relocation in the given period?  
The conceptual section provides a discussion of gentrification theory and the term „displacement‟ 
that came to dominate research of planned demolition caused residential relocation in the 2000s in 
the UK and abroad. It provides an argument for deviating from this critical line of inquiry and 
suggests a need for adopting an alternative research approach. The chapter concludes with 
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providing a definition of the concept of residential relocation used in this research, based on 
discussion of the various forms it might take.  
3.2 Policies Proposing Large-scale Housing Demolition in England from 
the 1850s till the 2000s 
3.2.1 Introduction of slum clearance – nineteenth-century England  
For much of this historical period, development proceeded in an unregulated fashion. In the 
nineteenth century, the urban population of industrial England saw unprecedented growth as 
people poured into the cities in search of new sources of income. The absence of planning 
combined with high demand for basic shelter led to extreme overcrowding and insanitary 
conditions. According to Gibson and Langstaff (1982) the rationale for the first slum clearance in 
Britain was rooted in the anxiety that epidemics of diseases such as cholera could spread from the 
slum areas and slum dwellers to the „healthy‟ (middle class) city quarters. 
Housing demolition and clearance were first introduced in 1868, by the Artisans and Labourers 
Dwelling Act (Torrens Act). The Act gave local authorities the power to demolish individual unfit 
houses. While the 1868 Act focused on individual houses, slum clearance was first put forward in 
1875 with the passing of the Cross Act (Artisans and Labourers‟ Dwellings Improvement Act 
1875). This Act first permitted the local authorities to purchase and clear areas of unfit housing, as 
well as build on them. In the years between 1848 and 1872 five housing and public health acts 
were passed, which established basic levels of sanitary provision, building standards and provided 
housing for the labouring classes (Malpass & Murie, 1994:32). The 1875 Public Health Act 
consolidated previous measures, established principles for the purchase of land by local authorities 
and set up the framework for extending local building by-laws (Malpass & Murie, 1994:32). The 
ideas put forward in the 1875 Act were further advanced, with the first Housing and Town 
Planning Act 1909, which empowered the local authorities to provide plans for urban development 
(including streets and districts in a planned and organised manner) and draw up schemes for the 
clearance and rebuilding of slum areas (Malpass & Murie, 1994:35). The Acts enabled the local 
councils to force owners (mainly landlords) to repair or demolish dangerous properties at their own 
expense. While the use of these first Acts was fairly limited, the introduction of the legislation 
marked a turning point for a state that previously did not intervene in the activities of the housing 
suppliers.  
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3.2.1.1  ‘Slums’ and ‘slum dwellers’ in Victorian England  
In Victorian England areas of substandard housing were termed „slums‟. The term „slum‟ came 
with an implication (and assumptions) about the characteristics of the „slum dwellers‟. These 
assumptions in turn shaped the relationship between the authorities clearing „slums‟ and affected 
residents (so called „slum dwellers‟) as well as the relocation process itself. In nineteenth-century 
England, the working-class slum areas were considered to be the loci of disease, crime, and other 
forms of social pathology (Gauldie, 1974; Gibson & Langstaff, 1982; Wohl, 1977). 
The fear and repulsion of the lower classes by the ruling elite (Gauldie, 1974) left little room for, or 
interest in examining the economic and societal causes of poverty (Wohl, 1977). The dominant 
discourse simply attributed the blame for poor living conditions to those affected by them (Wohl, 
1977). For instance, Bosanquet (1899) and Booth (1902) blamed poverty and disease in slums on 
husbands drinking away their earnings and submitting their wives to having more children than 
they could support.  
The elitist stance of the upper class effectively divided the population into Etzioni‟s (1993) notion 
of „us and them‟, the emancipated „us‟ and the „them‟ in need of cultivation and rule, a system of 
rule where the line of division between the two poles was employed to justify intervention without 
consultation about the intervention or support of residents through residential relocation. The 
approach to slum clearance and relocation of the period is best illustrated through Gauldie‟s words: 
„clear away the filth, clear away disease, clear away the paupers‟ (1974:132).  
The relocation was termed „forced eviction‟ (Young & Willmott, 1957). While compensation was 
provided for the owners of the demolished housing (starting from the reformed Torrens Act 1879) 
it is worth pausing to mention the tenure composition in the UK at the time. Prior to the First 
World War 90% of households rented their accommodation from private landlords, 2% rented 
from local authorities and only the reminder were owner occupiers (Pacione, 2005:220). Slum 
clearance affected mainly the private tenants renting in cheap „slum‟ areas. Therefore, slum 
clearance simply led to the displacement of those affected often to other areas of poverty and 
overcrowding in the private rented sector.  
3.2.2 The interwar period (1914–1939)  
The interwar period in Britain led to far more state intervention than had seemed possible before 
1914 (Malpass & Murie, 1994:44). According to Ravetz (2001) the new housing policy can be 
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seen as one result of a war which provided political motivation and opportunity to the more 
organised and respectable elements of the working class. Throughout the period the role of the 
local authorities in the implementation of central government housing policy was strengthened 
(Malpass & Murie, 1994:63). The introduction of financial assistance for slum clearance and 
housing provision (including replacement housing) by the state played a key role in this process. It 
set the pattern of roles in which central government provided financial assistance and local 
authorities built and managed the housing (Malpass & Murie, 1994:53). 
According to Malpass & Murie (1994:44) interwar housing policy consisted of two main elements 
(a) rent control in the private sector and (b) development of the public sector, which can itself be 
separated into two distinct activities, provision for general housing need and for need arising from 
municipal slum clearance programmes. This section focuses on the issue of slum clearance and 
resultant relocation.  
While the Acts of the late nineteenth century did not have a significant take up, the initiative in the 
1930s resulted in over 1.25 million housing units being demolished or sealed up and more than one 
and a quarter million people re-housed (Gibson & Langstaff, 1982). Slum clearance affected 
primarily the private rented sector that included a high proportion of the oldest and poorest 
dwellings, many built before 1919 (Pacione, 2005:223).  
The housing policies between 1914 and 1920s focused on easing housing shortage after the war. 
After 1930 local authorities were pushed towards a different role, abandoning general housing 
needs in favour of slum clearance. The Housing Act of 1930 (called the Greenwood Act after 
Arthur Greenwood, the then Labour Minister of Health) introduced, for the first time, a state 
subsidy specifically for slum clearance. The subsidy was related to the number of people displaced 
and re-housed, rather than, as in previous Housing Acts, the number of houses built (Bowley, 
1945; Hobhouse, 1994).  
In 1930, local authorities were required to draw up plans for slum clearance. The 1930 Act stated 
that, in deciding whether a dwelling was unfit for human habitation, local authorities were to take 
into account the extent to which sanitary conditions or the repair of a particular house fell short of 
the local by-laws or the general standard of working-class housing in the district. However, these 
standards were not clearly defined and were opened to interpretation by local officers. According 
to Burnett (1978:238) there were many who felt that this lack was one of the chief failings of the 
Greenwood Act.  
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After a slum clearance area was declared by the Council and approved by the Minister of Health, 
the council had the obligation to re-house residents (mostly private tenants) affected by the 
intervention. From 1933 local authorities were encouraged by the subsidy system to concentrate 
their new build on the needs generated by the clearance programme (Malpass & Murie, 1994:46). 
Thus affected residents were to be relocated into council housing that was generally in better 
condition. In practice however, the resultant housing programme was limited politically and 
financially, and affordable only by the most affluent members of the artisan class (Swenarton, 
1981).  
When contemplating slum clearance schemes, it was extremely difficult to find alternative 
accommodation which those displaced could afford. In cases where alternative properties were not 
available for any reason, the councils would purchase private property and divide it into two-flat 
dwellings to re-house residents and allow building work to proceed (Hobhouse, 1994).  
According to Hobhouse (1994) slum clearance did break up existing communities. Some cleared 
sites were simply not usable for re-housing and the residents would be relocated to remote council 
estates, while, where the site was reusable, the first group of people had to be removed elsewhere 
in order to allow initial clearance and redevelopment. Not surprisingly, there is plenty of evidence 
that many slum dwellers did not welcome their enforced move. For instance, the occupants of 
Spring Gardens Place, Millwall, declared a clearance area by the London County Council (EEN, 
22 May 1936, p. 4), did not want to move from their existing cottages to new council flats on the 
nearby West Ferry Estate because they feared loss of their gardens and privacy (Hobhouse, 1994).  
In the interwar period, the private rented sector declined quite rapidly as a proportion of all housing 
because of slum clearance and the transfer of over 1 million existing rented houses into owner 
occupation (Malpass & Murie, 1994:48). By the outbreak of the Second World War, the pattern of 
housing tenure had been significantly redrawn: in 1944, 12.4% of housing was rented from local 
authorities, 62% privately rented, 25.5% owner occupied (Pacione, 2005:221).  
3.2.3 Post Second World War slum clearance (1954–1968)  
The end of the Second World War brought a new sense of social idealism and public responsibility 
(Short, 1982). It became commonly accepted that there were limits to what free markets could 
achieve and that strong social policies were needed to protect people from the negative outcomes 
of the markets (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:44). Following the Beveridge Report (1942) the wartime 
coalition government and later the Attlee Labour government elected in 1945 introduced a number 
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of key reforms that radically extended the scope of state action in key spheres of social policy. The 
increased scale of state intervention that underpinned new social policies reflected a view that 
government could effectively intervene to tackle social ills. The UK saw the establishment of the 
welfare state. 
In 1947, the landmark Town and Country Planning Act was passed. The essential change that it 
introduced was nationalisation of development rights and their associated values (Cullingworth & 
Nadin, 2002:161). The 1947 Act granted local authorities the power to acquire land for public 
works by compulsory purchase and provide compensation to the land owners. The Act formalised 
and legalised mass demolition and relocation as state (or state supported) intervention. This 
legislation became the most important institutional background for residential relocation after the 
Second World War and onwards.  
The 1954 Housing Repairs and Rent Act restarted slum clearance which had been in abeyance 
since the 1930s (Malpass & Murie, 1994:66-67). The 1956 Housing Act introduced a subsidies 
system to help the local authorities in delivering slum clearance. It financed the demolition of 
obsolete housing as well as replacement council housing. With cross-party support for clearance 
throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, levels of slum clearance were sustained at around 12-
60,000 dwellings per year (Short, 1982). Between 1955 and 1979, 1.5 million dwellings were 
demolished and 3.79 million people relocated in the UK (Pacione, 2005:233). This is undeniably 
an impressive quantitative achievement and would not have been possible without continuous 
support and empowerment of the local authorities from the centre.  
The way the young welfare state democratic system was organised ensured that the way forward 
was articulated at a central government level and implemented through the system of hierarchy by 
the local authorities. In political terms the period between the 1940s and 1970s comprised a unitary 
state and a political system with strong central-local orientation (Cerny & Evans, 1999). The 
surrounding governmental dynamics meant that action was mobilised principally through 
parliamentary decisions and professionalised modes of implementation. The decision making 
reflected the political and professional belief that society operated in ways that were relatively 
homogenous, activities guided by clear goals and well-defined problems.
8
 The approach allowed 
the government as the central ruling body to identify and respond to the (perceived and at times 
abstract) needs of the population. The post Second World War slum clearance and subsequent 
                                                     
8 The social policies of the era were based on strictly standardised units and social behaviours. For instance, they 
assumed male wage earners, child-rearing women, and a particular view of a family: the traditional nuclear family. 
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residential relocation was delivered in a way nowadays widely referred to as a „top-down‟ 
approach (Malpass & Murie, 1994:64). Following the central government‟s plans, local authorities 
were the main housing providers at the time and had statutory power to relocate residents from 
dwellings earmarked for demolition. 
While statutory compensation was provided, it was rarely sufficient to enable households to 
purchase an alternative property somewhere else. The re-housing choices were limited to council 
housing, at least in part because slum clearance had played a key role in shrinking the private rental 
market (Power, 1993:209). This period saw an increase of council housing supply. Many council 
estates (also used for relocating residents from slum clearance areas) were a part of new towns and 
so-called overspill estates (built after the New Town Act 1946). Even though social housing 
provided much superior accommodation to that which was demolished, replacement estates were 
remote from the city centre where the slums were located, were poorly served by public transport, 
and lacked amenities (Coleman, 1985). Relocation from the inner city slum areas as well as general 
decentralisation of housing supply to the peripheries of cities contributed to the decay of inner city 
areas that later became part of HMR. 
Young and Willmott (1957) showed that relocating people into the new social housing estates may 
have achieved better housing standards but broke many social ties and networks which people had 
previously relied on. The relocation was conducted with little or no regard to the willingness or 
ability of the relocated residents to support the expenses. Young and Willmott (1957) argued that 
the state‟s new role in housing clearance and housing provision was influenced by a continuation 
of the Victorian perception that the poor are financially irresponsible and socially dysfunctional. 
Young and Willmott (1957) argued that the state‟s focus on meeting assumed needs resulted in 
insensitivity towards other important aspects of people‟s lives. The residents affected by relocation 
were largely ignored in the process, as their needs and characteristics were assumed rather than 
inquired into. The approach effectively took housing decisions away from residents affected by 
residential relocation and placed responsibility in the hands of the state and its delivery bodies. In 
some cases the communities appealed against demolition and compulsory purchase, however in 
deciding the outcomes the courts tended to put the primary importance on the issue of housing 
standards defined by the state or delivering authorities. The residential relocation was termed 
„forced relocation‟ or „enforced eviction‟.  
In the 1970s the critiques of slum clearance mounted (Davies, 1972; Dennis, 1970, 1972; English 
& Madigan, 1976; Parker 1973). The coercive nature of the clearance policy, the effects on the 
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existing population and stress imposed on the residents, and its discriminatory outcomes, have 
been heavily criticised (English & Madigan, 1976; Parker, 1973; Young & Willmott, 1957; Power, 
1993). Modern high-rise building, celebrated by the planning and architectural profession for its 
modern aesthetics and capacity to provide mass housing, was blamed for being inhuman in scale 
and unfit for family life. For example, in Liverpool, thousands of residents affected by slum 
clearance chose to share accommodation in terraced housing instead of moving to new council flats 
(Power 1987:53). The clearance schemes attracted criticism for their potential to cause problems to 
the affected residents (Coleman, 1985). Often redevelopment projects continued for over two 
decades as new building never caught up with the pace of demolition. For much of that time 
unused buildings, vacant lots and half-empty streets covered the centre of the city, causing vast 
economic and social damage (English & Madigan, 1976; Pacione, 2008; Parker, 1973; Young & 
Willmott, 1957; Power, 1993).  
Mounting criticism coming from academic research, combined with economic difficulties and 
growing public resentment of the damage that large-scale redevelopment was inflicting upon 
settled urban communities (Dennis, 1970, 1972) led to the abandonment of the slum clearance in 
the 1970s. The resulting „enforced relocation‟ in slum clearance led to questioning the right of the 
state to intervene in the built environment. The assumptions and beliefs on which the new welfare 
state paradigm was based in the UK (such as rational central rule approach, which many 
governmental agencies adopted), came under severe challenge as wider social and economic shifts 
began to undermine key elements of it (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:46).  
3.2.4 35 years of abstinence from large-scale housing demolition  
The 1968 White Paper „Old Houses into New Homes‟ marked the end of the period of high levels 
of construction and demolition and the beginning of a shift towards rehabilitation and improvement 
of existing dwellings (Malpass & Murie, 1994:70). The end of the post Second World War slum 
clearance was officially marked with the publication of Labour‟s „Policy for the Inner Cities‟ 
White Paper in the late 1970s. This was the start of the period of almost 35 years when there was 
virtually no housing demolition in the UK. 
This period in UK planning history is remembered for its introduction of small area-based 
initiatives, a tradition that continued up to introduction of HMR in 2002. Area based improvement 
policies were first used after the 1969 Housing Act which introduced the use of General 
Improvement Areas (GIAs). This Act advised the local authorities to declare GIAs in owner 
occupied areas in order to improve housing through voluntary take-up of improvement grants.  
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In response to criticisms of the GIA policy (see Short & Bassett, 1978) the 1974 Act supplemented 
GIAs with Housing Action Areas (HAAs), introduced compulsory improvement powers and 
strengthened the role of housing associations. Under the 1974 Housing Act, local authorities were 
empowered to declare HAAs to raise the housing quality and remove the underlying causes of 
housing stress in small areas of multiple deprivation (Short & Bassett, 1978:153). According to 
Kirby (1979), in the first instance the introduction of GIAs and HAAs did not mean that the 
clearance programme had been abandoned. Rather, the demolition was much smaller in scale and 
targeted at the worst properties while others were to be given improvement and repair (Kirby, 
1979:87). Nonetheless, this piece of legislation reflected convergence of two trends in British 
housing policy, the shift in resource deployment from housing clearance and redevelopment to 
housing improvement and the growing use of area based policies.  
3.2.4.1 Conservative government 1974-1997 
An important changing point in British housing policy came in 1979 with the arrival of the 
Conservative government (Malpass & Murie, 1994:97). Facing economic crisis and not content 
with reworking the prevailing political economic philosophies, government‟s intent was liberating 
markets while dismantling the pillars of the welfare state (Hall, 1979). The state project was 
dubbed Thatcherism (Jessop et al., 1998). „The role of urban policy was to assist with wealth 
creation and emphasis was placed on the (re) creation of markets in inner urban areas … Public 
private partnership in property development (rather than public sector led and funded initiatives) 
was seen as the route to economic and social as well as physical regeneration‟ (Cochrane, 
2007:89).  
Economic and ideological drivers meant it was now the tenure, rather than the age or type of 
housing that was problematised and deemed to be in need of remediation. This period has seen 
massive council stock transfer into private ownership through „Right to Buy‟ legislation and 
further strengthening of the housing associations (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006; Malpass & Murie, 
1994).  
Enterprise zones and urban development corporations
9
 (UDC) were established in a number of 
cities, directly appointed by central government and with planning powers to acquire land in 
anticipation of „leveraging‟ private sector input, but crucially bypassing local government control 
(Duncan & Goodwin, 1988, Deakin & Edwards, 1993).  
                                                     
9 UDCs had multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms. These new institutions required public and private sector 
collaboration and were furnished with their own planning powers to attract capital to post-industrial areas.   
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From the 1990s, „a new wave of urban policies encouraged localities to compete for resources, 
with winners and losers based on “quality of their bids” rather than scale of deprivation‟ (Oatley, 
1998). The initiatives in the early 1990s, such as City Challenge and the Single Regeneration 
Budget, were built on the earlier established area-based initiatives tradition.  
These reforms brought change in the relationship between central and local government. The 
position of local government was weakened significantly, while the private sector was included in 
service delivery (e.g. through privatisation of services traditionally provided by the state), this 
resulted in inclusion of a wide range of actors from public and private sectors into policy delivery. 
In this period the residents did not relocate directly because of housing demolition but because of 
the economic changes in their localities (e.g. closure of the traditional industries). It was long term 
unemployment that made the residents move from the most severely deprived inner city areas. 
Others were displaced because of housing rent change, housing tax and price increase in 
regeneration areas. A heartfelt sense prevailed that 15 years of Conservative policy had done little 
for the urban areas annihilated by 1980s deindustrialisation, not least Greater Manchester, 
Merseyside and Tyne and Wear (MacLeod & Johnstone, 2012:6). The trends led to deterioration of 
inner city areas and widening spatial inequality in England. 
3.2.5 Return to large scale housing demolition in HMR (2002–2011)  
After almost two decades of Conservative rule, the Labour party regained power in 1997. One of 
the key goals of the Labour government was to tackle social inequality that had intensified during 
the Conservatives‟ 18-year reign particularly in inner-city localities.10 The deepest concentration 
were in public or council housing estates increasingly residualised because of the Right to Buy 
initiative and an associated reduction in the commitment to build new council housing (Murie, 
1997a).  
The number of initiatives appeared to signal a commitment to reverse the trend towards escalating 
inequality, such as New Deal for Communities (NDC). A new ministerial body was established, 
the Social Exclusion Unit as well as the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit; Bringing Britain Together: 
A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal and A New Commitment to Neighbourhood 
Renewal (SEU, 2001) mapped out a vision for long term community regeneration. These 
programmes were characterised by a new political language of social inclusion and „people-based 
                                                     
10 In 1979, 14% of the UK population was classified as living in poverty, in the late 1990s 26% of the population was 
classified as living in poverty. In total 14.5 million (Gordon et al., 2000).  
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regeneration‟ (Colenutt, 1999; Hills & Stewart, 2005; Imrie & Raco, 2003) that replaced the 
market-led regeneration of the previous period.  
Working alongside these „regeneration‟ policies was the urban renaissance; a vision of the „good 
city‟ led by Lord Rogers (UTF, 1999). The emphasis was placed on innovative brownfield reuse 
and redevelopment, mixed use developments, quality streetscapes and public spaces, socially and 
culturally mixed neighbourhoods and higher urban densities. The report and subsequent white 
paper (DETR, 2000) had an aim to attract capital and people back to England‟s city centres where 
exodus had become the prevailing trend (Macleod & Johnstone, 2012:7). One programme to 
encourage the formation of sustainable communities – albeit marginally predating the official plan 
and which, as we have seen, was designed to stretch the geography of the urban renaissance – was 
Housing Market Renewal (Macleod & Johnstone, 2012:8). Housing Market Renewal reintroduced 
large-scale housing demolition after 35 years when this policy tool was not utilised. 
3.2.6 Housing Market Renewal and critical gentrification literature  
In 2002, Housing Market Renewal was launched as a part of New Labour‟s goals to reduce social 
inequality, promote urban renaissance and the creation of sustainable communities. HMR proposed 
demolition of around 100,000 residential units (this number was latter reduced to 60,000) therefore 
HMR became known as the second largest intervention of the kind since the post Second World 
War slum clearance.  
The Housing Market Renewal initiative generated significant controversy. The apparent paradox 
between creating sustainable communities and resorting to radical physical intervention attracted 
lots of attention. Effectively it split the research community in England between academics 
supportive of the initiative and others critical of it. The supportive academics argued that the 
devolution of state power to Pathfinders (see Chapter 2), presented „a radical change in the 
relationship between the central government and those localities undergoing changes‟ (Cole & 
Nevin, 2004:viii, ix); this method promised responsiveness to local circumstances and residents‟ 
needs. HMR critics argued that, on the contrary, by devolving power to the sub-regional 
partnerships, HMR was „a more top-down approach compared to other recent regeneration 
initiatives‟ in England (NAO, 2007:6) and that it was characterised by inequalities in power and 
capital (Webb, 2010).  
Residential relocation has not been given much attention by HMR supporters. Their work focused 
on examining and advancing HMR implementation on a large scale (Leather et al., 2007; Cole & 
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Nevin, 2004; Cole, 2008; Ferrari, 2007). With the exception of Cole and Flint‟s (2007) report 
examining „some of the issues about support for residents in HMR Pathfinders during the clearance 
and relocation process‟ (ibid., p.1), residential relocation was seen as a short-term disruption of 
individual households necessary to achieve housing market growth. However, residential 
relocation has been a bête noire of HMR critics. Demolition and clearance raised concerns about 
the displacement of households. Housing Market Renewal, much like the Hope VI programme in 
the USA, and similar programmes in Europe, had attracted the attention of „critical gentrification 
research‟ (Allen, 2008; Cameron, 2003, 2006; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). In the UK, perhaps 
more than in other countries, the debate about gentrification has moved from the „traditional‟ 
argument that displacement is driven by market forces, to claims that gentrification is now a 
deliberate strategy of state-funded urban regeneration policies (see e.g. Atkinson, 2004; Hackworth 
& Smith, 2001; Lees, 2008; Lees et al., 2008). Termed „state-led‟ or „state-sponsored‟, this type of 
gentrification, according to Hackworth and Smith (2001), represents an extension of the global 
reach and power of capital in promoting gentrification and involves an enhanced role of the state. 
Residents affected by demolition and relocation are more often than not presented as the victims of 
powerful actors and structural forces that they can do little to influence.  
Cameron‟s (2003) work played a significant role in conceptualising HMR as a state-sponsored 
gentrification initiative. He argues that the state‟s role has been even more prominent where 
gentrification takes place in weak housing markets than in the well performing areas that have 
underpinned most British work on gentrification (see for example Atkinson, 2002; Lees, 2003, 
2008). For Cameron and Coaffee (2005) the struggle over displacement of the poorest residents by 
the middle classes in UK provincial cities is „an irrelevance‟. They argue that „in cities most 
affected by deindustrialisation where the need for regeneration is most pressing, private capital has 
typically to be dragged “kicking and screaming”‟ (Cameron & Coaffee, 2005:45). The argument 
continues that in low-demand housing markets like the HMR Pathfinders, the overt driver of 
gentrification and „displacement‟ is neither gentrifiers nor capital, but the public sector in the form 
of the central and local state (Cameron & Coaffee, 2005) or Pathfinders in the HMR case 
(Cameron, 2003). Cameron (2003) assessed the Going for Growth initiative in Newcastle upon 
Tyne, a plan that later became a part of the HMR intervention areas, against different models of 
gentrification. Building on the wider body of gentrification literature, Cameron proposed a new 
model of state-led gentrification that he termed: public policy led gentrification.  
The recent wave of research in the UK has tied gentrification more explicitly to the agenda and 
language of „urban renaissance‟ (Atkinson, 2002; Lees, 2008). According to Lees, „urban 
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renaissance‟, and HMR as part of it, is „an aggressive, revanchist ideology designed to retake the 
inner city for the middle classes‟ (Lees, 2008: 2449) – an ideology by which the low-income 
residents are vengefully displaced to make room for the state‟s favoured middle class (Macleod, 
2002; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). Unlike other gentrification theorists, the critical 
gentrification theorists or revanchist style commentators acknowledge the existence of a wide 
range of actors involved in HMR conception and delivery, but only to argue that the state controls 
them. 
For Macleod and Johnstone (2012), HMR is „a process where a neoliberalizing state project enrols 
a range of agents‟ and choreographs conditions for the displacement of low-income residents 
(Macleod & Johnstone, 2012:11). As the result „… the geographical contours of the emerging 
urban form are increasingly choreographed through the control over and purification of urban 
space‟ (MacLeod, 2002:603).  
Allen (2008) extends the critique of the HMR programme using „contemporary class analysis‟ 
(Allen, 2008:195). He argues that, „HMR represents a breaking of the English working class living 
in the inner city, in terms of both its being toward the market for houses and its visibility on the 
urban landscape‟ (Allen, 2008:202). His argument is that the planning in the HMR framework as 
well as the type of the housing proposed are aimed at the state‟s preferred middle class. He arrives 
at a conclusion that the reasons for displacement are rooted in dramatic differences in the 
consumption of housing by the middle and working classes (Allen, 2008:199). Allen (2008) 
identifies agents implementing HMR „as powerful coalitions of middle-class actors‟, supported by 
the state in „institutionalised profit making‟, emphasising the state as the central actor in the 
process of displacement.  
According to critical gentrification theorists, HMR was deployed to „wipe out working-class 
imagery from strategically important parts of the urban landscape‟ (Allen, 2008:150) with the aim 
of inscribing a new urban aesthetic onto the landscape of neighbourhoods that is meant to please 
the middle classes (Macleod & Johnstone, 2012:12). The residents affected by the interventions are 
seen as victims of structural forces they can do little to defy. The outcomes of the displacement are 
seen as negative and harmful for the residents in aggregate. A wide array of negative feeling has 
been targeted towards the HMR programme by critical gentrification theorists, and as Macauley 
(2006) has pointed out, these seem to have „an instinctive opposition to this approach of 
regeneration‟. There have been a very limited number of contributions that contradicted this 
dominant view of the HMR critics and their conceptualisation of residential moves within this 
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framework as „displacement‟. While such studies are relatively scarce in the UK, the works of 
Kettle et al. (2004), Steele (2010), Perry (2006) and Castella (2006) point to the mixed outcomes of 
residential relocation in the HMR framework.  
For instance, Kettle et al.‟s (2004) research conducted in Leeds points out that there appeared to be 
an acceptance among residents that, in certain circumstances, the time was right for demolition and 
that, overall, this decision was welcomed. These researchers point out the need to improve the 
process of decision making as that does not always allow for a full consideration of alternatives. 
In different research in NewHeartlands, the Pathfinder that had been a stepping-stone for the 
critique of HMR by Allen (2008), the gentrification claims were contested in a different way. 
Steele (2010) in his (Pathfinder sponsored) report shows that: that on average 90% of respondents 
in this Pathfinder reported they were happy with their new home (Wirral 100%, Sefton 92% and 
Liverpool 84%) (Steele, 2010:2). Clearly, one could argue for potential bias as the report was 
commissioned by the Pathfinder. None the less, the results raise questions about the homogeneity 
of the results presented by HMR critics. Finally, Cole and Flint (2007) in their report on the issues 
of residential relocation in HMR, point out that there are several examples of good practice where 
the Pathfinders and local authorities engaging in relocation were providing a wide range of advice 
and support to the affected residents. They note resident support in terms of guidance, financial 
assistance, and the improvement of community involvement in the process.  
3.3 From ‘Displacement’ to ‘Residential Relocation’  
In terms of the literature concerning the matter of policy or development-induced resettlement, 
there is no one term that captures the phenomenon. As seen in the overview presented in this 
chapter, depending on the line of thought, relocation has been variably termed „forced eviction‟, 
„enforced relocation‟, „displacement‟ and „involuntary displacement‟. This study argues that 
employing these terms at the start of an exploratory study comes packed with assumptions from the 
previous (sometimes historical) research about the issue. The terms „forced eviction‟ and „enforced 
relocation‟ have their roots in the research developed around the issues of demolition in the 
interwar slum clearance and post Second World War slum clearance (Dennis, 1970, 1972; Davies, 
1972; English et al., 1976; Parker, 1973; Young & Willmott, 1957). They come to depict the fact 
that the residents asked to leave their homes were ignored in the process and forced to relocate to 
council-chosen premises without much consultation or choice to do otherwise. The terms also 
come with institutional baggage implying that the young welfare state had the power to „enforce‟ 
relocation in a hard-to-challenge, top-down manner. More importantly the labels „forced eviction‟ 
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and „enforced relocation‟ are in fact conclusions of the research carried out about relocation that 
took place between the 1950s and the 1970s in the UK. As such they are they seem to be packed 
with assumptions about the way the process of relocation had been carried out in a different era. 
In the 2000s, planned demolition has re-emerged as a state tool for urban regeneration. In England, 
Housing Market Renewal was launched. The research on this topic has been cast in a critical 
gentrification framework (see Allen, 2008; Cameron, 2003; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). The 
relocation from properties earmarked for demolition was termed „displacement‟, even though the 
concept was initially coined to describe the process of residents moving from out of their 
properties because of housing price, rent or tax increase. This thesis argues that the predominant 
conceptual angle of gentrification does not seem appropriate for the case of planned demolition 
caused residential relocation. In the special issue on residential relocation (see Housing Studies 
Journal), visiting editors Keinhans and Kearns (2013) emphasise that „whereas gentrification 
studies often approach displacement as a negative usually unintended outcome [of housing market 
shifts], restructuring and relocation studies should acknowledge that residents‟ transitions may be 
intended [and planned], and treat the desirability and effects of relocation more openly, as 
potentially positive or negative‟.  
The next section provides a discussion of gentrification theory which engages with the 
„displacement‟ issue at the heart of current gentrification debates. It offers justification for 
deviating from this critical line of conceptualisation and inquiry that had come to dominate planned 
demolition driven residential relocation research.
11
 The section supports the argument that in 
addition to gentrification research alternative research is needed (Keinhans & Kearns, 2013; 
Rosenfeld, 2013); one that has the capacity to engage with the specific institutional context of 
planned demolition driven residential relocation (where statutory compensation and other forms of 
assistance are available to residents), the complexities of this process and its diverse outcomes. The 
section concludes with providing a more neural conceptfor examination and conceptualisation of 
planned demolition driven relocation. 
3.3.1 Gentrification theory 
Gentrification is a term that was initially coined to describe the process of taking over working-
class areas of London by the middle classes through refurbishment and upgrading (Glass, 1964). 
                                                     
11 Also referred to as „neighbourhood restructuring‟ caused residential relocation.  
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The process of gentrification is argued to occur rapidly until all or most of the original working 
class occupiers are displaced and the social character of the district is changed (Glass, cited in Lees 
& Davidson, 2005). In the 1950s many cities experienced the gentrification of select central and 
inner-city neighbourhoods, most notably London and New York. „By the 1970s gentrification was 
widely regarded as an integral residential component of a larger process of urban restructuring 
linked with wider economic and social trends in capitalist society‟ (Pacione, 2005:213). 
Displacement was part of the original definition of the gentrification process (Slater, 2006:747). It 
is considered to be a consequence of housing market shift, whether caused by the market or the 
state. More contemporary literature considers gentrification as a broad phenomenon of middle-
class occupancy in previously working-class areas (Lees & Davidson, 2005; Smith, 1996). 
Consequently, the term displacement came to cover a wide variety of causes of residential moves 
in the built environment. According to gentrification theorists, residents may be displaced as a 
result of housing demolition, ownership conversion or rental units, increasing housing costs (rent, 
taxes), landlord harassment and evictions. Those who avoid these direct displacement pressures 
may benefit from neighbourhood improvements, but may suffer as critical community networks 
and culture are dismantled (Newman & Wyly, 2006). 
3.3.1.1 Critical gentrification theory vs mainstream gentrification theory  
According to Brenner et al. (2009) there are two lines of thought in gentrification theory so called 
„mainstream gentrification research‟ and „critical gentrification research‘. They both „view 
gentrification as essentially a class based process whereby working class or rundown areas of the 
city are transformed into middle class residential areas often with attendant changes in commercial 
use‟ (Hamnett, 2009:476; Slater, 2010). However, their position about the issue of displacement is 
different.  
At the heart of critical gentrification critique is that gentrification everywhere and always involves 
working-class displacement, that it is reprehensible and it must be opposed (Slater, 2010). In 
Slater‟s view „displacement is and always will be vital to an understanding of gentrification, in 
terms of retaining definitional coherence and of retaining a critical perspective on the process‟ 
(Slater, 2006:748). Critical gentrification theorists view displacement as having predominantly 
negative effects on the affected residents.  
To the contrary the „mainstream gentrification‟ theorists argue that gentrification does not always 
involve displacement nor is displacement the key cause of working class decline (Hamnett, 
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2009:476). They provide a more balanced view on urban regeneration (within a framework of 
gentrification theory) and a critique of the critical gentrification position.  
Critical gentrification research has been used to frame research on residential relocation caused by 
neighbourhood restructuring and planned demolition in the USA and Europe and it has been 
employed as a principal framework for studying relocation in HMR. In the next section I take a 
closer look at the definition of „displacement‟ as proposed in this line of thought, and contrast it 
with mainstream theorists, as well as my own views on the displacement concept (that are not 
gentrification related) in order to point out the need for adopting a new, more neutral term that 
enables closer engagement with this specific cause of residential relocation and differentiates it 
from other possible causes of displacement. 
3.3.1.2 Displacement  
The term displacement covers different causes of residential relocation in urban areas: 
displacement due to housing rent increase (Glass, 1964; Smith, 1996) „middle class invasion‟ in 
global cities (Slater, 2006, 2010) demolition of the existing housing in low demand markets 
(Cameron, 2003, 2006; Cameron & Coaffee, 2005) or the style of replacement housing (Allen, 
2008). These are used interchangeably and in conjunction to explain the reasons for the working 
class moving from areas undergoing change. For critical gentrification theorists displacement is 
always present.  
Mainstream theorists disagree with this position. For instance, Hamnett (2009, 2003) argues that 
there is a consistent assumption in the literature that gentrification is a cause of working class 
displacement, rather than a universal corollary (Hamnett, 2009:477). He argues that „the notion that 
gentrification equals displacement has been uncritically accepted as a conventional wisdom‟ 
(Hamnett, 2009:477). In his critique of Slater‟s work (2006, 2009) Hamnett points out:  
Slater is so convinced about the inevitability of displacement in all forms that he cannot 
see, and thus denies, the possibility of forms of urban social class change which do not 
necessarily hinge on displacement but reflect underlying changes in occupational 
structure (Hamnett, 2009:477–478). 
He points out, for instance, that the private rented sector in London has greatly declined in size 
since the 1960s. He adds that „while there is no doubt that rapid house price inflation can and does 
effectively price out low-income residents (Hamnett, 2009) this is not the same as direct or forced 
displacement as is often simplistically assumed‟ (Hamnett, 2009:477). Owners cannot be directly 
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displaced and council and social rented tenants generally have considerable security of tenure 
(ibid.). 
In the case of planned demolition, residential movement is easier to spot, the residents are asked to 
relocate in order to allow redevelopment to proceed. However, what is usually omitted in the 
critical gentrification research is that based on the plans proposing demolition, affected residents 
are eligible for statutory compensation and other forms of support that residents who are priced out 
from their neighbourhood are not. Therefore, in this case as in the example brought by Hamnett, 
residents affected by planned demolition cannot be directly displaced. Relocation involves a long 
policy, planning and legal procedure and negotiation with the residents. In this sense Hamnett‟s 
assessment of the displacement definition put forward by critical gentrification theorists applies to 
the specific case of planned demolition caused residential relocation as well:  
By extending the definition of displacement so widely as to embrace provision of any 
new middle class housing in the city, whether conversion or new build, and any shops or 
restaurants that the middle classes may visit, Slater‟s arguments lose both analytical and 
coherence and political bite‟ (Hamnett, 2009:481).  
3.3.1.2.1 Displacement outcomes and the position of the affected residents  
In general terms critical gentrification views gentrification as an expression of urban inequality that 
has serious (negative) effects, and that academics have a role to play in exposing these effects and 
perhaps even challenging them (Hartman et al., 1982). The costs of neighbourhood revitalisation 
are argued to fall principally on displaced households who would not otherwise have moved but 
are forced to do so by raising occupancy costs that they cannot afford to pay (Pacione, 2005:218). 
Residents affected by displacement (regardless of its cause) are more often than not presented as 
passive victims of powerful actors and structural forces that they can do little to influence (Allen, 
2008). The outcomes are argued to be harmful and negative wherever and however displacement 
takes place.  
Displacement from home and neighbourhood can be a shattering experience. At worst it 
leads to homelessness, at best it impairs a sense of community (Marcuse, 1985a: 931).  
Efforts by the policy makers or practitioners to re-house residents back into their community don‟t 
change critical gentrification theorists‟ view on residential move. For instance, Fullilove (2004) 
equates displacement with a clinical condition called root shock:  
Root shock, at the level of the local community, be it neighbourhood or something else, 
ruptures bonds, dispersing people to all the directions of the compass. Even if they 
manage to regroup, they are not sure what to do with one another. People who were near 
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are too far, and people who were far are too near. The elegance of the neighbourhood – 
each person in his social and geographic slot – is destroyed, and even if the 
neighbourhood is rebuilt exactly as it was, it won‟t work. The restored geography is not 
enough to repair the many injuries to the mazeway (Fullilove, 2004:14). 
Critical gentrification theorists argue that even when the displacement is relatively rare its impact 
is still so harmful that it requires widespread concern and should be opposed (Freeman, 2005: 488) 
along with the policies proposing it, according to Marcuse (1985).  
In the Housing Studies special issue on planned demolition incurred residential relocation 
Kleinhans and Kearns (2013) point out that „whilst it is important to take possible negative effects 
into consideration, we do not need (nor should we) adopt such a totalising narrative in respect of all 
restructuring processes, where ever and however they occur‟. While it is important to minimise the 
residential move in development and redevelopment projects, critical theorists‟ argument about 
displacement outcomes seem to be hyperbolic.  
While we know a lot about why regeneration initiatives (causing gentrification, according to 
gentrification theorists) should be cancelled, this body of literature has very little to say about the 
way residential relocation should be carried out in cases where the residents agree with the 
intervention. The guidance and solutions in this policy area are the scarcest.  
3.3.1.2.2 Displacement measurement  
Apart from the issue of conflating causes of displacement and a generalised view on their 
outcomes, perhaps the strongest argument against employment of the „displacement‟ concept to 
capture residential movements incurred by planned demolition is the difficulty of its measurement. 
While critical gentrification theorists claim that displacement is a critical issue they are not able to 
show how many residents it affects.  
The magnitude of dislocation is unknown ... though the scale of renovation, demolition, 
deconversion, and condominium conversion noted ... implies that tens of thousands of 
households have been involuntarily displaced through various forms of gentrification 
over the past twenty-five years in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Ottawa alone (Ley, 
1996: 70). 
Atkinson (2000) has called measuring displacement „measuring the invisible‟, whereas Newman 
and Wyly sum up the quantification problem as follows: 
In short, it is difficult to find people who have been displaced, particularly if those people 
are poor … By definition, displaced residents have disappeared from the very places 
where researchers and census-takers go to look for them (Newman and Wyly, 2006: 27). 
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Marcuse (1985) attempted to measure displacement by proposing four types of measurement a) 
economic/physical, where numbers of residents priced out or subjected to violence are estimated; 
b) last residents, counting only the last resident; c) chain, counting the residents, over time, who 
have been displaced from a property of area, and; d) exclusionary, where the number of people 
who have been vacated voluntarily from a gentrified area is counted. There are different forms of 
displacement and correspondingly different measures of the number of people affected. Critically 
the choice of definition affects observed level. Atkinson (2000) points out that „the difficulties of 
directly quantifying the amount of displacement and replacement and other „noise‟ in the data are 
hard to overcome‟ (Atkinson, 2000: 163). 
Along with the confusion over the way to measure the number of residents affected by so-called 
displacement, in gentrification studies there is no consensus about the territorial unit in which 
residents are affected by „displacement‟. The terms used are „community‟ or „neighbourhood‟. 
However, their size and scale are opened to interpretation. This is further complicated by spill-over 
effects (the fact that the increase of prices can affect not only the regenerated but also the 
neighbouring areas). 
At this point it is important to reiterate that the present study does not dismiss the occurrence of 
residential relocation, it challenges the usage of term „displacement‟ to describe it in cases of 
planned demolition caused relocation where statutory compensation and other forms of support are 
available to the affected residents. The argument here is that residential relocation of this type is 
measurable and predictable, it is institutionally distinct from displacement caused by housing rent, 
price or tax increase. It is not an unintended consequence of market change. The number of 
residents affected and the territory are known; these details are required for approval of the plans 
proposing demolition. This is not to say that residential relocation should not be minimised 
whenever possible, but that its institutional context and process is distinct and can be more directly 
influenced for better outcomes. Therefore, placing it under the umbrella of „displacement‟ (as 
covering various causes of residential move) is counterproductive. 
3.3.1.2.3 Actors causing displacement  
Critical gentrification theorists emphasise the role of the state in gentrification. According to 
gentrification theorists, governments‟ involvement in gentrification can be both indirect (and 
enabling) and direct. For instance, central government‟s taxation policy (e.g. relief on mortgage 
interest repayments, increasing or lowering housing tax) and grants for home improvement can 
facilitate gentrification (Pacione, 2005: 215). A direct influence may be exerted by local 
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governments which stand to benefit from the replacement of low-income groups through physical 
intervention such as refurbishment or planned demolition by middle-class consumers whose 
incomes boost the local economy (ibid.). 
The use of state-led gentrification and critical gentrification theory implies that residential 
relocation outcomes on the household level can be understood simply as the result of a structural 
shift in state activity, which takes place on a grander scale. However, this understanding is 
inevitably a selective one, which sacrifices institutional detail of cross-tenure relocation and 
obscures work taking place on a day-to-day basis as the residential relocation process is delivered.  
 A research system that focuses on the way that government operates fails to account for the much 
more complex (and interdependent) bargaining and negotiating process that takes place at 
neighbourhood level.  
3.3.2 Conceptualising the term ‘residential relocation’ in this research  
The term „residential relocation‟ in this thesis is used to describe a process by which residents 
whose homes are earmarked for demolition are moved to alternative accommodation. It is linked to 
specific plans proposing demolition which have defined boundaries, and contain details about the 
residents and other stakeholders affected. It refers to a planning intervention that by its legislative 
definition entitles affected residents to receive statutory compensation and various levels of other 
support. In this study the term relates to relocating owner-occupiers, social and private tenants 
from the homes they occupy in the areas of HMR intervention.  
Residential relocation can legally start only after the plans have been approved by the acquiring 
authority and appropriate government minister (DCLG, 2004, 2010). The residential relocation 
process develops only after the demolition plans are approved by the majority of the involved 
stakeholders. The key difference between „residential relocation‟ and various forms of 
„displacement‟ is that residents affected by demolition plans are eligible to statutory compensation 
and other types of support. This makes the institutional context of residential relocation (due to 
planned demolition) different from that of displacees due to rent or housing price increase who are 
not eligible for any type of support or compensation. 
It is important to emphasise that the concept of residential relocation, unlike displacement, is not 
linked to the possibility of gentrification or its absence. Residential relocation is carried out at the 
beginning of the regeneration process when the outcomes of the projects still cannot be known. In 
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other words, the goal of the project may be to attract better earning residents at some point, but 
there is no certainty that this goal will in fact be achieved or when. Regardless of these final 
results, residential relocation is carried out because it is in most cases a prerequisite for 
redevelopment of the new building to commence. As such residential relocation is an integral part 
of the urban regeneration process rather than being its consequence. Table 3-1: Residential 
relocation vocabulary provides a „residential relocation‟ vocabulary as used in this thesis.  
Table 3-1: Residential relocation vocabulary  
Residential relocation vocabulary  Term definition  
Residential relocation  - is a residential move from properties earmarked for 
demolition to alternative ones. It refers to relocation of 
owner occupiers, social and private tenants in projects where 
statutory compensation and other forms of support are 
available. 
- Residential relocation is an integral part of urban 
regeneration process rather than its consequence. 
Residential relocation practice (delivery) -  Refers to various chains of activity that shape residential 
relocation experiences and outcomes for the residents.  
- Residential relocation practice is delivered by professionals 
(e.g. local authority departments, housing associations etc.). 
Residential relocation process - Refers to a particular line of activity that shapes residential 
relocation in conjunction with other processes. 
- Residential relocation processes start when the demolition 
has been approved; they end (on household level) when 
relocation to alternative property has been completed.  
Residential relocation outcome - In general terms refers to the location, size, physical 
condition of alternative property after the residential 
relocation process is over. Specifically it refers to residents‟ 
perceptions about the end result of the residential relocation 
process (e.g. in terms of proximity to their work, social 
networks and their preservation or lack thereof, degree of 
continued contact with old neighbours).  
Relocatee  - Is a resident relocated from property earmarked for 
demolition to an alternative one.  
3.4 Conclusion  
In proposing a more neutral term „residential relocation‟, the thesis joins the emerging body of 
knowledge termed „neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation‟ that exists in Europe 
and the USA (for example Dekker & Kleinhans, 2010; Goetz, 2002; Kearns, 2010; Kleinhans, 
2010, Varady et al., 2001). Using the term „residential relocation‟ means that rather than assuming 
the nature of residential relocation outcomes and its process, these elements needed to be examined 
in a given context. This leaves space for a more open and balanced starting position for analysis, a 
position that is open to new institutional insights about the phenomena. In the next chapter, I 
propose a theoretical perspective to enable examination of the residential relocation process in 
HMR and in differentiated polity more generally. 




Chapter 4: Governance  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter argues that institutional changes that have taken place in Britain since the late 1970s 
have not been sufficiently taken into account in residential relocation research. These changes have 
resulted in the redistribution of previously centralised economic and political power in space 
(Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Kickert et al., 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 2006). Therefore, continued 
focus on the operation of central and local government, or residential relocation outcomes without 
attention to processes that shape them, may fail to account for the nuanced bargaining and 
negotiating process that now takes place, or to identify who is accountable for its outcomes. 
Understanding such issues entails an ability to grapple with disparate matters, such as 
governmental and institutional fragmentation, multiplication of agencies and complex webs of 
relationships.  
This study suggests that the emergence of a governance perspective (Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1997; 
Kickert et al., 1997) provides an opportunity to develop a theoretically informed approach and a 
better grounded examination of the complexities of cross-tenure residential relocation in a 
differentiated polity. The term governance signifies „a change in the meaning of government, 
referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule‟ (Rhodes, 
1996:652–3). It „calls into our focus of attention the [potential] complexity of governing and the 
range of governmental and non-governmental bodies that are engaged‟ in policy delivery (Stoker, 
2006:1). It introduces concepts of „heterarchy‟ and „networks‟, as alternatives to those of state 
„hierarchy‟ and the market (Stoker, 1997, 2006; Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 1998). Most importantly, a 
governance perspective challenges assumptions about rational and linear policy implementation 
and includes the possibility of an imperfect delivery process with uncertain and diverse policy 
outcomes (Kickert et al., 1997). In simple terms, a governance perspective suggests, that „the way 
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the things are being done‟ (to borrow a phrase from Kearns and Paddison (2000)) in public policy 
design and implementation has changed since the 1970s.  
The chapter is organised in following way: the first section introduces the term „governance‟ and 
presents the ways it is defined in the literature. The next section presents the historical overview of 
changing modes of governing from a centralised unitary state to a more fragmented polity. Section 
four provides a definition of differentiated polity under New Labour government and links it to 
HMR goals and objectives. Section four engages with the governance debate in the British 
literature. Section five presents the two lines of governance theory used to describe the perceived 
changes in British governance: governance orthodoxy and the governance sceptics (Davies, 2005). 
The chapter concludes by casting this study between these two poles of theoretical thought in order 
to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation in the HMR framework.  
4.2 Defining the Term ‘Governance’  
Reviews of the literature generally conclude that the term – governance – is used in a variety of 
ways and has a variety of meanings (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1997a, 1997b). The traditional use of 
governance and its dictionary entry defines it as a synonym of government. More recently, Anne 
Mette Kjaer (2004) examined the term and its usage in different fields of political science 
including comparative politics, international relations, and public administration policy. She found 
that most definitions refer to something broader than government alone: to the „steering‟ and rules 
of the game as well as to institutions and institutional change. Whilst the term „governance‟ has 
several meanings, in general terms, it conveys the idea that public decisions rest less within 
hierarchically organised bureaucracies (e.g. the model that was operating at the time of post 
Second World War slum clearance) and take place more in network relationships between key 
individuals located in a diverse set of key organisations at various territorial levels (John, 2001). In 
the context of wider political studies, the „governance‟ protagonists argue that in the past fifty 
years, but especially since the 1970s, the Western state apparatus has been challenged to redevelop 
in the face of the new political and economic realities (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:131). According to 
Stoker (2006), there are four distinct factors that caused the change in the way society was 
governed in the advanced industrial period of the past half-century. These are:  
 Economic development and the associated globalisation of the world economy 
 More demanding and sophisticated customers, taxpayers and citizens  
 Technological developments particularly around the management and transmission of 
information 
 The overarching diversity and complexity of society (Stoker, 2006:2)  
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As the result of these changes, Brenner argues, state activity has been „re-scaled‟. This involved 
both „up-scaling of authority to transnational and global institutions and a down-scaling of 
responsibilities to the sub-national level‟ (Brenner, 2004:3). The body of literature developed 
around the concept of „governance‟ raises questions about the ways the policies are delivered. The 
governance protagonists point out that the pre-eminent mode and manner of governing has been 
altered (Jessop, cited in Kearns & Paddison, 2000:847). „Governance‟ literature „calls into our 
focus of attention the complexity of governing and the range of governmental and non-
governmental bodies that are engaged in it‟ (Stoker, 2006:1). It expands the view on policy design, 
delivery and implementation (Hudson & Lowe, 2009) by pointing to the creation of a structure or 
an order which is the result of the interaction and multiplicity of governing and mutually 
influencing actors rather than sole operation of a government (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 1993:4). 
However, as Kjaer (2004) states, different disciplinary fields address different governance issues at 
different geographical scales (i.e. global governance, national, regional, local, and neighbourhood 
governance). While there might be „agreement that “governance” refers to the development of 
governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become 
blurred‟ (Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Pierre & Stoker, 2000:32), this agreement does not extend much 
further (Leach & Percy-Smith, 2001:21). The theoretical debates are complex and nuanced. 
Nonetheless, all versions of „governance‟ definitions address the importance of networks, of 
reciprocity and accountability. Davies suggests „that the change in the styles of governing may 
vary between geo-political levels of governance as well as between political systems‟ (Davies, 
2002:318). 
4.3 From Unitary State to Differentiated Polity? 
In the UK, the term „governance‟ has been mainly used to describe a gradual shift from system of 
hierarchical government to a more fragmented and networked polity – also called „differentiated 
polity‟ (Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Rhodes, 1997). Here, the term local governance denotes that local 
government in Britain has been transformed from the dominant public institution to its being one 
body among many which participate in a complex framework of governing (John, 1997:253, cited 
in Davies, 2001:303). 
According to Rhodes (1997) a differentiated polity is made of a multiform maze of institutions 
(Rhodes, 1997:3). „A “differentiated polity” is characterised by functional and institutional 
specialisation and the fragmentation of policies and politics‟ (Rhodes, 1997:7). Here the 
independence of organisations and interdependence coexist. „The differentiated polity both 
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describes the new institutional setting of British government and identifies the constraints on 
executive power which undermine policy‟ (Rhodes, 1997:4).  
Rhodes (1997) argues that between 1945 and the 1990s the institutions of British government have 
experienced two revolutions. The post-war Labour government built a welfare state and its 
institutions. But these survived barely three decades before a reforming Conservative government 
sought to redefine most and abolish many (Rhodes, 1997:4). The differentiated polity can be 
defined as the British government‟s search „for a new operating code to manage the shift from 
direct to indirect controls‟ (Rhodes, 1997:195).  
In the process of political and economic changes started by the Conservatives and continued (for 
rather different reasons) under Labour since 1997, the universalistic welfare state has been eroded 
by neo-liberal reforms (Kearns & Paddison, 2000:846). „The municipal council as the sole 
organism that proposed and disposed policies and services has been replaced by a network of 
agencies‟ (Booth, 2005:262, 268). The direct outcome of these changes has been the involvement 
of numerous actors from public, private and third sectors in the delivery of public services. Salmon 
(2002) argues that:  
Massive proliferation has occurred in the tools of public action, in the instruments or 
means used to address public problems. Where earlier government activity was largely 
restricted to the direct delivery of goods or services by government bureaucrats, it now 
embraces a dizzying array of loans, loan guarantees, grants, contracts, social regulation, 
economic regulation, insurance, tax expenditures, vouchers, and much more (Salamon, 
2002: 1612).  
The governance theorists, chiefly Rhodes (1997) put forward an argument that British government 
should be seen as a fragmented or differentiated polity rather than a unitary state. This idea became 
the centre of governance theory debate. The next section looks into this historical transformation in 
more detail.  
4.3.1 Reforms of the Conservative government after 1979  
In 1979, the Conservatives came to power deeply dissatisfied with traditional representative local 
government and saw the solution lying in the inclusion of the private sector in policy making and 
delivery (Booth, 2005:262). Responding to the perceived rigidity of hierarchic and bureaucratic 
structures and perceived interest group domination in the professions, closed policy communities 
and the institutions of corporatism, the neo-Conservative governments of the 1980s carried out 
series of reforms characterised as the „new public management‟ (Kjaer, 2004).  
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
84 
 
The Conservatives directly challenged the power of local authorities, the government‟s first allies 
in policy and public services delivery, by restricting their financial autonomy. Part of the public 
services was privatised and suppliers alternative to the local authorities were invited to compete for 
the state funding allocated through a bidding process (Oatley, 1998:94). 
The benefits of such a system were believed to include reduced costs, partly because the inherited 
public sector bureaucracies were seen as inherently wasteful, partly because competition provided 
incentives for greater efficiency. According to Malpass and Murie (1994:97) the changes that the 
Conservative government introduced in this period led to „a shift in the nature, direction and 
methods of state intervention in housing‟.  
Political differences between central government and local authorities and the impact of 
privatisation had resulted in the fragmentation of local services and institutions. This meant that 
delivery typically required the involvement of local government with special purpose bodies, the 
voluntary sector and the private sector (Rhodes, 1997). In this period public-private partnerships 
with their own multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms and planning powers were entrusted 
with the delivery of urban development and regeneration programmes. This involved minimisation 
of local government and community involvement in planning for regeneration and its 
implementation (Imrie & Raco, 2003:3).  
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, urban policy in Britain was dominated by property-led 
regeneration, characterised by the use of public subsidies, tax breaks and reduction in planning and 
other regulatory control. The rationale was to create a context that would encourage corporate 
capital to invest in the cities, the benefits of which, according to the government‟s view, would 
„trickle down‟ into local communities (Imrie & Raco, 2003:3). 
However, to many commentators the consequence of Conservative government‟s social and 
economic agenda was the intensification of inequality and poverty in the cities (Fainstein et al., 
1992; Pacione, 1997; Imrie & Raco, 2003). „A concern with the „socially excluded‟ became one of 
the early defining characteristics of New Labourism‟ (Ferrari, 2007:124).  
4.3.2 New Labour’s version of differentiated polity (1997–2010)  
As New Labour came into power in 1997, many voices urged radical changes in the orientation of 
urban policy (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 1997). After eighteen years of Conservative rule 
regional demographic and employment performances displayed major differences between the 
South and the North of England (ODPM, 2005:20), between the city centres and non-central inner 
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areas (Guy et al., 2005:235–236), as well as the more peripheral former industrial towns (Lee & 
Murie, 1999). The issue of social exclusion, in particular, played an important role in framing New 
Labour‟s approach to governance and urban and housing policies. In response to overwhelming 
evidence about social inequality and spatial polarisation, „immediately after the 1997 election, the 
[Labour] government set up a new ministerial body, the Social Exclusion Unit, to coordinate and 
monitor policies tackling social exclusion‟ (SEU, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001). In 1998 the 
government‟s Social Exclusion Unit headed up by the prime minister, published the report, 
„Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal‟ (SEU, 1998). The 
strategy identified problems at a spatial level and officially highlighted the problems of housing 
abandonment and low demand for the first time (SEU, 1998). 
The antidote to the observed problems was seen in economic restructuring, increasing 
connectedness and competitiveness of the most deprived areas. „For Tony Blair and his advisers, 
the attainment of such solutions depend[ed] on the re-scaling of government … the devolution of 
power to new layers of community governance‟ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:5) and modernising 
government by continuing the process of dismantling the cornerstones of the post-war welfare state 
first started in the late 1970s (Imrie & Raco, 2003:12).  
According to Imrie and Raco (2003:4) ‘in particular, discourses of community [were] pivotal in 
framing the policy agenda for cities, and the core of Labour‟s approach to the revitalisation of 
cities is the revival of citizenship and the activation of communities to spearhead urban change‟. 
These related to (a) inclusion of the community in policy making (b) helping the most deprived 
communities thrive, as articulated by HM Treasury: 
This requires nothing less than “refocusing main programmes to ensure that improving 
life in deprived neighbourhoods is one of their key objectives” while simultaneously 
“creating new and stronger co-ordinating mechanisms at the local level to enable services 
to work together more effectively” (HM Treasury, 2000 para 23:3). 
A range of area based initiatives (ABIs) have come from government to develop new ways of 
working in local authorities and other agencies such as the health service and the police (e.g. New 
Deal for Communities), and „Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders‟ as well as projects that 
target specific sections of the community, such as Sure Start and Education Action Zones. In 
addition, the New Labour government highlighted a „desperate need for urban regeneration‟ (Blair, 
1997 cited in Ferrari, 2007:125). In addition, the government saw urban blight and poor housing 
conditions being inextricably linked with observed social problems. Such views „led directly to 
such various policies and programmes as urban renaissance (UTF, 1999), Decent Homes (DETR, 
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
86 
 
2000c), the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (SEU, 2001) and, of course, Housing 
Market Renewal (ODPM, 2003). The latter, in particular, has signalled both an acceptance of the 
dominance of the market in housing provision as well as a will to intervene in its operations as 
necessary‟ (Ferrari, 2007:125). 
Labour‟s vision of the implementation of these initiatives was seen as a „re-articulation of active 
citizenship, with the state[‟s role] moving from that of a provider of [welfare] services, to that of a 
facilitator – enabling communities and individuals to take more responsibility for the conduct of 
their own lives‟ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:1). Therefore, the state „should exercise only limited powers 
of its own, steering and regulating rather than rowing and providing‟ (Rose, 2000:323–4). An 
important element of this process was the re-scaling of government and the devolution of power to 
new layers of community governance (Imrie & Raco, 2003:5). In Blair‟s words:  
After years of intervention centrally … I want power devolved down in our public 
services, so that the creative energy of our teachers, doctors, nurses, police officers is 
incentivised and released. These are the social entrepreneurs of the future (Blair, 2001:1 
cited in Imrie & Raco, 2003:7). 
Labour‟s agenda for change was based on two realisations. First that there was too much reliance 
by individuals on the power of the state and that individuals and communities „still often expect 
government to deliver as though we were in a by-gone era‟ (Blunkett, 2002:1 cited in Imrie & 
Raco, 2003:13). Second, that in the words of Blunkett, „government never could do it all … We 
have deluded ourselves if we believed we could simply deliver from the centre‟ (Blunkett, 2002:1 
cited in Imrie & Raco, 2003:13). 
The devolution of power from the centre was intended to enable the government to focus on 
strategic issues on one hand and to allow local flexibility in policy implementation on the other 
(Imrie & Raco, 2003). It was based on the premise that „social fragmentation and economic 
inequalities could only be solved by the pursuit of partnership between government and civil 
society. Such partnerships were envisaged „to revolve around the development of a society based 
on connecting individuals with the plurality of broader social networks‟ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:7). 
According to Imrie and Raco (2003:26) despite the rhetoric of empowering the locality there were 
also some tensions and contradictions that underpinned aspects of the New Labour policy 
programmes. These tensions and contradictions along with ideas of innovation shaped the nature of 
New Labour‟s version of differentiated polity in which HMR and residential relocation were 
delivered.  
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For instance, „at the local level, responsibility for policy development has not reverted to local 
authorities, as was the case in earlier rounds of urban policy. Instead, it has shifted to „a range of 
supra-local organisations based on partnerships, including Neighbourhood Renewal Teams, Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs)‟ (Imrie & Raco, 
2003:17). In 2002, the Labour government established nine specialist administrative bodies in 
order to implement Housing Market Renewal (see Chapter 2).  
However, „the funds come with „strings attached‟ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:21). According to Stewart 
(2000:123) New Labour„s „measures for “modernising” local government [were] a mixture of 
incentives and sanctions and decentralisation [was] the reward for improved performance‟ 
(Stewart, 2000:123 cited in Davies, 2002:316). Eligible partnerships, such as Local Strategic 
Partnerships, or HMR Pathfinders in this case, could only access funds if they had a government 
approved renewal strategy (Imrie & Raco, 2003:21). Therefore, the partnerships operated under 
some level of central government control and guidance. Hence, one can argue that only certain 
aspects of central power were devolved. By defining what these were and what were the aspects 
left to the partnerships and their members to develop, we can define the level of central influence 
over specific elements of the policy such as residential relocation in HMR. 
4.3.2.1 How ‘differentiated? ’ The role of the government in Housing Market Renewal  
HMR was conceived to „think big‟ (Ferrari 2007:126); it was put together as a vision rather than a 
blue print. It was based on the acceptance of the idea that housing markets reflect the connectivity 
of places. At a structural level, the diagnosis of housing market problems was associated with a 
problematic imbalance of functional connections such as patterns of migration or commuting and 
economic flows between areas (Ferrari 2007:126) that resulted in spatial and social fragmentation 
in HMR Pathfinder areas. According to Ferrari „by taking a sub-regional perspective on market 
conditions [HMR] was aimed as a strategy that could take better account of how the market 
responded to intervention‟ (ibid.).  
However, the government‟s vision about the nature of change in the housing markets in Britain 
altered by 2007 not once, but twice. In 2007, Ferrari (2007:124) pointed out that „the early years 
marked a concern with the renewal of housing‟ but that this focus was changed and that after 
Barker‟s reports (Barker, 2004) it shifted to „overriding concern with new housing supply‟ (Ferrari, 
2007:124). It was a shift of focus from that of low demand and abandonment in the 1990s to deep 
concern with house price inflation in the 2000s. As the result the concern with renewal has been 
replaced by that of „growth‟ (DCLG 2007a). „The Brown government‟s aspiration to provide an 
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additional three million homes by 2020‟ (Ferrari, 2007:125) supported this change in government‟s 
focus.  
As was pointed out in Chapter 2 (see section „HMR Goals‟), the emphasis and focus of the HMR 
programme changed throughout its short life. However, it is important to point out that the HMR 
goals did not change at the same pace on different scales. The Pathfinders were entrusted to define 
their own sub-regional goals. Goals were also set for each of the Pathfinders‟ projects at the local 
authority level. Pathfinders‟ goals did not change at the same pace as the change of the strategic 
goals on governmental level as they needed to provide continuity in the physical interventions for 
which HMR funds were provided (Chapter 2). For instance, the BNG goal, „creating great places to 
live‟ was defined in 200412 and was kept unchanged till the closure of HMR in 2011.  
The measure for success of HMR Pathfinders on the governmental level also did not change 
significantly. Empty properties, low or falling housing prices, and (for the social rented sector) 
high rates of turnover and refused offers to let, were seen as key indicators that needed improving. 
They constituted the government‟s success criteria for HMR, as articulated in its plan for housing 
to 2010, Homes for All (ODPM, 2005). According to Ferrari (2007:126) „they also form[ed] the 
basis for ongoing monitoring of the outcomes of the programme‟. HMR funding was distributed to 
Pathfinders for a specific set of interventions that focused on physical intervention in the housing 
stock. According to the Audit Commission (2011a:19) the funding was focused on four key areas, 
these were: housing demolition, refurbishment, new building and acquisitions.  
Pathfinders were the only public bodies eligible to bid for HMR funding. HMR resources were 
supposed to be used creatively to initiate development, foster partnerships, fund new ways of doing 
things and attract private funding. Pathfinders were established to present an effective challenge to 
the way that local government operated (Cole & Nevin, 2004). 
According to Cole and Nevin (2004:23) compared to other area-based initiatives (e.g. NDC, NRA) 
the HMR programme was marked by a considerable degree of latitude for individual Pathfinders 
and a flexibility of approach about how they should be supported by central government. The 
government departments such as ODPM had a relatively small team to support HMR, while the 
Audit Commission was employed as a critical friend, scrutinising Pathfinders based on the goals 
they set for themselves rather than nationally set ones.  
                                                     
12 In this case the definition of the goal in 2005 is linked to the change of the local government and the change in the 
Pathfinder leadership rather than reflecting the change in the government‟s trends, as the issue of the lack of supply was 
not relevant in the sub-region.  
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According to Cole and Nevin „this devolution of responsibility and the freedom for local 
partnerships to design and implement solutions in response to local drivers of change [was] a 
distinctive feature of this programme and mark[ed] a radical change in the relationship between 
central government and those localities undergoing such changes‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:viii, ix).  
However, this view was not shared by all. Namely certain aspects of central control of the HMR 
programme remained at central government level. ODPM/DCLG set out the broad expectations, 
but at the same time approved Pathfinders‟ prospectuses set out sub-regional plans and strategies; it 
also provided and had control over eligible grant spending based on a performance monitoring 
framework. While the Audit Commission was used as a „critical friend‟ according to some, it was a 
means of central control according to others.  
For Jones and Ward (2002) „Labour‟s recourse to urban renaissance [of which HMR was seen as a 
part] through context of community, seem[ed] to signify no more than procedural change and the 
rescaling of government in ways that [did] not effectively reduce the powers of the central state 
(Jones & Ward, 2002). In 2002, the Audit Commission noted that „Labour‟s urban policy 
programmes [were] not a radical departure from previous policy and „at the local level it 
appear[ed] to mean more of the same‟ (Audit Commission, 2002:10 cited in Imrie & Raco 
2003:31).  
These contradictory views suggest that the balance between continuity and change in local 
governance therefore needs a better explanation (Davies, 2002:304) and examination that is better 
focused. Namely, this study argues that because housing policies are vast and complex 
undertakings central control (or lack of it) may not be equally exerted on all its elements and 
aspects. The picture at the strategic level may not be the same at the implementation plane, or in 
specific interventions such as residential relocation in this case.  
4.4 Theoretical Considerations: the Governance Debate in the UK  
In his theoretical discussion about centralisation and decentralisation of state power, Davies 
(2002), points out that New Labour‟s „mode of governance [was] characterised simultaneously by 
the diffusion and augmentation of State power‟ (Davies, 2002:302). According to this author „there 
is a paradoxical process of decentralisation and centralisation occurring‟ (Davies, 2002:315). 
„Partnerships may be as much about bringing other groups into co-operation with the state as they 
are … about bringing local authorities into partnerships with other „stakeholders‟ and creating 
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networks‟ (Davies, 2002:15). Here, some responsibilities (as well as funds) for regeneration 
liberate while others imprison local political initiative (ibid.) . 
The overview of the political changes presented in this chapter, suggest that numerous changes 
have been introduced into the way that policy in general (or public service) and housing policy in 
particular has been delivered in Britain. Because the changes had mainly affected (or were 
supposed to affect) the way local government operates, the governance debate in the UK had 
focused on the „change of the local government‟ (Lowndes, 2005). According to Lowndes (2005) 
there are two dominant but seemingly contradictory narratives about the state of English local 
government, one arguing that local government has been „transformed‟ and other that it remains 
„unchanged‟.  
On one hand, we have the story of „local government transformed‟ which catalogues the 
arrival of the „new public management‟ and, more recently, new political structures 
inside local authorities, in a context characterised by new roles for non-elected bodies, 
commercial and voluntary sector contractors and multi agency partnerships. On the other 
hand, there is a story of „local government unmoved‟, which holds that – despite several 
hundred pieces of legislation – local authorities still look very much like they did in 
1979, a collection of professionally driven service departments and a form of politics still 
dominated by committee conventions, the party group and the whip (Lowndes, 
2005:291).  
She continues by pointing out that „the balance between transformation and immovability has 
varied in respect of different aspects of local government, and in relation to the different 
experience of 400 or so local authorities‟ (Lowndes, 2005:292). This position suggests that while 
some aspects of local governance may have changed the others may have stayed the same. It is 
„inertia and innovation [in combination] that have characterised, respectively, the political and 
managerial domains of local governance‟ (ibid.). 
Therefore, rather than taking a generalised view on the state of local government, its operation, the 
way it is delivering policies or specific interventions (eg. residential relocation), the issue needs to 
be examined in each specific case. Housing and urban policies are vast and complex undertakings; 
they consist of a myriad of processes, interventions and projects. As Lowndes pointed out in her 
discussion paper about the change of local government in Britain: „We need to be clearer about our 
object of analysis, avoiding any unified conception of local government (or indeed, local 
governance)‟ (Lowndes, 2005:292).  
The next section looks into the two theoretical lines of thought that seek to conceptualise the 
change in the way the Britain is governed and casts analysis of governance possesses shaping 
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residential relocation between them in order to explore to what extent there has been a change in 
large scale relocation since the 1970s when it was last used and last (intensively) studied in Britain.  
4.4.1 Governance orthodoxy and governance sceptics  
Two lines of thought are considered as possible contrasting ends of the continuum of network 
governance. These are used as a theoretical underpinning of this research. Davies (2005: 312) 
develops „a schematic distinction‟ between two strands of governance literature that dominate 
British academia, that appears to be relevant to this question. The first is „governance orthodoxy‟ 
and the second „governance scepticism‟. According to Davies, the first strand of literature, notably 
Rhodes (1997), emphasises horizontal transactions in the rise of autonomous, self-governing 
networks, without a dominant party that can coerce the development of decision making. They 
argue that the power of the state is „hollowing out‟. But the second strand, including Davies (2003, 
2004), Bache (2003), Marinetto (2003) and others, perceive that far from disengaging or 
empowering other actors, the national state is actually augmenting its power over local politics 
using the noted changes in governing (Davies, 2005:311). So-called governance sceptics 
emphasise „the continued, or growing, power of the central state in the institutions of local 
governance‟ (Davies, 2005: 312). Davies stresses that „the protagonists in this debate often present 
nuanced arguments which recognise complexity and acknowledge competing views‟ (Davies, 
2005:311). The detailed examination of these is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, by 
presenting these two strands of thought we begin unpacking residential relocation research 
assumptions and thinking about the ways residential relocation as a policy task may be delivered in 
the context of a differentiated polity.  
4.4.1.1  Governance orthodoxy  
The „governance orthodoxy‟ model, chiefly advocated by Rhodes (1997), considers that the 
government is no longer supreme, but depends on myriad public and private actors to deliver its 
policies. Hence, governance refers „to self-organising, inter-organisational networks characterised 
by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state‟ 
(Rhodes, 1997:15). This conceptualisation „replaces the zero-sum concept of power in [the 
hierarchical] Westminster model‟ (Rhodes, 1997:9) with a relational concept of horizontal 
transactions. There is no dominant party that can coerce decision-making; policy outcomes are the 
result of the cooperation or non-cooperation of network members (Kickert et al, 1997).  
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The body of literature that Davies brands „governance orthodoxy‟, provides an alternative to the 
rational central rule approach (Kickert et al., 1997:7). „Governance orthodoxy‟ considers that the 
government is no longer supreme and that public policy making takes place in networks consisting 
of various actors (individuals, coalitions, bureaux, and organisations) who all have their own goals 
and strategies. The decision-making process is seen to be fragmented into different policy arenas 
(housing, regeneration, social integration) and different levels (Europe, national, regional, local and 
neighbourhood) as the network actors come from very different backgrounds (national and local 
government, private for-profit organisations, third sector, non-profit organisations, community 
organisations) (Van Bortel et al., 2007:100). According to Kickert et al. (1997:32) the policy is the 
result of interaction between a number of actors. 
The „network‟ concept describes the governance architecture that emerges as a result of a 
relationship (planed or spontaneous; formal or informal) between the network actors. Here, the 
leading role of governmental actors is no longer self-evident. A networked decision-making 
process does not imply equal importance of all actors involved or dominance of one, and the 
network is more than a simple membership structure. It is a highly complex structure, resulting 
from the individual decisions of the actors involved. The advocates of network governance 
highlight the necessity of networked forms of decision-making to manage uncertainty, resolve 
problems, access expertise and enable citizen engagement in a complex society with dispersed 
power and resources (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, cited in Van Bortel et al., 2009:94). The 
contributions that belong to this group of governance theories „assume that the power of actors is 
linked to the resources they possess rather than the position in the hierarchy‟. In theory, every actor 
involved in the policy decision-making process can perform a leading role, depending on the 
context. This body of thought points out that as a result of the network‟s operation the policy 
results are uncertain and mixed.  
Kooiman and Van Vliet observe that in the new system:  
No single actor, public or private, has all the knowledge and information required to 
solve complex dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to 
make the application of needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action 
potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 
1993:4).  
4.4.1.1.1 Rhodes’ model: horizontal interaction 
A stream of work that has undoubtedly been the most influential in the planning field in the UK is 
the policy network approach or so-called „Rhodes‟ model (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:153). Some 
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authors argue that the conceptualisation of governance presented in this work has gained a 
„semblance of orthodoxy‟ in the past decade (Davies, 2005; Marinetto, 2003:593) as a considerable 
body of scholarship emerged following its lead (Bailey, 2003; Evans, 2001; Kickert et al., 1997; 
Marsh & Smith, 2001).  
Governance according to the „Rhodes‟ model (and related literature) refers „to self-organising, 
inter-organisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the 
game and significant autonomy from the state‟ (Rhodes, 1997: 15). Rhodes claims that although 
hierarchies and markets continue to vie with networks in the governing arena, networking is 
pervasive (2000b:xiv). Rhodes defines policy networks as having the following characteristics:  
1. Interdependence between organisations. Governance is broader than government, 
covering non-state actors. Changing boundaries of the state means that the boundaries 
between public, private and voluntary sectors became shifting and opaque. 
2. Continuing interaction between network members, caused by the need to exchange 
resources and negotiate shared purposes.  
3. Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and 
agreed by network participants. 
4. No sovereign authority, so networks have a significant degree of autonomy from the state 
and are not accountable to it. They are self-organising. Although the state does not occupy 
a sovereign position, it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks. (Rhodes, 1997).  
The key characteristic of Rhodes policy networks is interdependency. In other words, the 
government is no longer seen as a sovereign ruler whose goals are realised through a hierarchical 
system. The actors involved in the policy process develop relationships and interact because they 
depend on one another for resources (e.g. information, funds, resources, expertise).  
Rhodes sees central-local relations as a complex game in which various levels of government are 
interdependent and in which they exchange resources (Rhodes, 1997; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). In 
Rhodes‟ model and related literature, the concept „policy network‟ is used to indicate patterns of 
relations between interdependent actors involved in the process of public policy making.  
The model „replaces the zero-sum concept of power in [the hierarchical] the Westminster model 
with a relational concept which emphasises resources, not personality and the context of the 
relationships, not individual volition‟ (Rhodes, 1997:9). As there is no supreme authority, the 
networks are seen as self-governing. The state becomes overseer of a collection of inter-
organisational networks made up of governmental and societal actors. In other words, central and 
local government are seen as one of the actors in the maze of institutions involved, rather than their 
„manager‟. One of the crucial implications of the notion of governance understood this way is 
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change in the power relations between central government and the other actors involved in the 
policy process. According to Rhodes, because of the perceived shift from the system of hierarchy 
to one of network, the questions about accountability and responsibility in the decision-making 
process become crucial. In the context of this thesis the Rhodes model, in theoretical terms, 
challenges the assumption that residential relocation is delivered by central or local government 
alone. However, Rhodes‟ model is not the only conceptualisation of the new governance.  
4.4.1.2 The governance sceptics  
„Governance sceptics‟ argue that despite government attempts to involve a wide range of 
stakeholders and promote local networks in the form of partnerships, political power continues to 
be centralised (Davies, 2004:30). According to Davies (2003, 2004a), Bache (2003) and Marinetto 
(2003), far from disengaging, or empowering other actors, the national state is actually augmenting 
its power over local politics. John and Cole (1998:384) argue that the influence of central 
government does not stop at the level of the local authorities. Through a system of partnership 
networks, it manages to influence local businesses and the private sector as well. 
In Davies‟ categorisation of the governance literature in the UK, the „governance sceptics‟ contest 
the ideas put forward by „governance orthodoxy‟. This body of knowledge is in essence a critique 
of „governance orthodoxy‟. It „argue[s] that the national state remains the critical player in sub-
national affairs (Davies, 2002:301, 2001, 2003, 2005; Pierre & Stoker, 2000). For instance, Davies 
argues that „there is a paradoxical process of decentralisation and centralisation occurring in which 
responsibilities for regeneration imprison, rather than liberate, local political initiative‟ (Davies, 
2002:315) and uses the case of partnerships to support this claim. 
Namely, according to Alcock, the policy idea of partnership is the institutionalisation of the 
governance principle by government action (Alcock, 2002:243). It is this central idea that 
underpins New Labour‟s political economy and drives its normative commitment to networked 
multi-level governance. Partnership is claimed to reflect a notion of civil society „within which all 
partners, and all citizens, have mutual interests and obligations in securing local social and 
economic progress‟ (Alcock, 2002:243).  
The key idea that the „governance sceptics‟ put forward is that „despite government attempts to 
promote local networks in the form of partnerships, political power continues to be centralised to 
an extent unparalleled in recent UK history‟ (Davies, 2004:30). Moreover, they argue that the state 
uses the partnerships (like those founded to deliver Housing Market Renewal) to reinforce its 
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power, rather than promote inclusive, consensual and participative ethos responsive to the local 
actors and circumstances. They argue that partnerships are a distinctive mode of governance which 
fits neither the „old‟ model of governance by government, nor the „new‟ model of governance by 
network (Davies, 2002:302). For Davies, „policy partnerships are instruments of central 
government‟ as the „elected officials can exercise control over them‟. The „partnership networks … 
tend to reflect central political priorities, sometimes down to the detail of individual projects‟ 
(Davies, 2002:313).  
The main argument in support of this claim is that the policy funding is still provided and strongly 
controlled by the government. For instance, Beynon and Edwards (1999) and Morgan et al. (1999) 
argue that the reliance of partnerships on non-local sources of funding severely constraints their 
capacity to develop strategies around local interests (Davies, 2000). Therefore, the decentralisation 
of state power to the local partnerships can be seen as reorganisation of state administration, rather 
than an exercise in empowerment and inclusion of the local actors. According to Davies, by setting 
up partnerships the government is in effect, „attempting to buy new governing capacity in the 
locality, rather than leaving local governance to markets and networks‟ (Davies, 2002:315, 2000, 
2001). 
„The influence of the state over the locality appears to be growing rather than contracting‟ (Davies, 
2002:313). By controlling the funds the government in effect controls the local partnerships and 
therefore controls the policy process and its outcomes. John and Cole (1998:384) go further to 
argue that the influence of central government doesn‟t stop at the level of the local authorities, but 
through the system of partnership network, now influences local businesses and the private sector 
as well. Peters (1998:29) argues that „state led‟ partnerships could subvert private sector goals „in 
the name of achieving broad public sector goals‟. Davies (2002) adds that „partnerships could 
therefore be a way for a government committed to market-led growth to win influence over the 
market through incorporating business leaders into its view of regeneration‟. He concludes that, 
„partnerships may be as much about bringing other groups into co-operation with the state as they 
are about bringing local authorities into partnership with other stakeholders and creating networks‟ 
(Davies, 2002:315). For the governance sceptics, the „governance as networking‟ thesis is 
misleading as a characterisation of local regeneration politics in England. They argue that the state 
is still more than capable of getting its way in the politics of regeneration. 
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4.5 Conclusion: Towards Governance of Relocation  
The debate between „governance orthodoxy‟ and „governance sceptics‟ is nuanced and 
theoretically elaborate. Lowdes (2005) suggests that these narratives offer internally coherent 
accounts of local government transformation in the UK, but that they fail to capture the different 
trajectories of change and continuity that characterise English governance. The reality, she argues, 
lies somewhere between the two poles depending on each particular case (Lowndes, 2005). These 
two extremes open up creative spaces. Amid them, institutional entrepreneurs build the „rules of 
the game‟ so as to respond to their specific contexts. This thesis thinks in the creative spaces 
between the extremes of „governance orthodoxy‟ and „governance sceptics‟ to examine governance 
processes shaping the experiences of neighbourhood restructuring-induced residential relocation. 
 




Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods 
5.1 Introduction 
Governance is an interpretive art (Rhodes & Bevir, 2003, 2006). According to Rhodes and Bevir, 
the starting point of an enquiry must be to unpack the meanings, beliefs, and preferences of actors 
in order to then make sense of actions, practices, and institutions rather than impose a pre-set 
model. In order to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation in HMR 
Pathfinders this research employed an inductive research strategy in the form of Grounded Theory 
(GT) methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Within this methodological framework, qualitative 
methods were deemed the most suitable as they provide a refined close-up of the residential 
relocation process in real time. The key contribution is a detailed account of residential relocation 
practice in HMR. 
The research started from empirical data in the form of pilot studies, and through GT‟s constant 
comparative method, data collection and analysis, identified concepts capturing residential 
relocation practice. These concepts were tested through a survey of HMR Pathfinders and an in-
depth case study of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead, and linked with the theoretical ideas relating to 
governance in the concluding sections of the thesis. Its findings are specific to HMR, but may be 
replicated in other case studies. 
The empirical inquiry in this study was conducted from late 2007 till August 2011. The 
complexities of the research aim and objectives required a multi-scale examination: one that 
considers residential relocation practice at national, sub-regional and local levels. The examination 
of how residential relocation was delivered in the HMR framework was conducted on four levels: 
1) National level (ten Pathfinders operating at the time of inquiry)  
2) Pathfinder level (Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder) 
3) Local Authority (two BNG local authorities, Newcastle and Gateshead) 
4) Project level (three BNG Pathfinder Projects involving large scale residential relocation). 
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Semi-structured interviews provide the key of this study. In total, 44 interviews were conducted 
with respondents from the public, private, and community sectors comprising approximately 40 
hours of recorded interview material (see Appendix 2). The roles of the interviewees range from 
executive and managerial (on the national and Pathfinder level), to service and delivery (e.g. local 
authority, private developers, ALMOs, RSLs), and residents affected by relocation (resident 
representatives and leaders). Apart from semi-structured interviews, a number of methods and 
data-collection techniques have been used to support the process of empirical inquiry. These are 
presented in detail in this chapter. 
The chapter starts with a closer look at the thesis questions in order to identify the reasons behind 
such questioning, and the implications these have for the choice of data-collection methods, 
techniques and data analysis. This is followed by a discussion about Grounded Theory as a 
qualitative research methodology that has been adapted to examine residential relocation processes 
in HMR. The research methods and techniques are presented next followed by presentation of the 
data analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of research limitations and ethical 
considerations in the empirical work.  
5.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions  
As stated earlier, the aim of this thesis is to examine governance processes shaping residential 
relocation in the HMR framework. In order to achieve this aim, the thesis examines how residential 
relocation is delivered in HMR Pathfinder areas in England. It identifies actors involved in 
residential relocation practice, examines how actors work together and how this shapes residential 
relocation experiences and outcomes for the affected residents. The table below presents the Aim 
and the Objectives of this study.  
Table 5-1: Aims and Objectives of the study  
A
im
 The aim of the research is to examine governance processes shaping residential 








1) to examine how residential relocation is delivered in a differentiated polity  
 
2) to identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and 
responsibilities, and 
3) to evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation 
delivery and residential relocation outcomes.  
At the outset it was deemed important to explore „how residential relocation is delivered in the 
Housing Market Renewal framework?‟ (Objective 1). This involved examining the Pathfinders‟ 
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approach to relocation at national level, and identification of specific processes shaping residential 
relocation in the HMR framework. The interest was to identify the scale or territorial unit on which 
residential relocation processes unfolded in the HMR context (e.g. sub-region, local authority, 
community, neighbourhood, project or other). 
The second objective was to identify actors involved in residential relocation delivery, their roles 
and responsibilities. The key approach was going beyond the official lines of communication (e.g. 
Pathfinders‟ local authorities) and to identify other potential actors involved in the residential 
relocation process. This involved exploring on what level residential relocation delivery is 
orchestrated (e.g. governmental, Pathfinder, local authority level or some other level). The focus 
was on understanding delegation of roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in residential 
relocation. The last objective was an analytical one: „to evaluate governance arrangements as they 
relate to residential relocation delivery and residential relocation outcomes‟. This included 
mapping governance arrangements (including governance structure, and its membership) shaping 
residential relocation process and their outcomes. The aim was to analyse the nature of the actors‟ 
interactions within the identified governance arrangements, and to evaluate how their work 
together affected residential relocation outcomes. 
The Table 5-2 : Research objectives and operational tasks below lists in detail the research 
questions that have been developed to help achieve the research objectives. 
  




Table 5-2 : Research objectives and operational tasks  
Research Objectives Research Questions  
1) To examine how residential 
relocation is delivered in 
Housing Market Renewal 
Pathfinders.  
 How is residential relocation delivered within 
HMR?  
 How is residential relocation supported by 
legislation and guidance (if any)? 
 What processes shape residential relocation delivery 
and outcomes?  
2) To identify the actors 
involved in residential 
relocation and their roles and 
responsibilities.  
 
 Who are the actors delivering residential relocation 
in HMR?  
 What governmental level do they operate at 
(national, Pathfinder and local level)?  
 What sector do they operate in (private, public, third 
sector)?  
 What are the roles and responsibilities of each of 
these actors in residential relocation?  
3) To evaluate governance 
arrangements within HMR 
with special regard to 
residential relocation. 
 What is the delivery mechanism through which the 
identified actors operate (e.g. hierarchy, network, 
market)?  
 How do the identified actors interact within this 
mechanism (e.g. is there a leading actor, or can we 
talk about horizontal transactions)?  
 What is the impact of the above on residential 
relocation practice and on the way residential 
relocation outcomes are shaped? 
5.3 Grounded Theory as Qualitative Methodology  
The nature of the research and its purpose, has determined the choice of Grounded Theory (GT) 
methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), as the most 
appropriate to accommodate examination of residential relocation in the HMR framework. There is 
very little academic literature about residential relocation processes in general and cross-tenure 
residential relocation process in particular.  
Grounded Theory is an exploratory methodology that gives preference to the data. In the GT 
framework the subject is not studied but discovered. As such, GT allows the researcher to begin 
with a partial framework of local concepts and/or existing theoretical concepts (Strauss, 1987; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990), designating a few principal features of the structure and process in the 
situations that [she] will study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:45). Therefore, GT is well suited for 
examining phenomena about which there is little research or literature available. Data as well as 
certain questions are expected to arise from fieldwork results rather than from pre-existing 
research. GT accommodates this approach, in the most efficient way. Facilitated by „constant 
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
101 
 
comparative method‟ and a system of data analysis (i.e. open, axial and theoretical coding), GT as 
methodology gives the researcher the flexibility to adapt the inquiry as her understanding in the 
field deepens as well as a rigorous and systematic framework for identifying new conceptual 
categories or their properties from evidence (then the evidence from which the category emerged is 
used to illustrate the new concept).  
At the outset it is important to mention that, there are lots of „flavours‟ to Grounded Theory (GT) 
(Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Most significantly, there is a distinction between Grounded Theory as 
a tool for generating theory from data (that itself is systematically obtained from social research) 
and Grounded Theory as methodology (used in research where there has been little previous 
research) in conjunction with other available theoretical work. In this study GT was used as an 
inductive qualitative strategy. 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), a qualitative approach is the most adequate and efficient 
way to contend with the complexities of an empirical situation and to obtain information about 
structural conditions, consequences, deviances, norms, processes, patterns and systems (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967:18). In this study it was used examine residential relocation processes shaping 
relocation outcomes, to identify and analyse actors‟ way of working, relationships, meanings and 
perceptions of the residential relocation process and their effects on residential relocation outcomes 
in the HMR context.  
In terms of approach to the literature review, GT can be further, schematically, divided into 
Glaser‟s original empiricist and the Straussian version. After publishing the first version of 
Grounded Theory in 1967, Glaser and Strauss disagreed about the role of the literature in a 
research project and developed two different branches of Grounded Theory. Glaser stayed close to 
„the original empiricist, inductive‟ GT approach (Glaser, 1978). He argued for postponing the 
literature review until the data are collected to avoid „theoretical contamination‟. According to 
Glaser „there is a need not to review any of the literature in the substantive area under study‟ 
because the researcher must take care „not to contaminate, be constrained by, inhibit, stifle or 
otherwise impede [her] effort to generate categories (Glaser, 1992:31). This quote refers to related 
literature; literature in the same research area as the study being conducted.  
Contrary to Glaser, Strauss accepts the use of secondary literature prior to the fieldwork (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990: 52). In fact, Strauss in collaboration with Corbin, argued for the possibility of 
„integrating‟ concepts and ideas from other theoretical work into GT research (Strauss, 1987; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
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In general terms, Glaser‟s approach to literature review seems to be better suited in cases where 
GT is used to create a theory, while Strauss‟ version appears more appropriate in cases where GT 
is used as methodology in conjunction with other theoretical work, such as the case in this study.  
In this thesis a Straussian version of GT was used for two reasons. First and foremost, because GT 
is used as methodology and second due to the perceived impossibility for the author to examine 
residential relocation process in an „uncontaminated‟ way.  
The reasons for this are the following. First, residential relocation in this study is conceptualised as 
an intervention caused by planned demolition of housing. It is examined within a specific state 
initiative (HMR) that had its distinctive design and institutional contexts. This meant that the 
policy documentation and related material needed to be reviewed in advance and in the course of 
the empirical work. Second, it can also be argued that one generally has come in contact with 
views on social policies and exclusion via the media, education, political affiliation etc. Third, the 
author, an architect and an urban strategist by training, had substantial professional experience in 
development-induced residential relocation abroad prior to commencing this study (see section 
„Positionality‟ of the researcher). This means that in the case of examination of residential 
relocation caused by planned demolition it is illusionary to argue for Glaser‟s „uncontaminated‟ 
approach to the fieldwork. In fact, it was knowledge about the field of residential relocation and the 
challenge the practice faces that were the reason for and inspiration behind this research. From this 
perspective, the research built on a general theoretical framework (in this case governance theory, 
see Chapter 4) that could support the study (rather than lead it). By reviewing the secondary data 
and theoretical literature the researcher examined a variety of practical as well as theoretical 
concepts, that helped support systematisation of the empirical findings as well as her own 
preconceived ideas (through formulating alternatives to her own preconceptions). 
5.3.1 Concepts and conceptual framework  
A concept is a relevant conceptual abstraction capturing and explaining the social action in the area 
studied (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:23). The origin of the concepts in this study is twofold following 
the Straussian GT approach. They derive from governance theory on one hand, and are identified 
from the empirical evidence in the process of continuous comparative analysis that consists of data 
collection and analysis. In GT, „constant comparative method‟ (CCM) is a strategic method for 
generating concepts from data.  
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As noted in Chapter 3, a conceptual framework for analysing residential relocation processes in a 
differentiated polity is missing. Therefore, the grounded theory methodology approach allowed for 
a conceptual framework to be systematically generated in the process of data collection and 
analysis in the course of the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994:17). 
Concepts and the conceptual framework are in fact conceptual innovation and a contribution of the 
study, rather than the findings being the results of a predefined conceptual framework. The role of 
the GT‟s CCM was to help identify conceptual categories from empirical data (related to the 
residential relocation process), to link them with concepts „borrowed‟ from governance theory, and 
tie them both into a coherent explanation of the way the examined aspect of the social world 
operates (see thesis conclusion).  
In order to link residential relocation practice with governance theory, the existing theoretical 
concept of „game‟ was used. „„Game‟ is a metaphor for ongoing, sequential chains of activity 
governed by both formal and informal rules, with a high degree of interactive decision making that 
takes place in a network environment‟ (Lynn, 1981:144). In other words, „game‟ is a concept used 
in governance theory to signify complex processes that play out in network environments (Rhodes, 
1997). 
While the concept itself is defined, its nature needs to be explored and examined in each individual 
case (Lowndes, 2005). The way the game develops and unfolds, the actors involved in it, and the 
casual links between the game and its outcomes (in essence the aims and objectives of the study) 
are unknown.  
For this reason Grounded Theory methodology as inductive qualitative strategy was needed to 
identify these and generate concepts relevant to the residential relocation process from the 
empirical research. In order, to allow for identification of concepts from data, Grounded Theory 
methodology required an iterative process of data collection, coding, analysis, also called „constant 
comparative method‟ (CCM) (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:47). Therefore, the research design and 
research process are inextricably linked in Grounded Theory methodology. In fact, the research 
design is the research process. 
To illustrate, in this research, practical concepts and categories describing relocation practice in 
HMR were first identified (see Chapter 6) on Pathfinder level. These were tested in the BNG case 
study (the respondents were invited to give their feedback on the concepts identified by the 
researcher). In the analysis of respondents‟ narratives the first task was to disentangle individual 
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„chains of activity‟ (or individual relocation processes), to understand who was delivering them 
and how they each operated. The next analytical step was to bring identified „chains of activity‟ 
together and examine how their interplay (through the work of identified actors) shapes residential 
relocation experiences and outcomes on project level.  
Based on the results of analysis a conceptual model was built – the „Relocation Matrix‟ (Chapter 
6). This conceptual model systematises the chains of activity (or residential relocation processes) 
shaping relocation in HMR. The Residential Relocation Matrix is a model based on extensive 
empirical research and drawing on the governance concept of „game‟. In Chapters 7 and 8, it was 
used to identify the actors involved in the residential relocation process on Pathfinder, local 
authority and project levels, to map governance arrangements related to residential relocation and 
evaluate these in relation to residential relocation outcomes on project level. Grounded Theory as 
methodology allowed for flexibility in approach to exploring the way the game developed on 
HMR, Pathfinder and local authority levels, as well as to understanding the scale relevant to 
residential relocation studies, and to identify actors outside the conventional channels of 
communication.  
In the process of research facilitated by GT, discovered empirical categories (residential relocation 
processes) were integrated with an existing theoretical concept from governance theory (game). In 
this thesis, the approach allowed for linking two fields of research that have not been linked prior 
to this study: residential relocation and governance theory, and to allow for examination of 
residential relocation process and its impact on the outcomes.  
The approach facilitated conceptual innovation in relocation studies that would not have been 
possible using the existing and according to some authors „outdated‟ (Curley & Kleinhans, 2009) 
theoretical frameworks customarily used for examining relocation. Most importantly, a conceptual 
framework built this way presents one of the key findings of the research process (see Chapter 6, 
„Relocation Matrix‟). The concept of a „game‟ examined through Grounded Theory methodology 
allowed the governance of relocation to be researched between the creative conceptual spaces 
opened by governance orthodoxy and governance sceptics (see Chapter 4). Distinctively, the 
approach allowed the present research to focus on residential relocation procedure and work 
towards devising a theoretical vehicle that shows how governance has a profound impact on 
relocation delivery. 
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5.3.2 Approach to the selection of respondents 
The second research objective sets out to identify the actors involved in residential relocation in 
HMR. This clearly suggests that the respondents for the research are not known but that they need 
to be discovered as a part of research exercise. Sampling in Grounded Theory methodology is not 
based on statistical criteria. Grounded Theory uses 'theoretical sampling': 'this is the process of data 
collection … whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses [her] data and decides what 
data to collect next and where to find them‟ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 45). Identification of the 
respondents in this study is presented latter in the chapter. Casing and „scales‟ of inquiry  
Part of the challenge facing sociology is „casing‟ – the act of constructing the case as an „analytic 
unit‟ (Tavory & Timmermans, 2009:248). Trying to unravel the conception of the case, Ragin 
(1992, cited in Tavory & Timmermans, 2009:248) distinguishes two dimensions – specific versus 
general, and empirical units versus theoretical constructs. One of the key questions in sociology is 
whether the researcher explicitly uses a theory to determine the boundaries of the case, or treats the 
case as something produced by the social world. In this study „case‟ was treated as something 
produced by the social world. Establishing the „case‟ of planned demolition induced mixed tenure 
residential relocation is one of the findings of this study. 
„Grounded theory follows the tenets of the Chicago School of ethnography where the sociological 
case is elicited from ethno-narratives of actors in the field: the institutionally and internationally 
delimited ways members in the field „case‟ their action‟ (Tavory & Timmermans, 2009:243). GT 
adherents observe that social life remains ordered and narrated through institutional and inter-
subjective mechanisms. Following these logics, in this study the „case‟ of residential relocation 
delivery was defined based on the empirical data, through the interviews and correspondence with 
the actors in the field. In order to achieve this, empirical inquiry has been conducted with relevant 
respondents on four programme scales:  
1. HMR (national scale)  
2. Pathfinder (sub-regional) 
3. Local Authority (local)  
4. Project/Scheme (micro local)  
The empirical inquiry showed that the scale relevant for examining HMR-induced residential 
relocation is a „project‟ or „scheme‟. The finding challenges the common „scales‟ of „community‟ 
or „neighbourhood‟ used to examine residential relocation. By development project I mean an area 
planned for regeneration on local authority level that is a part of wider masterplan or local 
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development plan and has a planning permission. Contrary to scales such as „community‟ or 
„neighbourhood‟, the boundaries of the project are clearly defined; the number of residents affected 
by demotion and residential relocation are known and the residential relocation support provided is 
based on this information. 
5.3.3 Primary data collection  
Considering the nature of the study, a strategic decision was made at the beginning to start the 
fieldwork six months into the PhD programme. The scoping of the study started in December 
2007. After suitable respondents had been identified, the in-depth empirical inquiry was then 
developed in the following stages:  
1) May to July 2008 (Pilot Studies) 
2) January to March 2009 (Pathfinder survey) 
3) November 2009 and January 2010 (In-depth Case Study) 
4) HMR closure feedback Inquiry (Mar-Aug 2011)  
 
Table 5-3 : Primary data collection timeline  
 
5.3.4 ‘Positionality’ of the researcher 
Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 
1998) originally considered the researcher as a research instrument. The researcher was presumed 
to be a „neutral knower‟ (Charmaz, 2006:247). Her person (social position as a gendered, classed 
etc., research instrument) was not considered in the initial iterations of Grounded Theory, 
principles and practice. None of these original theorists accounted for the positionality of the 
researcher in the research process (Charmaz, 2006:247).  
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The work of feminist and other critical geographers has been critical in highlighting the importance 
of reflecting upon the multiple positionalities of the researcher (Anderson, 1998; Kobayashi, 2003; 
Vanderbeck, 2005) and thinking through the ways in which various identities may influence and 
shape research encounters, process and outcomes. It is through this work that the importance of 
researchers‟ positionality was introduced in Grounded Theory methodology (Charmaz, 2006). 
Positionalities may include aspects of identity – race, class, gender, age, sexuality, disability – as 
well as personal experience of research such as research training, previous projects worked on and 
philosophical persuasion of the researcher (Hopkins, 2007:391). Greenbank points to the 
potentially distorting effects on research of factors which are not often discussed such as the career 
aspirations of the researcher, and values linked to their educational background (Greenbank, 
2003:798). 
The qualitative approach employed in this research is in essence work with people. As such it is to 
a large extent influenced by relationships between the researcher and the researched (respondents). 
In the process of conducting qualitative research researchers necessarily „take‟ personal, cultural 
and professional stories from the respondents. These depend on negotiations of power between the 
researcher and the interviewee. It is what Charmaz (2006) calls „give and take‟ research practice. 
„Give and take‟ is a framework where who will give and who will take and what will be given and 
taken is ever present as an interactional subtext between the researcher and the researched 
(Charmaz, 2006: 248).  
The aspects of the author‟s positionality that were considered relevant and important to the way 
this present research was conducted are the following:  
(1) Researcher was born outside of the UK, is not a native English speaker and arrived in the 
country for the purpose of education and research.  
As such I did not share the mentality, background, culture or social conditioning that my 
local counterparts may have. This had an impact on the research process in the following 
ways:  
a. I did not have contacts or networks to rely on to contact the research respondents. I 
needed to discover, identify and develop relations with them by myself. While this 
posed initial difficulties and challenges it allowed for discovery of the relocation 
actors and networks rather than following the formal channels of communication.  
b. As a foreigner I do not have a clear position in the English class system. I do not have 
any class-related values or assumptions or assumed power relations that are the result 
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
108 
 
of such social location. I used this difference from the local population to freely 
approach and converse with the research respondents from different sectors and 
different roles (e.g. HMR management in DCLG, and residents affected by 
relocation).  
c. As a foreigner I did not have access to information about the post Second World War 
clearance prior to commencing this research, similarly I did not have „national‟ 
memories (direct or indirect) of the post Second World War slum clearance that 
proved to be emotional for many of the locals I have encountered. This meant that I 
have approached questioning about demolition without judgement that may have 
stemmed from this social conditioning. 
d. Being educated outside of the United Kingdom for most of my life I had to „catch up‟ 
with learning about the British planning system and approach this from scratch, which 
was time consuming.  
 
(2) Architect and Urban Strategist by training, the researcher had five years of professional 
experience in designing, managing and leading large-scale urban redevelopment projects 
abroad (including large-scale demolition, relocation and rebuilding) before commencing 
the research.  
This meant that I was acquainted in detail about project delivery and the elements such 
complex interventions require. I was professionally acquainted with the technical details, 
project management elements and processes (in terms of design, licensing, demolition, 
construction, community involvement and relocation). This said, my knowledge was 
formed outside the English context. While my professional background proved valuable in 
communication with the respondents (especially relocation-affected residents, 
professionals involved in project delivery and relocation practice on the ground) I also 
needed to be open and learn the particularities of the HMR context, and to make a 
transition from an architectural to the social science tradition. 
Local-foreigner relations are complex and sensitive (Allen & Rosenfeld, 2010), even more so when 
the research is done about an issue as sensitive as redevelopment and demolition in deprived 
neighbourhoods. Considering my social location, I consciously prepared myself to establish and re-
establish rapport with my respondents throughout the interviews, and took a strategic decision to 
position myself as a „foreigner who needs to be taught‟, rather than a „researcher who inquires‟ 
about a research subject. This clear power positioning on my side helped me navigate though the 
complex and sensitive landscape of residential relocation in HMR. 




Following GT logics the methods were adjusted to the object under study and not the other way 
around. Consistent with the overall qualitative approach, qualitative methods and techniques of 
data collection were used in this research. These are presented in the table below, along with a 
brief explanation of their purpose in this research. Four main methods of primary data collection 
were used: sampling, pilot studies, survey and in-depth case study. In accordance with the GT 
approach, methods were adjusted in response to findings in the process of the study.  
As there is little information about the ways residential relocation was carried out in the HMR 
framework, the first task was to explore the field: to identify who were the actors involved in 
residential relocation in the HMR framework. Scoping of the study started from the top down: in 
other words, the government and national agencies were contacted first. This exercise indicated 
that the responsibility for residential relocation lay with the Pathfinders. Following these findings, 
pilot studies were conducted along with interviews with the available representatives of national 
agencies between May and July 2008. The results of the pilot studies indicated the existence of 
various strategies and approaches to residential relocation within the HMR framework that differed 
within and between Pathfinders, between and within their local authorities as well as at a  project 
level. These results pointed to the need for verification of HMR level. Between January and March 
2009 the Pathfinder survey was conducted. The survey results confirmed the initial findings, 
showed that that there was a need for an in-depth case inquiry into residential relocation practices 
on project level within a sub-region (Pathfinder level). The case of residential relocation delivery 
was defined as „project‟ or „scheme‟ on local level. This study was conducted between November 
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This section presents these methods as well as the reason they were chosen. The section concludes 
by providing a link between the methods and techniques of data collection.  
5.4.1 Sampling as entering the field  
As a newcomer to England, the author did not have access to the field prior to this research. 
Therefore a strategy was designed in order to penetrate into the field, identify relevant contacts, 
establish and build relationships in order to (in later stages) be able to identify respondents relevant 
to this research (see also following sections; „Correspondence and entering the field‟ and „Process 
of identification and selection of research respondents‟). 
Sampling was a part of this strategy. This part of the study consisted of a review of the secondary 
data (see Techniques of Data Collection). The potential correspondents‟ contact details were 
identified on the websites of the relevant organisations. They were contacted first by e-mail and 
then by phone. Where relevant they were asked to provide an interview or recommend other 
respondents relevant for this research.  
At this stage representatives of agencies which funded, oversaw, scrutinised, or provided research 
for HMR were contacted (such as such as the DCLG, the Audit Commission, the National Audit 
Commission, Nevin Leather Associates LLP, English Partnerships, the Commission for 
Architecture and the Built Environment, and the Housing Corporation). Accessing the field top-
down was a strategic move considering the researcher‟s social location. Being able to refer to 
Table 5-4 : Methods used in this research  
Method Overall aim  
Sampling   Identification of the actors responsible for residential relocation on national 
and Pathfinder level, their roles and responsibilities.  
Pilot 
studies  
 Identification of the main issues relating to residential relocation practice. 
 Identification of the main actors delivering residential relocation in specific 
Pathfinder settings. 
Survey   Testing of the concepts and hypotheses about residential relocation practice 
identified in the pilot studies.  
 Examination of the residential relocation approach in all nine (original) HMR 
Pathfinders. Identification of the main actors delivering residential relocation 
in specific Pathfinder settings. 
Case Study  
 Testing the concept and hypotheses identified in the pilot studies and survey.  
 In-depth examination of residential relocation practice in the chosen 
Pathfinder. Mapping HMR Pathfinder governance structures (with special 
attention to residential relocation delivery). 
 Identification of the project teams (comparison groups) within the local 
authorities (e.g. Walker, Scotswood teams). 
 Development of the relevant concepts and conceptual model.  
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respondents from national organisations helped in eliciting a response from the Pathfinders and 
their local authorities, after initial difficulties in penetrating the field (see section on Challenges).  
Following the information, recommendations and contacts provided from the representatives of the 
above agencies, individual Pathfinder representatives were contacted; this included the Pathfinder 
directors and Pathfinder research and strategy teams. The aims of exploration at this early stage of 
research were: 
1) To identify and establish contacts with the relevant organisations;  
2) To build a network that would lead to identifying the key players relevant to the research; 
3) To determine the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved;  
4) To start establishing the governance arrangements in HMR, and specifically those related 
to residential relocation;  
5) To commence the casing of residential relocation delivery.  
5.4.2 Pilot studies  
The aim of the pilot studies was to understand how residential relocation was practiced in the HMR 
framework and who was responsible for it. Two contrasting pilots were chosen: Renew North 
Staffordshire (RNS) and Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder (BNG). BNG and RNS 
contrasted in terms of the number of demolished, renewed and new-built properties. At the time of 
selection (2007), RNS was among the less advanced in HMR implementation whilst BNG was 
among the most developed partnerships. RNS and BNG were in very different regional housing 
markets. Yet, they were among most advanced Pathfinders in terms of development of financial 
assistance packages for relocation (HMRC 2006a; Cole & Flint, 2007). This indicated the 
existence of some sort of strategy for residential relocation at the Pathfinder level that could be 
examined. It was hoped that this choice would provide a broad overview of the Pathfinder‟s 
approaches to relocation in contracting contexts. 
Both BNG and RNS Pathfinders were visited. In BNG this included a visit to Newcastle, to the 
BNG Pathfinder and the ALMO offices (where the interviews took place), and to the Walker 
redevelopment project where the demolished areas as well as the new-built homes could be 
observed. In RNS the visit included the RNS Pathfinder offices, the Housing Sanctuary (Housing 
Association) offices (where the interviews took place) and a tour of the redevelopment site in 
Stoke on Trent where the process of demolition could be observed as well as the new properties 
built to replace the old.  
 Techniques for data collection included face-to-face semi-structured interviews, site visits and 
observation and secondary data analysis. Four individual and three group interviews were 
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conducted (in total 10 respondents) with key players involved in residential relocation in 
Newcastle (BNG) and Stoke on Trent (RNS). Both local authorities were visited. The respondents 
comprised Pathfinder team representatives, local authority representatives, English Partnerships, 
the Housing Corporation and local ALMOs. The interviews lasted from 45 minutes to an hour and 
a half (see Appendix 2 for the List of Respondents).  
The pilot studies showed that there were significant differences in approach to managing 
residential relocation delivery. These differences were evident not only between Pathfinders 
(which was initially expected) but between the local authorities involved (within the same 
Pathfinder). Indeed, different public organisations were found to have a hand in residential 
relocation in different projects at a single local authority. The results indicated a situation that was 
not documented in the literature previously. In order to test these findings and validate them, a 
„Pathfinder survey‟ was devised.  
5.4.3 Pathfinder survey 
All ten Pathfinders operating at the time of inquiry were contacted. The respondent from each 
Pathfinder responsible for residential relocation (a Pathfinder Team member or local authority 
officer depending on the governance arrangements) was asked to describe the approach to 
residential relocation in their Pathfinder. For a detailed list of the survey respondents see Table 5-7 
: Respondents responsible for residential relocation HMR Pathfinders (Survey). The questions 
were designed as a direct result of information obtained in the pilot studies' data analysis. These 
concerned the delivery of residential relocation, the potential strategy and the overall approach to 
residential relocation.  
The approach is typified by the label „qualitative survey‟. While the statistical survey analyses 
frequencies in member characteristics in a population, the qualitative survey analyses the diversity 
of member characteristics within a population (Jansen, 2010). Techniques for data collection 
included structured to semi-structured phone interviews with key players responsible for residential 
relocation in all Pathfinders and secondary data analysis. All Pathfinders responded to the 
Pathfinder survey (one representative per Pathfinder). A total of eight phone interviews were 
conducted, two respondents preferred to provide the information via email. Support data included 
visits to six Pathfinders, including redevelopment and relocation sites, analysis of redevelopment 
project documentation (e.g. masterplans, business plans and reports). The survey confirmed that 
the approach to residential relocation across Pathfinders and their local authorities was not 
standardised; it differed on Pathfinder, local authority and project level.  
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Considering the scale on which residential relocation was found to be managed it was deemed vital 
to examine residential relocation delivery in-depth using a representative case study, in order to 
identify the particular governance arrangements as they related to residential relocation.  
5.4.4 Case study 
According to Yin, the case study is deemed the most appropriate for investigation of 'a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context in cases [where] the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident' (2003:23; Yin 2003a: 2). Using the Pathfinder 
survey results and secondary data analysis, the Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder (BNG) 
was chosen as the most appropriate Pathfinder for this type of examination for the following 
reasons. Firstly, in terms of representativeness the BNG was a strategic partnership, a form of 
governance structure that has been found (in the course of the Pathfinder survey) to be adopted by 
seven out of ten Pathfinders. Second, survey results confirmed that BNG was the most advanced 
Pathfinder in terms of number of demolitions and relocations in this category (MSP, the only 
Pathfinder that had higher outputs at the time of inquiry was the only Pathfinder that adopted an 
informal unincorporated partnership governance structure). At the time of selection, BNG had 
three primary projects or schemes (involving large scale demolition) at different stages of 
implementation. These were: Scotswood and Walker in Newcastle, and Bensham and Saltwell in 
Gateshead. This meant that residential relocation delivery could be examined in real time (or 
relatively shortly after completion) and could be compared between the projects. The following 
techniques of data collection were used: face-to-face semi-structured interviews (one-to-one and 
group interviews), observation and secondary data collection. A total of 31 respondents were 
interviewed, consisting of nine individual and five group interviews. The interviews lasted from 45 
minutes to two hours and were held at the respondents‟ offices or residents‟ homes. For detailed 
list of respondents see Table 5-8 : BNG respondents based on identified residential relocation 
processes. 
5.5 Techniques of Data Collection  
The aim of this section is to provide a closer look at the techniques of data collection used in each 
of the methods covered above. Glaser and Strauss (1967) point out that the research process 
„allows multi-faceted investigation in which there are no limits to the techniques of data collection, 
the way they are used, or the types of data acquired‟ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:65). Glaser asserts 
„all is data‟ in grounded theory research. The techniques used are adjusted to the object under study 
and not the other way around. The techniques used in this research were chosen to ensure best 
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results within the framework of each method (see section on Challenges). The table below shows 
which exact techniques of data collection were used in each of the four methods covered above. 
5.5.1 Correspondence and entering the field 
E-mail and phone correspondence was a technique used to establish contacts and gain access to the 
field. Potential correspondents‟ contact details were identified on the websites of the relevant 
organisations. E-mail was used to contact the representatives of the governmental and national 
organisations responsible for HMR, who otherwise because of their position may be hardly 
accessible. It took several attempts to establish contact, for three reasons. First, because of the 
position of the initial list of the respondents, second because of research fatigue, and third, and 
most important, because of the heavy critique HMR was exposed to. Some of the e-mail 
correspondents who provided information that was crucial for research were included in overall list 
of respondents for this research (see Appendix 2). After an initial „ice breaker‟ period of three 
months, the technique enabled relatively free and frequent contact throughout the study. This was 
especially helpful as the respondents were located in different parts of the country. 
Table 5-5: Techniques of data collection used in each method 
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Sampling v v - v - v - - - v v 
Pilot Study v v - v v v v - v v v 
Survey  v v v - - * - - v v v 
Case Study  v v - v v v v v v v v 
* Six out of ten Pathfinders were visited during the course of research. This was not an integral part of 
Pathfinder survey but it has provided valuable information about the nature of the redevelopment 
projects including residential relocation.  




Semi-structured interviews are the key source of information in this research. 44 interviews in total 
were conducted in the pilot studies, survey and case study, comprising in total approximately 40 
hours of recorded interview material. Two main interview approaches are used in this research: 
face-to-face (one-to-one and group interviews) and telephone interviews. Appendix 2 provides 
detailed information on type of interview (or other correspondence method) and length of each 
interview, date and place it took place, along with details of the roles and positions of each 
respondent in their organisation and sector. It also shows interviewees‟ codes used in the empirical 
part of the thesis. 
A semi-structured interview design was deemed most appropriate because it gives the researcher 
flexibility to adapt the interview questions to themes emerging during the interview as well as to 
the respondent‟s background.  
The interviews were designed to adapt from a semi-structured to an unstructured approach. For 
instance, in the initial stages of research (scoping and pilot studies) the questions were 
predominantly open ended to allow the respondents to speak their mind. The survey questions 
(qualitative survey) were structured. In the first stage of case-study research the interviews were 
less structured, while in the concluding stages it was deemed appropriate to allow for focus on 
specific themes, hence semi-structured interview design.  
5.5.2.1 Face-to-face interviews  
This type of interview was chosen as the most suitable for both the pilot studies and case study, 
because they have the capacity to provide answers to the interview questions and also allow in situ 
observation of the respondents in the place where their knowledge and experience is shaped. This 
also meant that, in order to conduct each interview, the researcher travelled to the office of each 
respondent (for the detail about the location of the interviews see Appendix 2).  
Whilst initially one-to-one interviews were envisaged, at times the respondents preferred to give 
interviews in groups. This was especially true at the beginning of the research when rapport needed 
to be established with various organisations and their teams. Instead of cancelling the interviews or 
requiring the respondents to be interviewed separately, this behaviour was treated as information. 
This also led to contact with more respondents. The group interviews normally lasted around two 
hours.  
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5.5.2.2 Telephone semi-structured interviews  
Telephone interviews were chosen as the most appropriate approach for conducting the Pathfinder 
survey, to ensure a good response rate, and to be time/cost efficient in terms of the research 
framework. 
5.5.2.3 Process of identification and selection of research respondents  
The process of identification of key informants in this research (for the full list see Appendix 2) 
consisted of several stages (see Table 5-6 : Process of identification of respondents) and it was 
managed in a top-down manner. That is, the representatives of the national organisations were 
contacted first, followed by contact with management of individual Pathfinders, Local Authorities 
and then relocated residents.  
Between December 2007 and March 2008 (the sampling stage), national organisations and 
government departments, the DCLG (managing HMR at the governmental level), English 
Partnerships (providing part of the funding for key redevelopment projects, represented on the 
boards of Pathfinders), the Housing Corporation (providing part of the funding for key 
redevelopment projects, represented on the boards of Pathfinders), and the Commission for 
Architecture and the Built Environment (setting the redevelopment standards for new buildings, an 
important aspect for replacement housing), were contacted. In addition, the respondents of the 
major agencies responsible for HMR design and research were contacted. This included Nevin 
Leather Associates (Nevin and Leather provided key research that was used to lobby for the launch 
of HMR, Leather led the research about national evaluation of HMR for the DCLG) and the 
National Audit Office (the NAO provided research and evaluation about HMR). These actors had 
significant knowledge about the operation of HMR, and were able to point out respondents who 
could be relevant for the present research. In addition, their reputation enabled the researcher to get 
easier access to the Pathfinders (see Research Challenges). Following the recommendations and 
contacts provided by the actors on the national level, Pathfinders‟ directors and management were 
contacted. 
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Table 5-6 : Process of identification of respondents  
Respondents  Level of informants  Dates  
10 Respondents (DCLG, CABE, 
English Partnerships, Housing 
Corporation, NAO, Nevin and 
Leather Associates)  
National Level December 2007 - March 2008 
   
E-mail and phone 
correspondence with the 
Pathfinders‟ directors and 
departments and personnel they 
entrusted to respond to research 
inquiry.  
RNS and BNG Pathfinders  
(sub-regional level)  
March and April 2008. 
   
12 respondents volunteered to 
take part in the pilot studies, 
eight in BNG and four in RNS  
RNS and BNG Pathfinders  
(sub-regional level), Housing 
Associations and ALMOs, Local 
Authorities.  
May – July 2008 
   
E-mail and phone 
correspondence with over 40 
contacts in 10 Pathfinders and 
their local authorities. 
Nine Pathfinders (plus Tees 
Valley) 
December 2008 and January 2009 
   
23 contacts shortlisted 
(Pathfinders and their local 
authorities).  




8 respondents (phone 
interview)  
/2 e-mail respondents  
Pathfinders Survey  January – March 2009 
   
Identifying respondents 
responsible for identified 
processes shaping residential 
relocation delivery: planning 
strategy, community 
involvement, financial assistance 
packages, resident support, 
alternative property provision in 
BNG.  
BNG Pathfinder, Local 
Authorities (Newcastle and 
Gateshead)  
(sub-regional level) 
September – October 2009 
   
25 respondents interviewed face 
to face, 9 individually, the rest in 
5 group interviews.  
BNG Pathfinders  
(sub-regional level), Local 
Authorities, Housing Associations 
and ALMOs, registered social 
landlords, private developers, 
community groups.  
November 2009 – January 2010  
The research was presented and Pathfinder directors asked to recommend people who were the 
most suitable to answer the research questions. This stage was conducted between March and April 
2008. The process was not easy as the directors tended to forward the e-mail to departments of 
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their choice, and these took some time to answer (clearly this did not guarantee that the right 
person was the one who answered the research call).  
Clearly, this put the control in the Pathfinders‟ hands, but this was done intentionally: first, to get 
access by developing rapport with the Pathfinder management, who controlled the information and 
contacts in HMR sub-regions. As mentioned earlier, accessing the field top-down was a strategic 
move (see section about Sampling). At the end of the process 12 respondents volunteered to take 
part in the pilot studies, eight in BNG and four in RNS (see Appendix 2). Although the choice of 
respondents in the pilot studies was not entirely within my control, their interviews comprised 
valuable data to build on, and to identify the relevant respondents in the next two stages of 
research: Pathfinder survey and case study. 
Between December 2008 and January 2009, the ten Pathfinders operating at the time of inquiry 
were contacted by e-mail and by phone. The process of identification of respondents suitable for 
this study consisted of contacting three to five people in each Pathfinder team or the relevant local 
authorities depending on the organisation of each individual Partnership assessing their suitability 
for the study and willingness to contribute to it. The correspondence took place by e-mail and 
phone. Around 40 people were contacted in the ten Pathfinders. 
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Table 5-7 : Respondents responsible for residential relocation HMR Pathfinders (Survey) 
Pathfinder Name  Pathfinder Team Local Authority  
(BNG) Bridging 
Newcastle & Gateshead 
Area Development Manager  
BNG Respondent S1-1 
 
(EEL) Elevate East 
Lancashire 
Development Manager 
EEL Respondent S1-2 
 
(GW) Gateway Hull Operations Director 
GW Respondent S1-3 
 
(MSP) Manchester and 
Salford 
 (Manchester City Council) 
Assistant Director for Housing 
Investment/ and council 
representative on MSP Board 




NHL Respondent S1-5* 
 




HMR Market Analyst/Former 
Relocation Officer  
PIA Respondent S1-6 
 
(RNS) Renew North 
Staffordshire 
Programme Manager 
RNS Respondent S1-7 
 
(TSY) Transform South 
Yorkshire* 
Programme manager 
TSY Respondent S1-8* 
 
(TV) Tees Valley 
 
 (Hartlepool Borough Council) 
Housing Regeneration 
Coordinator 
TV Respondent S1-9 
(UL) Urban Living 
 
 Area Initiatives Manager; 
Housing Strategy Division (CPO). 
UL Respondent S1-10 
At the end of the process, 23 respondents were identified as suitable to contribute this study 
because of their involvement in residential relocation. Out of the initial 23, six respondents agreed 
to give phone interviews; the respondents from TSY and NHL preferred to provide relevant 
information by e-mail. The list of the respondents in the Pathfinder survey is presented in the table 
below. The difference in the respondents‟ home organisation is representative of the difference in 
the distribution of roles and responsibilities in each Pathfinder over delivery processes in general 
and residential relocation in particular. This part of the research findings was discovered in the 
process of respondent identification. 
The respondents for the case study were identified after survey data was analysed. A Pathfinder 
survey data analysis (coding) exercise revealed five distinct urban regeneration processes that 
shaped residential relocation across these various Pathfinder projects (see Chapter 6 for more 
details). Based on the results of analysis a conceptual model was built – the „Relocation Matrix‟. 
This conceptual model systematises the chains of activity (or residential relocation processes) 
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shaping relocation in HMR. These are: planning strategy, community involvement, financial 
assistance allocation, alternative property provision and resident support.  
These conceptual categories describing the residential relocation processes were used in the BNG 
case study to identify the final set of respondents responsible for residential relocation within 
Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder, its local authorities and on the level of individual 
development projects. 
In Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (case study), interviews were conducted with key players 
delivering each of five relocation processes in the Scotswood and Walker neighbourhoods in 
Newcastle, and Bensham and Saltwell in Gateshead. The table below presents the list of 
respondents identified in BNG as playing an important role in residential relocation.  
Table 5-8 : BNG respondents based on identified residential relocation processes  







East and West 
(Pathfinder 
Team).  
Newcastle City Council 
departments: Regeneration 
& Environment Directorate, 
Area Based Regeneration 
Teams East and West, 
Directors, Project Managers 
and Planning Officers.  
Gateshead MBC 
departments: Development & 













Centre, residents & 
representatives, Cambrian 
Resident Association, 
Walker Network resident 
groups representatives. 
Saltwell & Benwell 
Community Group, SAVE 







NCC, Property Services 
(NCC).  
Your Homes Newcastle 
Housing Association  
GH MBC Development & 
Enterprise, Property 
Services, Neighbourhood 
Management Team,  




- Bellway, Taylor Wimpey 
(Private Developers), YHN 
(ALMO), Places for People 
(RSL), Local Housing 
Associations (Choice based 
lettings), NC City Council  
Private Developers, Housing 
Company Housing 
Association, Local Housing 





- Relocation Team (Your 
Homes Newcastle Housing 
Association) 
Housing Options Team 
(Housing Company), 
Neighbourhood Management 
Team (Gateshead Council)  
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Residents affected by relocation were identified in the last stage of the empirical study, the case 
study. The qualitative method and constraints on data availability did not permit for the selection of 
all residents affected by residential relocation in BNG and this had implications for the way that 
the research questions would be answered. In order to overcome this challenge the strategy was 
adopted to access the community activists, representatives and leaders who were (a) affected by 
demolition and relocation themselves, (b) played an active role in their community and thus had 
extensive knowledge about relocation of their neighbours and/or community members, (c) were 
involved in working with the local authority or their partners in shaping residential relocation in a 
certain way.  
Nonetheless, access to the residents was a complex and difficult undertaking, first because of data 
protection legislation (see Research Challenges) which dictated that no personal data was to be 
released by the Pathfinders, and the second because the Pathfinders had received extensive 
criticism based on cases identified by researchers. The process of access to the residents required 
first building trust and rapport with other actors identified to be involved in residential relocation, 
especially the ALMO and Neighbourhood Management Team (in Newcastle) and Neighbourhood 
Management Team (in Gateshead) which dealt with the residents on a one-to-one level. This 
process took from the first visit to BNG in mid-2008 till late 2009, when the first interviews with 
residents were done.  
At the end of the process, the Residential Relocation Team (part of the ALMO) in Newcastle 
provided information and contacts of one resident affected by relocation, an activist of the 
Cambrian Resident Association (involved in the community involvement process through Walker 
Residents Network). The Neighbourhood Management Team in Newcastle provided contact with 
Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre and organised a meeting with five activists and volunteers, 
affected by residential relocation (the representatives of the team were present at the meeting). The 
Neighbourhood Management Team in Gateshead ignored the requirement to provide contact with 
the residents on several occasions (secondary data available online from activists groups was used 
instead).  
The available contacts were used to conduct interviews with the residents whose details were made 
available and to visit their homes after relocation. The interviews were also used to ask the resident 
representatives for contacts of their counterparts or neighbours who were affected by residential 
relocation.  
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In Scotswood, contacts were made with the Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre, where five activists 
were interviewed. The women affected by relocation themselves volunteered their time helping 
their neighbours through the residential relocation process. In 2008, these Scotswood 
Neighbourhood Centre activists received national recognition – a Queen‟s Award for their 
voluntary services. During the group interview, an invitation to a Joint Working Group
13
 meeting 
was secured by the researcher.  
Attending that meeting in January 2010, led to identification, contact and interviews with the 
chair
14
 of Scotswood Village Resident Association and two activists. These residents were 
relocated by the HMR intervention from Scotswood. The group played a key role in leading 
Scotswood community from the days of protests against the Newcastle‟s demolition plans in 1999 
(prior to HMR), through securing engagement in the planning process, to establishing the 
Scotswood Village Resident Association as a player in the decision-making process in planning 
and residential relocation in Scotswood (through work in the Joint Working Group and Steering 
Group). Through the Joint Working Group and Steering Group they influenced the way residential 
relocation was shaped in Scotswood as well as in other parts of BNG Pathfinder.  
For instance in Walker this resulted in devising a planned community engagement exercise by 
NCC and RSL. In the case of Walker, the approach to identification of residents resulted in visiting 
the new homes of the former Cambrian Estate Residents relocated into newly built bungalows, and 
interviews with an additional three residents who were also actively involved in the community 
engagement exercise in Walker.  
As shown in this section, the identification of the respondents was a complex operation. It is 
illustrative of the complexity of the phenomena researched. The strategy and process of informant 
selection was overall successful both in terms of access to the field, identification of actors 
involved in HMR residential relocation delivery and answering research questions (based on their 
interviews). In this research the process of respondent identification also forms a part of the 
research findings of this research. It shows that actors from public as well as private and 
community sectors played a significant role in HMR delivery. 
                                                     
13 The Group was a co-operation between residents, local councillors and council officers that has been meeting monthly 
to discuss redevelopment of Scotswood. 
14 Scotswood Village Resident Association chair was chosen by her community members. She had a well-known history 
of community activism not only in Scotswood as a neighbourhood but earlier as part of a trades union in the shipping 
industry in Newcastle for which she received an MBE from the Queen.  
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5.5.2.4 Interview design and schedule  
Three interview questionnaires were designed for this research (see Appendix 4). These were the 
pilot study interview questions, survey questionnaires, and case study interview questions. The 
questions were attuned to each interviewee by thorough exploration of their background.  
It was considered imperative that a flexible, yet rigorous, approach should be adopted towards the 
interview design schedule, both because of the differences in the respondents‟ backgrounds, likely 
contingencies, and the requirement within the qualitative approach to follow up new avenues of 
enquiry that were not previously envisaged. 
For this reason, the interview design was developed to factor in these differences and allow for the 
cross-comparison of the findings, as well as to allow adjustments to the questionnaires in advance 
of, or during, the interview. 
Flexibility in conducting and managing the interview was established through an interview 
schedule that was designed to contain few layers of organisation:  
1) First, the main structure of the interview comprising the opening section (0), the interview 
context setting (1), interview questions (2), and interview closing (3), with possible 
questions stated in each section.  
2) Second, the main interview question (section 2), contained three additional layers of 
organisation:  
- The interview goals (silent reminder only): their function was to help the interviewer 
navigate the interview while being focused on research objectives.  
- The interviewee background adjusted interview questions: aimed to elicit the context-
situated knowledge relevant to the research questions. 
- The background texts: the purpose of these texts was a reminder about the specific 
interviewee background details, to help establish the researcher's credibility and develop a 
rapport between the two. 
The specific feature of the interview schedules is the level of detail, which could easily lead it to be 
mistaken for a more structured interview. The large number of questions had a specific purpose: to 
assist the researcher to swiftly rephrase the interview questions in real time depending on the 
themes raised by the interviewee (the intention was not to read each separate question).  
This layered interview design gave me the flexibility to move in a 'continuum between semi-
structured and unstructured interview' (Denscombe, 2003:167) depending on the specific interview 
dynamics, while staying focused on interview objectives. 




The milieu where respondents shape their opinions about phenomena and construct their 'reality' in 
interaction with their counterparts is considered an integral part of their narrative (Mason, 2002). 
Visits to redevelopment sites were deemed an important source of information about the nature of 
neighbourhoods HMR operated in: to draw conclusions about the condition of the properties 
earmarked for demolition and the alternative properties provided for relocation, as well as the 
general condition of the redevelopment process.  
During the course of this research five out of ten Pathfinders were visited: BNG, RNS, MSP and 
NH. Whenever possible interviews were conducted in the respondents‟ offices. This included the 
following locations: London, Newcastle, Gateshead, Sunderland, and Stoke on Trent (see 
Appendix 2, List of Respondents). In the case of the affected residents, more precisely community 
group representatives, interviews were conducted in Newcastle, in their homes (Walker) and their 
Neighbourhood Centre (Scotswood). The visits were recorded by taking textual (paper) and visual 
notes (photographs and videos when possible). The data was collected by note taking, and visual 
note taking which involved photography and video. The table below summarises the types of 
observation. 
Table 5-9 : Observation type and contribution to specific research methods  







(including projects)  
Pathfinders: BNG, RNS, TYS, MSP, NH  X X X 
Office Visit  All face to face and group interviewees  X X 
Home visit Relocated Residents in the Case Study 
(BNG) 
  X 
5.5.4 Secondary data collection  
Cole and Nevin (2004) point out that HMR contrasted with many other regeneration programmes 
in the UK, that have been replete with guidance notes, templates and regulatory advice from the 
outset. This meant that identification of the secondary data was a research exercise in itself. In 
order to collect the information about the background and strategy for HMR, the secondary data in 
the form of the Pathfinder reports, annual reports, business plans, and HMR initiative evaluation 
reports from the Audit Commission, the National Audit Office, and Parliament were key. (For the 
background to HMR see table below). 
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One of the research findings of this study is that the specific residential relocation approaches and 
policies developed differently at the Pathfinder, local authority and project level, depending on the 
context. Part of the secondary data was only available on those levels, and could be identified only 
when pointed out by the respondents. 
The secondary data was reviewed to strategically support each stage of the research from the initial 
scoping, through the pilot studies, the survey, and the case study. At each stage, the documents 
supporting the empirical findings were reviewed and analysed. The table below presents the 
categories of agencies and institutions whose reports and online material were used in the 
secondary data collection.  
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Agency Type Agency Name  











Commission, House of 
Commons, DCLG, HCA, 
NAO, ODPM. 
Annual reports, national and other 
evaluations, scrutiny reports, 
parliamentary sessions.  
Other agencies’ 
reports 
Includes: CIH, CABE, 
CURDS, ECOTEC.  
Guidance, research reports.  
Nine HMR 
Pathfinders  
BNG, GW, TSY, UL, 
RNS, MSP, NH, PIA, 
EEL, TV.  
HMR chairs‟ reports, Pathfinders‟ 
business plans, Pathfinders‟ annual 
reports. 
BNG Pathfinder  BNG Pathfinder  BNG annual reports, BNG business 
plans, BNG Board Meeting Minutes, 
BNG Newsletters, BNG Website. 
Local Authority  Newcastle City Council Financial Options for Home Occupiers, 
Walker Riverside area action plan, 
Walker Riverside Promise, Scotswood 
area action plan. 
Local Authority  Gateshead MBC Home options, Bensham & Saltwell area 
action plan, „Gateshead no stranger to 
Change‟ film and videos. 
Other Public 
Agencies (operating in 
BNG case study)  
Your homes Newcastle, 
Places for People.  
 
YHN Relocation Pack, info about 
Relocation Team, PfP Walker Riverside 








(operating in BNG case 
study)  
Keepmoat, Bellway, 
Taylor & Wimpey.  
Keepmoat: Scotswood development 
report, Bellway adds on available homes 
and sales in Walker.  
Taylor Wimpey: respondents‟ 
background.  
Planning and urban 
design consultants 
(operating in BNG case 
study)  
GVA Grimley, Urban 
Initiatives, Rudi.net, 
ReUrBa2. 
GVA: Bensham Saltwell area action 
plan, Urban Initiatives: Scotswood 
masterplan, Others: reports and case 




(operating in BNG case 
study)  











Protest organisations  
 
SAVE Britain‟s Heritage, 
Street Fighters, No 
Demolition in Bensham, 
Fight for our Homes 
Reports about the operation of SAVE in 
Gateshead, evidence on SAVE trials, 
Others: websites about the protests 
against demolition and residents‟ 
testimonies (audio and video).  
 Media Evening Chronicle, 
Chronicle Live, BBC 
(reports and shows). 
Includes: national media and newsletters 
online related to HMR.  
For detailed list of secondary data resources see:  
(1) Appendix 5 Secondary Data resources which contains extensive list of online data consulted. 
(2) „Bibliography and list of references‟ at the end of the thesis which contains detailed list of all 
research reports, evaluation reports, guidance, business plans, annual reports etc. (column Reports 
and online information description) listed by the name of the organisation marked in column 
„Agency Name‟ in this table. 
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5.6 Data analysis 
Qualitative research above all works with texts. Therefore the data collected via interviews (audio, 
notes) and observation (notes, visual notes: photography and video) was transformed into texts by 
note taking, recording and transcription. The Grounded Theory approach provides a systematic 
guide for textual analysis through open, axial and theoretical coding (Glaser & Strauss, 1987; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2006). This approach aids development of the theoretical 
concepts and theory based on the 'life world' examination.  
Open coding is the first stage of a text analysis. It is about labelling and categorising of 
phenomena. As such, open coding is used to identify and name initial codes. The mental openness 
that characterises the Grounded Theory approach starts here. At this stage, the codes are identified 
without any restrictions. This approach allows for the discovery of the unexpected (Charmaz, 
2006). Open coding results in large number of initial codes (e.g., names of actors' positions, tasks 
performed). These codes are used to identify more general categories within the text such as 
institutions, work activities, social relations, social outcomes, etc.  
Axial coding is the process of relating codes (categories and properties) to each other. It results in a 
reduced number of codes as the data is further analysed. According to Charmaz (2006:60) 'the 
purpose of axial coding is to sort, synthesise and organize large amounts of data and reassemble 
them in new ways after open coding'. In these terms, the objective of axial coding is to help define 
major categories relevant for research and specify their properties. In the final stage the aim is to 
explain relationships between chosen categories in order to explain the phenomenon to which they 
relate. Strauss (1987: 64) views axial coding as building „a dense texture of relationships around 
the 'axis' of a category‟ (Charmaz, 2006:60). The identified processes of residential relocation 
presented in Figure 4 are the best example of axial coding in this report.  
Finally, theoretical coding (or selective coding) validates relationships between categories 
developed in axial coding and builds theoretical relationships (Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 2006). It 
results in defining few major categories central to define the phenomena at hand (usually reducing 
the number of those inherited from axial coding). Charmaz (2006:63) points out that theoretical 
codes have as an aim to help tell an analytical story that has coherence. „These codes not only 
conceptualise how the substantive codes are related, but also move the emerging story in a 
theoretical direction‟ (ibid.). The final step is ordering categories in the way the researcher sees 
their potential to explain the collected data. The goal is, for example: „to define conditions under 
which the researched phenomena change and outline the consequences; learn its temporal and 
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structural orderings and discover participants' strategies for dealing with them‟ (Charmaz, 
2006:63). 
5.7 Research Challenges  
Several challenges have been encountered in the course of this study. Housing Market Renewal 
caused significant controversy because of proposed demolition. It has received negative media 
coverage on the national and local level. By choosing to research residential relocation this 
research tapped into some of the most sensitive issues Pathfinders dealt with. This made the access 
to the field and identification of the respondents relevant for the research and willing to contribute 
to it, challenging. 
Because of the wide and negative media coverage as well as growing academic critique of the 
initiative at the time, many Pathfinders were found to have built communication teams and data 
sharing policies to control information. The practitioners involved in HMR were extremely 
cautious in accepting invitations for interviews. In NewHeartlands Pathfinder (one of the extreme 
cases) a screening system for researchers was developed in order to limit the negative coverage the 
Pathfinder received from works like Allen (2008). The author of this study, for instance, was asked 
to fill in a form for research application that needed to be considered by the Pathfinder. No 
response was ever received to the form.  
On HMR Pathfinder level, detailed data about the actual relocation location of residents proved 
impossible to get from the Pathfinders or their local authorities. Under the Data Protection Act 
1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, all personal and sensitive organisational information, 
however received, is treated as confidential. Some of the reactions to the inquiry can be best 
illustrated by this e-mail from the BNG Head of Research and Strategy:  
Please note that we will share as much information with you as we can but some of your 
questions will relate to single cases and it would not be appropriate to release details on 
these matters (BNG Head of Research and Strategy, E-mail 22.04.2008). 
The exact number of the residents relocated within the Pathfinders was unascertainable. This is the 
same difficulty Cole & Flint (2007) quoted in their report when researching the issues of 
demolition, relocation and affordability. The Pathfinders in general were very reluctant to release 
information about demolition numbers and relocation numbers. The estimates had to be worked out 
from published reports (such as the Audit Commission‟s reports), reported vacancy rates and 
demographic information (such as household sizes). 
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Entering and progressing through the field was time-consuming and required creativity, patience 
and persistence. After the initial challenges, the strategy of contacting the respondents from the top 
down was found to be very effective, when the research passed the screening of a „boss‟ it was 
easier for the lower tiers of management (especially service providers) to accept the invitation. 
That said, not all the invitations to contribute to this research were answered and accepted despite 
considerable effort on the researcher‟s side. 
The emphasis on qualitative data means, in essence, developing relationships with people. As 
demanding as this is in normal situations, questions about demolition and relocation delivery 
seemed to be especially sensitive. Considering the challenges both the researcher and the 
interviewees faced, all efforts were made on the author‟s side to accommodate the respondents 
who were willing to contribute this study. Personal contact and conversation (interview or a phone 
interview) seemed to be the method preferred by most. For this reason each respondent was 
interviewed in their own office whenever this was possible. While the invitations to interview were 
strictly one-to-one, some of the respondents came to interview sessions in a group as they felt more 
confident to talk about the issues in this way. In order to build and sustain rapport with the 
respondents and their organisations and community groups, their wish was accommodated. 
Therefore group interviews in this research were not a result of the research design per se but 
proved appropriate in specific and sensitive context.  
5.8 Ethical Considerations 
I approached the interviews firmly believing that as 'field-workers we need to exercise common 
sense of moral responsibility' (Punch, 1986 in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998:72), and 'as [the] ones most 
often initiating the research relationships, our care and our responsibility is first directed towards 
our participants' (1998:169). My main concern throughout the process was how to build and 
maintain the trust of my respondents, and represent what they said truthfully and accurately. As the 
issues under research proved to be sensitive, special efforts were made avoid raising emotive 
subjects, causing additional anxiety to respondents. The fact that I was a foreigner with practical 
experience in designing redevelopment plans that involved demolition and relocation, seems to 
have put respondents involved in residential relocation delivery at their ease. This experience also 
gave me the know-how in approaching the residents affected by demolition and asked to relocate. 
The issues of demolition in HMR have been heavily criticised in the media, so additional care had 
to be taken to reassure the practitioners that interviews would not jeopardise their reputation, or 
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their or their Pathfinders‟ work. Focus on procedural and delivery issues, extensive preparation and 
researching respondents‟ backgrounds prior to the interview helped achieve this.  
Special attention was given to the anonymity of the respondents during and after the research. Prior 
to each face-to-face interview, informed consent was obtained from all participants in the 
interview, whilst the survey had no identification clause at all. In the case of the phone interviews, 
after the respondents agreed to this form of interview by e-mail, permission was asked to record 
the conversation. (In one case it was not granted and this was respected.) 
5.9 Limitations of Chosen Methodology  
The limitation of this research derives from the methodology used. Qualitative methodology allows 
the examination of a limited number of cases and respondents. Time is an apparent problem with 
this approach as it time consuming in every stage: respondent identification and access to the field, 
data collection, data processing and analysis. Within the qualitative framework employed, this 
implies that the researcher‟s own views, experiences and observations have an impact and shape 
the analysis and interpretation. In order to guarantee research validity within this framework, the 
positionality of the researcher was acknowledged. Generalisation potential is limited, and can be 
improved through further testing or linking to a theoretical body of knowledge. The explorative 
nature of this research means that the results and the conclusions have to be tested in other 
contexts. Considering the aim of this research these limitations did not jeopardise the validity of 
the study. 
5.10 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the methodology, methods, and techniques of data collection as well as the 
list of respondents who provided the information that this study builds on. The results of the 
empirical investigation are presented in the next chapters. 




Chapter 6. Residential Relocation Delivery in Housing Market Renewal 
Pathfinders  
6.1 Introduction: The way to relocation? No goals, no guidance and 
partial legislation … 
The Pathfinders were given „a mandate to experiment‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:24): to develop their 
strategies in response to local circumstances. The government requirements and guidance have 
been kept to a minimum (Cole & Nevin, 2004:23). This was in sharp contrast to English urban 
renewal initiatives in the past 30 years (Cole & Nevin, 2004:18) that have been „replete with 
guidance notes, templates and regulatory advice from the outset‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:23-24). 
HMR was not based on a precise set of interventions that could be easily scoped and replicated in 
different contexts (Cole & Nevin, 2004: 28). The programme was expected to develop organically, 
as programmes were adjusted to meet changed market conditions, and as a result of Pathfinder 
experiences elsewhere (Cole & Nevin, 2004:5).  
According to Leather et al. (2007), one of the key features of the HMR programme was a high 
degree of responsibility being devolved to newly formed sub-regional partnerships. This decision 
was underpinned by a recognition by policy makers that the exact nature of the problems and the 
reasons for housing market failure varied across the affected areas. Following this logic, HMR did 
not provide guidance to define procedures nor standards for delivering residential relocation, either 
on the national, regional or local levels. The flexible approach to policy delivery was intended to 
maximise positive results through decisions better adapted to local conditions, suited to the 
demands and needs of the local population (Cole & Flint, 2007). HMR goals were expected to be 
interpreted and translated into tangible strategies at sub-regional level by Pathfinders. The present 
chapter examines the way the Pathfinders responded to the complex and challenging demands of 
HMR and how they crafted their approach to residential relocation. This is the first of three 
chapters that present the results of the empirical study into residential relocation in HMR 
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Pathfinders. Chapter 6 focuses on the national Pathfinder level. It presents key results of the 
qualitative survey of ten Pathfinders (operating at the time of inquiry) and related secondary data 
analysis. The chapter starts by setting out the wider context in which HMR relocation played out. 
This is followed by an overview of HMR implementation strategy and legislation underpinning 
demolition directly, and residential relocation indirectly. The next section presents respondents‟ 
accounts of the residential relocation delivery approach across ten Pathfinders. The concluding 
section presents the Residential Relocation Processes identified in this research. The Residential 
Relocation Matrix is presented next; this is first of the three conceptual models developed in this 
study based on extensive empirical research and drawing on governance theory.  
All Pathfinders had to accommodate a potential contradiction. On one hand the government 
provided the partnerships with HMR funds and wished to see them maintaining an effective 
challenge to local government and the ways those organisations „do things‟ (ECOTEC, 2007). On 
the other hand, Pathfinders were set up as non-statutory bodies. This meant that they did not have 
the power to demolish housing nor relocate residents. Pathfinders depended on their local authority 
partners, who held the necessary statutory powers to carry out relocation. At the early stages of 
HMR implementation, the legal agreements which facilitated HMR demolition and subsequent 
relocation tended to be dominated by provisions which enabled local authorities to act lawfully 
(ECOTEC, 2007:3). In other words, in the absence of specific guidance on residential relocation, 
the Pathfinders and their partners needed to rely on general legislation that enabled them to 
intervene in the built and inhabited environment. This section examines the key piece of 
legislation, the Compulsory Purchase Order, which empowers local authorities in the UK to 
demolish and clear housing. The aim is to explore how this legislation relates to matters of 
residential relocation and to what extent the Pathfinders and their partners could rely on it to guide 
cross tenure residential relocation in the HMR framework. 
6.1.1 The Compulsory Purchase Order  
In the HMR framework, demolition was entrusted to the local authorities in the first instance as the 
Pathfinders were non-statutory bodies. In the UK compulsory purchase powers are provided to 
enable local authorities to purchase land to carry out a function „which Parliament has decided is in 
the public interest‟ (DCLG, 2004:6). ‘It is important to note that the acquiring authority does 
not have the powers to compulsorily acquire land until the appropriate Government Minister 
confirms the CPO’ (DCLG, 2004:4). This means that the local authority plans must be 
approved first. The plans define the borders of the intervention (or redevelopment project) 
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and include details of the residents affected by demolition and later relocation, including 
their tenure (DCLG, 2004:12). Based on these plans the residents are eligible for statutory 
compensation and other available forms of support.  
It is important to point out that local authorities ‘can acquire by agreement at any time and 
they should attempt to do so before acquiring by compulsion’ (DCLG, 2004:4). The property 
acquisition may affect owner occupiers, private landlords or housing associations. In the 
HMR framework, housing demolition affected three tenures: owner occupiers, private and 
social tenants. In some cases the local authorities may also be the owners of the properties 
earmarked for demolition. According to the CPO legislation all three tenures are eligible to 
statutory compensation regardless of the manner in which the property was acquired from 
the property owners (agreement or compulsion). This framework was also used by 
Pathfinders to lever government’s funding for this purpose. Planned housing demolition thus 
makes the institutional context of the residents affected by relocation different from those 
„displaced‟ by housing rent increase, housing price or tax increase. Whilst the first group is 
guaranteed statutory compensation the other three are not.  
However, the CPO is not a residential relocation guidance. CPO is legislation that enables local 
authorities to lawfully intervene in the built environment and guarantees residents statutory 
compensation in case of demolition and relocation.  
6.1.1.1 Acts of Parliament and re-housing 
In order to be able to demolish or clear housing using a CPO, the acquiring authorities are required 
to justify such action. In other words, CPO is subordinate legislation to Parliament Acts.  
According to the respondents interviewed for this research, Pathfinders‟ local authorities used the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and/or the Housing Act 1985 to justify demolition in their 
areas. Here it is important to point out that the Housing Act 1985 does not require local authorities 
to provide plans for redevelopment in order to get the demolition approved. The physical act of 
demolition is not linked with new building. This means that alternative properties for relocation are 
not available in the demolition areas by default. The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 
requires plans to be made for redevelopment as justification for demolition, however the local 
authorities are not required to provide alternative properties for relocation in the new development.  
While social tenants are statutorily required to be relocated or „decanted‟ by local authorities in 
cases where they (the local authorities) are the owners of the social housing (the key Acts being the 
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
134 
 
Land Compensation Act 1973 and the Planning & Compensation Act 1991), „there is no obligation 
on an acquiring authority to provide alternative premises‟ for owner occupiers or private tenants 
(DCLG, 2010:17). The acquiring authorities are obliged to show that they have sufficient housing 
in their area to cater for relocation; this is one of the conditions for CPO approval. However, the 
location, size, condition, tenure or affordability of these „available‟ properties is not defined. It is 
only in exceptional circumstances that the local housing authority is obliged to provide alternative 
property for relocation. DCLG guidance states:  
„Where no suitable alternative accommodation is available on reasonable terms the local 
housing authority has a duty to re-house a resident whose dwelling has been compulsorily 
acquired regardless of which public authority was responsible for the acquisition‟ 
(DCLG, 2010:22).  
If the residents affected by demolition are re-housed in this way „this will not affect the amount of 
compensation which the acquiring authority pays and an authority must not seek to make a 
reduction to reflect re-housing‟ (ibid.). This means that a compulsory purchase order does not 
require acquiring bodies to carry out residential relocation except in exceptional circumstances. 
Clearly, the interpretation of what constitutes „exceptional circumstances‟ depends on the acquiring 
authorities and their discretion.  
6.1.1.2 CPO and tenure  
As stated previously, residential relocation in the HMR framework affected mixed tenure 
neighbourhoods, which included owner occupiers, private and social tenants. The CPO 
differentiates between tenures. The primary function of the CPO is to enable appropriation of land 
from its owners (e.g. owner occupiers, private landlords, housing associations) in the name of the 
public interest, and to secure statutory compensation for affected residents (in the HMR case: 
owner occupiers, private and social tenants). Compensation, following an acquisition, is based on 
the principle of equivalence. This means that a resident asked to leave their property and relocate 
to an alternative one should be „no worse off‟ in financial terms after the acquisition than they were 
before. Likewise, the affected resident should „not be better off‟ (DCLG, 2010:8). Clearly, the 
notion of „no worse off‟ is open to interpretation: an interpretation that is formed through 
negotiation between the residents and the acquiring authority.  
The CPO differentiates between the owners and occupiers of the property. The property (or land) 
owners are entitled to compensation that equals market value. In addition, the CPO guarantees 
compensation for home loss and disturbance to the actual occupier of the property. This means 
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that, in addition to being compensated for the value of the land taken (in the case of the owner 
occupiers), occupiers are also entitled to the losses occasioned by being „disturbed‟ from land or 
premises (DCLG, 2010:17). This means that the occupiers of the property (social and private 
tenants) are entitled to this compensation. While the market value of the property is decided at the 
local level, the rate for home loss and disturbance is standardised at the national level. Contrary to 
HMR‟s vision of a „tenure blind‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004) approach to housing, CPO legislation 
differentiates between tenures, based on equity stake and occupation.  
6.1.1.3 Community involvement and CPO boundaries  
Because of the nature of the intervention, CPO legislation does not require community consultation 
as plans are formulated (DCLG, 2004). Whilst obtaining residents‟ support is considered good 
practice, such effort is not specifically required from the acquiring authorities. The residents may 
become aware of the possibility of the CPO in the formulation stage because of the initial field 
work by the local authority. While some local authorities may prefer not to communicate with the 
residents at this stage, others may choose to make direct contact with the residents, seeking to 
explore their attitude toward the intervention or even start negotiations for acquiring land by 
agreement. For instance, Cole and Flint (2007) reported that several residents they interviewed 
reported learning of clearance plans and the designation of clearance areas by word of mouth or 
rumour (Cole & Flint, 2007:23).  
After the initial stage of information gathering the clear boundaries of the CPO are defined, but it is 
only after the government‟s approval is given that the acquiring authority is obliged to publish the 
CPO in the local press. In the present research, the BNG residents reported that they learnt about 
the demolition of their neighbourhoods in the local newspapers but were not informed or consulted 
about the plans previously. Formal Notices, including a copy of the Compulsory Purchase Order 
and the statutory forms, are served upon all persons with legal interests in the land. This is subject 
to a 28-day objection period.  
Once the agreement of purchase is settled, the local authorities are not obliged by the CPO 
legislation to provide support for residents through the process. DCLG guidance states: „most 
[local authorities] will help you [the affected resident] to identify possibilities available on the 
market‟ (DCLG, 2010:17). 
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6.1.1.4 CPO and the type of housing market  
It is important to emphasise that the CPO mechanism assumes the existence of homogenous, 
healthy, operating markets, where statutory compensation can enable property owners and private 
tenants to find a „like for like‟ alternative property without much help. The assumption is that the 
owner occupiers will be able to find alternative property similar to their old one using the statutory 
compensation (market value of their property, home loss and disturbance payments). Similarly, the 
assumption is that with the home loss and disturbance payments social and private tenants would 
not have any losses in the relocation process and will be able to find an alternative property for the 
same rent they were paying in the areas earmarked for demolition.  
The detail that received little attention at the launch of HMR was that low-demand housing 
markets are considered an „unlikely exception‟ in CPO legislation (DCLG, 2010:8). According to 
DCLG (2010) guidance on the CPO process:  
„In exceptional circumstances when dealing with unusual or specialised land for which 
there is no general market, compensation may be assessed by considering the cost of 
providing an “equivalent reinstatement” of the property … [However]…it is extremely 
unlikely that circumstances giving rise to a claim for equivalent reinstatement will occur 
in the case of residential properties‟ (DCLG, 2010:8). 
No guidance is provided to the local authorities or residents in cases of low demand. The DCLG 
guidance recommends those affected by relocation in low demand areas to proactively seek advice 
if their property is in a low market area but there is no saying as to where this help may be found: 
„if you feel that your property which is being acquired is one for which there is no general market 
or demand you should seek professional advice‟ (DCLG, 2010:8).  
In other words, the CPO legislation was not intended or designed for the areas of low housing 
demand that HMR was established to tackle. In the early years of HMR implementation, the 
conceptual clash between the legislative framework and HMR Pathfinders specifically set up to 
work in low-demand areas, backfired on the residents affected by relocation. An 'affordability gap' 
has been identified 'between the statutory compensation packages paid to relocated owner-
occupiers and the cost of purchasing an alternative property elsewhere' (Cole & Flint, 2007:9. See 
also: Leather et al., 2007; NAO, 2007). The size of the gap varied, but an average figure quoted in 
consultants‟ reports for Pathfinders was around £35,000 (Cole & Flint, 2007:2). As the result, the 
residents affected by relocation refused to move and the delivery of many Pathfinders‟ projects was 
brought to a standstill.  
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In response to this situation, the ODPM had recommended that the Pathfinders should consider 
solutions beyond the CPO legislation:  
„To achieve their objectives in relation to demolition, Pathfinders may need to develop 
arrangements which go beyond the statutory requirements of compensation for owners 
affected by compulsory purchase. This may help them to achieve demolition more 
quickly and at less ultimate cost than if they rely exclusively on compulsory purchase 
powers‟ (ODPM, 2004:105). 
 The CPO‟s assumption of healthy housing markets put the local authorities within the HMR 
framework in a complex situation, as the programme was set up to tackle the low and failing 
housing market by demolition. Pathfinders could not rely on the CPO and needed to develop 
alternative solutions.  
The emphasis in the literature, especially literature critical of HMR, is on the CPO as legislation 
used to compulsorily purchase properties from owner occupiers, and the difficulties this may 
represent (see for example Power, 2007; Pritchard, 2007; Edwards & Martin, 2006). While it is 
important to engage with these issues, the problem is that they represent only a fraction of the ways 
in which residential relocation was conducted in the HMR framework. Focusing on purchase by 
compulsion alone is insufficient, for the following reasons:  
1) HMR interventions affected three tenures. Property purchase by compulsion directly 
affected only owner occupiers and only a small percentage of these (see next point). The 
manner of property purchase did not affect social and private tenants; these residents were 
eligible for statutory compensation available through the acquiring authority regardless of 
their property provider. Local authority tenants were relocated following the decanting 
policies (and with available statutory compensation). In these cases the properties were not 
purchased as the property was LA owned.  
2) Property acquisition may be carried out by agreement or compulsion. According to the 
Pathfinder survey respondents, property purchase by compulsion was used as the last 
resort by the Pathfinders and their local authorities and was applied only in the later stages 
of HMR implementation. For instance, the BNG Pathfinder reported that purchase by 
compulsion was enforced only in 2008/9 (CS-BNG Team respondent 1, CS-YHN 
Relocation Team respondents 1, 2, and 3). In the BNG redevelopment area of Scotswood, 
only six out of over 1,200 demolished properties were acquired by compulsion. 
Respondents from Oldham and Rochdale and Elevate East Lancashire reported having 
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acquired the majority of the properties by agreement as well. For illustration I provide also 
the quotes from two respondents from Manchester Salford and Gateway Hull Pathfinders.  
Box 6-1. Voluntary vs Compulsory Purchase 
‗What we tend to do is run acquisition by agreement programme at the same time as we 
are preparing and submitting CPOs. In terms of going to the full extent of the property by 
compulsion. The ultimate extreme of CPO. I think we‘ve done in case of two properties. … 
But even when we are at that stage we have lots of fairly intensive work going on by the 
officers on the ground to agree housing solutions and to avoid coming to that 
confrontational … taking possession by force‘ (MSP Respondent S1-4) 
 
‗We haven‘t taken CPO at all yet. We will just start it [March, 2009]. There are one or two 
owner occupiers who won‘t negotiate‘ (GW Respondent S1-3)  
3) According to the professionals dealing with purchases for the local authority, the majority 
of the owner occupied properties were acquired through negotiation and agreement. Here 
the CPO framework was used to guarantee the residents the statutory compensation not to 
acquire properties by compulsion. This quote from the Gateway Hull respondent best 
explains this approach: ‗We compensate as if we were doing CPO‘ (GW Respondent S1-
3). A similar approach was reported in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead and Manchester 
Salford as well.  
4)  Pathfinders could only partially rely on the CPO legislation because this assumes the 
existence of homogenous housing markets (where the average housing prices are the 
same). In order to enable residential relocation the Pathfinders needed to develop 
alternative strategies.  
In the absence of HMR guidance the Pathfinders and their local authorities relied on CPO 
legislation to enable them to lawfully intervene in the built environment. However, as it was 
showed in this section (a) CPO legislation was only partially relevant to the case of HMR (b) the 
Pathfinders did not acquire all the properties by compulsion, a large number of properties were 
acquired by agreement (c) private and social tenants were not affected by the manner of the 
acquisition process.  
As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, this has led to the proliferation of a range of 
residential relocation strategies as the Pathfinders and their local authorities made a great effort to 
develop local solutions for residential relocation. 
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6.2 The Pathfinder Approach to Residential Relocation: Project Focused  
Considering that residential relocation was not listed as an HMR goal or intervention by the 
programme designers (see Chapter 2), and that the available legislation was ambiguous, the 
question that the next section will address is: how did the Pathfinders respond to this situation and 
how was residential relocation delivered at a Pathfinder level? This was the objective of the pilot 
studies and the Pathfinder survey conducted for this research. The Pathfinder representatives 
considered responsible (by their own partnerships) for aspects of residential relocation were asked 
what their approach to residential relocation was, whether guidance, policy or strategy for 
residential relocation was available on their sub-regional level. The following section covers the 
main themes that emerged from this inquiry. 
When asked how they would describe their approach to residential relocation, respondents 
(Pathfinder survey) suggested that the implementation strategy and residential relocation delivery 
differed, depending on each individual project or scheme at the local authority level. All ten 
Pathfinders that took part in the survey indicated that their approach to relocation depended on the 
project or scheme at hand. Box 6-2 Project focused approach to residential relocation presents 
some illustrative quotes from the Pathfinder survey. The respondents pointed out that the approach 
to planning might differ between and within the local authorities and their teams, as well as the 
implementation.  
Box 6-2 Project focused approach to residential relocation  
‗It varies from scheme to scheme …. It depends… I am sorry that the answer is ‗it depends‘, but 
it depends on the scheme that you are doing … area that you are working on..…‘ (MSP 
Respondent S1-4). 
 
‗Implementation strategy depends on each specific project. Approach to planning is also 
different. It depends on the local authority in question. In general terms masterplans are 
produced for all renewal areas. However, on the project level the approach may differ‘ (EEL 
Respondent S1-2). 
  
‗The projects in two local authorities are not the same size. It would not be appropriate to do the 
same thing‘ (PIA Respondent S1-6). 
 
‗One of the things I think is quite interesting, and has been quite obvious to me across the whole 
of the west of the city, has been just the extent to which every project and every area whether it‘s 
residential or economic or whether it‘s physical or social, every scheme comes with their own 
history, whether there should be or not is another matter, but there isn‘t one standard route by 
which these projects happen‘ (BNG Respondent S1-1).  
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6.2.1 Reason 1: tenure of relocation affected residents  
One of the key HMR goals was changing the tenure ratio in the affected areas. This meant not only 
that the residents were offered the opportunity to change their tenure in the process (especially 
from social and private tenure to owner occupation) but that the new housing provided following 
the demolition had a different tenure mix. However, the overall HMR approach was envisaged to 
be „tenure blind‟. A tenure blind approach, according to Nevin and Cole (2004), was envisaged to 
apply equally to dwellings in intervention areas, and provide resources for renewal, regardless of 
their tenure.  
However, this overall approach did not take into account the legal difference of the residents of 
different tenures in the process of relocation. As the Pathfinder Survey respondents reported, the 
tenure of residents affected by demolition made the key difference in relocation. 
Box 6-3 Project focused approach: tenure of relocatees  
‗The team doesn't take a different approach by definition. The difference in approach is the 
result of CPO legislation‘ (UL Respondent S1-10). 
 
‗There are obvious differences between the tenures just because of the legislative position … and 
then you get a layer of some political things …‘ (MSP – Respondent – S1-4).  
As shown in the previous section residents were eligible to different types of statutory 
compensation depending on their tenure. The approach to relocation also differed depending on 
ownership or occupation. It was clear from the outset that the reason for such differentiation was 
CPO legislation, as well as the tenure mix planned in the new development. The political matter 
the MSP respondent was referring to was the intention of the Pathfinders to change the tenure ratio 
in their constituencies. This intention affected the possibility of people affected by residential 
relocation returning to their old neighbourhood. 
6.2.2 Reason 2: partnership arrangements and agreements  
The approach to residential relocation was reported as differing on the development project level 
depending on the partnership delivering each specific project. When asked about the way that 
residential relocation was delivered within specific projects, an important point was made by a 
representative of NewHeartlands in his e-mail response. He pointed to the fragmentation within the 
partnership as well as the multiplicity of actors involved:  
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Box 6-4 Project focused approach: partnership arrangements  
‗Now how that is handled varies from scheme to scheme depending upon the structure of the 
partnership‘ (MSP Respondent S1-4). 
 
‗There are separate officers responsible for the phasing of development. Other officers would be 
responsible for the provision of financial assistance and the relocation advisory teams. So to get 
a complete picture you may need to speak to 2 officers each from the 3 local authorities‘ (NHL 
Respondent S1-5). 
This means that the partners involved in relocation in different Pathfinder areas may have differed.  
The way the Pathfinders and their partners organised the delivery and delegated responsibilities 
also had an impact on the way HMR implementation in general, and residential relocation in 
particular, was delivered. Gateway Hull and Transform South Yorkshire respondents presented 
contrasting approaches. 
Box 6-5 Project focused approach: partnership agreements 
‗We work on the policy level, with our partners responsible for developing strategies for their 
particular areas … we don‘t physically deliver [the] project, unlike some other Pathfinders, so I 
am unable to answer in detail the questions [survey] (TSY-Respondent S1-8).  
 
 ‗We are not like other Pathfinders, we have our teams in the local council, we tell them what to 
do, we don‘t wait for their approval‘ (GW – Respondent S1-3).  
6.2.3 Reason 3: consideration of the ‘human factor’  
Several Pathfinder representatives (Elevate East Lancashire, Manchester Salford, Tees Valley and 
Urban Living, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead) emphasised the importance of the „human factor‟ in 
relocation delivery. The respondents responsible for residential relocation stressed that relocation 
delivery was significantly influenced by the way the residents reacted to Pathfinder projects 
proposing clearance. In fact, several Pathfinder respondents stressed that sensitivity and 
responsiveness to the community affected by demolition and residential relocation was the main 
reason for adopting different approaches to HMR implementation at the project level.  
Box 6-6 Project focused approach: consideration of the ‘human factor’ 
‗Implementation strategy depends on each specific project. This is mainly because of the 
sensitivity toward the requirements of each community‘ (EEL Respondent S1-2).  
  
‗Overall approach to phasing is the same, however each site is specific. This is because each site 
has different makeup and different community expectations‘ (TV Respondent S1-9).  
The respondents emphasised that it was impossible to know how the residents would react to plans 
for demolition. The response might be very different from scheme to scheme. The Elevate East 
Lancashire Pathfinder respondent stated that in some schemes residents protested against 
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demolition while others just wanted to leave; the same was reported in Bridging Newcastle 
Gateshead.  
6.2.4 Reason 4: difference in approach based on legislation and HMR funding 
Finally, the Pathfinders who were involved with compulsory acquisition commented on links 
between their relocation practice and the CPO legislation that provided an overall framework. The 
survey respondents pointed to the complexities of relocation on a project level caused by CPO 
legislation. First, because of the different ways in which the residents reacted to the demolition 
plans; second because of the HMR funding regime aimed to cover the expenses of statutory 
compensation (see CPO). 
According to the UL respondent, it was the nature of the law that dictated the relocation approach, 
not only for the project as a whole, but at the household scale within each project. His team found 
that every household reacted to the plans for demolition differently, while some residents were 
happy to move, others resisted. Negotiations with residents from the same street or even the same 
Box 6-7 Project focused approach: legislation and funding 
‗Our team does not take different approach by definition. The difference in approach is the result 
of CPO legislation. Every household is bound to react differently to the CPO, this is the reason 
of the CPO implementation is extremely varied in practice. Because of the way CPO is set up, 
there is a difference in CPO process in case of every project, on the level of the household‘ (UL 
Respondent S1-10). 
 
‗If you work with the community and you work with people … when you are moving somebody 
from their home there is expectation from the funders (the government) that it is very easy to do 
that. That it can be done in a precise timescale … within a quarter. But that is not possible even 
when you are moving your own house. It is not always possible to get people to move. That 
seems to be lost when we are doing the report to the government. The current framework is 
totally inflexible. It needs to be flexible to the human need, rather that the rigid process they 
have now‘ (TV Respondent S1-9).  
 
‗We acquired most of them [properties earmarked for demolition] but didn‘t … 2 flats within that 
block and didn‘t acquire the shop so we couldn‘t demolish that whole corner. We had boarded 
up properties here, but I‘d already started negotiations with [the shop owner] … Now, it gets to 
November last year and we‘re still saying ―oh, we‘ll give you £200k for your property,‖ ... 
That‘s in my programme and in my budget that I‘ll spend £240k on number 1, 2 by March 31st 
2010, but if I don‘t spend that, I can‘t carry it over and take it with me, I get me next year‘s 
funding but it doesn‘t include that £240k but I‘m still negotiating with him, we still haven‘t 
bought it. For now, I‘ve got to find ... ‗cos he might suddenly say in June ―alright then, you can 
have it,‖ but the money that I had set aside for that £240k is gone and communities [DCLG] 
won‘t give that back. Government won‘t give us that back, we can‘t carry money over from one 
year to the next. It‘s like there‘s this cut off which says ―if you haven‘t spent it, you lose it‖‘(CS-
NCC East Team2). 
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row of terraces may take a different amount of time. For this reason according to this respondent it 
was impossible to phase demolition and relocation using CPO.  
Inability to phase relocation resulted in further challenges for the Pathfinders because the HMR 
funding regime was planned for precise targets and time scales as indicated by the quotes from the 
TV and BNG (CS-NCC East Team2) respondents described in Box 6-7 : Project focused 
approach: legislation and funding. In attempting to satisfy the wishes of the residents (and avoid 
purchase by compulsion that involves court appeals) and work with HMR funding streams, the 
Pathfinders and their partners were frequently forced to change or alter plans and approaches 
within a single project as well.  
6.2.5 Conclusion: project focused approach to residential relocation delivery  
The examination of residential relocation delivery across ten Pathfinders showed that the 
decentralised approach to policy design, combined with the lack of residential relocation guidance, 
has led to the proliferation of a range of strategies for residential relocation that substantially differ 
over time and space. The Pathfinders indicated that they had taken a so-called project focused 
approach. Projects varied considerably between Pathfinders and within their boundaries. Project 
characteristics, community reaction to the project, tenure and structure, and mode of partnership 
working have been quoted most often as the key reasons for taking different and project focused 
approaches. An unexpected finding of the Pathfinder survey was that the survey respondents, in 
effect, „cased‟ residential relocation onto a „project or a scheme‟ level. The „project‟ or „scheme‟ 
level was the scale and area to which the respondents referred when conceptualising the boundaries 
of their social action related to residential relocation practice. The scale or case of the „project‟ was 
delimited based on interviews with respondents responsible for residential relocation (on the 
Pathfinder or local authority level) or actors in the field (see Chapter 5, Methodology and 
Methods). A „project or a scheme‟ refers to an area planned for redevelopment, which in this case 
involves planned housing demolition and clearance. Relocation-related studies often refer to a 
„neighbourhood‟ or „community‟ as the focus of their examination; the size, the boundaries of the 
area, and the number of residents affected (for example, by displacement in gentrification studies) 
are not clearly defined and are open to interpretation. Unlike „neighbourhood‟ or „community‟, a 
„project‟ (or a scheme) has planned and defined boundaries as well as a known number of residents 
affected by demolition along with their tenure and other details. In fact, as shown previously, the 
project boundaries and information about the affected parties are requirements of the CPO 
procedure (DETR, 2004). It is based on these details that statutory compensation, and any other 
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forms of support, are made available to residential relocation affected residents. Consequently, the 
residential relocation approach and practice differed between the Pathfinders, within Pathfinders 
between the local authorities, and within local authorities on a project level. However, even within 
the micro-local scale of a „project or a scheme‟ there are variations to the approach as noted by the 
TV, BNG and UL respondents. 
The flexible approach envisaged by HMR designers was aimed to maximise positive results 
through decisions being better adapted to local conditions, suited to the demands and needs of the 
local population (Cole & Flint, 2007). However, in reality the respondents noted that that they were 
unable to guarantee any particular residential relocation outcome. For instance, the GW respondent 
noted in her interview: ‗Although we would like to offer everyone the same option, we haven‘t had 
the new built option
15
 in all places‘ (GW – Respondent S1-3). In other words, since there were no 
set rules, standards or guidance for residential relocation provided by HMR on the national, policy 
or local levels, and because the legislation only attended to residential relocation issues in part, the 
practitioners involved in residential relocation delivery designed their strategies in response to 
specific issues related to each particular project within their local authority. Community reaction to 
the demolition plans was just one of these factors. For example, BNG and GW respondents 
indicated that in some particularly deprived parts of their Pathfinders some residents ‗could not 
wait‘ to be relocated out of neighbourhoods that suffered high levels of deprivation, crime and 
physical deterioration. They took statutory payments of a few thousand pounds (social tenants) to 
make the desperate move. Other residents in the same neighbourhood founded community pressure 
groups and forced the local authority to provide new or refurbished homes, of a size and quality 
and in a location they desired.  
 As will be shown in Chapter 7 in detail, as the result of this project focused approach, residential 
relocation outcomes were highly uncertain and contrasting in terms of process length, location, 
quality and size of alternative properties. These differences were present at Pathfinder, local 
authority, project and household levels, between and within tenures.  
For instance in BNG (see Chapter 7), some residents were relocated from homes worth less than 
£20,000, into sustainable homes worth eight times the price of their old property (without any 
monetary transaction). They were moved to the opposite side of their street (the Cambrian Estate in 
the Walker project). Other residents in the same local authority struggled to find or afford 
                                                     
15 In some areas of GW the Pathfinder was offering newly built properties to demolition and relocation affected residents. 
This was an option preferred by the residents.  
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alternative accommodation within the boundaries of their local authority (Scotswood project). The 
relocation process lasted a couple of months for some, up to a decade for others (from the moment 
the decision to demolish had been communicated to the residents).  
It is beyond the scope of this research to examine all Pathfinder projects and their characteristics. 
Each Pathfinder included a number of neighbourhoods, and there were several schemes within 
each of them. For instance, MSP Pathfinder was involved in over fifteen neighbourhoods through 
eight major intervention areas. According to its 2008-11 business plan, NewHeartlands worked in 
thirteen neighbourhoods and developed several projects within each of them. BNG Pathfinder 
developed 13 different projects, among those eight proposed some degree of demolition. In order 
to analyse the residential relocation delivery across Pathfinders and their projects, two strategies 
were followed. First, the processes shaping residential relocation across the Pathfinders and their 
projects were identified, based on the respondents‟ interviews (Pathfinder survey and pilot study). 
Second, in order to provide an in-depth insight into residential relocation delivery on the project 
level, a BNG Pathfinder case study was conducted, focusing on three primary intervention areas 
involving large-scale demolition and relocation (Ch. 7). 
6.3 The ‘Relocation Matrix’: Residential Relocation Processes Shaping 
Residential Relocation Delivery in HMR Pathfinders  
The focus on the project level indicates the complexity and diversity of the approaches and 
strategies that Pathfinders took in their efforts to deliver residential relocation. The observed 
dynamics and changeability of the approaches to residential relocation raise fundamental questions 
about the processes shaping residential relocation in the HMR framework and, crucially, 
accountability and responsibility for these. 
This research sought to systematise the observed residential relocation approaches in order to 
establish causal links between residential relocation experiences and governance processes shaping 
them. For this reason residential relocation processes were first identified. In order to allow 
analysis of relocation processes identified in this study, and understand how their interplay shaped 
residential relocation outcomes on project level, a conceptual model was built drawing on the 
„game‟ concept and extensive empirical research. The „Residential Relocation Matrix‟ presents an 
amalgam of emerging residential relocation processes identified in the HMR framework (Figure 
6-1: Residential Relocation Matrix).  
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The reason for making such conceptual model was the following. This research found that as the 
result of HMR programme design and partial legislation that was incompletely relevant to its 
context (i.e. CPO) there was no consensus among partnerships as to what residential relocation 
entailed, nor who was officially accountable for it. For example, for some of the respondents high 
in the Pathfinder hierarchy (e.g. Pathfinder Board, Pathfinder Directors) residential relocation 
appeared to be 'something that local authorities do' (TV Respondent S1-9). However, for the 
practitioners in local authorities 'residential relocation is something that [they] didn‘t do for at 
least twenty years' (TV Respondent S1-9) as the respondent from Tees Valley Pathfinder pointed 
out. 
The previous section showed that different approaches to relocation emerged and evolved in the 
course of HMR programme implementation at the project scale, in each local authority across the 
Pathfinders. The interviews with respondents in the pilot studies, the survey, and later the case 
study all confirmed that residential relocation practice developed in response to the issues that the 
respondents responsible for residential relocation encountered in their local authorities at the 
project level. However, these lessons were rarely recorded, exchanged or learned from. Rather, 
each of the 26 local authorities involved in the HMR programme invented and re-invented its own 
residential relocation solutions as perceived problems arose.  
The analysis of the respondents‟ answers and the pilot study suggested that there was no consensus 
about what residential relocation delivery entailed. Depending on the project the respondents had at 
hand at the time of inquiry or the prevailing issues affecting their Pathfinder in terms of residential 
relocation (e.g. relocatees tenure composition) 'compulsory purchase', 'neighbourhood 
management', „community consultation‟, „property acquisition‟, „decanting‟, „financial assistance‟ 
were all referred to as a part of 'residential relocation'. For instance in Pathfinders such as UL and 
more specifically in Sandwell, where large-scale owner occupied areas were earmarked for 
demolition, local authority „compulsory purchase‟ and „property acquisition‟ were referred to as 
residential relocation by the interview respondent (UL Respondent S1-10). In projects primarily 
inhabited by social tenants, like in Walker in BNG Pathfinder, relocation was referred to as 
„decanting‟ (BNG Respondent S1-1). In the areas where residential relocation has been going on 
for a long time (e.g. four to eight years), 'neighbourhood management' was referred to as part of the 
residential relocation process (see Chapter 7, Bensham project in Gateshead) even though this 
related to maintenance of the empty properties and support to residents awaiting relocation. While 
for some respondents community involvement presented a part of residential relocation practice 
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(e.g. MSP Respondent S1-4) others referred to community involvement as the process that was 
missing or omitted from this element altogether.  
In order to make sense of the disparate practices which Pathfinders developed on the project scale 
and to tackle perceived complexity, a conceptual model was built based on empirical data analysis 
(i.e. coding). This research sought to (a) identify the residential relocation processes common to all 
the Pathfinder projects and (b) systematise these in a coherent model with the capacity to provide 
analytical direction. The empirical research was divided into three stages. The first stage was an 
explorative one. It consisted of BNG and RNS pilot studies, interviews with Pathfinder, local 
authority and housing association (in RNS) and ALMO (in BNG) representatives, and secondary 
data analysis. The findings were coded and analysed. Several residential relocation processes were 
identified as shaping residential relocation in these Pathfinders. In order to ensure the relevance of 
the findings to other Pathfinders, a qualitative survey was then conducted with all Pathfinders. The 
respondent from each Pathfinder responsible for residential relocation (a Pathfinder Team member 
or local authority officer depending on the governance arrangements) was asked to describe the 
approach to residential relocation in their Pathfinder and report whether the processes of residential 
relocation identified by the researcher in the pilot studies were relevant in their case. In the last 
stage the list of residential relocation processes (or the working variant of the „Residential 
Relocation Matrix‟, see Appendix 4, Figure 4: Processes involved in residential relocation) were 
given to the in-depth case study respondents for feedback. Based on the results of analysis a 
conceptual model was built – the „Relocation Matrix‟.  
The analysis of respondents‟ narratives in the pilot studies and subsequent feedback through the 
qualitative survey of ten Pathfinders and the BNG case study, led to identification of five distinct 
processes shaping residential relocation in the Housing Market Renewal framework. These are: 
planning strategy, community involvement, resident support, alternative property provision and 
financial assistance provision. While some processes, such as planning strategy, are well known to 
affect residential relocation prospects, others, such as financial assistance provision, community 
involvement, alternative property provision and resident support, have been advanced or developed 
from scratch (depending on the tenure in question) during Pathfinder operation. 
The development of the residential relocation process emerged out of response to challenges 
Pathfinders and their local authorities encountered while attempting to relocate three affected 
tenures (owner occupiers, social and private tenants) using available legislative tools. 
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At this point it is worth pausing to reiterate that this research distinguishes between the decision 
making process related to demolition and the decision making process related to relocation. The 
thesis focuses on the cases where the agreement to demolish and acquire properties has been 
reached by the stakeholders involved, primarily the residents. The five residential relocation 
processes describe HMR residential relocation delivery from the moment a decision to demolish or 
acquire properties has been approved. Very few studies focus on this issue. The argument is that 
only after demolition has been approved does a set of relocation processes evolve, and that these 
processes shape residential relocation outcomes. The assent to demolition does not guarantee 
positive outcomes to the residents (just as disagreement with it does not necessarily bring negative 
residential relocation outcomes). The process of residential relocation itself shapes relocation 
outcomes. The residential relocation outcomes depend on the level of advancement of each of the 
residential relocation processes in the case of an individual project, the actors that deliver them and 
the nature of their governance arrangements.  
Figure 6-1: Residential Relocation Matrix  
 
Based on HMR empirical study. 




The „Residential Relocation Matrix‟ is a conceptual model that systematises the chains of activity 
(or residential relocation processes) shaping relocation in HMR. Drawing on GT methodology of a 
simultaneous process of data collection, coding and analysis, the „Residential Relocation Matrix‟ 
also presents part of the conceptual framework of this study (see Chapter 5) that emerged in the 
course of this research. As such, it is a frame designed and imposed by the author to capture the 
governance processes shaping residential relocation, identify actors involved and enable analysis 
on the Pathfinder, local authority and project scale (see Chapters 7 and 8). In the next section, the 
Matrix is used to facilitate an in-depth examination of governance processes shaping residential 
relocation in HMR Pathfinders, and identify actors involved.  
 
6.3.1 Residential relocation process 1: planning strategy  
Planning strategy relates to a planning exercise that concerns the design of a specific scheme or 
project area and its implementation strategy. Planning strategy is not necessarily related to, or a 
factor in, residential relocation. However, planning strategy fundamentally influences relocation 
prospects, whether it plans for relocation within the project or omits planning for it.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, planning strategy proposing demolition (and leading to 
relocation) needs to follow the CPO legislation. However, CPO legislation does not require the 
acquiring authorities to plan for relocation, re-housing, or to secure new properties within the new 
development for relocation. These are left to the discretion of the acquiring authority. The local 
authority must, however, show that it has the capacity to re-house. Clearly, the location, size or 
estimate of what constitutes „like for like‟ property is open to discussion. Even though legislation 
guiding the legal aspects of planning has changed during the implementation of HMR to include 
some of the elements not covered by the CPO process, it needs to be appreciated that the changes 
took some time to implement. For instance, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (PCPA) 
2004 provided greater flexibility in the ways by which local authorities can justify demolition and 
introduced statutory community engagement. It also required local authorities to develop Local 
Development Frameworks (LDFs) to replace old Local Development Plans (LDPs) or Unitary 
Development Plans (UDPs). However, in 2007, the Chartered Institute for Housing pointed out that 
„many authorities were still in the process of compiling their LDF and that the planning process 
was still guided by LDPs or UDPs which were several years old (Lister et al., 2007:109).  
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Considering HMR specifically, the National Audit Office (2007) pointed out that many of the 
Pathfinders‟ projects or schemes put forward when bidding for HMR funds were mainly „off the 
shelf‟ projects. In other words, in many instances the plans for proposed demolition had already 
been approved or started before the launch of HMR.  
The Manchester Salford Pathfinder representative, amongst others, pointed out that there were two 
main Parliamentary Acts that the Pathfinders used to justify their demolition plans. These are the 
Housing Act 1985 and the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (Box 6-8 Planning strategy: 
Parliamentary Acts used). Which Parliamentary Act was used to justify demolition determined 
whether new building was planned or not at the time of the demolition proposal. The Town and 
Country Planning Act 1990 requires the local authorities to draft the plans for redevelopment to 
justify demolition. While there is no requirement to build properties for relocation, this option is 
open. This is not the case when the clearance is approved using the Housing Act 1985. Under the 
Housing Act 1985, local authorities are not required to have a plan for redevelopment to justify 
demolition.  
The choice of the Parliamentary Act fundamentally influenced the direction relocation practice 
took in each individual project; whether the affected residents were able to relocate back into their 
neighbourhood or not (Figure 6-2 : Planning Strategy and Residential Relocation Scheme).  
While the newer plans may have been commissioned after PCPA 2004 became law, this did not 
guarantee that the improvements this legislation brought were utilised. In a number of Pathfinders, 
no building was completed prior to demolition regardless of the Act used because of the way the 
redevelopment was phased.  
 
Box 6-8 Planning strategy: Parliamentary Acts used  
„[within the Town and Country Planning Act framework] … you start with: we need to build a 
school, we need to put a road… etc. Then you are looking where can that be best done and how 
to deliver. In other words, you have a very clear view of what your game is and what you want to 
achieve‘ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA).  
 
‗Under the Housing Act powers you actually have a reversed logic [to that of Town and Country 
Planning Act]. You are in a situation where you need to go through and exclude any other option 
but clearance. So you‘ve got a group of ‗problem‘ properties here …. You‘ve looked at repairing 
them, You‘ve looked at changing ownership … and concluded … none of that will work … none 
of that is appropriate … Therefore you have to clear. So what you have here [within the Housing 
Act framework] is reverse … what you end up with is this piece of land that is going to be 
cleared … and a question: what will I do with it?‘ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA).  
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Box 6-9 Planning strategy: project phasing  
‗Initially we didn‘t plan before we demolished‘ (PA Respondent S1-6).  
 
‗There has been only demolition‘ (UL Respondent S1-10). 
 
‗The approach that we‘re taking is really to get through the demolition and the site assembly 
before anything is handed over to the developers … it always works on the basis that we take 
care of the demolition and basically provide a green space for future development‘ (CS-NCC 
Team 3).  
 
While some of the Pathfinder representatives argued that the new properties (when finished) were 
first offered to the residents affected by relocation, the teams delivering relocation on the ground 
commented that relocation into these properties was not possible simply because the relocatees 
were eligible to be relocated (using statutory compensation, financial assistance and resident 
support) only once. Once the residents have been relocated using the assistance available based on 
the fact that the property they own or occupy is earmarked for demolition, they are not entitled for 
help in new relocation or to bid for new properties. Quotes from the group interview (pilot studies) 
with the residential relocation officers and BNG Pathfinder representative best illustrates this point.  
Box 6-10: Planning Strategy: Project phasing impact on relocation options 
Author: But once they [relocation affected residents] have been relocated they cannot move back [to 
the rebuilt neighborhood] because they slide down the priority ladder. 
 
CS-BNG Team1: Exactly. They will be knocking down somewhere else in the city and they will get 
those people a priority….  
 
CS-YHN Relocation Team1: So the idea that the people will be able to move back is a theoretical 
one. The reality is, that they will probably not have the opportunity to do so… 
… anybody with a housing priority, homeless or something like that, will come on the top of the 
list. So if you've been homeless living in different part of the city, they will have the chance to move 
to Scotswood much better than somebody who lived there previously for 30 years and has moved 
out of Scotswood because they had to. But they are not housing priority anymore because they 
have been adequately re-housed.  
 
At the later stages, Pathfinders developed a so-called sequenced or staged approach to 
redevelopment (e.g. MSP and BNG Pathfinders). This meant that the relocation of the residents 
was factored into the redevelopment plans: a number of homes were built prior to demolition, a 
portion of the residents relocated, and then their homes demolished in order to give space for the 
next stage of redevelopment and relocation (see Chapter 7, Walker Project). However, this 
approach did not guarantee that all the residents affected by relocation were able to relocate to new 
homes in their neighbourhood.  
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The next issue that was identified as vital in terms of the planning strategy process is the question 
of tenure. As mentioned earlier, one of HMR goals was changing the tenure ratio in the 
intervention areas. While the aim was to keep the areas mixed in tenure, the objective was to 
change the tenure ratio from social tenure to owner occupiers. This meant not only that the 
residents were offered the opportunity to change their tenure in the relocation process but that the 
new housing provided following the demolition usually had a different tenure mix than the areas 
earmarked for demolition.  
Box 6-11 Planning strategy: tenure mix 
‗The percentage of affordable housing doesn‘t necessarily respond to number of households 
moving out of a clearance area … The result is that in some cases residents relocate in close 
proximity of their old property and that in other cases they relocate within the borders of the 
local authority‘ (EEL Respondent S1-2).  
This meant that, depending on the planned project tenure ratio a percentage of the residents were 
relocated back into their old neighbourhood (given that construction was completed by the time 
they needed to relocate) while others did not have the opportunity to do so  
Figure 6-2: Planning Strategy and Residential Relocation Scheme  
 
Based on Pathfinder Survey and Secondary Data Analysis.  
RR- residential relocation 
APP – alternative property provision  
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Figure 6-2: Planning Strategy and Residential Relocation Scheme presents the options for 
relocation provided depending on the approach to planning strategy and tenure mix ratio.  
Planning strategy is a defining process in terms of residential relocation. It sets the key options for 
relocation, whether it plans for it or not. This section showed that the projects involving residential 
relocation had different planning strategies. Therefore, the extent to which re-housing on the same 
site was intended for residential relocation-affected residents and the extent to which residential 
relocation outcomes were shaped by other residential relocation processes differed from the outset. 
The graph above Figure 6-2 (Planning Strategy and Residential Relocation Scheme) indicates the 
complexity as well as the variety of forms that relocation within a project took, depending on the 
planning strategy adopted. This said, planning strategy does not have the capacity to shape the 
residential relocation outcomes entirely. In cases where relocation was not attended to in the 
planning strategy because of the way demolition was justified or because of the planned tenure 
mix, the residents had to find an alternative property through other means, supported by other 
relocation processes (identified in this study), which are described in the following sections.  
6.3.2 Residential relocation process 2: community involvement  
CPO legislation empowering local authorities to demolish does not require community 
consultation in the planning process because of the nature of the intervention (DCLG, 2004). 
However, the councils‟ initial failure to consult properly on the strategy generated a great deal of 
anger and protests against HMR plans. Following the initial unrest and followed by extensive 
negative media coverage, the Pathfinders experimented with different types of community 
involvement to enable redevelopment to proceed.  
After the enactment of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 that made community 
engagement in the planning process (in general terms) compulsory, some HMR local authorities 
resorted to extensive engagement exercises. Others decided to design their plans ‗bottom-up‘ 
(MSP-Respondent S1-6), drafting their plans based on consultation with the community before 
commencing the planning exercise (e.g. MSP). However, community involvement was rarely 
crafted for relocation purposes specifically. As the NAO respondent noted in his interview for this 
research, ‗deciding which parts of the community to involve and when remained a challenge until 
the end of the programme‘ (NAO Respondent 1).  
In this research it was found that community involvement (be it formal or informal) influenced the 
process and shaped the outcomes of residential relocation in several ways. First, community 
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involvement influenced the length of the residential relocation process. Community protests were 
proven to have the capacity to delay the process of redevelopment, reduce number of properties 
planned for demolition and consequently the number of relocations as well as to reshape the ways 
residential relocation was delivered (e.g. change the value of financial assistance packages, 
provision resident support and/or alternative property provision).  
Based on the analysis of community involvement modes across Pathfinders, three basic types were 
identified: statutory community engagement, community protests, and institutionalised protest 
groups‟ engagement (see Table 6-1: Community Involvement: Actors and Relevance to Residential 
Relocation Process).  








A chosen group of residents was 
consulted about the matters of 
demolition and masterplanning. The 
residents were not necessarily 
affected by relocation.  
This process was not directly 
related to the residential 
relocation issue as such. Rather 
consultation was designed to 
cover general planning issues.  
Community Protests 
 
These were self-organised resident 
groups. In the vast majority of cases 
the residents were directly affected 
by demolition and had to relocate 
when the clearance was approved.  
The community protests were 
directly linked to demolition and 
were organised against it. When 
well-coordinated, protests led to 






These were resident protest groups 
that were institutionalised and 
formed a part of the local 
governance. In some cases they 
were given decision making power 
and were regularly consulted about 
the change in their neighbourhood 
as well as residential relocation 
process and choices. 
This community involvement type 
was the most relevant to shaping 
of residential relocation process 
directly. Community groups 
directly affected by demolition 
and residential relocation were 
involved in the decision making 
process regarding residential 
relocation.  
The extent to which one or more of the community involvement modes listed above were present 
and/or influenced relocation practice varied from project to project (an example is given in the next 
chapter that examines relocation in BNG in-depth). 
6.3.2.1 Statutory community engagement 
In the year HMR was launched, the Housing Corporation (2002, 2003) emphasised the importance 
of engaging the community in the planning and regeneration process. In 2004, two years after the 
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launch of HMR, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 made community involvement 
compulsory across the board. In 2004, the ODPM stated „the Planning and Compulsory Purchase 
Bill specifically requires that Local Development Documents must have regard to the Community 
Strategy, giving spatial expression to those elements that relate to the physical development and 
use of land‟ (ODPM, 2004:4). Two documents directly linked to statutory community engagement 
are the Local Development Scheme (LDS) and the Statement of Community Involvement (SCI). 
However, as mentioned earlier, some of the local authorities struggled with the implementation of 
the changes made by the Act. In addition, even in places where the PCPA 2004 was implemented, 
non-statutory plans such Area Development Frameworks (ADFs) and Neighbourhood Renewal 
Assessments (NRAs) formed a part of the HMR process. Community engagement in these was not 
required but considered as good practice. 
In cases where statutory consultation went ahead, there were two major issues concerning 
residential relocation. First, as a CIH report (2007) pointed out, there were difficulties with 
community engagement in HMR emerging from the „competing requirements of the different 
statutory processes, the wishes of residents themselves and the difficulty of accommodating 
different timescales‟ (Lister et al., 2007:111). Second, the broader perception emerging from the 
expert testimonies in this research was that the Pathfinders and their local authorities did not have a 
consultation strategy that specifically addressed issues of residential relocation (see Box 6-12: 
Community involvement: statutory engagement).  
Box 6-12: Community involvement: statutory engagement  
‗We‘ve got a group of residents that we speak to, so called, residents‘ sounding panel. They are 
people from lots of different areas … they are not all from the clearance areas … but they have 
their views on it … We have exploited that to see what is going on. What pressures there were ... 
it was quite interesting actually‘ (PIA Respondent S1-6).  
 
‗Oh, they [residents‟ representatives] were all for it, regeneration in Walker, but not at the cost 
of their homes. They all wanted it but not if it affected them ... others … when their homes wasn‘t 
gonna be demolished, they sort of walked away ‗oh, it doesn‘t affect us‘… they walked away. 
Ours, we knew we‘d lost ours, so we said: ‗right we‘ve lost our estate, it is I gone‘ … but we are 
sticking together for what we want‘ (CS- Walker Resident1).  
This meant that in some cases the statutory consultation did not bring the expected results as the 
residents who were affected by demolition and residential relocation were outnumbered by other 
community representatives. This meant that some tensions related to residential relocation were not 
resolved and some residents resorted to protests or formed pressure groups despite statutory 
engagement taking place.  
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6.3.2.2 Community protests 
Residents‟ protests were very characteristic of the first years of HMR implementation, with their 
numbers peaking between 2003 and 2005. A lack of timely and/or relevant community engagement 
and consultation resulted in residents‟ discontent that was widely covered by the media. According 
to a BBC report in April 2004 (BBC News, 6 August 2004), about 80 residents lobbied Parliament 
to protest at the plans. Some other examples included concerted efforts to overturn the decision to 
demolish 162 Victorian houses in the Nelson West urban renewal programme, in Pendle in Elevate 
East Lancashire. The demonstrations against demolitions in Liverpool‟s Walsh Streets and ex-
Beatle Ringo Starr‟s birthplace in Madryn Street became one of the symbols of HMR controversy. 
While it is important to acknowledge the issues that the residents faced, community protesters were 
often presented as a homogenous group and generalisations made based on the „loudest‟ ones. 
This research found that there were several types of community objectors and protesters who had 
different motives to object against the plans. Depending on the type these groups had different 
influences on the residential relocation process and outcomes.  
1) Residents who opposed demolition of their own home and neighbourhood outright  
2) Residents who wished to be „listened to‟ and taken into account in the process of planning 
and relocation 
3) Residents and groups who did not have a stake in the area, but protested against demolition 
for idealistic and other reasons.
16
  
Box 6-13 Community involvement: difference in residents‘ attitudes presents quotes from the first 
and second group in order to illustrate the difference in views and attitude these groups had.  
Box 6-13 Community involvement: difference in residents’ attitudes  
‗They will have to bring the bailiffs, bring the boot boys and they will have to walk over our 
younger member to get to the older members. And will do it very public – they are not having 
our houses‘ (Action group member PIA, BBC News, 6 August 2004).  
 
‗We‘re not against regeneration, just the wholesale demolition of Spital Hill. We would like to be 
listened to and to take an active role in rewriting the Masterplan … There is a lot of concern and 
fear about what‘s happening‘ (Dave Harvard, Burngreave Messenger March 2005). 
The three groups had different objectives and different influences on the demolition and relocation 
process. While the first and the third group worked to stop the intervention completely, the second 
group wished to be taken into consideration and have chance to influence it. These groups were 
variably present in different projects. When operating in the same project, they were not 
                                                     
16 Interestingly, the heritage lobby had become involved, supporting the retention of inner city Victorian housing that has 
faced charges of obsolescence (see for example Inside Housing, 15 August 2003).  
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necessarily in alignment. In fact, relocation of those residents who wished to move and use the 
statutory compensation offered to make a new start was at times stopped or significantly delayed 
because of protests by external groups or parts of the community that did not have stake in the 
areas earmarked for demolition, as was the case in BNG in Gateshead or in NHL in Liverpool (see 
Figure 6-3: Collision of protesters and those wishing to relocate in Liverpool below) for example. 
These issues are rarely taken into account when examining residential relocation, yet they had a 
fundamental influence on the residential relocation process.  
Figure 6-3: Collision of protesters and those wishing to relocate in Liverpool  
  
Residents‟ pledge for demolition in Liverpool 
Welsh Streets.  
Source: http://www/life/com 
SAVE bought 21 Madryn Street (Liverpool) in an 
effort to halt demolition. 
Source: http://21madrynstreet.blogspot.com  
6.3.2.3 Institutionalised protest groups and ‘bottom up’ planning 
One of the more important phenomena identified in this study is what I term institutionalised 
protest groups. Their title, as well as their position, was controversial. The advantage of this 
research was that it was conducted in the mature stage of HMR implementation. In the period 
between 2007 and 2011 it was observed that some of residents‟ groups that initially protested 
against demolition in their areas joined Pathfinders‟ and/or their local authorities‟ decision making 
process (in regards to planning process in general and/or residential relocation in particular). In 
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other words, the former protest groups became institutionalised and their leaders joined the 
Pathfinders‟ partners in planning for relocation. In BNG for example, the Scotswood residents‟ 
group, which fiercely protested against Newcastle CC‟s plans in 1999, joined the Joint Working 
Group (in 2002) that brought together NCC officers, local councillors and community 
representatives to work together on the BNG plans in their area. As a result, the Scotswood 
residents influenced the way residential relocation was delivered not only in their neighbourhood 
but in other parts of the city as well (see next chapter for more details). In this research, 
„institutionalised protesters‟ were found to have made a significant difference (and improvement) 
to the residential relocation practice in their local authorities and helped secure better residential 
relocation outcomes for themselves and their neighbours.  
In some other Pathfinders, MSP for example, the local authorities took a so called „bottom up‟ 
approach to consultation and consulted the residents about the potential plans before drafting them, 
suggesting a CPO, or confirming any action. This was done in order to avoid and minimise dealing 
with the areas where the residents resisted demolition, and to focus on those who supported 
intervention. The approach proved to be more financially sustainable and less time consuming than 
others based on regular CPO procedure. In these cases the residential relocation outcomes seemed 
more acceptable to the residents because they were consulted in advance and because residential 
relocation was conducted in cases where the residents expressed their agreement with it. 
Box 6-14 Community involvement: a ‘bottom up’ approach  
‗We are working bottom up. In that you are looking at: what can you deliver? … If you are 
looking at CPO [the question is] what is the level of objections … Is it going to require public 
inquiry? ... can you do it by agreement?‘ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA)). 
The review of the Pathfinder projects as well as the media reports on demolition suggested that 
both formal and informal community involvement had an impact on HMR development in general 
and residential relocation in particular. For this reason, „community involvement process‟ in this 
study refers to both formal and informal forms of community engagement related to the residential 
relocation processes. 
6.3.3 Residential relocation process 3: financial assistance provision  
Financial assistance provision in this research refers to all financial assistance designed to facilitate 
relocation for owner occupiers, social tenants and private tenants. Housing Market Renewal has 
been a major source of proliferation of innovative financial assistance packages (FAPs). Unlike the 
planning strategy, which has been long known to set the trajectory of residential relocation, FAP 
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allocation was developed as a response to the difficulties Pathfinders faced. Two years into HMR 
delivery, an affordability gap was identified between the statutory compensation offered to owner 
occupiers and the price of alternative property somewhere else (Cole & Flint, 2007). Owner 
occupiers who were not in a position to sustain their home ownership in the process of residential 
relocation, or who could not afford to move somewhere else, refused to relocate. Innovative FAPs 
were developed to bridge the affordability gap and facilitate relocation.  
In the first years of HMR implementation, statutory compensation based on the CPO legislation 
was offered to the residents in the areas earmarked for demolition. Table 6-2: Statutory 
compensation based on CPO as applied in the HMR framework shows the way the statutory 
payment was made available to owner occupiers, social and private tenants affected by residential 
relocation in the HMR framework. Owner occupiers (outright and with mortgage) were entitled to 
all three types of compensation (market value of their property, home loss and disturbance 
payments). By agreement between the Pathfinders, social and private tenants were entitled to home 
loss and disturbance payments where the maximum values were defined on the national level 
(these two payments together did not exceed £4800). 
Table 6-2: Statutory compensation based on CPO as applied in the HMR framework  
Compensation 
Tenures  
The market value of 
the property 
Home Loss Payment Disturbance Payment  
Owner Occupiers 
(outright and with 
mortgage) 
√ √ (plus 10 % of the 












N/A √ √ 




receive the market 
value of their property, 
based on a valuation 
conducted by their 
council and/or an 
independent valuer. 
The affected residents 
receive a payment to 
compensate them for the 
process of having to 
relocate. This is a fixed 
statutory payment equal 
for all tenures across 
England.  
All tenures receive this 
payment. It covers actual 
expenditure occurred in 
relocating (e.g. replacing 
some fixtures and 
fittings. etc). This amount 
is higher in the case of 
owner occupiers.  
As mentioned earlier, the CPO legislation assumes the existence of a healthily operating market 
when defining statutory compensation. It was noticed early on that this compensation would not 
allow the owner occupiers to afford an alternative property somewhere else. For this reason, at the 
outset relocation grants were offered along with the statutory compensation. However, these were 
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not sufficient. Comments from the BNG, TV and UL Pathfinders support this claim (Box 6-15 
Financial assistance provision: relocation grants).  
Box 6-15 Financial assistance provision: relocation grants  
When we started six, years ago, there has been a basic package available to owner occupiers, 
the value of maximum £10,000. This was a grant. It wasn‘t sufficient ...‘ (BNG-Respondent-S1-
1). 
 
‗The original grant was not sufficient for the residents to move and purchase an alternative 
property. Because of residents pressure the grants have been raised to 15,000 pounds so that the 
people could access owner occupation‘ (TV-Respondent –S1-9 (LA)).  
 
‗The initial value of the grant was £12,000, however the residents were facing equity gap and 
were not able to move to an alternative property. After consultation with the residents the grant 
was raised to 20,000‘ (UL –Respondent –S1-10 (LA)).  
According to David Cumberland Associates (cited in Cole & Flint, 2007:9), the outstanding gap 
remained at around £35,000 (after statutory compensation and relocation grant). While the 
affordability gap may have affected the social and private tenants because of the potential 
difference in rent, this issue has not gained too much attention. Namely, HMR set as one of its 
objectives to increase owner occupation in the Pathfinder areas in order to renew the housing 
markets. The danger of decreasing existing home ownership in the process of residential relocation 
gained political attention. In 2004, the ODPM pointed out that the Pathfinders would have to build 
a solution for the relocation of owner occupiers that went beyond the requirements of the CPO 
legislation, and use a newly drafted Regulatory Reform Order for this purpose:  
„Pathfinders will need to consider the circumstances of each owner and identify what 
help could be provided to assist them to move. The flexibility is now available to local 
authorities under the Regulatory Reform Order 2002 (England and Wales). This allows 
local authorities to make top up payments to home owners in addition to any statutory 
entitlement under CPO procedures‟ (ODPM, 2004:105). 
In July 2002, three months after the launch of HMR, the Regulatory Reform Order (RRO) was 
enacted. Under the Regulatory Reform Order 2002 local authorities gained powers to develop 
appropriate forms of assistance for home owners, including increased grant aid, loans, provision of 
materials, advice and information. The RRO was the basis upon which innovative financial 
assistance packages were developed by the Pathfinders. According to the ODPM (2004), the FAPs 
available were: special purpose lending vehicles, local authority loans, faith loans, partial equity 
purchase, re-sale covenants, and homesteading. While this list presents an orderly picture, in reality 
the Pathfinders offered a varied number of FAP options. Table 6-3: List of innovative FAPs in the 
RNS and BNG pilot studies in 2008 presents the list of innovative financial assistance packages 
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developed in the two pilot studies of BNG and RNS. The table illustrates that the FAPs on offer 
were numerous as well as differing between the Pathfinders.  
Table 6-3: List of innovative FAPs in the RNS and BNG pilot studies in 2008 
Equity Loans for purchase and improvement 
(largely replacing grants) 
Interest-free repayment loans 
Shared ownership for elderly and tenants 
A new-build offer – sale and rent 
Homeswap offer 
Supporting tenants into owner-occupation 
Fair deal for private tenants 
Relocation grants in hardship cases 
Relocation equity loan (in Gateshead only), 
HomeBuy  
Relocation grant (only as a last resort)  
Shared ownership 
Discounted sale options  
Homeswap 
Capital and Interest repayment loan  
Unsecured loan (through the council) 
(tenants can also use HomeBuy and the First 
Time Buyers initiative)  
RNS (Pilot study, 2008) BNG (Pilot Study, 2008) 
The availability of FAPs, their value, and the sources of funding and provision also differed across 
the Pathfinders‟ local authorities. FAPs on offer changed over time and may have been different on 
a project scale within the same local authority, depending on the time of implementation and time 
of relocation.  
Box 6-16 Financial assistance provision: difference in FAP availability  
‗The availability of FAPs used to be different across the local authorities. But this has changed 
recently. Today, the FAPs are equally available across all local authorities within the 
Pathfinder. The value may slightly differ based on the state of the local market‘ (EEE 
Respondent S1-2). 
 
‗The financial package and the way it works is the same but it is a different amount … It is 
different in both local authorities, but that is because the [affordability] gap is different. The 
FAPs are always designed to plug a specific gap‘ (PIA – Respondent – S1-6).  
 
‗There are some local specifications. We would look at the market conditions and we would 
usually set a ceiling. We will support you up to this level‘ (MSP – Respondent – S1-4 (LA)). 
At the outset, the sheer number of choices and possibilities seemed to confuse the residential 
relocation-affected residents more than assist them. The Pathfinders invested a considerable 
amount of time explaining FAP options to residents. This caused additional delays in the 
residential relocation process. As a result the residents lived for prolonged period of time in half 
boarded up streets.  
The development of FAPs made a fundamental change in the residential relocation process. It 
resulted in a change of the role of the local authorities in the relocation process and introduced a 
new set of actors in the process. Pathfinder local authorities assumed a new role, that of a lender. 
Organisations like ALMOs and RSLs were further contracted to manage or distribute FAPs to 
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relocatees. Partnerships and private lenders (e.g. ARC4, Kickstart) provided funding for FAPs 
additional to that of the HMR fund.  
Unlike other residential relocation processes, that affected all tenures, FAPs influenced residential 
relocation prospects for owner occupiers the most. The reason is that the compensation and FAPs 
they received had, in the majority of cases, a direct impact on the type of property they could 
relocate to. 
Development of financial assistance packages enabled home owners to move and gave them 
freedom (within the constraints of the local market and resources available) to relocate within the 
boundaries of their local authority. However, application of FAPs also resulted in the formation of 
a new tenure – shared ownership. In other words part of the alternative property equity that was not 
covered by the statutory compensation and grants was made available through equity loans owned 
by local authorities (as lenders). Future research should examine the long-term effects of this 
relocation option on relocatees.  
Based on the Pathfinder survey, this section argues that the high dependence on financial 
assistance for relocation (in the form of grants, loans and equity loans) made policy extremely 
sensitive to both micro- and macro-market shifts. A highly localised approach to policy design 
(and in particular to the relocation of residents) has led to the proliferation of a range of FAPs that 
differed substantially between the Pathfinders, their local authorities and between individual 
projects. In addition depending on the time of relocation (at the beginning of project 
implementation or at more mature stages) FAPs may have differed on a project level as well. It 
appears as if FAP provision and availability changed in a frenetic race with both micro- and macro-
economic shifts. As the result, relocation outcomes for owner occupiers differed as well, at the sub-
regional, local authority, project and household level, and have been inconsistent, even chaotic, in 
form. Even though a substantial proportion of the £2.2 billion policy fund has been invested in 
demolition and relocation, the process has been overshadowed by great uncertainty for residents.  
6.3.4 Residential relocation process 4: alternative property provision 
Alternative property provision (APP) in this research refers to the process of planning for and/or 
securing properties for re-housing residents from properties earmarked for demolition. It refers to 
alternative dwelling provision for all tenures (owner occupiers, social and private tenants) whose 
relocation is required by HMR interventions. 
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The alternative property provision process has a crucial impact on residential relocation outcomes. 
The properties meant to replace homes lost to demolition have certain characteristics related to 
their type and location. These have an impact on the residents not only in terms of the physical 
environment, but on their economic standing and the development or redevelopment of social 
relations within the relocated household unit and the community. In this research, type of property 
relates to its physical characteristics (such as old, new built, refurbished), its size (e.g. two, three, 
four bedroom) and dwelling type (e.g. flat, terrace, bungalow etc.). The „type‟ of the property 
defines the living space of a household unit (e.g. family) and caters for their specific needs (e.g. 
disability, elderly population, religious needs, or simply personal preferences and aspirations) and 
social relations between household members. The location of the property defines the aspects of 
affordability, in terms of its location in the local sub-markets as well as its proximity to the old, 
demolished neighbourhood and its community. In those terms the location of the alternative 
property defines and redefines (in the case of residential relocation) the wider social relations of 
the relocated household with its surroundings.  
Re-housing or alternative property provision is not required by CPO in general terms. Only the 
social tenants are required to be re-housed based on the „decanting policy‟ of their housing 
providers (housing associations or local councils). However, such a legal requirement does not 
exist for owner occupiers and private tenants. The acquiring authorities are not obliged to provide 
alternative properties for owner occupiers and private tenants, except in exceptional circumstances. 
The Pathfinders started developing alternative property provision options for these two tenures 
only after the „exceptional circumstances‟ (in other words inability to move because of the 
affordability gap or unavailability of alternative properties) were proven. However, similarly to 
FAPs, APPs varied between the Pathfinders, their local authorities and depending on the project, 
timing, tenure or delivery.  
6.3.4.1 Owner occupiers  
There is no legal obligation to re-house owner occupiers. The CPO works under the assumption 
that the residents will be able to find an equivalent property somewhere else with the statutory 
compensation to which they are entitled. Following this legislation the relocation ‗depends what is 
available in the housing market at the time you choose to move … and the amounts of money‘ (PIA 
Respondent S1-6), as a PIA respondent pointed out. However, in the case of HMR this was not 
possible, for the simple reason that the cheapest and most „unpopular‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004) 
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homes were designated for demolition. In many cases the available FAPs were not sufficient to 
bridge the affordability gap, or simply properties for relocation were not available.  
At the beginning of HMR implementation, in the majority of Pathfinders there was only 
demolition. In many cases the residents could not afford to buy properties in the same state as their 
old one in other parts of the local market. For this reason, in some of the Pathfinder projects 
redevelopment was planned in advance or in sequence with demolition. This enabled the owner 
occupiers to invest their statutory compensation and the FAPs they were eligible for in new-built 
homes in their old neighbourhood. The option enabled the relocatees move into brand new 
properties that they would not be able to afford otherwise and preserve connection to their old 
neighbourhood and social networks. However, this option was not widely available. The process 
was not without challenges. Namely, general property provision within the HMR framework was 
entrusted to private developers. These agents provided affordable properties under agreement with 
the acquiring authorities, in exchange for access to large sites. This meant that the local authorities 
and Pathfinders became dependent on the private sector to deliver residential relocation.  
Box 6-17 Alternative property provision: housing provision by private developers 
‗Each developer agreement has a certain percentage of the affordable housing (10-25%). The 
percentage is decided upon in collaboration with the local authority. The agreements are made 
between the local authority and the developer‘ (EEL Respondent S1-2). 
 
‗In some cases you have a very straightforward development agreement, where there is a 
developer, the city council is separate, but we agree that this land will be made available at 
certain time. In all the situations you have the council as an active partner. However, when there 
are specific requirements for the site in terms of affordability, the council is in tighter 
partnership, with a stake in the game, as opposite to the situation when owner occupier schemes 
are delivered to the market‘ (BNG Respondent S1-1). 
In 2008 alternative property provision in the form of new-built homes was especially challenging 
because of the financial crisis that affected the housing sector as a whole. According to the 
respondents the main challenge was the ability to sell the properties built for sale. The revenue for 
these partially financed the affordable properties built for relocation. As the result the private 
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Box 6-18 Alternative property provision: difficulties in new housing delivery 
‗The challenge is the new building. This is because there is no market for housing in general at 
the moment. The developers are reluctant to start new building‘ (EEL Respondent S1-2).  
 
‗We need mechanisms that will allow us to get on with new building … to be able to relocate … 
New building has been stopped by the credit crunch‘ (GW Respondent S1-3).  
 
‗The biggest problem [in new housing provision] is confidence about being able to sell and the 
impact that this has … because when the stock is sold that money can be taken somewhere else 
to a next phase … everything is just cluttering up at the moment‘ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA)).  
Apart from the provision of new affordable properties for relocation, the Pathfinders developed a 
Homeswap option, to help owner occupiers relocate. The Homeswap scheme was designed and 
launched in the Seedly and Langworthy areas of Salford, MSP Pathfinder. Homeswap allowed 
people with negative equity (especially owner occupiers with mortgages) to choose an alternative 
property in a retained area, in close proximity to their old neighbourhood, which is then renovated 
both internally and externally to their specifications and to modern standards. In 2008, the Audit 
Commission (2008:12) reported that the scheme was one of the most popular relocation options in 
HMR framework. 
Box 6-19 Alternative property provision: Homeswap scheme  
‗We buy properties on the open market near demolition areas and transfer those to our housing 
association partners. West Hull and East Hull have different housing associations … They let 
these as social rented housing. We fully fund the purchase and transfer it to them … we have 
100% relocation rights from our relocation areas to those properties‘ (GW Respondent S1). 
 
‗That [Homeswap] proved to be very successful and popular. It also gave you the double benefit, 
not only were you helping relocating people and avoiding resistance to compulsory purchase … 
people were comfortable that they were not being disadvantaged. It also meant that you are 
retaining residents from the community and that you are getting secure owner occupation on 
properties that were currently standing vacant‘ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA)). 
In 2003, the council reports showed that Bridging Newcastle Gateshead started to transform 
Tyneside flats into larger properties and offer them as a Homeswap option (NCC, 2003). In the 
same year the approach was being explored in Transform South Yorkshire (House of Commons, 
2008). By 2005, when the MSP Homeswap scheme was publicised as one of the most popular 
residential relocation options (SCC, 2005), the approach was adopted in three additional 
Pathfinders. NewHeartlands offered the scheme to home occupiers in Sefton Council, Bedford 
Road and Queens Road and social tenants in the Klondyke redevelopment areas (NewHeartlands 
2005a, 2005b; Cole & Flint, 2007). Tees Valley Pathfinder developed Homeswap options in 
Middlesbrough, Gesham clearance area, with Hartlepool and Redcar and Cleveland local 
authorities following (HBC, 2005; RCBC, 2011; MC, 2011). At the same time Partners in Action 
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Pathfinder (PIA) was examining adopting the scheme as well (Partners in Action, 2005). However, 
the scheme was not as widely available as it appeared. Usually a dozen homes per project were 
available through Homeswap. For instance, MSP Pathfinder that invented the scheme, distributed 
just around 150 Homeswap homes, while it demolished several thousands. 
6.3.4.2 Social tenants  
Re-housing or decanting social tenants in the event of housing demolition is required by law. 
Decanting is a legal term used to explain the process where residents are required to move from 
their (rented) homes, because an authority with compulsory purchase powers has redevelopment 
plans for their home. Government legislation has an impact on how HAs or local authorities can 
implement their decanting policy. The key Acts to be taken into consideration are the Land 
Compensation Act 1973 and the Planning & Compensation Act 1991.  
The plans that require decanting may involve demolition or major repair or improvement to the 
property (resulting in a significant change of character to the property, e.g. building an extra room), 
and may require the resident to move out, either temporarily or permanently, for the works to be 
completed (CIH, 2010). Decanting is done within the properties of the housing provider or through 
a choice based lettings system. In both cases the social tenants are eligible for a priority card in 
order to ensure their relocation from areas affected by demolition. 
Depending on the Pathfinder, local authority or specific project, the social tenants were relocated 
into existing social housing properties of the council or housing associations (through a choice 
based letting system). In some cases where new properties were available for social tenants, they 
were relocated in brand new properties (such was the case for a number of social tenants in BNG 
and MSP Pathfinders). 
While social tenure was the one of the three that received the most support, there were also 
challenges that social tenants faced in accessing alternative properties. This research found that the 
demolition of social housing led to increasing pressure on the social housing stock in the 
Pathfinder areas. This was because of the HMR goal to reduce social housing in the intervention 
areas. Generally the number of social tenure units demolished was larger to number of new built 
ones. This led to long waiting lists and a prolonged process of residential relocation in some cases.  
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6.3.4.3 Private tenants 
Private tenants, unlike social tenants, were not required to be re-housed. However, this research 
found that the Pathfinders developed various ways to attend to the needs of the private tenants. In 
Newcastle (BNG), for example, private tenants were relocated in the social rented properties as 
there was no other available option. In several Pathfinders a Private Landlord Accreditation 
scheme was developed in order to ensure decent housing standards for private tenants. 
The enactment of the Housing Act 2004 had a special influence on the issue of private tenants‟ 
relocation. The Housing Act 2004 granted local authorities power to license all landlords in areas 
of low housing demand or similar areas, where poor management of the private rented sector 
frustrated efforts to create sustainable communities. The accreditation was, in effect, an agreement 
between private landlords in the intervention areas and the local authorities, which guaranteed 
certain housing standards from the landlord. But it also meant that the residents, both private and 
social tenants, could be referred to these agents to be relocated to an alternative property.  
In summary, alternative property provision significantly influenced residential relocation options 
and outcomes within a project area; specifically the type and location of a property and the social 
change that comes with it. In addition, the process of alternative property provision had a vital 
impact on the process and length of residential relocation for all tenures (feelings of certainty or 
uncertainty among the residents). While planning strategy set an overall plan and direction for 
general housing provision in the planned area, alternative property provision had its own pace as it 
depended not only on the authorities planning and approving redevelopment plans (i.e. Pathfinders 
and local authorities) but on numerous property providers for all three tenures. Cross-tenure 
relocation in HMR meant that property provision depended on different housing providers such as 
private developers, RSLs, ALMOs and private landlords. In turn the Pathfinders and local 
authorities depended on these actors to complete residential relocation. Dependence on disparate 
actors to deliver APP for relocation was a challenge that was not envisaged in HMR design, which 
planned for a „tenure blind‟ approach to housing. 
6.3.5 Residential relocation process 5: relocation support  
‘To exercise real choice requires not only a range of options but also accurate 
information about them‟ (Lister et al, 2007:85).  
As shown in previous sections, residential relocation was a complex intervention, involving trial 
and error and frequent changes of approach. This put relocatees in a challenging position. They had 
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to negotiate the complexities of public service delivery and navigate through changing relocation 
options and choices and also to respond to many consultation and engagement activities. This led 
to confusion and disillusionment among the residents and uncertain residential relocation 
outcomes, as well as wasted resources on the Pathfinders‟ side. In some cases the councils faced 
protests and resistance despite community engagement being completed. Resident support as a 
residential relocation process for all affected tenures evolved in response to the increasing 
complexity of the residential relocation process in the HMR framework. 
It is worth noting that resident support was not required from acquiring authorities under the CPO 
legislation. During the time of HMR implementation, resident support process developed, from 
mandatory support to social tenants (under decanting policies), to cover owner occupiers as well as 
(though less often) private tenants. The previous sections showed that the relocation options 
differed between projects in the same local authority and changed during the time a single project 
was implemented. Information relevant to one project was often not relevant in the next. The 
relocation process and options differed between tenures. The respondents in the pilot studies 
pointed out that there was a different approach to counselling about relocation depending on the 
tenure type. Because of the legislative position, the information needed to be provided to owner 
occupiers, social and private tenants was different; the organisations to which relocatees needed to 
be directed for alternative properties for instance, were also different. In addition, different tenures 
were eligible for different types of FAPs and properties. 
The residential relocation information systems and teams were set up at first in response to 
community pressure (see Chapter 8) and later through the support of the Regulatory Reform Order 
2002. The RRO granted local authority funding for appropriate forms of assistance advice and 
information among other things. 
Resident support processes developed to cover a wide range of information and advice to the 
relocation affected households (e.g. organising the removal, finding an alternative property, 
contacting the right organisation for issues of property valuation, distribution of FAPs, providing 
information about alternative property options and choices in each household case, etc.). In many 
Pathfinders printed, web and video information was supplied in order to support the residential 
relocation teams‟ work and keep residents informed about relocation choices and options (for 
illustration see Figure 6-4: Resident support examples). 
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In the process of HMR delivery, special purpose relocation teams were set up on the local authority 
or Pathfinder level depending on the case. These teams were a part of local council staff, ALMOs 
or local Housing Associations depending on the case. The relocation teams were the frontline 
delivery service that dealt with all the details of relocation, and usually had up-to-date information 
about the project phasing, availability and value of FAPs along with the APPs. These teams 
worked with each individual household that was affected by demolition daily on a one-to-one 
basis, in some cases for several years, as reported by the relocation team in BNG‟s Your Homes 
Newcastle ALMO. The respondents reported that because of the length of involvement, teams 
developed a strong relationship with relocatees.  
Resident support was proven to be an important residential relocation process that helped the 
residents navigate through the dynamic and complex maze of residential relocation choices and 
options, and reduced anxiety and feelings of fear and uncertainty among the residents. The teams 
were also used by the Pathfinders to learn about the community and the possibilities of intervention 
in more mature stages of HMR implementation. 
6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter showed that residential relocation practice developed in a complex and demanding 
policy context. It showed that residential relocation in HMR was delivered differently and variably, 
not only on Pathfinder or local authority, but on project level within each of the 26 Pathfinder local 
authorities. There was no consensus among practitioners as to what residential relocation entailed. 
Figure 6-4: Resident support examples  
  
Relocation team  Information and newsletters 
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The development and evolution of residential relocation delivery was a result of responses to issues 
the respondents encountered in their local authorities at project level.  
In order to make sense of the disparate approaches across numerous Pathfinders‟ projects, the 
study built a conceptual model – the „Residential Relocation Matrix‟ – drawing on extensive 
empirical research in GT tradition and the governance theory concept of „game‟. This tool is 
presented in  Figure 6-1 (Residential Relocation Matrix). The Residential Relocation Matrix 
systematises residential relocation processes identified to shape residential relocation in the HMR 
framework. These are: planning strategy, community involvement, resident support, financial 
assistance provision and alternative housing provision. The five residential relocation processes 
describe HMR residential relocation delivery from the moment a decision to demolish or acquire 
properties has been approved. This issue is important, as residents‟ agreement to demolition and 
relocation did not guarantee acceptable residential relocation outcomes and vice versa. The 
residential relocation processes were found to differ depending on the tenure affected by housing 
demolition; they were differently developed across Pathfinders and their projects. The procedural 
approach to residential relocation contributes to the literature concerning residential relocation in 
two main ways. First, it shows that residential relocation consists of several interdependent 
processes. The findings suggest that focus on residential relocation as a homogenous process or 
focus on one of its processes (e.g. new building) may not have the capacity provide an explanation 
about the nature of the residential relocation outcomes or the solutions needed. Community 
involvement (Power, 2007) may not be sufficient if private developers refuse to build alternative 
properties for relocation. Phasing new building, demolition and relocation (Cole & Flint, 2007) 
may be vital in a limited number of cases where new building is planned for relocation, but not in 
others.  
The findings in this chapter point to the need to identify residential relocation processes as they 
relate to a specific project, analyse them together, and use the results to explain how their 
interaction shapes residential relocation outcomes. It is only through such in-depth analysis that the 
researchers will be able to tackle the complexity of the processes shaping specific residential 
relocation outcomes. 
Identifying the processes that shaped mixed tenure residential relocation in HMR is important, not 
only to describe how residential relocation was delivered but also to facilitate in-depth analysis of 
residential relocation practice on project scale, to help identify the actors shaping residential 
relocation and their roles responsibilities in this framework. These themes are addressed in the 
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following chapter through the in-depth case study of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead and its three 
primary intervention areas: Scotswood, Walker, and Bensham and Saltwell. 




Chapter 7. Residential Relocation Delivery in Bridging Newcastle 
Gateshead: Pathfinder and Project level  
7.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter showed that HMR Pathfinders developed their approach to relocation on the 
level of individual projects and that the residential relocation approach differed between the 
Pathfinders, within Pathfinders between the local authorities and within local authorities at the 
project level.  
This chapter presents the case of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder and its three primary 
intervention areas (three projects). It examines in detail how residential relocation processes were 
delivered at project level. The results presented here are based on more than thirty face-to-face 
interviews conducted within the pilot study in May 2008, and the in-depth case study conducted 
between November 2009 and January 2010. This allowed for examination of residential relocation 
practice in real time. The BNG Pathfinder was chosen because at the time of inquiry it was one of 
the most advanced Pathfinders in terms of demolition. The Pathfinder had one of the most 
developed relocation financial assistance strategies. It was confirmed as representative of the 
majority of the Pathfinders, when the survey results showed that seven of the ten Pathfinders 
adopted a strategic partnership governance structure. Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (BNG) was 
set up as a strategic partnership of Newcastle City Council (NCC), and Gateshead Council. 
Newcastle and Gateshead are two administratively sovereign cities which face each other across 
the River Tyne. Newcastle and Gateshead are located in the north east of England. The BNG 
Pathfinder area is a part of the wider Tyne and Wear conurbation (see Figure 7-1: BNG Pathfinder 
area in Tyne and Wear conurbation). The chapter is organised in the following way. The first 
section sets out the BNG background. The next three sections individually address the BNG 
primary areas: Scotswood, Walker and Bensham. In these projects the number of demolitions was 
the highest, these were also the areas into which the Pathfinder put the majority of its resources. 
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Each of the sections covers key information about the project and its background, examines five 
residential relocation processes, identifies actors involved in each of the processes and presents the 
attainable residential relocation outcomes. 
Figure 7-1: BNG Pathfinder area in Tyne and Wear conurbation 
 
Source: Audit Commission (2005:5) 
7.2 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Background  
Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder was established in 2002-3. It covered the inner core 
areas of Newcastle and Gateshead Councils. Activity in Newcastle was focused on Elswick and the 
Discovery Quarter, Benwell and Scotswood, Byker, Walker, and the Cowgate and Blakelaw 
neighbourhoods. In Gateshead, it was focused on Dunston and Teams, Felling, Deckham, and 
Bensham and Saltwell (see Figure 7-2: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead neighbourhoods of 
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intervention). These neighbourhoods formed a Newcastle Gateshead sub-region and had specific 
intervention areas and specific projects defined within their boundaries. 
Figure 7-2: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead neighbourhoods of intervention  
 
Source: BNG, 2006 
The BNG sub-region had a population of around 150,000 people living in 77,000 homes (52,000 
properties in Newcastle and 25,000 in Gateshead). The Pathfinder covered an area of over 3,600 
hectares (Audit Commission, 2005; Leather et al., 2007). 
Similarly to other Pathfinders, Newcastle and Gateshead have suffered severe economic decline in 
past decades, and found themselves among the most deprived English regions. Once the 
nineteenth-century powerhouse of industrial revolution, the Tyne region‟s shipbuilding, mining 
and heavy industry, had attracted labour to the area. In that period the majority of the terraced 
houses and Tyneside flats were built for the industrial labour force.  
However, the story of industrial success began to fade in the twentieth century. In fact, in the Tyne 
region industry had been in decline for most of the twentieth century and the situation substantially 
worsened at the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s. In the 1990s, a resulting poor environment, low 
educational attainment and high crime levels meant that the neighbourhoods surrounding the urban 
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core showed all the symptoms of multiple deprivation (Audit Commission, 2005) and became 
some of the most deprived areas in the country (BNG, 2011:46). 
In an effort to revitalise the area socially, economically and physically it has been the subject of 
many urban regeneration initiatives designed in England since the Second World War and the 
subsequent slum clearance. In the 1960s, small-scale Urban Aid measures were introduced to 
support social and environmental projects. In the late 1970s, after publishing the White Paper, 
„Policy for the Inner Cities‟, Newcastle and Gateshead were designated as Inner City Partnership 
authorities. In the 1980s, the West End of Newcastle became one of the Conservative 
government‟s Enterprise Zones and later Urban Development Corporations. Other policies 
included the government‟s City Action Teams established in 1985, West End City Challenge and 
the Single Regeneration Budget in the mid-1990s. Some of these projects were successful, others 
less so (Robinson, 2003; Audit Commission, 2004, 2005). 
In Quayside, large-scale regeneration had replaced the former shipping premises with imposing 
new architectural achievements, the landmark Gateshead Millennium Bridge and major cultural 
developments including the Baltic Centre for contemporary art. However, in former industrial 
neighbourhoods such as Scotswood and Walker in Newcastle, or Bensham and Saltwell in 
Gateshead, the interventions did not bring the expected results. These areas continued to top the list 
of the most deprived areas in England and lose population. 
Figure 7-3: Contrasting results of Newcastle and Gateshead regeneration initiatives  
  
Gateshead Millennium Bridge, Newcastle-upon-
Tyne; By Xavier De Jauréguiberry.  
Source:http://www.thephotographypages.co.uk/20
09/05/dig-where-you-are/ 
„Now we have a paradox of parts of Newcastle Gateshead booming; attracting a world-wide 
audience with new homes in exciting neighbourhoods, but set against areas of multiple 
deprivation‟ (BNG, 2004). 
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The contrasting stories of urban success and failure have resulted in a patchwork-like housing 
market in the sub-region. Figure 7-4: Vital Indices overall ranking 2006 shows that some of the 
most viable (pink colour) areas were in close proximity with the least viable ones (dark purple). In 
the HMR framework, this indicated instability and a lack of balance in the local housing market.  
Figure 7-4: Vital Indices overall ranking 2006  
 
The Vitality Index is a statistical market intelligence model that operates at a neighbourhood level and 
shows relative levels of vitality or deprivation at the local level. The index is made up of six domains that 
each use one or more indicators to summarise performance in that domain: housing, health, crime, 
education, income, unemployment. Where more than one indicator was used in a domain, the statistical 
technique of factor analysis was used to summarise the indicators into one overall score (or factor) based on 
the interrelationship between them. 
Map Source: Newcastle City Council (2007) 
 
The BNG area covered the weakest sections of the sub-regional housing market. Figure 7-5: 
Change in house prices 1996 to 2005 shows that housing prices in the BNG area were significantly 
lower than in England as a whole, and lagged behind average prices in the sub-region as well as 
more locally in Newcastle and Gateshead. The West End of Newcastle in particular gained national 
coverage in 1999 with the availability of properties for 50p to investors who agreed to refurbish 
them (BNG, 2011:9). In 2004, a CRESR17 evaluation confirmed BNG still represented a 
concentration of low house prices, containing four of the ten lowest priced postcode sectors within 
the North East (CRESR quoted in Audit Commission, 2005:17).  
                                                     
17 CRESR - Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University 
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In BNG, as in other Pathfinders the turnover of social housing was high. Between 2000 and 2001 it 
was 14.5% (Leather et al., 2007:104). This further fortified the claims about the housing market 
weakness in the sub-region.  
Figure 7-5: Change in house prices 1996 to 2005 
 
Source: HMR Land Registry quoted in Audit Commission (2005: 7)  
 
Economic activity in the BNG area was only 52.1% (while England as a whole was 64%) with 
incomes significantly lower than in the city region (ratio of Pathfinder median income to the city 
region was 0.78) (Leather et al., 2007:218). In the 1990s, economic growth was a quarter of the 
national average, while in 2005 the figures indicated 1.3% of economic growth compared to 3.1% 
nationally (Audit Commission, 2005:7). In 2001, BNG had the highest proportion of people who 
were permanently sick or disabled (12.4%) among the Pathfinders. BNG was also among the 
Pathfinders that had a high percentage of retired population (13.1%) and students (8.6%). Figure 
7-6: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder key facts table, presents a comprehensive overview 
of the BNG facts and figures according to Leather et al. (2007) based on the 2001 Census. BNG, 
like the other Pathfinders, was entrusted to identify the specific problems that led to housing 
market failure in their jurisdiction and to develop locally adopted solutions based on this evidence. 
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 Figure 7-6: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder key facts table  
 
Table Source: Leather et al. (2007:218) 
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7.2.1 Perceived problems and need for HMR intervention  
The evidence about the BNG Pathfinder is elaborate. Its comprehensive overview is out of the 
scope of this thesis. For this reason in this section the focus is on the issues that the BNG 
Pathfinder itself identified as the most pressing, and based on which it defined its goals and 
objectives. The problems that the BNG Board and Team considered especially critical were: 
population loss, vacant properties, oversupply of the same type of property, and high levels of 
social housing (BNG Key Facts, 2008, Leather et al., 2007). 
7.2.1.1 Population loss, and vacant properties 
Population loss from BNG areas seemed to be a particularly important problem to tackle for the 
BNG officials. Census data showed that the area lost over 20,000 people in the period between 
1981 and 2001 (BNG Key Facts, 2008). This made BNG one of the Pathfinders most acutely 
affected by population loss. Leather et al. (2007:xiii) indicated that BNG and NewHeartlands 
topped the list of the Pathfinders with a record 9% population loss in the period between 1991 and 
2001.  
The population loss in BNG was associated with industrial decline. However, a number of studies 
showed evidence that the geography of the Newcastle and Gateshead housing market had 
expanded since the nineties. While the old inner suburbs declined, new housing development was 
supplied outside Newcastle and Gateshead. The studies pointed to relative ease of travel into the 
two cities and development of a culture of commuting to work. For instance, research carried out 
by consultants Experian for BNG (Experian, 2005) found that historically only one in ten people 
taking up jobs in Newcastle Gateshead actually made their home there, with North Tyneside in 
particular housing many commuters in professional occupations. 
Tyne and Wear Housing Market Assessment, by Coombes et al. (2004), found that in 1991, 
Newcastle‟s housing market included North Tyneside and part of  Tynedale but that by 2001, it 
was part of a much wider housing market that also included Northumberland and part of Cumbria. 
Also while Gateshead was relatively self-contained in 1991, by 2001 its market operated with parts 
of Tynedale and Derwentside. The report suggested Newcastle was much more strongly linked 
with areas north of the Tyne and beyond the Tyne and Wear border in particular than with 
Gateshead (Audit Commission, 2005:17)  
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The North East Housing Aspirations Study (Nathaniel Lichfield and Partners, 2005) confirmed a 
significant movement away from the Pathfinder to North Tyneside, Tynedale, Derwentside and 
Castle Morpeth (Audit Commission, 2005:18). Figure 7-7 : Migration patterns on sub-regional 
level Tyne and Wear presents a map of internal migration in the Tyne and Wear sub-region.  
Figure 7-7 : Migration patterns on sub-regional level Tyne and Wear  
 
Source: BNG (2011:68) 
Despite the overall population increase due to international migration in the 2000s, both Newcastle 
and Gateshead continued losing their population due to out migration to surrounding areas (BNG, 
2011:65). As a result of these trends, the area experienced population loss and housing 
abandonment. According to the 2001 Census, the vacancy rate in the Pathfinder area was 7.1%, 
making over 5,200 vacant household spaces (Leather et al., 2007:218).  
Nathaniel Lichfield and Partners‟ (2005) study suggested that if insufficient desirable housing was 
available in the short term, current migration and price trends would continue. Hence, one of the 
BNG goals was diversification of housing supply in the inner city cores of the two cities.  
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7.2.1.2 Tenure and oversupply of the same type of property 
According to the 2001 Census, the Pathfinder target areas had a large amount of social rented stock 
(47.3% in total) (Leather et al., 2007; BNG, 2011). The ratio of owner occupiers in the area at 
39.9% was lower than in Newcastle (53.3%) and Gateshead (53.1%), and significantly lower than 
the national average (68.7%) (see Table 7-1: Percentage in each tenure 2001). One of the key 
objectives of the BNG Pathfinder was changing the tenure ratio by reducing the amount of social 
housing and increasing owner occupation. In some cases this required clearance and demolition.  
Table 7-1: Percentage in each tenure 2001 
 
Source: BNG (2011: 73) 
The BNG intervention areas comprised poor quality housing that was relatively small. Three 
dwelling types dominated the area: flats (33.6% mostly Tyneside flats), terraces (30.6%) and semi-
detached properties (31.6%). Semi-detached properties were newer and usually belonged to the 
social rented sector. Tyneside flats and terraces were built around the 1900s and were mostly in the 
private rented sector or low income owner occupation. The Pathfinder area lacked a supply of 
larger family homes; increasing the availability of these was one of the BNG objectives.  




Source: BNG (2011: 73) 
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7.3 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder  
In September 2003, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (BNG) submitted its first proposals to the 
government. Here the partnership outlined the approach to be adopted to tackle what were 
considered „long-standing problems‟ and create a stable housing market in the North East sub-
region. The BNG sub-regional HMR goal was „creating great places to live‟ (BNG, 2011). 
Demolition was an important part of this strategy. It was seen as a potential to ensure a clean start 
in areas that had been in decay for decades. BNG planned for the demolition of around 4,300 
residential units between 2003 and 2018. By February 2011, two months before the cancellation of 
the HMR programme, the Pathfinder had demolished close to 3,000 properties and acquired 1,200 
(BNG, 2011). The exact number of the residents relocated within the Pathfinder is unobtainable 
(see Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods). Considering the average empty property rate at 7.1% 
for BNG, and given the prevailing household composition (Leather et al., 2007:26), the author‟s 
conservative estimate is that at least 6,000 people were relocated during the BNG operation. 
7.3.1 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead goal 
‗Creating places where people want to live, work, learn and invest is key to the future of 
Newcastle Gateshead, the North East and the country as a whole. These are the central 
ideas behind our aim to redress housing market failure.‘ (BNG, 2005)  
In order to solve the identified problems the BNG Pathfinder defined a goal to „create great places 
to live‟. The goal was developed at the sub-regional level as envisaged by HMR designers. As seen 
above, the BNG goal was quite different from the overall HMR goals at national level. Review of 
the BNG annual reports and business plans showed that BNG defined its goal as place making in 
2004/05 and stayed loyal to it until the programme closure in 2011.  




Source: BNG (2011:15):  
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BNG‟s objectives primarily addressed the issue of critical population loss from the area, limited 
choice of dwelling types and poor condition of housing stock. One of the major concerns of the 
BNG officials was changing the tenure ratio, as the prevalence of social tenure was considered 
unsustainable. 
The BNG goal and objectives were in reality directly linked with providing better quality and 
improved choice of housing. As can be seen in the Table 7-3: BNG Outputs achieved up to 
February 2011, the work to be carried out concerned physical improvement of the housing stock: 
home refurbishment, land acquisition, land preparation (for development), new building and home 
clearance (BNG Key Facts, 2008). Land acquisition and clearance caused residential relocation. 
7.3.2  Selection of the BNG areas  
Having considered some of the key BNG characteristics in the previous section, it is necessary to 
look into the way the BNG area and projects were selected. BNG developed a Vitality Index. The 
Vitality Index has been cited in national evaluation commissioned by the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM) as „one of the best examples of a [market intelligence] model … to 
present various analyses of neighbourhood vitality‟ (Audit Commission, 2005:15). According to 
the Audit Commission the model played an important role in defining the Pathfinder boundaries 
and informing the stakeholders of market conditions and change at a range of local levels. 
However, interviews with representatives of the two councils and the BNG Pathfinder team 
showed that BNG‟s list of intervention neighbourhoods comprised areas where regeneration 
initiatives had been tested and failed in the past or where the funds had simply run out.  
In 1999, just before the launch of the national HMR strategy, Newcastle City Council developed 
the Going for Growth initiative. At its core was the view that previous attempts to regenerate the 
poorest areas of Newcastle had failed and that a different strategy was required. NCC launched a 
bold plan to demolish large areas in the West and East Ends of Newcastle (Scotswood and 
Walker). Similarly, on the other side of the Tyne, Gateshead Council attempted to regenerate the 
Bensham and Saltwell areas using a Single Regeneration Budget and several other schemes. 
However, these ambitious plans did not attract sufficient funding and/or had run out of funds. 
HMR funding was essentially used to fund the Going for Growth strategy in Newcastle and plans 
in Gateshead that were already on the council‟s agenda. In January 2003, the Director of 
Community and Housing at the NCC, in his report to BNG wrote: „the Pathfinder provides the 
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most significant opportunity to deliver long-term Going for Growth objectives‟ (BNG Report, 15 
January 2003).  
Undoubtedly, these areas could not show great results in housing market measurement as they 
were already identified as decaying and deprived, but relying on the market intelligence (Vitality 
Index) as a sole defining reason for inclusion in the HMR programme would be ignoring the 
history of the BNG intervention areas. By including so called „off the shelf‟ projects into BNG‟s 
work, the partnership inherited a complex landscape of failed urban regeneration initiatives and 
challenging stakeholder relations, especially demolition-affected residents who had quite a 
negative experience of residential relocation long before HMR had been introduced (Wainwright & 
Wainwright, 2000). 
7.3.3 BNG Intervention Areas 
BNG intervention areas consisted of inner areas of older private housing and refurbished local 
authority dwellings around the city centres of the two conurbations: Newcastle and Gateshead. As 
mentioned earlier, BNG Pathfinder covered a number of neighbourhoods (see Figure 7-2: Bridging 
Newcastle Gateshead neighbourhoods of intervention). In each of these neighbourhoods a number 
of projects were defined.  
At the time of inquiry, BNG Pathfinder had 13 separate intervention areas (projects) where 
identified BNG activities were carried out in different proportions.  
Figure 7–8 (Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder projects) shows the individual projects 
included in the BNG boundaries.  
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In some of the areas the BNG team and partners focused on housing refurbishment alone. 
However, eight of thirteen BNG intervention areas included a percentage of housing demolition 
along with refurbishment efforts, these were: 
1) Pathfinder Priority Areas: Scotswood, Walker (Newcastle) and Bensham  (Gateshead).  
2) Other strategic and mixed demolitions: Ouseburn (Newcastle) and Teams (Gateshead) 
3) Private Housing Stock Clearance: Felling (Sunderland Road and Brandling) (Gateshead). 
4) City Council Stock Clearance: Cowgate, Blakelaw, Kenton (Newcastle). 
In 2007 (at the beginning of this research), a series of strategic commission reviews established a 
clearer vision of the BNG goals. This helped in the identification of the three priority areas for 
investment (Scotswood, Walker Riverside and Bensham and Saltwell) with lesser interventions to 
be progressed in the other BNG areas (BNG, 2011:9). The number of planned demolitions was the 
highest in the so-called Pathfinder Priority Areas: Scotswood, Walker (Newcastle) and Bensham 
(Gateshead). In Scotswood over 1,500 homes were planned for demolition, 400 in Walker and over 
approximately 440 in Bensham and Saltwell (BNG Key Facts, 2008). Over three quarters of the 
£223,401,092 BNG budget (2003-2011) was concentrated in these areas (BNG, 2011:9). Figure 
7-9: Total spend by Intervention Area 2003-2011 (£m) shows that the BNG priority areas, 
Scotswood, Walker and Bensham and Saltwell, received the most funding. These were also the 
Figure 7-8: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder projects 
 
Source: BNG (2011)  
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projects BNG had focused on at the time of the inquiry. This allowed the residential relocation 
processes to be examined in real time.  
Figure 7-9: Total spend by Intervention Area 2003-2011 (£m) 
 
Source: BNG (2011:15) 
7.3.4  Project focused approach to residential relocation  
‗It's like a tale of two cities, to be honest. The approach on the East End and the West 
End [Newcastle]… they are just miles apart. It is really interesting to see how one city 
can take such a different and diverse approach to regeneration‘ (CS-YHN Team1). 
These words of a relocation officer in Newcastle best illustrate the approach to regeneration and 
consequent residential relocation within the HMR framework. As other Pathfinders, BNG had 
taken a project-based approach to redevelopment and residential relocation. According to BNG 
Pathfinder the planning strategy and implementation was adjusted for each project case and was 
therefore different between the intervention areas in general and priority areas in particular.  
‗So we have visions for each of our areas, what we want them to look like … each of 
these areas is distinctively different in terms of approach. In Scotswood, you see, it is 65 
hectares of developable land in one public sector owned chunk, so it is just one huge site 
near the city centre … Walker is a little bit different; it is not a big site. We had to 
ensemble 5 to 50 houses on one end and then another 100. Bensham … is an 
unbelievable dense network of terraced streets that has very small individual units‘ (CS-
BNG Team1). 
This project focused approach to redevelopment had a significant impact on residential relocation 
practice as will be shown in the following sections. At the time of inquiry, three Pathfinder Priority 
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Areas (Scotswood, Walker and Bensham) were the main focus of the Pathfinder and its partners, 
and received the most funding; for this reason they are examined as cases of residential relocation. 
They collectively present the case study of residential relocation processes in the BNG Pathfinder. 
Each of the following three sections addresses one of the priority areas. The project background is 
presented first, followed by examination of relocation processes, actors delivering them as well as 
indicative residential relocation outcomes. The chapter concludes by pointing out the differences 
between the approaches and their impact on residential relocation outcomes. It provides analysis of 
residential relocation in the three projects using the Residential Relocation Matrix (see Table 7-7 : 
Summary of Scotswood residential relocation , Table 7-8: Summary of Walker residential 
relocation processes, Table 7-9: Summary of Bensham & Saltwell Residential Relocation 
Processes) at the end of the chapter. 
7.4 The Scotswood project: protesters turned into the council’s co-
developers  
Scotswood is a part of the West End of Newcastle. The southern boundary is clearly delineated by 
the River Tyne. While the boundaries have been changed several times since the plan‟s inception, 
for the respondents in this research the northern boundary of Scotswood was defined by the 
Fenham suburb. At the dawn of HMR, Scotswood had a prevailingly white population (95.8% in 
comparison to Newcastle as a whole 93.1%). It was 46.9% owner occupied, while 30.3% of the 
housing belonged to the local authority, 10.5% to the local housing association and 9.6% to private 
landlords. The majority of the properties were semidetached (46.8%), according to the 2001 
Benwell and Scotswood Ward Census data, and 21.7% was terraced housing. Flats in Scotswood 
made 24.9% of all housing (less than in Newcastle as a whole 30.3%). 
Scotswood used to be home to some of the biggest names of the Tyne region‟s heavy industry: 
Vickers, Elswick, Threes Engineering, Anglo Great Lakes, Glass Tubes, Ever Ready, Metal 
Spinners and the Elswick Leadworks are some of them (Robinson, 2003). In the 1970s the process 
of deindustrialisation removed most of the West End‟s traditional economic base. The result was 
persistently high unemployment, deprivation and population decline. Since the industrial decay 
commenced in the neighbourhood, Scotswood has been subject to a majority of the „regeneration 
schemes, policies and initiatives launched in England‟ (Robinson, 2003). „A policy laboratory‟, 
Scotswood has been continually weakened by outmigration, by stigma, by criminal activity as well 
as by the top-down imposition of „solutions‟ (Robinson, 2003). There has been a proliferation of 
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partnership approaches, involving more and more agencies and local residents. This formed a 
confusing and fragmented policy landscape.  
In the process the Scotswood population dropped from 11,000 in 1981 to just over 6,500 in 2001 
(Robinson, 2003). In 2002, Scotswood was one of the most extreme examples of housing market 
collapse (BNG, 2008:32). Under BNG, 1,500 homes were planned to be demolished and around 
1,800 properties built between 2003 and 2018. In February 2011 (two months before the 
cancellation of HMR), 1,256 homes were demolished, 427 acquired and only 18 built. BNG 
refurbished 877 homes in this neighbourhood (BNG, 2011:16). This author‟s estimate is that at 
least 2,500 residents have been relocated during HMR implementation.  
Figure 7-10: Scotswood Arial View  
 
Source: BNG Business Plan 2008-9 
7.4.1 Scotswood Project residential relocation processes  
This section examines the development of Scotswood residential relocation processes and their 
impact on residential relocation outcomes. Scotswood is the first project in which demolition and 
relocation started in the BNG Pathfinder. In many ways the development of residential relocation 
processes in this project influenced the approach to residential relocation in other BNG priority 
areas.  
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7.4.1.1 Planning strategy  
The demolition and relocation in Scotswood started before HMR was launched. In 1999, 
Newcastle City Council launched the Going for Growth initiative in an attempt to develop a long-
term overarching strategy for the whole city that would join the existing partnerships and funding 
streams. The Going for Growth initiative was a bold approach aimed to tackle what were 
considered long-standing problems of deprivation and population loss that previous initiatives 
failed to solve. The vision was simple: NCC envisaged replacing the neighbourhood with „a world 
class urban village‟, but at the outset there was little idea about what this may mean (Robinson, 
2003). Like many early Pathfinders‟ plans, Scotswood demolition (CPO plan) was approved under 
the Housing Act 1985 and did not require redevelopment plans. The initial plan was to clear 
around 7,000 homes, create a large-scale cleared site and to kick-start regeneration by attracting 
mass house builders (private developers). However, no plan, strategy or support was envisaged for 
residential relocation from the site. 
Following the bare bones of the CPO legislation, the residents were not consulted about the NCC 
plans. They read about the council‟s plans to demolish their homes in the local newspaper. No 
community involvement or resident support was planned. While social tenants were planned to be 
relocated under the council‟s decanting policy, alternative property provision was not planned for 
private tenants and owner occupiers. Regardless of the fact that Scotswood was known to be one of 
the most extreme examples of housing market failure, a place where homes would change hands 
for the symbolic price of fifty pence (50p), the Council‟s Property Services standard envisaged 
statutory compensation (CPO) with consideration of a relocation grant of around £10,000. This 
was not sufficient for the owner occupiers to relocate anywhere else. The Scotswood Residents 
Association chair, who relocated herself in the process, recalled:  
‗I could not have gone, I couldn‘t have bought a hen-cree for that, I couldn‘t afford 
anything and I would have had to move into a council house, which wasn‘t what I wanted 
to do, nothing against council houses, nothing against council tenants, but I didn‘t want 
to do that. I‘d owned my own house all my life, my mother and father had owned it before 
me so I didn‘t really want to give it up for nothing so I decided I was gonna stick it out 
till I got what I felt was a reasonable offer or a reasonable price, not for another house, a 
reasonable offer of a like for like situation‘ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). 
The council‟s initial failure to consult properly on the strategy, its paternalistic stance, top-down 
approach, insensitivity and apparent inability to see how people would actually be affected by it, 
generated a great deal of anger and undermined much of its credibility (Cameron, 2003; Robinson, 
2003). Owner-occupiers refused to move, some of them because the statutory compensation didn‟t 
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allowed them to, others, social tenants among them, because they didn‟t want to see Scotswood 
demolished entirely. During the Going for Growth initiative, Scotswood residents organised 
protests against the council‟s plans under the banner „Save our Scotswood‟. The Scotswood 
Residents Association chair and a handful of residents organised a meeting in the Church Hall, but 
to their surprise 400 residents turned up. Residents protested against NCC planning strategy.  
‗We got a huge amount of people who came along and Newcastle City Council got up 
and said what their intentions were and they were booed off the face of the earth because 
people said they weren‘t going to fall for it, we will fight it all the way … we said ―you 
are not going to do this to us, we aren‘t going to be put out of homes, we‘ve invested, 
we‘ve put our money where our mouth is and we‘ve stayed here through all the trials and 
tribulations that have gone on‖‘ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). 
The Scotswood Residents Association chair, a leader in her own right, held community meetings in 
her home in a half boarded-up street with crime mounting and services being cut. As a result of the 
community pressure that got local and national media attention, the NCC began to reconsider its 
plans. 
‗Newcastle City Council came along and started accepting the fact that we weren‘t going 
to go away, we weren‘t just going to sit back on our laurels and be told what was gonna 
happen to us, that we wanted some involvement in it‘ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). 
At the beginning of the 2000s the residents‟ requirements began to be answered. The group 
received support from their local councillors. They helped the residents get organised, secured the 
funding for design training sessions, and the residents (former protesters) joined planners in re-
designing their neighbourhood.  
‗Labour councillors and it has always been a Labour led area, the Scotswood and 
Benwell areas, so they‘ve been a great support and quite honestly, where we were all 
maybe going in a different direction, they brought us all together as a whole and said to 
us ―come on now, we‘ll support you, help you, give you some financial help ….‖‘ (CS-
Resident Scotswood1). 
In 2003, Scotswood became a part of BNG‟s primary intervention areas. The planned demolition 
had been significantly reduced under residents‟ pressure. As a result more of Scotswood was 
retained than originally planned. However, the planning strategy did not change. In 2009, the West 
End Area Based Regeneration director presented the planning strategy in the following way:  
‗The approach that we‘re taking is really to get through the demolition and the site 
assembly before anything is handed over to the developers … it always works on the 
basis that we take care of the demolition and basically provide a green space for future 
development‘ (CS-NCC West Team1). 
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From 2003 onwards HMR funding supported consolidated plans for the assembly of a 60-hectare 
site for redevelopment in Scotswood (BNG, 2011:17). From 2004 onwards work began to develop 
proposals for the replacement housing offer in Scotswood. A masterplan for the area – including an 
exemplar housing site – referred to as „the EXPO‟ was approved as late as 2009. The 
redevelopment was envisaged to coincide with an international festival in 2011-13 (the Expo) 
which would provide prime examples of sustainable housing in England (Rudi.net, 2011). In late 
2008, Resettlement and Relocation Team officers responsible for relocation in the neighbourhood 
revealed in their interview for this study that the relocation from several hundreds of demolished 
properties in Scotswood had been completed. Scotswood redevelopment strategy meant one 
direction for relocation: out of Scotswood. Rebuilding started on 1 March 2011, almost a decade 
after demolition started and three years after all but six residents had been relocated from over 
1,200 demolished homes.  
While the BNG planning strategy for Scotswood was more moderate than the original „Going for 
Growth‟ initiative, it did not plan for residential relocation. Residential relocation was shaped by 
other residential relocation processes that evolved during HMR implementation, mainly because of 
Scotswood community pressure.  
7.4.1.2 Community involvement  
The Scotswood residents‟ role in planning the future of their neighbourhood underwent quite a 
metamorphosis from the start of demolition plans in 1999 through involvement in the BNG 
initiative and beyond. Initially protesters against Newcastle City Council‟s „Going for Growth‟ 
plans, under BNG Pathfinder Scotswood residents became convincing ambassadors of the BNG 
plans. Most importantly, the Scotswood residents‟ involvement played a vital role in evolving and 
reshaping residential relocation processes in the West End, as well as in BNG Pathfinder as a 
whole. Rather than the process being statutorily guided it was an initiative of the residents affected 
by demolition and residential relocation. Scotswood Residents Association chair said during her 
interview:  
„Well, because we were Scotswood & Benwell, and we‟ve always been well organised, 
well involved, made ourselves involved, we‟ve insisted on the involvement‟ (CS-
Resident Scotswood1). 
The Scotswood residents‟ involvement in Scotswood redevelopment changed from the position of 
protesters in 2002. This is when Scotswood Joint Working Group was founded. The Group was a 
co-operation between residents, local councillors and council officers that has been meeting 
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monthly to discuss the development of Scotswood. With the foundation of Bridging Newcastle 
Gateshead the Scotswood Residents Association and Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre groups 
became a part of the overall Pathfinder governance. Scotswood residents officially gained 
decision-making power in Newcastle. The Scotswood Residents Association chair ascribes this 
success to the fact that they were the only such resident group in Newcastle at the time:  
‗We‘ve been in it from the start, so we had the decision-making powers and we sat round 
the table with people who came to us with the kind of decisions … because we were the 
only one [resident group in the city]‘ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). 
The negotiations between the residents and the council meant that some of the former protesters 
against the council‟s plans, agreed for their homes to be demolished under BNG to give way to 
new development.  
‗We came up with fantastic plans for this and we produced them, with the help of 
architects, but we all sat round and, contrary to what Tony Flynn [Councillor, Newcastle 
City Council Leader 1994-2004] thought at the time, all of the people in Scotswood 
weren‘t thick, we were intelligent people, we were able to do this, so we came up with all 
these plans and we produced them and gave them to them and then they started to think 
―well yes, perhaps this can work‖ because a lot of us, in the process of this planning, 
gave up our homes, I did‘ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). 
Fundamentally, however, the Scotswood residents‟ agreement to give up their homes meant that 
they were determined to get the best out of relocation – a „like for like situation‟ (CS-Resident 
Scotswood1). The council and BNG were now required to provide residential relocation solutions 
for the affected residents that were initially not available. Involvement of the community in the 
council‟s work in Scotswood brought several changes in residential relocation practice. These 
were:  
1) Changes in the planning strategy. While the NCC plans did not change in terms of 
approach, the number of homes planned for demolition was reduced by around 800. 
2) Increase of the relocation grant and development of financial assistance packages for 
owner occupiers.  
3) Alternative property provision for owner occupiers. Through the Joint Working Group, 
arrangements were made for home owners to swap houses. In the private sector the 
landlords have been put under tighter control and an accreditation scheme launched. 
4) A Resettlement and Relocation Team was founded to provide support to all residents 
affected by relocation regardless of tenure.  
However, the Scotswood residents‟ influence did not end in their neighbourhood. Their 
representatives were invited by other resident groups, notably Walker neighbourhood residents, to 
advise them about involvement in the process.  
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‗Yes, we were invited by all of their groups because they, long after we started, they were 
starting up new groups and they wanted a bit of help in starting up these new groups and 
so we went along and sat in and listened to how they were running them and then give 
them an idea of what we‘d done and how we‘d got involved so, yes, we did, and then all 
of a sudden the Walker groups seemed to take off and they seemed to be getting things 
done an awful lot quicker than we were‘ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). 
As the result of the Scotswood residents‟ involvement in the planning process, residential 
relocation practice has been changed not only in this neighbourhood but in other Newcastle 
projects, as well as in BNG as a whole. Their activism attracted media attention and their influence 
continued after the residential relocation process ended. 
The Scotswood women who fought for better relocation options, and helped their neighbours 
through voluntary work in the Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre, have won a Queen's Award for 
Voluntary Service. The Scotswood Residents Association chair, an MBE herself, was reported by 
the BBC (Denten, 2007) to have been taken to Sweden to be consulted about the suitability of the 
eco-homes produced there for Scotswood. While the „Scotswood Grannies‟ will probably not be 
able to come back to Scotswood, they are continuing to be involved in the consultation about the 
new plans for the new village there:  
‗So, we‘re looking to get all of these things for our children, for our future, and 
incorporate into that some of our heritage, some of the things that went on when we were 
young that children would enjoy and would like to have because we were the industry on 
the Tyne and we‘ve had shipbuilding, we‘ve had armament factories, we‘ve had mining, 
we‘ve had so much work and so much industry on the Tyne …‘ (CS-Resident 
Scotswood1). 
7.4.1.3 Financial Assistance Packages (FAPs) 
Under the Going for Growth initiative, the residents were advised to take a mortgage to move and 
buy an alternative property, which they refused. Their actions brought redevelopment to a 
standstill. The Bridging Newcastle Gateshead funding enabled a change in the approach to 
residential relocation that was not possible beforehand. Therefore, in general terms the arrival of 
the BNG in Scotswood was seen as a positive development. A Resettlement and Relocation Team 
officer remembers:  
‗The major innovation [of the BNG] is worth of packages for relocation, when the BNG 
first came into being … I don‘t know what would have happened if the BNG hasn‘t come 
about. The decision [under Going for Growth initiative] was taken without knowledge of 
where the money was coming from …‘ (CS –YHN-Relocation Team1). 
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In 2003, when BNG was founded, the BNG Board took on re-examination of the financial 
assistance packages (FAPs) for residential relocation in response to residents‟ refusal to relocate. 
With statutory compensation for social and private tenants set at a national level (Home Loss and 
Disturbance summing up to around £4,600) the focus was on owner occupiers. The first attempt to 
tackle the affordability gap for the owner occupiers in Scotswood was increasing the existing 
relocation grant from £10,000 to £25,000. The grant enabled relocation from Scotswood:  
‗… For what we found in Scotswood was that a lot of owner occupiers were older people, 
who had been there for quite some time. People who didn't have access any longer to 
mortgage, didn't necessarily want to move in a hurry and didn't want to take any loans … 
because they have been living in the houses with their mortgages paid off, didn't have any 
housing costs, other than bills. They didn't see why they had to be penalised, by having to 
move and take out a mortgage. They found voice in BNG, and the council responded and 
the packages came about. When the packages had been increased up, that's when we had 
people moving in quite large numbers and quite successfully from Scotswood‘ (CS –
YHN-Relocation Team1).  
In 2006, three years after BNG was founded, the „Financial Options for Homeownership Policy‟ 
was completed. The policy set what help (financial and otherwise) was made available to people 
who lived in areas which had been identified for clearance or improvement (BNG, 2006). This 
policy became one of the key strategies for relocation on BNG level. It defined financial assistance 
packages for relocation not only in Scotwsood but in BNG as a whole. As it will be seen in the 
Walker and Bensham and Saltwell cases, the FAPs outlined in „Financial Options for 
Homeownership Policy‟ assisted relocation in these projects as well.  
In the years that followed, various financial assistance options have been offered: Homebuy, 
shared ownership, discounted sale, and equity loans, among others. According to a Resettlement 
and Relocation Team officer there was a limited uptake of different packages and grants and equity 
loans seemed to be the most popular with the residents:  
‗We did have several packages available, on bit of mix and match front. But we've only 
had one person who used anything other than the relocation grant. Relocation grant is 
very free, given the flexibility to buy in the market. So they don't have to buy a particular 
house. It can be added into their basket, if you like. For example, if somebody is buying a 
property for 100,000 pounds and their current valuation of their property is only 60,000. 
Than they can access the 25,000 grant, and if they are still short, they can access 
something else which is called: equity top up.
18
 That allows them to access additional 
15,000 pounds‘ (CS –YHN-Relocation Team1).  
                                                     
18 „Equity top up‟ or „Equity Loan‟, is a loan provided by BNG (partially funded by HMR budget, partially by other 
public agencies such as the Housing Corporation, English Partnerships) and managed by the local authority conducting 
residential relocation. The loan is repayable on sale at the same percentage of market value as at time of purchase. No 
ongoing fees or interest are payable. Intended as a loan of last resort for residents who cannot obtain or afford 
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While the development of FAPs enabled residential relocation, and improved on the old statutory 
compensation it had shortcomings as well. Namely, the access to FAPs could not guarantee the 
relocation near old neighbourhoods nor could it enable relocation in close proximity to old 
neighbours. Relocatees were forced to buy a property available on the market.  
7.4.1.4 Alternative property provision  
At the outset, in Scotswood alternative properties were secured only for social tenants. They were 
„decanted‟ to available council properties within a three-mile radius according to Relocation Team 
officers. Owner occupiers and private tenants were not secured alternative properties. They were 
expected to be able buy or rent an alternative property within the NCC boundaries using the 
statutory compensation and latter FAPs. As the result of residents‟ refusal to move, the NCC 
invested in thinking about ways to secure alternative properties for owner occupiers and private 
tenants as well. After 2004, a „private landlord accreditation‟ scheme was set up. In this novel 
scheme, the NCC partnered with private landlords with the aim of ensuring access to decent 
housing for private tenants affected by relocation. Where reasonable re-housing options for private 
tenants were not available, they were also offered social housing. 
In order to secure alternative properties for owner occupiers (and some long-term social tenants) a 
„Homeswap‟ scheme was launched. The Newcastle City Council bought empty properties just 
north of Scotswood and refurbished them based on relocatees‟ specifications, at times down to the 
location of the sink in the home (CS-Scotswood Resident4). The Scotswood Residents Association 
chair described: 
‗The Council paid for it, to my specifications, because the house I had was to a very high 
standard so I wanted the house that I was going into to have the same standard. I had 
central heating, I had a beautiful car port out in the back and everything was done, 
double glazing and all the things up to the standard, it wasn‘t only of my specifications, 
but Newcastle City Council‘s standards so the house was done up … [but] it took a while 
and I had to live in a street with huge amounts of boarded up houses and all the threats 
and crime and burning buildings next door … Because my move was taking longer to get 
the house ready for me to move into so I had to live in the street where all of this 
demolition and crime was going on‘ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). 
After the initial hardship and delays, the scheme proved to be very successful. The residents 
interviewed for this research stayed relatively close to one another, and reported to enjoy their new 
neighbourhood. Apart from being happy to have stayed together, they seemed proud that they had 
                                                                                                                                                                
commercial loans at reasonable rates. The effective APR depends on house price inflation. Over a long term 30-year 
period it averages about 7½% with a long term of 2.4% real increase over inflation (BNG, 2006). 
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secured better relocation options for owner occupiers. Homeswap enabled people to remain near to 
their old neighbourhood and neighbours. It also helped NCC to reduce resistance to relocation and 
securing owner occupation in properties that were vacant. However, the scheme was limited in that 
it catered for only several dozen home owners from Scotswood.  
7.4.1.5 Resident support 
An additional breakthrough that the Scotswood residents achieved in residential relocation delivery 
in BNG was setting up resident support for all tenures. Under the Going for Growth initiative, 
Newcastle City Council‟s Housing Office in Scotswood was the only point of call for the residents 
affected by planned demolition. Following its statutory duties NCC provided resident support only 
to its social tenants, largely ignoring nearly half of the population it aimed to relocate (48% of the 
Scotswood population was owner-occupiers, 10% was private tenants). In 2002 the Resettlement 
and Relocation Team was founded by the city council in response to Scotswood residents‟ 
pressure. A Resettlement and Relocation Team (R&R Team) officer recalled:  
‗Our team originally came into being six years ago [in 2002]. The reason the team came 
about is because, in the West End in Scotswood the original plan for the city was Going 
for Growth plan … There were hundreds of people to be moved from Scotswood. There 
was one housing office in Scotswood that was absolutely flooded with people … The 
Housing Office was predominantly dealing with council tenants … they would not have 
been in a position to offer any assistance to owner occupiers or private tenants in the 
areas. At the time there were lots of campaigns by the communities. And the residents 
said: ―Look, the resources aren‘t there to help us with the stress‖ ... And that is how our 
team initially came about, because of the residents‘ demand‘ (CS-YHN Relocation 
Team1). 
The R&R Team service had developed to cover meeting all relocation affected residents regardless 
of tenure, helping them through the process by providing relevant information, verbally or through 
information packs as well as directing them to organisations that could take care of their inquiry if 
the R&R Team could not. Their mission statement was the following:  
‗We are here to help residents find a new home. We can provide you with as much or as 
little support and assistance as you need. We can meet you in your own home, or if you 
prefer, at a suitable alternative venue, to discuss what you need. We will answer any 
questions or concerns you may have about your relocation, and provide you with 
sufficient information for you to decide where you would like to relocate to‘ (R&RT, 
2007).  
In the years to come the R&R Team not only advanced assisted relocation in Scotswood but also 
became a main port of call for relocation in Walker, in the East End of Newcastle. The interviews 
with the residents, NCC officers, as well as BNG staff all confirmed that this team, „a street level‟ 
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service delivery, was trusted not only by the residents but by officials to deliver relocation. They 
balanced a difficult situation of being between the authorities asking residents to move and the 
residents themselves and strangely, they became a part of residents‟ lives and the team BNG would 
call to assist in cases where relocation came to a halt. After the foundation of the Newcastle 
ALMO in 2004, the R&R Team was transferred to this organisation and became a city-wide 
residential support service for residential relocation (see Walker project for more details).  
In Scotswood specifically, with the establishment of BNG in 2003, the Neighbourhood 
Management Team was founded and received funding from BNG. It had offices established in the 
neighbourhood and had an aim to help manage the neighbourhood in the process of residential 
relocation, especially when homes were boarded up and remaining residents waited for relocation.  
In addition to this service, the Scotswood residents organised their own voluntary resident support. 
The residents organised themselves and founded Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre. Here, 
residents who had already been through the residential relocation process, volunteered to help their 
neighbours through the process.  
Establishment of residential support for all residents was an innovation in residential relocation 
practice in NCC, proved to help reduce the levels of anxiety and feelings of uncertainly among 
relocatees and therefore contributed improvement of relocation process.  
7.4.2 Scotswood residential relocation outcomes  
The planning strategy meant one way for relocation: out of Scotswood. The Benwell Scotswood 
Area Action Plan (part of the wider Local Development Framework for Newcastle) was adopted by 
the council on as late as 4th November 2009, six years after BNG was launched, or ten years after 
the first demolitions had been announced to the residents under the Going for Growth plan. It was 
only on 23
rd
 April 2010 that the Evening Chronicle announced that the preparatory work had 
started:  
‗Work has finally started on the long-awaited regeneration of a famous Tyneside 
neighbourhood. Ten years after the vision for the Scotswood area of Newcastle was 
unveiled and whole streets were demolished, work to build houses has started. Thanks to 
millions of pounds of Government cash, contractors will work to clear and level the land 
left bare after hundreds of homes were pulled down‘ (ChronicleLive.co.uk, 23 April 
2010). 
The building had started on 1
st
 March 2011, a month before the HMR initiative cancellation, as the 
public private partnership, a joint venture between Newcastle City Council and developers Barratt, 
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Keepmoat and Yuill, was announced to have kick-started work in Scotswood where the residents 
had long been relocated. The £435 million Scotswood project was planned to eventually deliver 
1,800 high quality, eco-friendly family homes, schools, retail, leisure, commercial and community 
buildings, roads and drainage and utilities infrastructure over 15 years. The return of the original 
residents according to the R&R Team will not be possible even though 25% of the homes are 
planned to be affordable. According to the R&R Team, residents were eligible for resident support, 
financial assistance for relocation (or priority card in case of social tenants) only once.  
‗They would be moving back out of choice, rather than we would have set up to move 
them back. We move them once, then we build what we planned to build, next year, and 
then independently they can choose to move back into the area‘ (CS-YHN Relocation 
Team1).  
As the rebuilding of Scotswood started several years after all relocation had been completed, the 
residents would simply not be eligible to residential relocation assistance. In addition, FAPs to 
owner occupiers came with a condition of remaining in alternative property for five years. In other 
words, the residents who were among those who received and used the relocation grant and equity 
loan to move, were required to stay in their alternative property for at least five years, or are 
otherwise required to repay it to the council. Similar constraints are put on the residents who were 
relocated through the Homeswap option. 
According to the R&R Team social tenants moved to alternative council properties in Fenham 
neighbourhood, north from Scotswood, an area that was considered better than Scotswood among 
the locals:  
‗What we find in relocation team is a general rule of thumb, people don‘t tend to move 
more than 3 miles from where they live currently. People move at times much further but 
that‘s an exception. Generally, they tend to stay within 3 miles radius. People from 
Scotswood move to neighbourhoods like: Fenham …‘ (CS-YHN Relocation Team1).  
While the precise data about relocation outcomes, especially for owner occupiers and private 
tenants was unobtainable, the respondents‟ testimonies and media reports (including both local and 
the BNG media) suggested that the results varied. While some residents were relocated through the 
Homeswap scheme near their old neighbourhood this option was not widely available. Many of the 
original owner occupiers took equity loans in order to move, however this option did not guarantee 
them access to homes in close proximity to their old neighbourhood. The residents that have been 
interviewed for this research, the Scotswood Residents Association leader and the volunteers from 
the Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre who have been involved in the redevelopment process from 
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the days of Going for Growth, have been relocated through the council‟s „Homeswap‟ into the 
council refurbished properties just north of Scotswood, overlooking their old neighbourhood:  
„The whole package now is really good, it worked well for me, but not without an awful 
lot of heartache‟ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). 
Table 7-4: Scotswood residential relocation outcomes summary 
Owner 
Occupiers 
Relocated within three miles radius. Option used: grants at the beginning of the 
process; Homeswap, equity share when available. Homeswap allowed some 
residents to stay near to their old neighbours.  
Challenges included: uncertainty living long years in blight in half boarded-up 
streets, many of the residents ended up in a form of shared ownership.  
Social Tenants 
 
Relocated within three miles radius. Options used: relocated within ALMO 
stock, relocated through choice-based system. 
Challenges included long waiting lists, over demand for social housing, 
eligibility for smaller properties because the standards changed.  
Private tenants 
 
Largely undocumented. The private landlords have been accredited but there is 
doubt about the ability of the old residents to afford the accredited schemes. 
Offered to become social tenants, but many remain not eligible.  
7.5 The Walker Project: ‘Walker Promise’ and Walker Challenges  
The Walker neighbourhood is located east of the city centre, near the Tyne, in Newcastle‟s East 
End. It is situated between Welbeck Road and the banks of the River Tyne. Walker was the 
traditional home of the ship-building community. When the dockyards in the city declined, the 
neighbourhood experienced a significant economic and social downturn. Between 1971 and 2001 
Walker lost 41% of its population (NCC, 2007). There had been almost no new house building in 
the area for nearly 40 years, meaning that there were few opportunities for local young people to 
return and settle in the area as adults.  
In 2000, the National Index of Multiple Deprivation rated Walker as the most deprived ward within 
Newcastle. The decay had adverse effects on the remaining population. The council records show 
that by the turn of the century life expectancy in Walker was ten years lower than the city average. 
In 2005, the rate of Job Seeker‟s Allowance claims was 71% above the city average and 550 
households in every 1,000 received housing benefit compared to less than 300 per 1,000 across the 
city. Unemployment in Walker was double that in Newcastle as a whole and 3.5 times the national 
average (NCC 2007). But the community has kept a strong sense of identity; family ties remain 
strong and community groups attract high levels of voluntary activity. The area is predominantly 
white, around 90%.  
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The Walker ward has the highest proportion of social rented properties of any ward within a 
Pathfinder area in the north east of England. According to Census 2001, 73% of social housing was 
in local authority ownership (4,871 housing units in total), 5% was privately rented and 22% owner 
occupied (1,801 housing units, private rented and owner occupied combined). One of the key 
objectives of the Walker Riverside plans was changing the tenure ratio to 80% owner occupied and 
20% affordable (including both social rented and low cost home ownership). By February 2011, 
BNG had demolished 599 dwellings and acquired 189 (BNG, 2011). According to the Walker 
Riverside Action Plan, the demolition mainly affected Tyneside flats and maisonettes (86%) and 
less other types of accommodation; houses (5%), sheltered accommodation (8%) and bungalows 
(1%). While originally 1,700 dwellings were planned to be built (between 2003-2018) only 189 
had been completed by the end of the HMR programme. 497 homes have been refurbished (BNG, 
2011).  
 
Figure 7-11: Walker Arial View  
 
Source: Google Maps 2011. 
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7.5.1 Walker residential relocation processes  
The Walker project commenced after Scotswood. In many ways the approach to redevelopment in 
Walker was set up based on lessons the partners learnt in the case of Scotswood. For this reason, 
residential relocation processes at the commencement of this project were much more developed. 
The former Walker project leader recalls:  
‗In Walker, in a way, for that programme, we‘ve had a number of foundations in place, 
we‘ve got the Walker Promise, we had a relocation team to work with, we‘ve got the 
choice-based letting scheme in Newcastle, so if people want to move out of Walker they 
can and we were giving them a guarantee saying they could‘ (CS-NCC East Team2).  
This section examines residential relocation processes in Walker and the way their 
operationalisation shaped the outcomes in this project.  
7.5.1.1 Planning strategy  
Initially, Walker was a part of Newcastle City Council‟s Going for Growth initiative. The council 
envisaged mass demolition in this part of Newcastle as well. With the foundation of BNG the 
Walker neighbourhood (also referred to as „Walker Riverside‟), became a part of the Pathfinder‟s 
priority areas. However, the approach to the planning strategy was different to that in Scotswood. 
The planning strategy in Walker was designed around the existing community. The aim was to 
avoid mistakes made in Scotswood, the former director of Area Based Regeneration (NCC) in 
Walker recalled:  
‗Lots of lessons have been learnt from Scotswood. The amount of backlash the council 
had from the community and then didn‘t build anything back nobody would ever support 
that in Newcastle ever again. Regeneration is an expensive business it cannot be done on 
the cheap particularly if people are there. You have to design around them‘ (CS-PfP 
Team1). 
In 2002, Newcastle City Council contracted Places for People (RSL)
19
 to deliver the area action 
plan in Walker Riverside. At the time the NCC was quite understaffed according to the former 
planning officer (Walker). The Walker NCC team consisted of two, a planning director for Walker 
                                                     
19 Registered Social Landlord or RSL, is an alternative term for a „housing association‟ in the UK. RSLs are private, non-
profit making organisations that provide low-cost social housing for people in need of a home. Although independent 
they are regulated by the state and commonly receive public funding. They are now the UK‟s major providers of new 
housing for social (as well as in some cases private) rent. RSLs may also run shared ownerships schemes to help those 
who cannot afford to buy a home outright. In the recent years some of nationwide RSLs (such as Places for People 
working in Newcastle) have developed regeneration and planning services as well. They are often contracted by the local 
authorities to prepare plans, redevelopment strategies and conduct community engagement exercises; such was the case 
in Newcastle‟s Walker project.  
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and later a planning officer. A visionary in his own right, the NCC Planning Director for Walker 
(later Project Director in PfP) supported the PfP approach at the council. Places for People (PfP) 
set out to consult with the residents about the redesign of their neighbourhood in order to inform 
redevelopment plans, in effect to design around the community. The results of the community 
inquiry were used to finalise the submission of a draft area action plan. The interview with the PfP 
project director revealed an approach that facilitated inclusion of residential relocation as an 
integral part of the planning strategy in Walker:  
‗…[we collect] fine detail about their [residents‘] housing aspirations … and their 
affordability of those aspirations …. Then you have to take it away and work with 
partners to inform the development plan … so that if you have the confidence that 10 or 
20% of that community wants to stay together… This informs the tenure mix and informs 
the house types that we may need to prioritise in an early phase or at least build into the 
scheme so you can re-house people within the scheme … so that is what we did. Before 
you even get to drawing plans where houses go … You end up with building trust [with 
the community]… and overcoming that uncertainty. People are by and large fearful of 
change … you have to establish that trust through dialogue … long before planning 
application goes in … it is far too late then …‘ (CS-PfP Team1). 
Places for People took forward plans for the Walker Riverside area through their Development 
Framework Plan, released in November 2002. The Draft Walker Riverside Master Plan was 
accepted by Newcastle City Council for consultation in July 2003 and received final approval in 
2007. The plan set a long-term aim to build up to 1,780 new homes, and to replace up to 330 
occupied social rented dwellings (NCC 2007:1). High standards for new developments were 
adopted by the partners following intensive work with CABE. All homes were designed to meet 
lifetime homes standards.
20
 Alongside the housing redevelopment, a new neighbourhood centre 
„Heart of Walker‟ was planned, with new shops, leisure facilities and a new building for the 
primary school, over the period 2006 until 2021. 
Published in 2006, the „Walker Promise‟ is a precedent in the HMR framework and was designed 
specifically for the issues of residential relocation. The document was one of the outputs of 
community consultation, and it was made in order to help the residents and the partners navigate 
through the complex governance structure in Walker in the process of residential relocation 
delivery. The Walker Promise introduction states:  
                                                     
20 „Lifetime‟ homes are homes incorporating 16 design criteria that can be universally applied to new homes at minimal 
cost. Many local planning polices in the UK require the Lifetime Homes standard in new developments. Good design, in 
this context, is considered to be design that maximises utility, occupiers‟ independence and quality of life, while not 
compromising other design issues such as aesthetic or cost effectiveness. Housing that is designed to the Lifetime Homes 
Standard is aimed to be convenient for most occupants, including some (but not all) wheelchair users and disabled 
visitors, without the necessity for substantial alterations.  
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‗The Promise is a written statement that describes how the Partners involved in the 
regeneration programme for Walker Riverside will work with you if you are affected as a 
result of areas of housing being identified for redevelopment. This Promise includes 
information for residents, community and voluntary organisations, and local businesses 
within the seven neighbourhoods identified in the Walker Riverside Options Report‘ 
(Walker Promise, 2005:2). 
The document „promises‟ affected residents that they will be supported to achieve their housing 
aspirations in the relocation process, both if they wish to remain in the project area and if they want 
to move elsewhere. It also included a commitment to allow residents to remain living close to 
neighbourhoods and in existing social networks where possible. In order to achieve this, a staged 
approach to redevelopment was devised. Contrary to the approach in Scotswood, the PfP strategy 
was to prevent local people from being displaced by demolition. Former Project Leader at NCC 
explained: 
‘The approach was that we wanted to really take the community with us … we decided 
what we wanted to do is basically have them involved in the whole project, so we would 
clear some land, build some houses and move some of the community in, then knock their 
houses down, build some more houses, move the next lot of community in, but what that 
did, I think we underestimated how much time that would take.‘ (CS-NCC East Team2)  
In each stage between 50 and 100 homes were planned to be cleared and rebuilt. Wherever 
possible, open or cleared sites would be developed first to allow relocation.  
7.5.1.2 Community involvement  
As shown in the previous section, community involvement and consultation from the start was at 
the heart of planning strategy in Walker. The community consultation exercise consisted of 
extensive community consultation that lasted over two years. It was based on Arnstein‟s Ladder of 
Participation, which clearly differentiated between occasions where residents were being informed, 
consulted and were invited to participate. In addition, PfP set up an information centre in the 
neighbourhood. A full-time Community Engagement team was based on site within an information 
centre, providing local people with up-to-date information on all aspects of the programme. The 
planning officer at NCC recalled:  
‗There was a lot wider involvement … we did loads of involvement… It was a huge effort; 
it was over and above what was normally done … At the time the Community 
Engagement Team were doing the hands-on community work, so they were in a mobile 
temporary hut down the Cambrian and they were fielding people‘s concerns about 
programmes that they have on a day to day basis.‘ (CS-NCC East Team1).  
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The intensive consultation and engagement with the community enabled the partners, notably PfP 
and the small NCC team to develop in-depth knowledge about the community in Walker. What 
they found was that the community in Walker was varied. Whilst some street areas were made of 
tight-knit communities such as the Cambrian, others were more transient. This knowledge 
influenced the residential relocation strategy (Walker Promise), and options were designed for 
those residents who expressed a wish to stay in Walker and those who preferred to leave and find 
an alternative property somewhere else in Newcastle.  
It needs to be stressed however, that while the community was extensively consulted in Walker, 
unlike the community in Scotswood, Walker residents did not have decision-making power, 
something which later reflected on the operationalisation of Walker Promise.  
7.5.1.3 Alternative property provision 
In contrast to the case in Scotswood, in Walker alternative property provision for residential 
relocation was a planned as a part of the planning strategy and the relocation specific Walker 
Promise. Detailed information about the community affected by Walker plans, allowed NCC and 
PfP to plan for alternative property provision in Walker strategically. The alternative property 
provision was designed for two types of relocatee from Walker (a) those who expressed a wish to 
leave Walker and relocate somewhere else (b) those residents who wished to stay in Walker.  
Residents who wished to leave Walker were offered FAPs (see next section). The social tenants 
were able to relocate through the Choice Based Letting System with a priority card. This allowed 
them access to social housing offered by nine local housing associations in Newcastle. This is how 
the Walker Resident Network representatives (relocated residents themselves) perceived the 
reactions of some of their counterparts:  
„As soon as some of them found out that you got a home loss payment, what was it then 
£3,000 and something? It was a lot of money to some of them, never seen that much 
money, you know what I mean, if they‟ve never worked. Some of them would measure it 
in how many cans they could get, they‟d think “oh, I‟m away, I‟m moving off that estate” 
„cos they had what you called the priority card, they could move away. They had to be re-
housed because they were part of a regeneration area, they could move wherever they 
wanted, they could argue and stick for Walker but some of them moved ...‟ (CS-Resident 
Walker1). 
Private tenants were offered social housing in the local ALMO (YHN). In addition, the Walker 
Promise, made a difference to the properties they could access. Namely, it stated that all relocatees 
regardless of tenure would be offered a „like for like‟ property.  
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The residents who expressed a wish to stay in the neighbourhood went through a different process 
(owner occupiers and social tenants). After the consultation was over these residents were offered 
new built „lifetime standard‟ properties. Wherever possible open or cleared sites would be 
developed first to allow one-stop decanting (social tenants) or re-housing (owner occupiers). The 
alternative properties were provided by private developers. PfP and NCC made an agreement with 
preferred developer Belway to provide 20% of agreed affordable properties at the beginning of the 
redevelopment process in order to cater for relocations in Walker. The relocatees were further 
consulted about the precise location of their alternative property. One of the residents relocated in 
this way described the way the residential relocation process was carried out in her street:  
‗We [residents] said ‗right we want to stay here … So, there was a plot preference, so we 
as a group off the Cambrian went … you go up and had a plot preference and you could 
pick what plot. They basically put the old estate down on a map and they put a new estate 
on the top of it so you could see where you lived then and where you would like to live, 
you had a choice of three. This happened over a period of months‘ (CS-Resident 
Walker1). 
An early success at Walker Riverside was the Cambrian Estate. This was a small estate of 84 
homes towards the eastern end of Walker. A decision was taken early on to demolish and rebuild 
with 143 new homes to be built for sale and rent. Bellway built 40% of these, they were affordable 
housing to re-house the existing community. This provided a one-move solution. The new 
properties were built on an empty piece of land (that had been cleared sometime in the 1990s) in 
close proximity to the old estate. Only when the residents were moved across the street into the 
new development, was the Cambrian demolished. The residents from the old Cambrian Estate were 
moved across the street to a new development before their old estate was even demolished.  
However, even though alternative property provision in Walker was meticulously planned early on 
it faced challenges in the operationalisation stage; this influenced the extent to which the preferred 
solutions were available.  
7.5.1.4 Financial assistance packages  
At the time the Walker project relocation commenced, the FAPs were defined in BNG based on the 
Scotswood experience. The BNG „Housing Policy for Home Ownership‟ (BNG, 2006) was in 
place. Therefore, the residents in Walker projects did not face the difficulties that their counterparts 
in Scotswood had in regards to financial assistance for residential relocation.  
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It has to be appreciated that the intervention in Walker mainly affected social tenants. There were 
fewer than 100 owner occupiers affected by the intervention. Around half of the owner occupiers 
in Walker stayed in their neighbourhood using the new built option that was offered to them in 
exchange for FAPs they were eligible for. 
7.5.1.5 Resident support  
Similarly to the case of FAPs, resident support was established in Newcastle before the Walker 
project implementation commenced. YHN‟s Resettlement and Relocation Team was fully 
operational and had already accumulated considerable experience in Scotswood relocation. The 
residents interviewed for this research reported that the R&R Team was very helpful in guiding 
them through the process and helped them relocate to property they wanted.  
In addition in the first stages of the Walker project implementation PfP also established an 
information desk in the area, that had an aim to help relocatees through the process. The residents, 
some of whom were initially wary about the new plans, welcomed the approach:  
‗Oh, I‘ll tell you what they‘ve put out, at the top of Church Street they had these 
Portakabins for an information centre which was run by Places for People, it was the 
best thing they‘ve ever done because if anybody had any queries in Walker, you could go 
in there and say ―do you know what‘s happening on my area of Walker?‖ and they could 
tell them straightaway‘ (CS- Resident Walker 1).  
7.5.2 Operationalisation of the ‘Walker Promise’ and residential relocation outcomes  
The Audit Commission publicised the Walker Promise as a good practice example of the preferred 
way of doing relocation in HMR. However, the implementation of the Walker Promise was not 
without challenges. In fact, what promised to be a breakthrough residential relocation practice 
ended up in delays and broken promises.  
It has to be appreciated that the governance arrangements in Walker were much more complex 
than those in Scotswood. While in Scotswood, NCC envisaged to lead the whole operation in-
house, in Walker the tasks were delegated to other actors.  
 In order to deliver this ambitious plan a separate Walker Riverside regeneration partnership was 
formed with a distinct governance structure, project board and delivery team. Walker Riverside 
was a partnership between Newcastle City Council, Places for People, local community networks 
(Walker Riverside Community Network), English Partnerships, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead 
Pathfinder, the Housing Corporation, the voluntary sector, the business sector, and OneNE. Co-
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optees were private developers Bellway Homes, Emblem Homes, E5, and Government Office 
North East. Partner organisations formed the Walker Riverside project board (formed in January 
2005), which took strategic decisions about the regeneration area (NCC 2007). It is worth pointing 
out that the Walker Riverside Project Partnership operated as a sub-partnership in BNG. In other 
words, while some actors such as NCC or English Partnerships were involved in Walker at the 
BNG level, others such as Bellway or Places for People were responsible and took decisions solely 
relating to the specific project of Walker Riverside. In this environment the operationalisation of 
the Walker Promise proved to be more complex than envisaged. 
The interviews with former Walker planning officer, planning director and project leader, and the 
Walker Riverside Community Network representatives, revealed that there were four main 
challenges that hampered the implementation of the Walker Promise and shaped the final output in 
Walker and residential relocation outcomes.  
7.5.2.1 Walker Promise complexity  
Residential relocation based on plot preference and phased development turned out to be more 
complex than initially envisaged. While the residents were able to pick a plot for their alternative 
property, this choice was at times at odds with the choice and wish of other residents affected by 
relocation. These issues have had a knock-on effect on development phasing and contributed to 
redevelopment delays. The Walker project leader who was in charge of organising relocation 
recalls:  
‗Now, human nature being human nature ... Mrs Jones might decide ―well, actually I 
want that bungalow up there‖ and that would probably be phase 4 but we need her house 
to build phase 1, how on earth are we gonna do that? … We‘ve got to move her out of the 
house and move her into a house on the understanding that she‘ll move back … house 
where they‘ve built 3 years down the road … and that‘s the bit that the residents get 
frustrated at, ―it‘s 3 years down the road if I‘m gonna get the house that I wanted, 
although I‘ve already picked it‖. The whole thing is about trying to make those times knit 
and when it comes to residents being given their preference match, human nature being 
what it is, you‘re not gonna get them all to pick the bungalows in order, so you‘ve got to 
try and manage that whole thing as well, so that has a knock-on effect … and you end up 
with people having to move twice‘ (CS-NCC East Team2). 
The complexity of the owner occupiers‟ relocation phases based on their aspirations and 
preferences had a knock-on effect on private developers‟ behaviour. The private developers 
entrusted to deliver the affordable homes for relocation were not always in a position, or willing, to 
follow the complex allocation and reallocation system. The situation resulted in tension between 
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the residents and the private developers entrusted to deliver their homes for re-housing. A 
Cambrian resident group resident recalls:  
‗Michel […] he worked for E5, he was a great guy to talk to and we had this meeting and 
he said ―obviously, there‘s people who‘ve picked a plot and we can‘t build that plot until 
you move‖. Well I knew straightaway who he was getting at, it was us and our 
neighbour. We had to move from Bernard Street over to Malaya Drive in a brand new 
house, temporarily, till they pulled our block down so they could build these‘ (CS-
Resident Walker2). 
Involvement of the individual households in the process, each one with their own plot preferences, 
housing aspirations and a clear view of the neighbours they wished and wished not to live next to, 
contributed to low output in practice.  
In 2007, a BNG Newsletter proudly advertised that the first 27 homes in Walker were completed 
and that the first residents were relocated into new homes built to „lifetime standards‟. Walker 
Resident Network representatives interviewed for this research, as homeowners, were relocated 
into new bungalows of their preference near their old neighbours. According to their testimony 
90% of their neighbours who wished to stay in Walker were able to do so. At the time of the visit 
to their new „lifetime standard‟ home, the residents seemed to be content with the relocation 
outcome and proud of their input in the plans but critical of the limited output of the partners and 
the delays that caused to some of their counterparts.  
7.5.2.2 The ALMO’s political ambitions  
The relocation of the social tenants was not without its challenges either. In 2004, a year after BNG 
was set up, Newcastle City Council transferred the management of its stock to their Arms Length 
Organisation (ALMO). Your Homes Newcastle ALMO took over the management of 29,000 
tenanted local authority properties. In Walker, this meant that 73% of all housing was now under 
ALMO management. This organisation was now legally responsible for decanting the council‟s 
residents in the event of demolition.  
However, quite soon after the council stock transfer to Your Homes Newcastle, YHN management 
began to lobby against demolition. Demolition in Walker meant an income loss for the new 
organisation for three reasons. First, Walker council residents were planned to be relocated though 
a Choice Based Letting System to other housing organisations therefore YHN lost rental income 
coming from these residents. Second, as an ALMO, YHN was legally obliged to decant its 
residents and bear the costs of decanting. Third, as the BNG goal was to reduce the number of 
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social housing units, the ALMO did not have the right to build new properties and recover some of 
its costs. At the same time the ALMO became eligible for government funding to refurbish its 
stock to meet decent homes standards. Quite soon after the council stock transfer to Your Homes 
Newcastle, the organisation produced evidence suggesting that demand for social housing had 
changed since the launch of HMR and that there was now much more demand for it. The following 
is what the former NCC planning officer for Newcastle City Council reported:  
‗The organisation [ALMO] … it felt … started to struggle with over demand for social 
housing, too much demand. And was starting to be very resistant to demolition and also it 
was getting millions of pounds of stock improvement so there was actually a political 
rivalry going on between the officers of Your Homes Newcastle and the officers in the 
Regeneration Directorate …. Where we really couldn‘t work out what was going on half 
of the time … All this stuff about increased demand, how much of it actually has any 
substance … Trying to get our head around the validity of the figures, and was this just a 
bid in order to increase the number that Your Homes Newcastle had … an increase of the 
organisation‘s influence or something like that … so there was a lot of suspicion going 
on between these two sides and then from their side there were certain [Newcastle City 
Council] officers who weren‘t into demolition and disagreed with it …‘ (CS-NCC East 
Team1). 
The ALMO, which was initially not a part of the decision-making process, was now lobbying 
against demolition and for expansion of the council stock, a goal that was at odds with the HMR 
framework and BNG‟s goals. The political rivalry led to delays in the delivery of the Walker 
regeneration and had a knock-on effect on relocation in the social rented sector. 
The financial crisis that started in 2007 helped one actor: the ALMO. The increased need for social 
housing became a nationally accepted fact. By 2011, YHN secured itself the right for new building. 
According to their new built offer available in 2011, the ALMO took over several sites (among 
them properties that were initially planned to be for sale) that were built or were in preparation to 
be built in BNG redevelopment areas, for example: Byker – Bolam Coyne; Elswick – Bristol 
Terrace; Fenham – Reedsmouth Nursery; Walkergate – Fossway; and Walker – Greenford Road 
(YHN, 2011). 
7.5.2.3 Political rivalry and indecision  
The complexity of the Walker Promise delivery was not the only factor that hampered Walker 
Promise relocation ambitions. In June 2004, just a year after it was founded, BNG‟s work in 
Newcastle was shaken to the core. In June the same year, the Labour administration that had ruled 
Newcastle for over thirty years and won the HMR bid for the city, lost the local elections. Liberal 
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Democrats, who had lobbied against demolition and heavily criticised their opponent‟s plans, took 
power.  
By early 2005, changes started to take place in the BNG Partnership. In September 2005, Leo Finn, 
the BNG Board Chair, announced he was stepping down. This was followed by BNG‟s director 
resigning the following November. The same year substantial restructuring took place in 
Newcastle City Council. Just hours after their victory, the Liberal Democrats symbolically declared 
that the Going for Growth plans (that HMR was now funding) would be scrapped. After initial 
pride in their bold claims, the party changed its mind, as it was realised that the move would result 
in the loss of lavish HMR funding.  
While the plans were kept, the change of local government somehow translated into a change of 
ownership of the Walker Riverside plans. What was to follow was a period of rivalry between the 
political parties, challenging the goals and objectives inherited from the previous administration, 
especially questioning the scale of and justification for demolition in priority areas. In Walker, in 
the words of one of the planning officers:  
‗It‘s a bloody nightmare … We put a lot of time in trying to manage the political situation 
because it‘s a bloody nightmare in Walker just simply because the members tend to be in 
opposition to everything so I‘d put a planning application in for 25 shiny houses on 
there, even if some of them are socially rented they‘ll object. We‘ve got most of our 
Planning Acts though by a wing and a prayer and I really mean that … just simply 
because they feel they have to object because it is not their policy, it‘s Liberal Policy … 
so regardless whether it would be good for Walker to have all these new shiny facilities 
… as far as the Labour members are concerned, it‘s a Liberal policy and they‘ll object. 
They accuse us of social engineering … it‘s what they usually say to us‘ (CS-NCC East 
Team2). 
In other words, after the council was taken over by the Liberal Democrats, the Labour councillors 
objected to the plans even though these had been set up (especially demolition) by their own party 
in 1999. The demolition planned in „Going for Growth‟ under Labour‟s reign now equalled „social 
engineering‟ in the eyes of the same Labour councillors only because the council was now under 
Liberal Democrat control. The situation was frustrating for the residents who, after years of 
consultation, bargaining and negotiation, had agreed to the scale of demolition acceptable to them, 
each picked their preferred plot and looked forward to be relocated into new homes in Walker:  
‗And we were in the middle waiting for things to happen, it was very political. It was 
terrible, so you would go to the meeting and you‘d have a Labour Councillor saying, ―I 
don‘t agree with that‖ and I was saying ―well, why not‖… ―Oh, no, that wouldn‘t work‖ 
and so it was delayed, it was political, y‘know … this [name] took it over and he said 
―oh, things aren‘t working the way they should work‖ and he was gonna dissolve it, so 
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he said. He stopped in February and we as community reps said ―you have no authority 
to stop that [the project], we need a meeting to see what‘s going on‖ and he just said 
‗well, I ―don‘t think it‘s working and we‘re doing away with it but will get something 
else‖‘ (CS-Resident Walker1). 
Residents‟ frustration was shared by the practitioners who were tasked to deliver the Walker 
Regeneration project and residential relocation. By the time of the inquiry the Walker Planning 
Director, his assistant planning officer and the Walker project leader, a group of practitioners of 
vision and extraordinary commitment to the community they felt they were meant to provide a 
service to, had all resigned and left Newcastle City Council. The political changes resulted in over 
18 months‟ delay in project implementation. According to the Resettlement and Relocation Team 
working with the residents on a day-to-day basis, it was not the decision to demolish that was a 
problem in Walker but indecision about it.  
7.5.2.4 Private developers walk off site 
In Walker new housing provision was entrusted entirely to private sector developers. The 
agreement between the council and developers obliged the house builders to provide 20% of 
affordable housing in Walker. The affordable housing was planned for relocation and for this 
reason these properties were planned to be delivered at the beginning of the regeneration process.  
An early success at Walker Riverside was the Cambrian Estate that was built by Bellway. New 
homes were provided to the social tenants and these relocated before their old estate was 
demolished. However, because of the political tensions between the stakeholders in Walker, 
indecision and complexity of the Walker Promise relocation operationalisation, not many homes 
were delivered. A Cambrian resident lucky enough to have been relocated to one of the finished 
properties pointed out:  
‗Bellway, who‘s the builder, the City Council and Places for People who were actually 
running the thing and as I say they were put in place in 2002 … 2010 coming up very 
soon, and all they‘ve built is these here, they built 27 along there, they were all for rent 
and before that…‘ (CS- Resident Walker 1).  
In 2008 building across the Pathfinders as well as in BNG had stopped because of the global 
financial crisis. Bellway the private developer faced the harsh reality of not being able to sell its 
commercial properties in Walker. The inability to sell homes for owner occupiers meant that the 
promised affordable units planned for relocation in subsequent stages could not be delivered. A 
Cambrian estate resident remembers the day everyone walked off the site:  
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‗John came and said everybody had walked off site who were in here. The lad we knew 
that worked for Bellway, he was a labourer …We moved in September, no we moved in in 
the June and that first September, everybody left the site and everything just stopped. It 
was the same at Riversgate, the credit crunch, and then people say ―what‘s happening?‖ 
and I say ―oh, they‘re starting phase 2 soon‖ ―oh, I‘ll believe that when it happens‖… 
They are awaiting a bungalow further over, but because they said they were building 
here for the next people that are waiting to be re-housed, the rented accommodation, he‘s 
getting the one next to us when it‘s built, they‘re starting anytime now. They‘re supposed 
to be on site this week, but they‘re changing a gas main or something...‘ (CS- Resident 
Walker 1). 
In 2012, the commercial properties that were built in Walker two years before were still on the 
market. Bellway was offering residents from elsewhere in the country free relocation in order to 
increase their chance of sale. An inability to sell commercial properties resulted in halting new 
building for relocation as well. Alternative property provision in Walker provided ‗fabulous‘ (CS-
Walker Resident1) relocation outcomes for some residents (e.g. the Cambrian Estate), while others 
were left in temporary accommodation uncertain of when and whether they would be able to 
complete the move. 
By 2008, the original NCC Walker team that designed the Walker Promise had resigned, Bellway 
had walked off the site, Places for People closed its information centre, and the residents were left 
in limbo despite a fine-grained and well-intentioned relocation strategy. In January 2010, when the 
last stage of the BNG case study was conducted, some of the Walker residents were still waiting to 
be relocated, others were in temporary accommodation hopeful that their homes would be finished 
in the near future. The council was paying their rent. The closing interviews with BNG staff 
revealed that only around 150 new homes had been built in Walker, while over 599 were 
demolished. Overall the results were limited. What promised to be a model relocation attempt 
turned into disappointment for both residents and partners involved.  
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Table 7-5: Walker residential relocation outcomes 
Owner 
Occupiers 
Around 30 households were relocated into new „lifetime standard‟ homes.  
Challenges: Limited output, many remain in temporary accommodation. 
Unsuccessful housing provision had left some residents disappointed because 




The Cambrian Estate residents were relocated in new properties.  
Residents from more transient estates were happy to leave the area.  
The residents who expressed the wish to stay in the neighbourhood were 
enabled to do so. In the new developments (new streets) some old neighbours 
were re-housed next to one another according to their wishes. 
Challenges: Some of them were eligible only for smaller apartments as their 
condition was reassessed and the NCC housing standards changed; long 
waiting lists and delays because of the ALMO‟s opposition to demolition.  
Private 
tenants 
Largely undocumented. The percentage of private tenants in Walker was very 
small. The residents were offered to become social tenants where applicable.  
 
7.6 The Bensham and Saltwell project: SAVE Britain’s Heritage  
The Bensham and Saltwell neighbourhoods are considered one by the local population. They are 
situated across the river in Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council, the second BNG local 
authority partner. Bensham and Saltwell is an inner urban neighbourhood in Gateshead. It is 
situated in the west of central Gateshead and south of the River Tyne. The area has been known for 
its limited choice of housing options and poor quality. Pre-1919 older terraced houses and flats 
provide 88% of the available stock. Although there is considerable variety within the terraced 
form, there is still an unusual dominance of flats (42%), compared to 13% average for the North 
East and 20% average for England (GVA Grimley, 2006). Owner occupation is quite high in 
comparison to Scotswood and Walker in Newcastle and was standing at 48%, according to the 
2001 Census. The area has particularly high levels of private renting, 29% on average. The 2001 
Census indicates that there are concentrations of private renting activity within the neighbourhood 
where this tenure exceeds 40% and even 60% of the stock (GVA Grimley, 2006). High levels of 
private renting seem consistent with a relatively large ethnic minority population that normally 
cannot afford to buy or is not eligible for social housing (Allen & Rosenfeld, 2010). The 
neighbourhood has a diverse population, with large Jewish and Muslim communities. In 
comparison to its northern counterparts, Scotswood and Walker, this BNG priority area did not 
seem to have lost as much population. The Census 1991 and 2001 indicated a loss of around 12% 
population between 1991 and 2001. 
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 Figure 7-12: Bensham Arial Views  
 
Source: BNG Business Plan 2008-9 
By February 2011, some 405 properties had been acquired, and only 119 demolished. The 
demolition of the acquired properties and new building (total number of new built units was 11) 
was held up because of the intervention of national campaign group, SAVE Britain‟s Heritage 
(BNG, 2011:20).  
7.6.1 Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation processes  
The case of Bensham and Saltwell does not provide evidence about relocation outcomes nor 
residential relocation processes (based on evidence available at the time of inquiry). However, it is 
included in this study in order to make a different point that is equally important for examining 
residential relocation practice. Earlier in this thesis, it was argued that the processes shaping 
residential relocation are set in motion only when agreement about demolition is reached by all 
partners. In the absence of agreement about demolition residential relocation cannot start. Bensham 
and Saltwell‟s case is the example that supports this argument. It shows the SAVE Britain‟s 
Heritage (third sector actor) intervention and the impact of this on residential relocation practice.  
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7.6.1.1 Planning strategy  
The Bensham and Saltwell (B&S) neighbourhood in Gateshead has been subject to regeneration 
interventions prior to BNG. In 1996, a Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) programme was 
approved to halt decline and poverty in the area. The SRB was linked to the Capital Challenge 
programme within the overall context of the Area Regeneration Strategy, and the two were co-
ordinated to ensure that a range of concerns in the area was addressed. These initiatives focused on 
social regeneration and did not give sufficient results, according to the officials.  
In 2003 Gateshead Council put Bensham and Saltwell forward as the primary intervention area 
within the BNG framework. The housing market was seen to be failing because of limited choice 
and poor quality in housing, in which vulnerable socio-economic groups tended to live.  
After the foundation of BNG, Gateshead Council contracted out neighbourhood planning and part 
of the community consultation to private consultants. GVA Grimley, in association with Social 
Regeneration Consultants (SRC), Nathaniel Litchfield and Partners, delivered the plan in February 
2006.  
In December 2005, a preferred plan for Bensham and Saltwell was circulated to residents. A total 
of 440 properties were proposed to be demolished which represented around 5% of the total 
housing stock in the Bensham and Saltwell area. The properties to be cleared were within those 
areas identified as exhibiting the greatest characteristics of housing market instability (GVA 
Grimley, 2006:23). According to these plans over 70% of the 550 residents who were involved in 
the planning process agreed to the changes proposed in their neighbourhood (GVA Grimley, 
2006:17). 
The planning approach in Bensham and Saltwell was similar to the one in Walker in general terms. 
First, the demolition was planned only after the plans for redevelopment were completed and the 
Council had a clear vision of the future development goal. Second, the demolition was confirmed 
only after consultation with the residents in the area. Third, a phased or a staged approach was 
adopted. A planning strategy was designed to accommodate phased relocation. This meant that the 
area was sub-divided into manageable projects. According to the responses of the Gateshead 
Council Neighbourhood Manager responsible for relocation, demolition and relocation were 
planned at the scale of a block of houses rather than street or neighbourhood. GVA plans were 
drafted based on the availability of relocation support, financial assistance and the Homeswap 
option for re-housing (GVA Grimley, 2006:21).  
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7.6.1.2 Community involvement  
The planning in Bensham and Saltwell started with large-scale consultation. In Gateshead the 
preparation of Neighbourhood Action Plans involved consultation with local residents, community 
groups, local voluntary organisations, businesses and other stakeholders such as churches, schools 
and service providers. Targeted consultation had been undertaken with specific groups such as 
school children and the Jewish community. BNG estimated that over 4,000 people had been 
involved in the process (CAG, 2006:8). The council took the role of informing the residents about 
the plans:  
‗We didn‘t want to go in to the community just saying: ―whether you like it or not we are 
demolishing your street‖. It was never about that. It was about building a story. This is 
what is wrong with your neighbourhood, why it is going wrong, what happens if we don‘t 
do anything … giving them all the factors … then options are produced and community is 
consulted again. We have gone back again and again about 4 or 5 times‘ (CS-GH MBC 
Team1). 
In addition to statutory consultation, the street representatives had been chosen, and a series of 
small workshops were held with the community between January and March 2005 to ascertain 
residents‟ views on the key issues and opportunities for the area (GVA Grimley, 2006).  
7.6.1.3 Financial assistance packages  
At the time of inquiry, the financial assistance packages for relocation were set at the Pathfinder 
level. „Financial Options for Homeownership Policy‟ (BNG, 2006) set the FAPs for the entire 
Pathfinder and these were made available in Gateshead. The Neighbourhood Management team 
was entrusted with their distribution to the residents. At the time of inquiry not many FAPs had 
been taken up as the relocation was delayed by SAVE Britain‟s Heritage objection to the council‟s 
demolition plans. 
7.6.1.4 Resident support  
Differently from Newcastle where resident support was provided by the local ALMO, in Gateshead 
this service was provided by Gateshead Council‟s Neighbourhood Management team. In contrast 
to the R&R Team, the team in Gateshead had a long-standing presence in the Bensham and 
Saltwell neighbourhood and had extensive knowledge about the community before HMR 
implementation commenced in the area. In Gateshead, perhaps differently than in Newcastle, the 
Neighbourhood Management team seemed to have more input into the development phasing in 
terms of relocation matters. This influence may have been down to the fact that the Neighbourhood 
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
217 
 
Team was a part of Gateshead MBC and in close working relationship with the planning 
department. The development phases were designed in consultation with Neighbourhood 
Management who had fine-grained insight into the population in Bensham and Saltwell due to their 
long presence in the area. Their strategy, according to the interviews, included tackling those areas 
that were most problematic and where people expressed the wish to relocate. The manager of this 
unit interviewed for this research pointed out:  
‗Who wants to move? Generally our team knows that because they have been working 
with the community … So we started with the pocket with worst housing, the most voids, 
most problems, which is a logical place to start … Till now we haven‘t had difficulties in 
who wants to go, because people pretty much have wanted to go‘ (CS-GH MBC- 
Neighbourhood Team1).  
In terms of residential relocation support the Team in Gateshead provided similar support to its 
counterpart the YHN Resettlement and Relocation Team in Newcastle. Gateshead Council‟s 
Neighbourhood Management team manager said in her interview for this study:  
‗This [resident support] can involve anything, organising the removal, paying the 
disturbance, informing them [the residents] on time scales … We help them find suitable 
alternative accommodations. This is irrespective of their tenure. We really are the 
signposting section … if we don‘t manage it, we‘ll enable it to happen … When they [the 
residents] don‘t know where to come to they come to us‘ (CS-GH MBC- Neighbourhood 
Team1).  
However, as the redevelopment in this project was delayed and halted by SAVE Britain‟s Heritage 
group, the primary function of the Team was distributing information about the process. The Team 
manager reported that the residents who were interested in relocating from the neighbourhood (and 
were delayed by SAVE‟s intervention) needed special attention and help with the process as the 
Council‟s attention had been shifted from relocation to approval of the plans.  
7.6.1.5 Alternative property provision  
While alternative property provision in Bensham and Saltwell was envisaged though a staged 
approach to redevelopment outlined in the planning strategy, it was not carried out because of the 
delays caused by the intervention of SAVE Britain‟s Heritage group. As stated earlier, by February 
2011 only 11 housing units had been built. Alternative property provision for social tenants was 
secured through the local ALMO. The social tenants were relocated to available social housing.  
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7.6.2 Bensham and Saltwell: SAVE Britain’s homes and relocation halt.  
At the time of inquiry Gateshead Council was going through a legal battle with SAVE Britain‟s 
Heritage. This group, as many others that were active during the implementation of the Housing 
Market Renewal across Pathfinders, ideologically opposed demolition of English terraced houses 
that characterise post-industrial inner cities in England. SAVE has been campaigning for historic 
buildings since its formation in 1975 by a group of architects, journalists and planners. As such 
they can be categorised as a third sector organisation. While not having a stake in the area, SAVE 
appealed against the Gateshead BNG plans on the basis of incomplete planning documentation. It 
argued that the prior approval document was incomplete as it had not considered the need for an 
Environmental Impact Assessment. This led to re-examination of the plans by the government‟s 
Office for the North East. 
As a result the plans and the development had been halted. At the time of inquiry, the respondents 
representing Gateshead MBC suspected that the group wished to delay the HMR implementation 
in the area until the partnership ran out of funding, ironically, two years afterwards this became 
reality. In July 2011, three months after HMR had been cancelled on a national level, the Evening 
Chronicle published that the Bensham and Saltwell revamp plan had finally been unveiled. This 
came after a bitter legal battle with SAVE Britain‟s Heritage, that opposed the demolition that had 
been proposed in the 2006 Bensham and Saltwell Neighbourhood Action Plan, was completed 
(GVA Grimley, 2006).  
In Bensham and Saltwell, the relocation process was delayed for the residents effectively before it 
began. In terms of residential relocation research this case as well as similar ones is important for 
two reasons. First, it shows that a third sector organisation with no stake in an area can 
significantly delay the process, in fact that without agreement about demolition residential 
relocation cannot proceed as planned. Second, it needs to be appreciated that the focus of the group 
was not on the residents but on the buildings that need to be saved according to SAVE‟s 
perspective. It is important to emphasise that not all residents agreed with their ideology (as much 
as not all residents stood by the council‟s plans). 
SAVE did not conduct community consultation about their plans or intentions. The reality is that 
this group did not consult the affected community about their plans; it set out to convince it. 
Clearly there were residents opposing demolition, but there were also those who wished to take the 
statutory compensation and available assistance to leave the area. These residents saw demolition 
and relocation as the opportunity to move out of old council properties in Gateshead into better 
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accommodation. In Bensham and Saltwell in contrast to the Scotswood case where the community 
and third sector protests led to improvement of the residential relocation process for the affected 
residents, SAVE‟s intervention led to confusion among the residents.  
The council‟s clearance work in the areas progressed in the meantime, but not following the plans 
for phases, rather avoiding areas that were under SAVE‟s scrutiny and under Gateshead‟s 
ownership. Despite the fact that much more support for residential relocation was available in this 
neighbourhood than in Scotswood (especially in the first years) the results were much more 
concerning in Gateshead. The residents whose neighbourhoods were earmarked for demolition, 
continued living in half demolished and half boarded up streets not only during the BNG period but 
after HMR cancellation when regeneration work was stopped in its tracks (April, 2011). Residents 
whose homes were earmarked for demolition found themselves in a difficult situation. The delays 
caused by SAVE‟s intervention and the cancellation of the HMR initiative, meant that much of the 
residential relocation support that was organised and secured through BNG was no longer 
available, however because of the plans the value of their homes was more devalued than before 
HMR had commenced in the area. As the result they felt that they were stuck in the area without 
hope of being able to leave (Inside Housing, 2011). 
This example also shows the wide variety of residents and third sector actors that may influence 
residential relocation by delaying demolition, regardless of whether the residents in the 
intervention area wish for it or not. Therefore, the example raises questions about the role of the 
third sector in the relocation process, and their power and right to stop, delay or cancel relocation 
(for those who wish for it). 
 
Table 7-6: Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation outcomes 
Owner 
Occupiers 
At the time of inquiry one show home for Homeswap was completed.  




Social tenants were decanted from the council‟s properties. The relocation was 
local, within their own ward or a neighbouring ward.  
The community kept together by plan. 
Private 
tenants 
The relocation was delayed with the purchase of the properties due to delay of 
the plans.  
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7.7 Conclusion  
This chapter examined residential relocation practice in three BNG priority areas using the 
„Residential Relocation Matrix‟ (five processes identified in this research). It showed that that the 
approach to relocation in BNG Pathfinder differed between two councils: Newcastle and 
Gateshead, as well as within the councils‟ schemes. A procedural approach to residential relocation 
analysis pointed out the complexity and dynamics of residential relocation practice on Pathfinder 
level.  
Scotswood, Walker, and Bensham and Saltwell projects in BNG Pathfinder suggest that relocation 
processes emerged and changed at different rates and in different directions. In doing so these 
created time and context-dependent residential relocation practices that shaped residential 
relocation outcomes on project scale. Table 7-7 : Summary of Scotswood residential relocation 
processes; Table 7-8: Summary of Walker residential relocation processes; Table 7-9: Summary of 
Bensham & Saltwell Residential Relocation Processes, present summaries of residential relocation 
processes, actors involved and residential relocation outcomes at the start and closure of three 
BNG priority areas.  
There are several conclusions that I wish to draw from the presented „Residential Relocation 
Matrix‟ diagrams (Table 7-7 : Summary of Scotswood residential relocation processes; Table 7-8: 
Summary of Walker residential relocation processes; Table 7-9: Summary of Bensham & Saltwell 
Residential Relocation Processes).  
(1) The importance of the availability of residential relocation support, options and choices. 
In other words the importance of the level of development of residential relocation 
processes (i.e., planning strategy, community involvement, FAPs, resident support and 
alternative property provision) in shaping residential relocation outcomes.  
A comparison of the Residential Relocation Matrix diagrams at the beginning of each of 
the three projects, suggests that at the outset residential relocation practice was not 
developed in BNG. In Scotswood little residential relocation support was available at the 
outset. It was the absence of acknowledgement of specific cross-tenure residential 
relocation requirements in low market demand areas that was leading to negative 
residential relocation outcomes (e.g. lack of FAPs, resident support, alternative property 
provision).  
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The case of Walker however, showed that institutional learning took place in the process 
of relocation. The NCC and BNG learnt from the mistakes made in Scotswood and 
adjusted their approach to residential relocation in Walker. As the result residential 
relocation processes at the beginning of the Walker and Bensham and Saltwell projects 
were developed and pre-planned. In these projects more favourable residential relocation 
outcomes (for the residents) were available from the beginning of the project 
implementation. However, their offer was not maintained till the project‟s closure and the 
cancellation of HMR. Both the Walker and Bensham and Saltwell cases indicated that the 
behaviour of actors (directly or indirectly) involved in residential relocation could alter the 
plans. The Walker and Bensham and Saltwell cases indicated that the plans for relocation 
were as good as their operationalisation and collaboration of the actors involved in them. 
This brings us to the second point.  
(2) The importance of the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in residential 
relocation practice (formed by interaction of residential relocation processes) their 
cooperation and non-cooperation in shaping residential relocation outcomes.  
The three projects showed that different actors were able to change the course of relocation 
and variably influence residential relocation practice and outcomes. The number of actors 
involved in residential relocation processes grew from the Scotwsood case to the Walker 
and Bensham and Saltwell cases. Actors from public, private as well as third sectors are 
well able to determine the course of residential relocation and took centre stage depending 
on the time and scheme in question. 
For instance, initially ignored, Scotswood Village Residents Association and Scotswood 
Neighbourhood Centre residents protested, but later joined the decision-making process 
and changed residential relocation practice in BNG. The case in Walker showed that 
private developers had the ability to provide some exceptionally good residential 
relocation outcomes for the residents (in the form of new affordable housing) as well as to 
leave the site when the circumstances do not go their way. In Bensham in Gateshead 
relocation was stopped before it even began. SAVE Britain‟s Heritage stopped the process 
by taking the council to a legal battle over the Environmental Assessment of their 
intervention.  
This poses questions about how the actors defined their roles and responsibilities in the 
process and how their interaction unfolded.  
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
222 
 
The case of BNG and its three priority areas shows that the availability of residential relocation 
support in the form of five identified processes was crucial to be able to start residential relocation 
and to secure acceptable residential relocation support, options and choices for relocatees. 
However, it also indicates residential relocation outcomes depended on the behaviour of actors 
involved in residential relocation practice, their cooperation or non-cooperation. These matters 
along with the questions about roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in residential 
relocation are examined in the next chapter. 
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Table 7-7 : Summary of Scotswood residential relocation processes 
Scotswood residential relocation processes at the start of the project in 1999 
Residential Relocation Matrix View Process Description  Actors Involved 
 
  
Planning strategy did not contain 
plan for residential relocation (RR)  
Newcastle City 
Council (NCC) 
Minimal within legal framework  NCC 
Available only to social tenants NCC  
Statutory compensation available to 
all tenures 
NCC 
















































































































Governance arrangements at the start: 
Newcastle City Council took a top-down approach to 
planning. It followed the basic CPO guidance. The result 
was residents‟ refusal to move and protests against the 
plans.  
Scotswood residential relocation processes at closure of relocation in 2011  
Residential Relocation Matrix View Process Description Actors Involved 
 
  
Planning strategy remained the 
same  
NCC 
Involved in planning and 
decision making process.  
Scotswood residents‟ 
associations and groups 




Statutory comp., FAPs available 
to home owners 
Pathfinder, NCC 
Secured for owner occupiers 
and private rent 
























































































































































Governance episode that brought change: 
Foundation of the BNG Pathfinder in combination with 
inclusion of the Scotswood residents in the decision-
making process brought change to NCC relocation strategy 
and helped bring better RR outcomes than were possible 
with statutory guidance applied at the start. 




Table 7-8: Summary of Walker residential relocation processes 
Walker residential relocation processes at the start of the project in 2005 
Residential Relocation Matrix View Process Description  Actors Involved 
 
  
Residential relocation included in 
the strategy 
RSL, NCC 




Relocation team supporting all 
tenures 
ALMO 
Statutory comp., FAPs available 
to home owners 
Pathfinder, NCC 
New properties, Choice Based 
Lettings, Private Landlord 
Accreditation  
Priv. Developers, 
Housing Associations  




















































































































































Governance arrangements at the start: NCC contracted a 
preferred Registered Social Landlord to draft the plans for 
Walker. Plans were based on intensive community 
consultation. The plan promised residents who wished to stay 
in Walker options to do so.  
 
Walker residential relocation processes at closure of relocation in 2011 









associations and groups 
Relocation team supporting all 
tenures 
ALMO 
Statutory comp., FAPs available 
to home owners 
Pathfinder, NCC 
New building stopped. 



































































































































































































































Governance episode that brought change: 
Arms Length Organisation contracted to manage NCC 
properties opposed demolition plans. The change of the 
ruling party in NCC resulted in questioning the demolition 
plans as well. Indecision and delays resulted in Private 
Developers and preferred RSL stopping new building in 
Walker.  
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Table 7-9: Summary of Bensham & Saltwell Residential Relocation Processes 
Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation processes at the start of the project in 2005 




included in the strategy 
Private Consultants, 
Gateshead Metropolitan 
Borough Council (GH 
MBC) 
Plans based on intensive 
community consultation 
Private Consultants, GH 
MBC 
Neighbourhood 
Management team - all 
tenures, ALMO - social 
tenants 
GH MBC, ALMO 
Statutory comp., FAPs 
available to home owners 
Pathfinder, GH MBC 
New properties (planned), 
ALMO properties, Private 
Landlord Accreditation  
Priv. Developers, ALMO  
















































































































Governance arrangements at the start: NCC contracted a 
preferred Registered Social Landlord to draft the plans 
for Bensham and Saltwell. Plans were based on intensive 
community consultation. The plan promised residents 
who wished to stay in in Bensham and Saltwell options to 
do so.  
Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation processes at closure of relocation in 2011 
Residential Relocation Matrix View Process Description Actors Involved 
 
  
Planning strategy brought into 
questioning. 
Private Consultants, 
GH MBC, SAVE 
Britain‟s Heritage  
Increased communication (web, 
media) with residents to clarify 
the process.  
GH MBC 
Neighbourhood Management 
team - all tenures, ALMO - 
social tenants 
GH MBC, ALMO 
Statutory comp., FAPs available 
to home owners 
Pathfinder, GH MBC 
New building did not take place 
















































































































































 Governance episode that brought change: 
SAVE Britain‟s Heritage objected to the Gateshead 
Council‟s plans on the grounds that these lacked an 
Environmental Impact Assessment. The case was brought 
to court. By the time the court case was settled (in favour 
of GH MBC) the process was critically delayed and 
redevelopment and relocation were not completed before 
cancellation of HMR in 2011.  




Chapter 8: Roles, Responsibilities and Governance Arrangements in 
BNG Relocation 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the story of relocation in three BNG projects. It showed that the 
approach to relocation delivery differed among the three. The cases of Scotswood, Walker and 
Bensham showed that actors involved in residential relocation practice belonged to public, private 
and community sectors. They were all able to significantly influence the process of relocation at 
different times. These findings raise questions about roles and responsibilities of actors involved in 
residential relocation and their formal and/or informal governance arrangements. This chapter 
examines these issues. Such analysis is important in order to understand the way residential 
relocation was delivered in HMR and in a differentiated polity more generally.  
This chapter is organised in the following way. The first section addresses the question of „roles 
and responsibilities‟ in residential relocation. It discusses the notion of „responsibility‟ in relation 
to residential relocation as defined by legislation enabling demolition and the residential relocation 
processes identified in this study in the HMR framework. This is followed by examination of 
delegation of responsibilities related to residential relocation. Roles and responsibilities of selected 
actors are examined in section four along with the governance arrangements that define actors‟ 
interaction. The chapter concludes by arguing that residential relocation in the HMR framework 
and in a differentiated polity more generally, is delivered by a complex network of actors.  
8.2 Definition of Relocation Roles and Responsibilities  
Residential relocation has been known to be one of the most complex planning interventions. 
However, there is no consensus about what the residential relocation process entails precisely in 
literature or practice. In Chapter 3 it was shown that gentrification theorists refer to relocation as 
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„displacement‟ – a forced residential move caused by the operation of the market or the state. 
Residential relocation and neighbourhood restructuring researchers tend to focus on the outcomes 
rather than the residential relocation process. However there is little agreement as to what the 
outcomes should be (in terms of location, size of quality) (Kearns & Kleinhans, 2013).  
There is no more agreement about what relocation entails among practitioners either. The 
Pathfinder survey showed that, 'compulsory purchase', 'neighbourhood management', „decanting' 
and „property acquisition‟ were all referred to as 'residential relocation' (Chapter 6). The legislation 
recommends that residents are „not worse or better off‟ after the procedure. Clearly, what is „better 
or worse‟ is open to interpretation by both the agencies causing relocation and relocatees 
themselves. The findings presented in Chapters 6 and 7 showed that different relocation processes 
emerged and evolved in the course of the HMR programme implementation, without pre-planned 
strategies or governance arrangements to deliver them. 
The question about „responsibility‟ in relocation is a difficult one. For a definition of 
„responsibility‟ to exist, there must be some sort of standard or a requirement, a goal to achieve, so 
to speak. If so, what are the goals or standards to be achieved in residential relocation? Here it is 
worth pausing to point out that residential relocation is a result of intervention in the built 
environment, a planned housing demolition. The goal is not to relocate per se, but to regenerate an 
area. The question of the „right to intervene‟ in the built environment, has been discussed by many. 
The view of the issue remains negative for gentrification theorists. The assumption is that the 
intervention is forced upon neighbourhoods and communities that ultimately resist it. However, 
there is much less discussion about cases where agreement to intervene in the built environment 
and demolish has been reached, cases where residential support is provided (Curley & Kleinhans, 
2009). Consequently, there is much less clarity about residential relocation roles and 
responsibilities in these cases.  
With no guidance or standards for residential relocation, Pathfinders and their local authorities 
developed residential relocation practices on local policy level. Their „right to intervene‟ in the 
built environment had been defined by CPO legislation. For this reason, a good way to start 
exploring actors „roles and responsibilities‟ in residential relocation is to reflect on the 
requirements of this legislation.  
The primary function of the CPO (apart from empowering the acquiring authorities to intervene in 
inhabited areas) is to guarantee statutory compensation to affected residents. A CPO requires local 
authorities to show that they have the capacity to re-house, but it does not require them to relocate 
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or find alternative properties for affected residents. Whilst resident support is considered a good 
practice acquiring authorities are not required to perform this function. LAs are also not required to 
consult because of the nature of the intervention. Separate legislation requires social tenants to be 
„decanted‟, but this requirement does not exist for owner occupiers or private tenants except in 
exceptional circumstances.  
As shown in Chapter 6, HMR areas are an „exception‟ as far as the CPO is concerned. The CPO 
rests on the assumption that housing markets are healthy, operational and homogenous. Based on 
this assumption statutory compensation (to property owners) can ensure relocation into a „like for 
like‟ property. Housing Market Renewal rests on the assumption of the existence of fragmented 
local markets and was launched to tackle their weak and failing parts. Clearly, in exceptional 
circumstances „roles and responsibilities‟ of acquiring authorities are even more difficult to define. 
The legislation that empowers local authorities to demolish properties is partial in defining 
responsibilities in relation to residential relocation, especially in the case of HMR.  
Chapter 6 identified five distinct processes that partnerships developed in order to deliver 
residential relocation in the HMR framework. These are: planning strategy, community 
involvement, financial assistance provision, alternative property provision and resident support. 
These processes evolved in response to local circumstances and the challenges partners faced on 
the ground. They present a significant development of residential relocation practices when 
compared to the requirements defined by CPO legislation enabling demolition. The case of BNG 
showed that considerable resources were invested to deliver residential relocation processes (e.g. 
increasing the relocation grant and introduction of FAPs, resident support and community 
involvement). For this reason in this study, relocation „roles and responsibilities‟ are examined and 
established based on five residential relocation processes that Pathfinders developed on the ground. 
Using the „Residential Relocation Matrix‟ (Chapter 6), the actors involved in residential relocation 
processes are identified, and then their roles and responsibilities in relation to residential relocation 
processes examined.  
8.3 Delegation of Responsibilities over Residential Relocation Processes  
Much like other Pathfinders, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder was not a statutory body 
and as such did not have the power to intervene in the built environment, demolish housing or 
relocate residents. BNG depended on its partners to deliver these interventions. Thus, BNG like 
other Pathfinders had to accommodate potential contradiction. On one hand the government 
wished to see Pathfinders and their boards maintaining an „effective challenge‟ to local 
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
229 
 
government. On the other hand local government possessed the statutory power to deliver HMR 
interventions. Residential relocation was delegated to BNG local authorities, Newcastle and 
Gateshead. The delivery arrangements which facilitated HMR relocation tended to be dominated 
by provisions which enabled local authorities to act lawfully.  
However, the cases of Scotswood, Walker and Bensham presented in Chapter 7, indicated that the 
local authorities delegated residential relocation tasks further, to other organisations. There are 
three reasons for this. First, the lack of skills. It should not be forgotten that the majority of LAs 
involved in HMR had not undertaken demolition for over 35 years since the abandonment of slum 
clearance in the 1970s. Second, HMR caused cross-tenure relocation, for which there are few 
precedents in general. This brought complexities that were not envisaged nor planned for at the 
outset. Third, local authorities seemed to have very limited resources to tackle the tasks at hand.  
Figure 8-1: Scheme of delegation of residential relocation responsibilities (BNG Pathfinder) shows 
the delegation of roles and responsibilities over residential relocation in relation to residential 
relocation processes identified in this research (see „Residential Relocation Matrix‟, Chapter 6). It 
shows that BNG Pathfinder delegated responsibility for residential relocation to local authorities 
(in the BNG case to NCC and GH MBC) in the first instance. 
Figure 8-1: Scheme of delegation of residential relocation responsibilities (BNG Pathfinder)  
 
Based on BNG case study  
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The scheme also shows that local authorities delegated the tasks further to other organisations. 
Planning and statutory community consultation was contracted out in both local authorities. While 
Newcastle contracted the RSL to plan for Walker project, Gateshead preferred private consultants 
in the case of Bensham. Financial assistance package provision stayed the responsibility of local 
authorities. However, it needs to be pointed out that the funding for these came from the BNG 
partnership and to smaller extent from private lenders. Alternative property provision was one of 
the most complex and fragmented processes because of cross-tenure relocation. Housing providers 
for each tenure were involved in the relocation process (ALMOs, RSLs and private landlords and 
private developers). As shown in Chapter 7, community involvement consisted of three separate 
processes: statutory engagement, protests and institutionalised community involvement. This 
meant involvement of disparate organisations supporting each one of these. Resident support was 
provided by councils, ALMOs and/or housing associations depending on the local authority and 
tenure.  
The delegation scheme identifies organisations involved in residential relocation delivery in the 
BNG pathfinder based on the residential relocation processes. However, as the Residential 
Relocation Matrix indicated (Chapter 6), residential relocation processes developed variously 
depending on tenure. The evidence presented in Chapter 7, suggested that the delegation of the 
responsibilities in the BNG Pathfinder also differed depending on the local authority and project in 
question. Based on the collected evidence, and systematisation based on the Residential Relocation 
Matrix, this study is in a position to identify the organisations and their departments involved in the 
residential relocation process, not only by identified residential relocation process, but by tenure, 
local authority and project. The table overleaf presents a comprehensive list of the actors involved 
in the residential relocation processes by tenure and project in BNG.   
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Table 8-1: List of actors involved in residential relocation delivery based on the Residential 
Relocation Matrix in priority areas in BNG Pathfinder  
RR Processes Matrix 
applied 
Residential Relocation 
Processes and Tenures 
Newcastle City Council Gateshead MBC 
















































(all tenures)  
N/A (based on CPO) Representatives of the 
wider Walker, 
managed by NCC and 
RSL 
Representatives of the 
wider Bensham and 
Saltwell, managed by 
GH MBC and GVA.  
Unplanned –
Opposition  













Neighbourhood Centre.  
Walker Network 
(association of 















All Tenures  Resettlement and 
Relocation Team, part 
of Your Homes 




Relocation Team, part 
of Your Homes 




Management Team  
Social Tenants  Gateshead Housing 
Company ALMO  
Private 
Tenants 
Housing Options Team 




























Services, NCC Legal 
Services.  
NCC Property 
Services, NCC Legal 
Services. 
GH MBC Property 
Services, GH MBC 
Legal Services,  
 Owner 
Occupiers 

































NCC for (refurbished).  
Homeswap option: 
NCC, RSL & Private 
Developers (for new 
and refurbished).  
Homeswap option: GH 
MBC.  
Social Tenants Your Choice Homes 
(choice based lettings) 
local HAs, NCC 
Accredited Private 
Landlords, NCC for 
Homeswap 
(refurbished).  
Your Choice Homes 
(choice based lettings) 
local HAs, Private 
Developers (Bellway), 
RSLs (Places for 
People) for Homeswap 
(via Walker Promise),  
NCC Accredited 
Private Landlords. 
(choice based lettings) 







Private Landlords.  
NCC Accredited 
Private Landlords.  
GH MBC Accredited 
Private Landlords. 
Notes:  
* The former protesters joined the council in making the plans 
** Owner occupiers and private tenants are encouraged to choose from the properties in the free market, in this 
case their properties are not provided by the partners involved.  
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Table 8-1: List of actors involved in residential relocation delivery based on the Residential 
Relocation Matrix in priority areas in BNG Pathfinder shows further fragmentation or roles and 
responsibilities over residential relocation on a micro scale. The analysis in this section shows that 
different departments within identified organisations were entrusted to deliver one or more 
residential relocation process. The observed multiplication of actors and agencies raises questions 
about governance arrangements that shaped their interaction in residential relocation practice. 
8.4 Exploring Residential Relocation Governance Arrangements  
At the outset it was deemed important to explore, rather than assume the mechanism shaping 
residential relocation in the HMR framework. Governance literature suggests that policy making is 
characterised by institutional fragmentation and that delivery depends on a network of actors, 
rather than the market or the state (Chapter 4). However, there is no agreement about the way the 
policy network operates. In other words, networks may be self-governing as governance orthodoxy 
suggests, or manipulated by the state according to the governance sceptics. This dichotomy 
suggested that the governance arrangements needed to be examined in specific cases and contexts.  
In this study governance arrangements formed around residential relocation processes were 
identified through a two-stage exercise.  
1) First the governance network was mapped, based on information collected in the first stage 
of the BNG case study (see Figure 8-2: BNG Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure 
(Draft)).  
2) Second, in order to establish validity of these conclusions and further examine interaction 
of the identified actors, the initial residential relocation governance graph was taken to the 
respondents for feedback in the second stage of the case study.  
Results of the first stage of the BNG case study indicated that residential relocation was delivered 
by a complex network of actors. Figure 8-2: BNG Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure 
(Draft) presents the residential relocation governance network mapped using the residential 
relocation matrix and identified actors in the case of the Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder in the 
first stage of the case study. The relocation network is a network of actors within wider Pathfinder 
governance structure. It is a thematic sub-network that forms within this wider structure to deliver 
the five residential relocation processes. The network is in effect a map of actors‟ links and 
interactions that develop to deliver residential relocation.  
As seen in figure below, the relocation network stretches from the Pathfinder board, through local 
authorities, their departments, external contractors (e.g. RSLs, HAs, developers, private lending 
companies), to the relocated community. As the BNG Pathfinder covered two local authorities, the 
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relations between local authorities varied. The reasons for this were differences in governance 
structures of the two local authorities (Newcastle and Gateshead). Within this framework the 
relations within a single local authority varied and were adjusted to every project delivered. Actors 
were seen to interact variably with the community asked to relocate. 
 
Figure 8-2: BNG Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure (Draft) was built based on the 
results of the first stage of the interviews in the BNG case study. In order to test validity of these 
conclusions the network members (case study respondents) were asked to give their feedback in 
the second stage of the case study examination. In this way, theoretical propositions about the 
potential existence of a network and its operation in case of residential relocation were examined 
by the very actors identified to be a part of the relocation delivery network. The final conclusions 
about the shape and operation of the relocation network in BNG were built in collaboration with 
the actors responsible for residential relocation processes in BNG. This exercise also helped 
establish respondents‟ position in the network and prompt questions about the nature of their 
interaction with other actors. Their feedback is presented in the following sections in form of notes 
and sketches on Figure 8-2. 
Figure 8-2: BNG Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure (Draft)  
 
Designed based on pilot study and secondary data analysis.  
All – refers to all tenure groups within a community affected by relocation; Owners – refers only to owner occupiers  
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8.5 Actors’ Roles, Responsibilities and Position in the Relocation 
Network 
This section examines roles and responsibilities of selected actors identified to be involved in 
delivery of one or more residential relocation processes in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead. It 
presents the respondents‟ feedback on governance structure based on the first stage of the BNG 
case study. In doing so it allows for examination of governance arrangements, actors position and 
interaction within the BNG relocation network.  
The section explores the roles and responsibilities of the actors who were identified to have the 
most involvement in shaping residential relocation strategies, processes and their delivery in BNG. 
These are:  
1. BNG Pathfinder Board and BNG Team 
2. Local Authorities 
3. ALMOs 
4. House builders (Private Developers) 
5. Registered Social Landlords  
6. Community and Third Sector Organisations  
8.5.1 BNG Board and Team  
The BNG Board was the Pathfinder‟s main governing body directly accountable to ODPM and 
latter HCA. It was composed to ensure representation from key stakeholders in BNG. The Board 
was the only body eligible to bid for the government‟s HMR funding. BNG‟s Board was 
responsible for overall Pathfinder strategy and finances. The BNG Team was the Board‟s 
operational body. Its task was to translate the Board‟s decisions into action. The Team was closely 
involved in the development of BNG priority areas (projects). BNG Pathfinder was a non-statutory 
body. This means that the Board and Team did not have the statutory power to intervene in the 
built environment. However, it did have an influence over residential relocation though BNG 
funding. 
8.5.1.1 BNG Board  
The Board had an important role in developing and funding financial assistance packages for 
relocation. This work began by attempting to tackle affordability problems in the Scotswood 
priority area. Here an affordability gap was indentified between statutory compensation and the 
price of an alternative property somewhere else. The owner occupiers refused to move. The 
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concerns resonated with the national goal of increasing and sustaining homeownership in low-
demand areas (see DCLG, 2004). A BNG Board member pointed out in the interview for this 
research:  
 ‗The Pathfinders are trying to develop packages which will help them deliver that 
change programme [HMR], hence the equity packages…‘ (CS-BNG Board-English 
Partnerships).  
The „Financial Options for Homeownership Policy‟ (BNG, 2007), that become one of the key 
strategies for residential relocation of owner occupiers in BNG, was incepted by the BNG Board in 
the first years of BNG‟s existence. However, this also meant that the Board shaped the nature of 
FAPs. In the first years the focus was on increasing the residential relocation grant. When this 
proved to be financially unsustainable because of market recovery and increased property prices, 
the strategy changed. Loans, equity loans and the Homeswap scheme were introduced and funded 
partly from the BNG budget. The Board also partnered with the Housing Corporation, English 
Partnerships, commercial lenders, as well as the private developers, to be able to deliver these. 
FAPs helped owner occupiers relocate to better quality housing. While „lending‟ was financially 
more sustainable than „grants„ this also meant that the Pathfinder‟s approach resulted in the 
formation of an additional tenure in the relocation process: shared ownership. A BNG Board 
member commented on the strategy:  
‗It is not an easy option … that the Pathfinder staff will take. It is the best value for 
money for you and your family in the long term as well as for the public sector in the 
short and medium term. Being difficult is, probably … our job. But in a nice way…‘ (CS-
BNG Board -English Partnerships). 
Sustained problems around affordability brought the issue back to the Board in November 2007. At 
this time an Affordability Task Group was founded to look at housing allocations. In May 2008, 
the Board received a housing options and affordability update. ARC4
21
 was contracted to look at 
Housing Options and Affordability. The interest in the issue continued throughout 2008 and the 
beginning of 2009. At this time the concern about affordability was widened to include the 
challenges arising as the result of the global financial crisis. In summary, the BNG board‟s role as 
a non-statutory body meant that it took over responsibility for the financial management of the 
programme. In terms of residential relocation the main influence was on definition and funding of 
the financial assistance packages for relocation of owner occupiers, who otherwise would not be 
able to move.  
                                                     
21 ARC4 is a housing and regeneration consultancy that specialises in: housing market research and analysis; 
affordability and affordable housing policy, strategy and delivery; assisting in establishing homeownership products and 
intermediate rental options that underpin economic growth options and support the excluded middle market.  
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8.5.1.2 BNG Team  
In essence the role of the BNG Team was to implement the BNG Board decisions by bringing 
together the work of actors from public, private, community and voluntary sectors. The Team‟s 
role involved coordination of programme development, financial strategy, project appraisal and 
approval, implementation (working with delivery partners), monitoring, evaluation of the impact of 
the programme and programme reviews. In other words, the BNG Team was a central point of call 
for other partners involved in HMR delivery in BNG. The feedback from BNG Head of 
Development and Area Programme Coordinator presented in the Figure 8-3: Bridging Newcastle 
Gateshead (Feedback) stands witness to this. 
Figure 8-3: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (Feedback) 
BNG Team  
 
Respondents: Head of Development (CS-BNG Team2), Area Programme Coordinator (East) (CS-BNG 
Team3).  
This is how the Area Programme Coordinator interviewed for this study saw his role:  
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‗I am a programme coordinator. So basically I am acting as a part of partnership, my job 
is to coordinate all the programmes across three specific areas. I work specifically in 
East End which covers Walker Riverside and Byker. My role is to be involved in 
everything that goes on in those areas in terms of … from project accepting, which I take 
part in as well, through project completion. In all those projects I am the BNG link, for 
any issues that arise … any funding that needs to be done or allocated appraisals of the 
projects that come through to see if they are viable … I am involved across a whole 
spectrum of all that goes on here …‘ (CS-BNG Team 3). 
In their interview (the second stage of the BNG case study) the BNG team representatives (Head of 
Development and Area Programme Coordinator (East)) highlighted that there was much more 
interaction between the Team management and the Regeneration and Environment Directorate in 
Newcastle and Development Enterprise in Gateshead, departments responsible for planning 
strategy, than initially assumed. Area Programme Coordinators on the other hand worked with the 
teams delivering the programme.  
The Team, especially Area Programme Coordinators (APCs), had a good insight into the 
development of the priority areas because of their work with the two councils, and was able to raise 
concerns relating to these to the Board and secure funding if needed. For instance, in Scotswood, 
the BNG team set up and funded a neighbourhood management team in order to help the residents 
through the relocation process. While having a good insight into specific projects and schemes in 
the Pathfinder area, especially Walker, Scotswood and Bensham, the BNG team or the APCs were 
not directly involved in residential relocation or planning for that matter.  
 ‗All the policies are administered by Newcastle City Council. We just really fund the 
options that come from that policy … We have an influence but it is just an influence. We 
don‘t have a statutory position …‘ (CS-BNG Team 3). 
 Whilst the government was expecting the Pathfinders to challenge the way the local authorities 
operated there was little evidence of this in BNG. The BNG Team was employed by Newcastle 
CC, and while operating quite independently, it served a purpose of resolving conflicts and helping 
in crisis rather than being a core shaker. Funding FAPs for relocation of owner occupiers in 
Scotswood was such an intervention. When asked who they considered to be responsible for 
residential relocation delivery, the representatives of the BNG team referred to the Resettlement 
and Relocation Team in Newcastle (see ALMO section) and Neighbourhood Management Team in 
Gateshead (see Local Authorities section). 
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8.5.2 Local authorities  
Newcastle City Council (NCC) and Gateshead Metropolitan Council (GH MBC) were the key 
BNG Pathfinder partners. Local authorities or councils are statutory bodies with the power to 
intervene in the built environment and compulsorily purchase land when deemed necessary. They 
played an important role in BNG. Newcastle was BNG‟s host local authority. As stated previously, 
the BNG Team was employed by NCC. Gateshead MBC was the Pathfinder‟s accountable body. 
Local authorities in BNG had a strong influence over BNG development plans and strategies, 
especially in the first years.  
However, because of the shortage of staff and resources many functions were delegated and 
contracted out to other agencies. For instance, at the time of inquiry the planning officer in 
Gateshead MBC pointed out that HMR intervention in his council was the largest they have ever 
done and that the council needed help. In Newcastle several respondents pointed out the same.  
Residential relocation processes were delegated and contracted out differently as previously shown 
in the comprehensive table of actors. Here it needs to be stressed that the delegation of 
responsibilities was different in Newcastle than in Gateshead. This influenced the way residential 
relocation was planned in their constituencies. In the following sections I address this issue for the 
two councils separately. 
8.5.2.1 Newcastle City Council  
The roles and responsibilities of Newcastle City Council (NCC) changed and evolved in the 
process of HMR implementation. At the outset the Council saw as its role to assemble the land and 
de-risk it for private developers. Following the basics of CPO legislation in Scotswood (see also 
Chapter 7), NCC did not provide resident support, nor consult the residents. Alternative properties 
were provided for social and council tenants as required, however they were not planned for owner 
occupiers or private tenants. The council‟s approach to relocation in Scotswood changed in 
Box 8-1 Local authorities: delegation of responsibilities and contracting out 
„This is the biggest planning exercise we‘ve ever done really … we brought in private consultants 
to get the neighbourhood plans drawn up…‘ (CS-GH MBC Team1).  
 
‗It was a large exercise we just needed help really. It was a joint effort…‘ (CS-GH MBC Team2).  
 
‗At the beginning before we all came in posts as project officers for his [Area Director] it was 
just him and a planning policy officer‘ (CS-NCC East Team2).  
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response to community protests and later involvement. Residents‟ protests and refusal to move 
caused lots of controversy in the council, and split the practitioners into those supportive of the 
intervention and those who opposed it. After initial community protests, new teams were set up to 
support residents through the relocation, and engage with them. The restructuring of NCC between 
2005 and 2006 led to the setting up of Area Based Regeneration teams in the East and West End of 
Newcastle. These teams were responsible for regeneration in Walker and Scotswood respectively. 
This is how the Area Programme Director (West) described his role:  
‗I‘m Area Programme Director with Area Based Regeneration which is a new division 
set up within the City Council and it‘s very much a delivery focused role … I‘ve got 
equivalents in the north and east, but my job is basically to ensure that projects are 
delivered, which has been a weakness of Newcastle in the past terms of delivery … June 
15
th
 was when I started, so I‘m 5 months in post‘ (CS-NCC West Team1).  
After the establishment of Area Based Regeneration teams, NCC‟s approach to relocation 
continued to develop differently in East and West Newcastle. The relocation governance scheme 
below shows the Area Based Regeneration teams being separate. Their interaction with the BNG 
Team was separate too. Namely, the BNG Team had Area Programme Coordinators for East and 
West of the BNG. In his feedback on the proposed governance scheme, the Area Based 











Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
240 
 
The accounts of the Planning Officers in East End Team suggest that the NCC area teams were 
fairly independent and that they could draft their strategies to suit specific projects:  
‗We did what we wanted.‘ (CS-NCC East Team1) recalled Walker planning officer.  
‗We had no standards, but we had a way of working that we worked towards to try and 
ensure people got feedback, they had plenty of choice and all the rest of it, but there was 
no formal guideline‘ (CS-NCC East Team2) said the project leader for Walker.  
According to the account of these respondents, the Walker Promise relocation strategy (see 
Chapter 7) was in fact a vision of the East End Planning Director (later Project Director at Places 
for People).  
‗[Area Director] just pushed it though basically. He saw that one of the only ways that 
would enable the community to move and be on board with it was to make this Walker 
Promise … albeit that a lot of people in the housing section didn‘t agree with it because 
obviously it was giving people the right to have ‗like for like‘ [property in relocation], 
which is in odds with choice based letting scheme‘ (CS-NCC East Team2). 
Figure 8-4: Newcastle City Council (Feedback) 
Area Based Regeneration (West)  
 
Respondent: Area Programme Director (West End Newcastle) (CS-NCC West Team1) 
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Establishment of area teams in NCC‟s East and West End increased the council‟s capacity to 
advance the projects however many of the tasks were still contracted out. This presented further 
fragmentation on the local and project level. In the case of Walker, the NCC contracted out the 
masterplanning to Places for People (registered social landlord and preferred developer, see 
Registered Landlords section) and Llewellyn Davies consultants. Alternative property provision in 
general as well as for purposes of relocation was entrusted to private developer Bellway (note that 
the respondent made on the scheme). In 2004 the management of the council‟s stock in Walker as 
in Scotswood was contracted to ALMO Your Homes Newcastle, as was the residents‟ support. The 
same year the Resettlement and Relocation Team moved from NCC to YHN. NCC retained the 
responsibility to manage the Walker Riverside plan through the planning system and project 
manage its implementation. Consequently the outcomes have been different, and have been 
differently shaped. While the residents achieved their ends through protests in Scotswood, the 
residents in Walker were engaged from the outset. The council‟s representatives interviewed for 
this research considered R&RT (YHN) team, and departments such as Property Services (CPO) 
and Strategic Housing (managing FAPs) to be responsible for relocation. 
8.5.2.2 Gateshead MBC 
This section examines the Gateshead‟s roles and responsibilities in regards to residential relocation 
in Bensham and Saltwell, one of the three BNG primary intervention areas.  
Differently from Newcastle, the organisation of Gateshead council was more centralised. The 
council did not have separate area teams. Work with BNG involved links with the Area 
Programme Coordinator (East). As the feedback sketch indicates, the Council‟s planning 
department saw itself as a coordinator or manager of different departments and organisations 
involved in the process. However, loyalty lay with the council and council departments and 
keeping tight links and relationships in-house seemed very important. After the foundation of 
BNG, Gateshead Council contracted out neighbourhood planning to GVA Grimley consultants. 
The company worked in association with Social Regeneration Consultants (SRC), Nathaniel 
Litchfield and Partners and delivered the plan in February 2006. The planning exercise involved 
intensive community consultation in which both the private partners and the council took part. 
B&S Community consultation was a part of bigger exercise that involved all the BNG area in 
Gateshead.   




Figure 8-5: Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council (Feedback) 
Neighbourhood Management  
Development & Enterprise  
 
Respondent: Neighbourhood Officer/Manager (CS-GH MBC Neighbourhood), Senior (CS-GH MBC 
Development1), Senior Environmental Health Officer (CS-GH MBC Development2) 
While planning was contracted out, quite differently from Newcastle, Gateshead council kept tight 
control over its ALMO and quite easily relocated social tenants from intervention areas. Unlike 
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Newcastle, Gateshead council provided resident support to residents affected by demolition and 
relocation through their Neighbourhood Management team (the team that performed the same 
function as R&RT in Newcastle).  
The role of this council‟s department evolved in the face of the SAVE Britain‟s objection to 
demolition. According to the Neighbourhood Management department representative SAVE‟s 
campaign caused lots of confusion among the residents, some of whom saw BNG intervention as 
an opportunity to move from their deprived areas or sell their home to the council (especially in 
2007 and 2008 when the crisis started). The Neighbourhood Management Team felt they needed to 
„manage‟ the information about the BNG intervention.  
„They caused a huge confusion with the residents, because it sends the wrong message 
out. So it is like … aw ... the project has come to a halt … and we constantly have to 
manage the message: ‗no it hasn‘t, we are still buying up your property … and this is 
what you do if you want to sell … and put them back on the right track again‘ (CS-GH 
MBC Neighbourhood Team1)  
Gateshead MBC developed a sophisticated communication and marketing strategy on the ground 
and online (see Appendix 5). Local Neighbourhood Management officers provided information to 
affected residents directly. Videos of relocated residents and their stories about the process and the 
outcomes were put on the council‟s web site, together with the privately produced movie 
„Gateshead no stranger to change‟. The street representatives (residents) were involved in the 
process and were able to stream the information to their neighbours.  
 
8.5.3 Arms Length Organisations 
Arms Length Organisations or ALMOs are non-profit companies set up by local authorities. Their 
primary responsibility is day-to-day management and maintenance of the councils‟ housing stock. 
In 2004, a year after BNG was set up, both Newcastle and Gateshead councils transferred 
management of their stock to Arms Length Organisations (ALMOs). In Newcastle, Your Homes 
Newcastle ALMO took over the management of 29,000 tenanted local authority properties, while 
in Gateshead, the Gateshead Housing Company ALMO took over this task for 25,000 units. To an 
extent the difference in the ALMO‟s roles in residential relocation can be linked to the percentage 
of the council properties within each project (see table below).  
 




Table 8-2: Percentage of council housing in each BNG priority areas (projects) 
Council  Project  Council Housing % ALMO 
Newcastle  Scotswood and Benwell 30% Your Homes Newcastle  
Newcastle Walker 73% Your Homes Newcastle 
Gateshead Bensham and Saltwell  23% The Gateshead Housing 
Company 
Based on Census 2001 used as evidence base in BNG 
In statutory terms local authorities or organisations managing their properties (ALMOs) are 
responsible for relocating or „decanting‟ their social tenants from properties earmarked for 
demolition. Alternative accommodation may be offered from the ALMO‟s stock. Alternatively, 
relocation can be arranged online through a choice based letting system. In both cases affected 
residents receive a so called „priority card‟ due to demolition that enables them to relocate. 
The roles and responsibilities of the AMLOs in BNG differed. In Gateshead Council, Gateshead 
Housing Company (ALMO) supported only the residents it was obliged to – social tenants. The 
Council‟s Neighbourhood Management team was the one providing the resident support for other 
tenures. 
In Newcastle, the role of Your Homes Newcastle (YHN) ALMO was considerably wider than that 
of its counterpart in Gateshead.  
The Resettlement and Relocation and Team was originally set up by Newcastle City Council in 
response to Scotswood community pressure. In 2004, when Newcastle Council transferred its stock 
management to Your Homes Newcastle ALMO, the Resettlement and Relocation Team was 
transferred to this organisation. Inclusion of the Resettlement and Relocation Team into YHN 
ALMO effectively widened the role of this organisation in respect to relocation delivery in 
Newcastle. Instead of being responsible solely for support of council tenants, YHN was supporting 
owner occupiers as well as private tenants. The transfer resulted in a prolonged fight between NCC 
and YHN ALMO, over influence over the Resettlement and Relocation Team (especially in the 
case of Walker where the ALMO objected to demolition, see Chapter 7). A section of the R&RT 
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Box 8-2 R&RT position in BNG governance structure  
Author: What is your role in relocation and housing market renewal? 
CS-YHN Relocation Team1: I think it's essentially quite complicated how we fit in with it 
because obviously you do have BNG you have the City Council and you have Your Homes 
Newcastle and sometimes there are other agencies as well … communities, there are all these 
people putting money into a pot for regeneration. Our line managers are the managers here at 
Your Homes Newcastle but we have an awful lot to do with strategic housing and the area based 
regeneration schemes at the City Council. 
Author: And the Pathfinder team as well …? 
CS-YHN Relocation Team1: We don't have that much to do with them, we do see them at 
meetings but that's probably our senior managers that probably have more to do with seeing 
them. 
Author: So you don't meet [Area Programme Coordinator East] from the BNG? 
CS-YHN Relocation Team1: I haven't seen him for a while, he used to come along to meetings 
we were at but he tends to deal really with the Council and then the Council then deal with us 
over here at Your Homes Newcastle, so it's quite a complicated process. 
CS-YHN Relocation Team2: No-one deals with us directly at that level I suppose we're 
delivering the service on the ground so I suppose instructions come down through regeneration 
really from a context where you've got Head of Regeneration at the City ... senior officers at 
Your Homes Newcastle, have a regular four weekly meeting with them discussing strategy, 
discussing new schemes. I suppose that's where the information is fed through to us and it comes 
cascading down through line management to our level where we're asked to go and start 
consultations with residents. 
CS-YHN Relocation Team1: Yeah … I think it can depend on the scheme that we're actually 
working on, certainly in the Walker Riverside Regeneration, I think we had probably much 
closer links with the Council at that particular time. 
Author: You as a team? 
CS-YHN Relocation Team3: Yes … It depends on each scheme, quite often a scheme like 
Walker will have a project which will be made up of hundreds of staff on the Council, from BNG, 
Your Homes Newcastle, sometimes we are asked along to that and invited to it, sometimes we're 
not, it depends ... 
CS-YHN Relocation Team1: but whichever one of those is the master if you like we will answer 
the call to it ... I think our role in this process is to make sure that everybody is aware of what the 
residents‘ expectations are, basically, what‘s been promised to those residents and how we are 
supposed to fulfil them. 
R&RT feedback on the BNG relocation network shows that the team worked with various 
departments in Newcastle City Council (Property Services, Strategic Housing) both Area 
Regeneration Teams, and was in contact with the BNG Team. At the same time this R&RT worked 
on a one-to-one basis with residents affected by relocation in Newcastle from the moment 
demolition was announced in their areas, and guided them through the process until the moment 
they were relocated and settled into an alternative property. One of the R&RT team members said:  
 ‗We are in a privileged position, we met everybody …‘ (CS-YHN Team1). 
In the course of the interview with the R&RT it became apparent that the team developed loyalty, 
not toward NCC or YHN, but toward residents they felt they were serving. The R&RT team‟s 
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approach and good relationship with the relocatees resulted in better residential relocation 
outcomes and improved process according to the Walker and Scotswood residents interviewed for 
this research. This in turn resulted in the R&RT being often considered „accountable‟ or 
„responsible‟ for relocation even though they were a „street service‟. 
Figure 8-6: Your Homes Newcastle (ALMO) (Feedback) 
Resettlement and Relocation Team  
 
 
Respondents: Relocation Officer 1 (CS-YHN Relocation Team1); Relocation Officer 2 (CS-YHN 
Relocation Team2); Relocation Officer 3 (CS-YHN Relocation Team3); 
8.5.4 House builders (private developers) 
A distinctive characteristic of HMR was formal involvement of private house builders (private 
developers) in the intervention delivery. Moreover, the private sector developers were entrusted to 
provide new housing in the HMR framework. Across the Pathfinders different mechanisms 
(developer panel, developer competitions, developer‟s agreements and RSL agreements) were 
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devised to engage private developers in Housing Market Renewal. The role of the house builders in 
the relocation process differed depending on the project and agreements with Pathfinder partners  
Involvement of private developers in cross-tenure residential relocation is a precedent. In the UK, 
private developers have been known to avoid building in deprived areas as they consider them too 
risky. Therefore, they consider it imperative for the council to de-risk the land before their arrival. 
Clearly, in this line of reasoning, providing properties for residential relocation was not something 
that private developers considered doing at the start. The Financial Director of Taylor Wimpey 
North East, a BNG Board member, asserted:  
„You would not build in those areas unless they are seriously subsidised and de-risked. 
BNG are facilitating site preparation. So they are providing the land they are preparing 
the land for development and then they are providing some funding to lower land cost for 
the developer, effectively de-risking it‘ (CS-BNG Board Taylor Wimpey1). 
This said, the Walker case showed that it was in fact possible to engage private developers and 
secure alternative properties for relocation from these actors. However, this required planning and 
partnership working, rather than simply preparing the site and giving it to a developer to build on 
after relocation alongside other work is finished. In the Walker case, Places for People envisaged 
using some of the affordable properties planned for the site to relocate residents affected by 
demolition back into new properties in their own neighbourhood. An early success in Walker 
Riverside was the Cambrian Estate (see Chapter 7). It provided a one move solution and relocation 
into new „lifetime standard‟ properties near their old neighbours. 
Alternative property provision for relocation is clearly a significant change in what is perceived as 
the „traditional‟ role of private developers. Whilst arrangements with private developers achieved 
success initially, the output was fairly limited. A PfP project director noted:  
„There is not a great volume of housing that‘s built in a way we have approached in 
Walker … because it is costly it is difficult and it is not a kind of thing that most 
developers do … up until recently…‘ (CS-PfP Team1). 
Housing provision was one of the most challenging aspects of HMR among other reasons, because 
of the inherent tension between the private developers and the public sector. There was significant 
difference in culture and ethos of the two, that led to long delays and cases when developers 
walked off sites (see Walker case, Chapter 7) before completing the building. The involvement of 
private developers in HMR was as loose as the sketch the Taylor Wimpey respondent showed in 
the graph below: the private developers were there but not really linked with any of partners in the 
network.  




Figure 8-7: Taylor Wimpey North East (Private Developer) (Feedback)  
 
 
Respondent: Finance Director & BNG Board Member (CS-BNG Board-Taylor Wimpey1)  
8.5.5 Registered Social Landlords  
Registered Social Landlords, more precisely Places for People (PfP) in the case of BNG, played an 
important role designing a strategy for residential relocation delivery. NCC contracted PfP to take 
forward plans for the Walker Riverside area through NCC Development Framework Plan. 
Following its successful completion, PfP won a competitive bid and was named Lead Regeneration 
Partner for Walker in 2004. In the case of Walker, the RSL‟s role covered planning strategy, part 
of housing provision as well as Walker neighbourhood residential relocation strategy. 
In order to develop the planning strategy for Walker, PfP (see the feedback below) developed 
strong links with the Pathfinder Management (Development Department) and the Regeneration and 
Environment Directorate at NCC. Most importantly, PfP worked closely with the R&RT (YHN 
ALMO) to be able to deliver residential relocation according to the Walker Promise, in other words 
to enable the residents to achieve their housing aspirations in the residential relocation process. The 
core of the PfP strategy was to minimise the impact of the intervention on the existing community 
and to reinvigorate it.  
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Figure 8-8: Places for People (Registered Social Landlord) (Feedback) 
 
Respondent: Projects Director (CS-PfP Team1)  
The interviews with Newcastle City Council officers who used to work with PfP in the Walker 
programme suggested that the approach was very much a result of strong personal commitment by 
the PfP Chief Executive and PfP Project Director. In his interview for this research the PfP project 
director stressed:  
‗I feel very strongly that fine grained sensitive approach to local residents and what they 
need is well worth the money. Essentially understanding who your customers are, who 
the residents are. Those are the people who rent. Because the cost of redeveloping an 
estate times and times and times again is just ludicrous‘ (CS-PfP Team1). 
Through engagement with the community, Places for People were able to create a group of resident 
advocates for their plans for future work. Residents relocated into Bellway‟s new properties on the 
Cambrian Estate were some of them.  
While the project delivery in Walker was not completed as planned (see Chapter 7) the case of 
Walker indicates that the RSLs took an important role in HMR implementation in general and 
residential relocation in particular. This role covered community involvement, resident support, 
alternative property provision and planning strategy.  
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8.5.6 Third sector voluntary organisations 
The influence of voluntary organisations on residential relocation practice depends on each case. 
For example, in Newcastle there was no evidence that any such organisations (residents groups and 
organisations are classified as „community‟) had significant influence over the relocation process 
or the HMR delivery process more generally. In Gateshead however, the SAVE Britain‟s Heritage 
group took issue with the demolition of English terraces in the Bensham and Saltwell areas.  
This group was by no means specifically interested in matters of relocation. It was opposing 
demolition. SAVE appealed against Gateshead Council‟s plans based on the claim that the plan did 
not have an Environmental Assessment. This resulted in significant delays. To illustrate, work in 
Bensham had only started in 2011, the year HMR was cancelled by the government.  
Here it needs to be mentioned that the focus of this group was not the residents but buildings. 
Residents affected by demolition were not consulted by this group about their feelings about 
demolition nor their wish to relocate. Instead, assumptions were made that the community as a 
whole opposed demolition, and that this should therefore be stopped. The residents that had already 
been informed about their relocation and agreed with it were delayed in making the move. 
In Bensham, the SAVE appeal resulted in significant delays in the BNG programme 
implementation.  
While not having a direct interest in residential relocation per se, the Gateshead case shows that 
third sector organisations had significant influence on residential relocation process whilst they 
were focusing on stopping demolition. 
8.5.7 Community  
Oh! Me lads, ye shud a‟ seen us gannin, 
Passin‟ the folks upon the road just as they were stannin‟. 
Thor wis lots o‟ lads and lasses there, all wi‟ smiling faces 
Gannin‟ alang the Scotswood Road to see the Blaydon Races. 
19th century by Geordie Ridley 
More often than not residents affected by relocation are presented as victims of the residential 
relocation process. The assumption is that residents have little influence over the process but have 
to bear its consequences. The story of Newcastle residents comes to challenge this assumption.  
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The old Geordie song „Blaydon Races‟, epitomises the spirit of relocated Scotswood community 
members even though the Scotswood Road houses are long demolished. During the interviews 
conducted with the representatives Scotwood Residents Association and Scotswood 
Neighbourhood Centre it was hard not to be inspired by relocatees, women in their 60s, Geordie 
Grannies, determined to get things straight for themselves and their neighbours. Authorities 
proposing demolition in Newcastle „shud a‘ seen them gannin‘.  
The Scotswood residents‟ role in remodelling their neighbourhood underwent a metamorphosis 
from the time demolition was first announced in their neighbourhood under the Going for Growth 
initiative in 1999 through implementation of Housing Market Renewal between 2003 and 2011. 
Protesters against demolition in the days of Going for Growth forced themselves into the planning 
and decision making and at the end became keen advocates of the partners‟ regeneration plans. In 
this process they transformed the way residential relocation was delivered in their neighbourhoods 
and in Newcastle as a whole (see Chapter 7). 
Residents found support in local councillors who helped raise funding for community consultation 
and involvement in planning. The real breakthrough was inclusion of the representatives of the 
Scotswood community in the work of the council. The Joint Working Group was founded in 2002. 
The group involved cooperation between residents, local councillors and council officers 
responsible for planning strategy in NCC. Scotswood residents got a voice in the council and 
decision making power.  
The Scotswood Residents Association leader was among the respondents asked to give feedback 
on relocation network governance scheme prepared by the researcher. The respondent marked the 
position of the Joint Woking Group (between (Area Based Regeneration Team (West) and the 
Regeneration Directorate) in the overall governance network supporting residential relocation in 
BNG. She also pointed out that the Scotswood residents were present in the Steering Group 
operating at a higher level. This involvement resulted in securing better outcomes for the owner 
occupiers relocated from Scotswood and improving the residential relocation practice in Newcastle 
as a whole. Residents‟ voluntary involvement in the Joint Working Group and the Steering Group, 
resulted in reducing demolition in Scotswood by 800 properties; resident support for relocation (all 
tenures) was set up (see ALMOs), relocation grants were increased and FAPs designed to enable 
relocation of the owner occupiers alternative property, provision (owner occupiers) were 
organised. The Homeswap scheme was designed by the Council and funded by BNG. While 
primarily designed for owner occupiers the representatives of the Scotswood Neighbourhood 
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Centre interviewed for this research pointed out that the scheme was at times available to the social 
tenants as well. Homeswap enabled relocation into homes refurbished by the council following 
residents‟ specifications.  
Figure 8-9: Scotswood Village Residents Associations (Community Group) (Feedback) 
 
Respondent: Resident/Leader (CS-Residents Scotswood1 (Leader))  
Apart from this work, Scotswood residents were involved in supporting their own community 
through the relocation process. This was crucial as the process was taking years for some. 
Scotswood residents‟ activism attracted visits from the local media, politicians and ministers and 
earned them the Queen‟s Award for voluntary work. The community representatives were also 
determined to empower the community in the East End of Newcastle that was affected by 
demolition. 
‗Yes, we were invited by all of their groups [Walker] … we‘re starting up new groups 
and they wanted a bit of help in starting up these new groups and so we went along and 
sat in and listened to how they were running them and then give them an idea of what 
we‘d done and how we‘d got involved. So, yes, we did, and then all of a sudden the 
Walker groups seemed to take off and they seemed to be getting things done an awful lot 
quicker than we were‘ (CS- Residents Scotswood1).  
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The influence of community groups was not equal across Newcastle. For instance, Walker 
Network (the network of residents associations in Walker neighbourhood) did not have a decision 
making power. This said, the community in East End was statutorily engaged in the planning 
process from the start (see Chapter 7). However, the Walker Promise was designed by the council, 
based on the lessons learnt in Scotswood. 
As the result of the engagement as well as successful relocation (into new and refurbished 
properties) residents‟ representatives became advocates of the BNG plans in both Walker and 
Scotswood. They took pride in the results of their work and changes that they achieved in the 
planning process and residential relocation outcomes they secured for themselves and their 
neighbours. Interestingly, in the process the residents took ownership of the plans to the extent that 
they began to „police them‟. 
A Walker Network representative, relocated herself, seemed to be quite judgemental of her fellow 
residents who easily moved away and then complained over the residential relocation outcomes:  
‗They had to be re-housed because they were part of a regeneration area, they could 
move wherever they wanted, they could argue and stick for Walker but some of them 
moved ... And then when they‘ve seen how they‘ve built it ... we stuck it out, all our 
neighbours here, we said ―no, we want to stay there‖ so we stuck it out and now when 
they see the houses they say ―oh, wish I‘d stayed there‖, but it had already gone. ―Oh, 
I‘m coming back,‖ I said ―you can‘t come back, you‘ve moved away there‘s other people 
has priorities over you now‖ (CS-Resident Walker1). 
In Scotswood the residents‟ comments felt like a sort of policing of their fellow neighbours who 
obstructed the development of the plans they drafted with the council. The Scotswood residents‟ 
leader said:  
‗I can only see a future for Scotswood that we wouldn‘t have had if we‘d stuck with the 
place the way it was and the people who are appealing against it with CPO‘s, there are 4 
of them, and I didn‘t think that they had enough clout to warrant their CPO‘s, I mean 
there‘s the house that remains on Armstrong Road, he didn‘t put anything but bad into 
the area all the time he owned the house, … he multi-occupied it, like a bed & breakfast 
kind of thing with a room and they were all people who were on benefits, the house was 
occupied with undesirables, that‘s all I can say, because they caused an awful lot of 
problems and he has gone against the CPO … he‘s talking about demolishing it and 
making it into a multi-occupational place again, bed & breakfast or the like. Now, we 
don‘t want that, none of us wanted it, we wanted it to be demolished as it was ear-marked 
for, it was in the picture …‘ (CS-Residents‘ Leader Scotswood). 
In one of the reports about the area, ReUrba (2005) pointed out that residents‟ representatives 
sounded a bit „like ambassadors for the Council‟s plans‟ and rightfully asked: how do they avoid 
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being branded an extension of the local government? The example of the Newcastle residents 
challenges the assumption about the role of the residents in demolition and the relocation process. 
It shows that the community was well able to influence the Pathfinder‟s plans and strategies. Their 
success was based on the awareness (as well as persistence) that the Council depends on them to 
move in order to develop. By refusing to move the residents bargained for a relocation deal that 
they considered fair and acceptable and in the process reshaped the residential relocation approach 
in Newcastle and in BNG more widely.  
8.6 Conclusion: Governance Arrangements and Impact of Relocation 
Outcomes  
This chapter identified actors delivering residential relocation, examined their roles, 
responsibilities and governance arrangements. This section provides concluding remarks. The 
solutions Pathfinders developed in order to respond to the challenges of relocation on the ground, 
call for rethinking of the way relocation roles and responsibilities are defined in a mixed tenure 
context. This research identified five distinct processes shaping residential relocation in HMR (see 
the „Residential Relocation Matrix‟). The roles and responsibilities of actors have been examined 
based on these findings. The analysis shows not only that numerous actors were involved in 
residential relocation in HMR in general and BNG in particular, but that their „traditional‟ role in 
terms of relocation changed and evolved. For instance, private developers who have been known to 
avoid building in low demand areas altogether were entrusted to provide alternative properties for 
residents affected by relocation. The ALMOs‟ role evolved from providing resident support to 
social tenants only to include residential relocation support for all tenures. RSLs found themselves 
designing relocation specific strategy aiming to meet residents‟ housing aspirations in the 
relocation process, and so on. The process was not without challenges. Some of the results were 
achieved through „trial and error‟, error that took the form of negative residential relocation 
outcomes. However, the results point out the change in the sector, and call for re-examination of 
the way relocation is researched, re-examination of actors involved in the process, their roles and 
responsibilities and governance arrangements. 
One of the key findings presented in this chapter is that residential relocation was delivered by a 
multitude of actors from public, private and community sectors. Fragmentation of delivery 
characterised residential relocation in the HMR framework. The reason for this was residential 
relocation complexity compounded by cross-tenure residential relocation and the practice of task 
delegation. Traditionally, local authorities have been regarded as responsible and accountable for 
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residential relocation process and outcomes. Based on evidence presented in this study, we can no 
longer claim this. As shown in the previous chapter local authorities depended on a myriad of 
actors to deliver residential relocation. They were not in a position to fully influence or control the 
behaviour of these actors. Residential relocation in mixed tenure context is delivered by a complex 
network of actors. Figure 8-10: Governance of Relocation in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead 
Pathfinder presents the final form of the BNG relocation network based on the feedbacks provided 
by the respondents. Residential relocation process and outcomes were the result of cooperation or 
non-cooperation of network actors involved in specific projects at specific times. Consequently, 
residential relocation was characterised by uncertainty, mixed outcomes and delays. In governance 
literature delays and uncertainty have been defined as characteristics of the operation of complex 
networks of actors, unclear or changing goals (Kickert et al., 1997). These have certainly been 
identified in the relocation practice examined in this research.  
Based on the extensive empirical research this study is in position to claim that residential 
relocation network operation resembles the model described by governance orthodoxy theorists 
(Rhodes, 1997; Kickert et al, 1997). Future research should look in more detail at the possibilities 
of the management of the relocation networks shaping development caused residential relocation. 
The concluding chapter provides a definition of the „governance of relocation‟ based on the 
research presented here and provides recommendations for the development of future research and 
practice.  
  




Figure 8-10: Governance of Relocation in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder  
 
Based on the case study conducted between March 2008 and January 2010 




Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions towards Governance of 
Relocation  
9.1 Original Contribution to Knowledge  
This research has examined mixed-tenure residential relocation delivery in the context of a 
differentiated polity. Drawing on governance debates and extensive empirical research, its key 
innovation is in devising a theoretical framework that shows how governance has a profound 
impact on residential relocation outcomes at the scale of individual projects. Using the example of 
the Housing Market Renewal initiative in England, the study showed that the practices of 
residential relocation consisted of five distinct processes and were delivered by a complex network 
of actors. It provided a fine grained examination of institutional contexts that evolved around 
residential relocation in Pathfinder areas on the national, sub-regional and local levels. The 
findings challenge assumptions and conclusions put forward by HMR critics, notably gentrification 
studies. The thesis recommends further exploration of „governance of relocation‟ as a network 
governance model, in order to enable greater in-depth understanding of residential relocation 
delivery in other contexts.  
This research represents a substantial and original contribution to knowledge because it examines 
certain key aspects of residential relocation that are under-researched and under-theorised. To date 
there is very little published knowledge about the way mixed-tenure residential relocation is 
delivered in the context of devolved state policy implementation. An extensive search of the 
research literature on residential relocation revealed a gap in academic research. While residential 
relocation outcomes receive overwhelming attention, the examination of institutional aspects of 
relocation as well as relocation process has been neglected. By moving beyond the conventional 
focus on residential relocation outcomes, this study makes a significant contribution to an 
emerging body of research on neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation that has 
developed in response to state planned housing demolition policies in Western Europe and the 
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USA over the past decade (see for example Allen, T., 2000; Cole & Flint, 2007; Goetz, 2003, 
2002; Kleit & Manzo, 2006; Kearns, 2002; Kleinhans & van der Laan Bouma-Doff, 2008; 
Rosenfeld, 2013). 
The novelty of the approach lies in the development of a conceptual model for capturing and 
analysing residential relocation processes. The research shows that institutional fragmentation, the 
multiplication of actors and confusion over „who does what‟ take effect not only on a wide policy 
plane, but also affect residential relocation as practical intervention. Its key contribution is a unique 
process-focused perspective on state induced residential relocation delivery. The governance 
networks that emerge around relocation processes have a profound impact on the relocation 
delivery and outcomes. The conceptual models this thesis has generated on the basis of extensive 
empirical study of HMR relocation in England are themselves an original contribution to 
knowledge (see Thesis Summary below).  
The task for future residential relocation research is to test in other contexts the conceptual models 
developed here. Although focused on the English example, the conclusions and insights developed 
have wider relevance. In the past decade initiatives similar to that in England have been developed 
in the USA and Western Europe. The thesis argues for further exploration and development of 
residential relocation research that focuses on examination of the residential relocation processes 
and related governance issues in other contexts and their influence on residential relocation 
outcomes. 
The results of this thesis also have direct policy relevance. It examined an aspect of HMR that has 
received little attention, in both research and official HMR reports. It accomplished a better 
understanding of the nature of residential relocation delivery, localised gaps in the existing 
legislation and guidance, specified the processes involved as well as residential relocation delivery 
mechanisms. Hence, the changes required for more resident adjusted residential relocation in the 
policy process can be identified. In doing so, more appropriate solutions can be achieved. 
9.2 Thesis Summary: Addressing the Main Research Objectives  
This thesis has examined governance processes shaping cross-tenure residential relocation in the 
Housing Market Renewal initiative in England. It aimed to fulfil three key objectives: 
1) to examine how residential relocation is delivered in  a differentiated polity,  
2) to identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and responsibilities, and,  
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3) to evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation delivery and 
outcomes. 
These objectives have been addressed more broadly in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. In this section I provide 
short summaries to link these to the theoretical debates presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and reflection 
on the thesis as a whole. The thesis takes a sociological approach underpinned by governance 
theory and was researched using grounded theory as the qualitative methodology. Answers to the 
research aim and objectives in this study are drawn from extensive empirical inquiry that builds on 
two pilot studies, the Pathfinder survey and an in-depth case study of the BNG Pathfinder. The key 
source of data is 44 interviews with key stakeholders shaping residential relocation practice, from 
private, public and community sectors, at national, sub-regional and local level (see Chapter 5).  
9.2.1 Objective 1: To examine how residential relocation is delivered in a 
differentiated polity  
The Pathfinders were given „a mandate to experiment‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004) and they did. In the 
absence of governmental guidance or standards, residential relocation delivery evolved at the 
Pathfinder level, or more precisely as the respondents indicated, on the project level within each 
individual Pathfinder. The Pathfinder survey and in-depth BNG case study showed that a devolved 
approach to policy design (and in particular to the relocation of residents) led to the proliferation of 
a range of strategies that substantially differed over time and space (Chapter 6). This research 
sought to systematise the observed residential relocation practices in order to establish causal links 
between residential relocation outcomes and governance processes shaping them. The analysis of 
respondents‟ narratives in the pilot studies, subsequent feedback through qualitative survey of nine 
Pathfinders and the in-depth case study, led to identification of five distinct processes shaping 
residential relocation practice in the Housing Market Renewal framework. These are: 
redevelopment strategy, community involvement, resident support, alternative property provision 
and financial assistance provision.  
The development of residential relocation processes emerged out of response to challenges 
Pathfinders and their local authorities encountered while attempting to relocate residents in HMR 
projects using available legislative tools. Identified residential relocation processes describe 
relocation delivery from the moment the decision to demolish has been approved by both 
authorities and residents affected the intervention.  
At this point it is worth pausing to reiterate that this research delineates between the decision 
making processes related to (a) demolition, and (b) relocation. The thesis focuses on the cases 
Orna Rosenfeld                                                                                     Governance of Relocation 
260 
 
where the agreement to demolish and acquire properties had been reached by involved 
stakeholders, primarily residents. Very few studies focus on this issue. In literature critical of HMR 
the attention has been on the cases where the residents disagreed with the intervention outright. 
The importance of considering cases where residents agreed with the intervention is twofold. First, 
only after demolition has been approved and agreed upon does a set of relocation processes evolve 
which then shape residential relocation outcomes. Second, agreement to demolition does not 
guarantee positive residential relocation results, just as initial disagreement with it does not 
guarantee negative ones. The processes of residential relocation shape relocation outcomes.  
While some processes, such as planning strategy, have been known to affect residential relocation 
prospects, others such as financial assistance provision, community involvement, alternative 
strategy provision and resident support, were invented or advanced from (depending on the tenure 
in question) during Pathfinders‟ operation. The evidence presented in Chapters 6 and 7 showed that 
relocation practice was especially complex because of the coexistence and interaction of the five 
identified relocation processes affecting three different tenures, as well as different levels of 
development and change of processes at the time of implementation.  
In order to allow analysis of relocation processes identified in this study, and understand how their 
interplay shaped residential relocation outcomes on project level, a conceptual model was built 
drawing on the „game‟ concept and extensive empirical research. The „Residential Relocation 
Matrix‟ presents an amalgam of emerging residential relocation processes identified in the HMR 
framework (see Figure 9-1: Residential relocation matrix (Ch. 6)). 
  








 Applicable to different 
project cases  
 Applicable to different 
stages of the same project 
case 
 Applicable to different 
tenures  
 Tool for indentifying 
disparate actors involved in 
the residential relocation 
process in different 
projects.  
Based on the HMR empirical study 
As was shown in Chapters 6 and 7, residential relocation processes identified in this study changed 
in different ways, reflecting innovation introduced by the actors involved, their cooperation or non-
cooperation. In addition, the observed processes did not move in the same direction or with the 
same speed, nor they were necessarily compatible or reinforcing. 
Innovations like financial assistance packages or alternative property provision for relocation 
involved establishment conventions that shaped the behaviour of many different organisations 
beyond the elected local authority and resulted in additional actors joining residential relocation 
delivery.  
Using the Residential Relocation Matrix designed in this research (Chapter 6) it was possible to 
identify and track changes in different relocation processes on project scale (as well as in each 
stage of each individual project). This conceptual model was also used to establish links between 
residential relocation processes (based on tenure), actors delivering them and residential relocation 
outcomes. The Residential Relocation Matrix formed a conceptual framework that enabled 
examination of governance processes shaping residential relocation in HMR on specific project 
scale and specific stage of project implementation. It is the key conceptual innovation that allowed 
focus on the procedure of residential relocation.  
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9.2.2 Objective 2: To identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and 
responsibilities 
Pathfinders were set up as non-statutory bodies. Therefore, Pathfinders‟ Boards and Teams did not 
have the power to intervene in the built environment, to demolish property or to relocate residents. 
These tasks were delegated to the local authorities the Pathfinder covered. However, the increasing 
complexity of residential relocation practice and additional resources this required put pressure on 
local authorities. As the result, in BNG, as in other Pathfinders, local authorities resorted to the 
practice of task delegation and contracting out. As a result, various actors were included in the 
process of residential relocation practice where the resources seemed to be missing.  
 
Figure 9-2: Scheme of delegation of residential relocation processes (BNG Pathfinder) (Ch. 
8) 
 
Based on BNG case study  
Figure 9-2: Scheme of delegation of residential relocation processes (BNG Pathfinder) (Ch. 8) 
presents a schematic delegation of the responsibilities linked to residential relocation processes in 
the case of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder. As HMR did not provide any guidance for 
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relocation practice, the roles and responsibilities of actors were identified in relation to residential 
relocation processes (Residential Relocation Matrix).  
The findings indicate that residential relocation practice in HMR was dependent on the myriad 
actors drawn from beyond the boundaries of the formal institutions of government (central and 
local), from public, private and community (third) sectors. Various organisations and their 
departments were found to have played a significant role in residential relocation practice in BNG. 
Therefore, residential relocation in the HMR context was shaped by the interaction of a large 
number of actors that came from very different backgrounds.  
While some commonalities existed, the involvement of actors varied at Pathfinder, local authority 
and individual project level and depending on tenure. No actor had a full overview or knowledge 
of all actors included in the process. The residential relocation outcomes were shaped by 
cooperation or non-cooperation between these actors. The results indicate that the nature of 
Pathfinder partnerships, transformation in local government, institutional fragmentation and 
contracting out, have each had a vital influence on the way that residential relocation was delivered 
in HMR.  
9.2.3 Objective 3: To evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential 
relocation delivery and outcomes  
This study showed that mixed tenure residential relocation in the context of differentiated polity is 
delivered by complex networks of actors. The „network‟ concept describes the governance 
architecture that emerged as a result of an interaction and relationship (planned or spontaneous) 
between actors identified using the Residential Relocation Matrix. The relocation network presents 
all actors connected by certain type of residential relocation process and/or interaction of several 
processes. It maps actors identified to be involved in residential relocation practice (including the 
five residential relocation processes) in BNG Pathfinder. 
  




According to the analysis in this study, a „relocation network‟ is an organically developed sub-
network interwoven with the official (government recognised) BNG Pathfinder governance 
structure designed to deliver the main HMR goals. „Governance of relocation‟ is not a planned 
governance arrangement, it is a network that emerged in response to the processes required to 
deliver residential relocation in the HMR framework. Therefore, the membership and shape of the 
„relocation network‘ differs between the Pathfinders. The common denominator was the link 
between the Pathfinder team and the local authority. However, the branches of the network within 
this wide structure differed and changed depending on the local authority and project in question. 
Actors from other public and private organisations, the community and the third sector formed a 
part of the relocation network. Therefore, the decision making related to each of five residential 
relocation processes was fragmented into different arenas as the actors came from very different 
backgrounds. The examples of the Scotswood, Walker, and Bensham and Saltwell projects in BNG 
showed that residential relocation practice was a result of cooperation or non-cooperation between 
interdependent parties with different often conflicting goals, interests and strategies. Interaction of 
actors in the relocation network following the residential relocation processes forms the 
„governance of relocation‘. 
Figure 9-3: Governance of relocation in BNG Pathfinder (Ch. 8) 
 
Based on the case study conducted between March 2008 and January 2010 
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Given the mechanism shaping residential relocation identified in the case of HMR, the key 
question deriving from governance theory debate is who rules this network? Are there any actors 
who have disproportional control over residential relocation processes?  
The evidence collected for this study showed that none of the actors involved possessed the power 
or resources to fully determine the strategies of other actors and therefore fully determine 
residential relocation outcomes. Having delegated responsibility over disparate relocation 
processes to other agencies, Pathfinder teams and local authorities depended upon other actors 
from public, private and community sectors to deliver residential relocation.  
As the result residential relocation outcomes differed between Pathfinders, local authorities and 
within individual redevelopment projects. While some residents got relocated on the opposite side 
of their street to a brand new property, others struggled to find or afford alternative accommodation 
within the boundaries of their local authority (Chapter 7). In different cases, the relocation process 
lasted from a couple of months to a decade from the moment the decision to demolish had been 
advertised to the residents. The key challenge for future policy design proposing demolition and 
incurring residential relocation is the recognition of residential relocation networks and the creation 
of governance capacity in the midst of observed complexity. 
9.3 Governance of Relocation: a Working Definition 
After extensive empirical examination of the HMR case, this study is in a position to provide a 
working definition of ‗governance of relocation‘ and position it within creative spaces of 
governance orthodoxy (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1997) and governance sceptics (Davies, 2004; 
Bache, 2003) (Chapter 4). 
'Governance of relocation' is a form of „steering‟ residential move from properties earmarked for 
demolition to alternative ones. „Governance of relocation‟, relates to governance processes and 
networks specifically linked to the issue of residential relocation after the agreement to demolish 
has been reached and where systems of statutory and other support are available. 
Residential relocation practice consists of several inextricably linked processes adjusted to 
different tenures („The Relocation Matrix‟). The residential relocation processes are delivered by 
numerous actors from public, private and community sectors. The multiplicity of actors might be 
seen just as an ecological adaptation to the complexities of residential relocation processes in 
demanding HMR, and in a differentiated polity more generally.  
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 Actors depend on one another to relocate residents from the areas earmarked for demolition, as 
well as to achieve their own goals in the process. Their cooperation or non-cooperation shapes the 
relocation delivery process and residential relocation outcomes.  
The actors form a relocation network. The relocation network is created by myriad actors from 
public, private and community sectors. It is not a planned network. It develops in order to deliver 
one or more residential relocation processes and differs on a project level.  
In HMR, the relocation network was a thematic sub-network of the wider Pathfinder governance. 
This network was found to form organically in response to the circumstances on the ground. 
Residential relocation practice and outcomes are the results of network operation.  
9.3.1 Governance of relocation as a governance orthodoxy model  
Based on extensive empirical research this study argues that „governance of relocation‟ resembles 
the model described by governance orthodoxy (Rhodes, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997). Relocation 
networks are self governing and hard to control. They operate on the basis of interdependency and 
are self organising, inter-organisational networks independent of the state. The decision making 
process is fragmented into different arenas (see relocation processes) and different levels (sub-
regional, local, project).  
The conceptual link between residential relocation as a practical intervention and that of wider 
governance theory, allows for revision of the way residential relocation is conceptualised and 
researched. Devising a theoretical framework to capture the residential relocation process allows 
new questions to be asked about restructuring and residential relocation that were not asked before.  
For instance, questions about accountability (Rhodes, 1997) for relocation processes and their 
outcomes; the effects of cooperation or non-cooperation of network members on relocation 
experiences; questions about the way the residential relocation networks could be managed or 
better organised (Kickert et al., 1997) and how best practice could be institutionalised and 
residential relocation outcomes acceptable to residents achieved.  
This conceptual and theoretical extension contributes to the emerging body of knowledge on 
neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation (Varady, et al., 2001; Goetz, 2002, 2003; 
Kearns, 2002, 2010; Kleinhans, 2003, 2010; Cole & Flint, 2007) by providing both a new 
perspective on the institutional context of residential relocation and a conceptual framework for 
researching the residential relocation process in other contexts. 
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9.4 Governance of Relocation versus State led Gentrification  
HMR induced relocation has attracted the attention of critical gentrification theorists (Chapter 3). 
Conceptualised as „displacement‟, relocation was seen as state led or state sponsored (Cameron 
2003, 2006; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). The „governance of relocation‟ challenges 
assumptions and conclusions put forward by gentrification theorists and HMR critics on the 
following points:  
1) Displacement perspective  
2) Uniform outcomes  
3) Centrality of the state in residential relocation  
4) Position of the affected residents  
9.4.1 Displacement perspective  
The findings presented in this thesis challenge the „displacement‟ perspective presented by HMR 
critics (see Cameron, 2003; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). This research argues that 
the critical gentrification perspective is limiting for an examination of planned demolition induced 
residential relocation (where forms of statutory and other support are available) for several reasons. 
First, the term displacement covers different causes of residential relocation in urban areas: 
displacement due to housing rent increase (Glass, 1964; Smith, 1996) „middle class invasion‟ in 
global cities (Slater, 2006, 2010) demolition of the existing housing in low demand markets 
(Cameron, 2003, 2006; Cameron & Coaffee, 2005) or style of replacement housing (Allen, 2008). 
According to Slater (2004) the focus on gentrification studies is on the effects of the displacement 
rather than on its cause. This study argues that disregard of relocation causes leads to neglect of 
important institutional differences between different types of relocation. For instance, displacement 
due to housing rent increase or so called „middle class invasion‟ does not entitle residents affected 
by the phenomena to statutory compensation or any other form of support; however planned 
demolition does. Because of the difference in institutional context different actors are involved in 
shaping residential relocation outcomes (or „effects‟ as Slater terms them) in different types of 
relocation.  
Second, in gentrification studies there is no consensus about the territorial unit in which residents 
are affected by „displacement‟. The terms used are „community‟ or „neighbourhood‟. However, 
their size and scale are opened to interpretation. This further leads to lack of clarity about the 
number of residents affected by „displacement‟. On the contrary, in the case of planned demolition 
induced residential relocation the boundary of areas planned for housing demolition, the number of 
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residents affected as well as the details about these residents are known. They are required for 
approval of the plans. Moreover, the approved plans form the basis on which the residents affected 
by interventions are eligible for statutory compensation and in the case of HMR other forms of 
residential relocation assistance (see The Relocation Matrix).  
This study argues that clear definition of the cause of residential relocation is important in order to 
identify the relevant institutional context, the actors involved in the process as well as the delivery 
mechanism shaping residential relocation. This fine grained information can allow planning for 
residential relocation that has a better prospect to provide outcomes acceptable to relocatees.  
9.4.2 Relocation outcomes  
Critical gentrification studies tend to take a predominantly negative displacement perspective on 
outcomes of the relocation process regardless of the displacement cause or mechanism shaping it 
(market, state, powerful coalitions). The effects of „displacement‟ are seen as predominantly 
negative and harmful to the residents. This study showed that residential relocation outcomes are 
far from being uniform; they are mixed. By suggesting that the displacement outcomes are 
predominantly negative regardless of process or context, the state-led gentrification (Cameron, 
2003) stance resembles the „conventional steering perspective‟ in policy analysis literature. 
Here, „the central government is seen as society‟s central ruler, and citizens and private 
organisations and lower tiers of government, [are] considered more or less passive objects of these 
steering efforts‟ (Kickert et al., 1997:5). From this perspective, policy implementation is a neutral 
and technical exercise where similar actions are assumed to produce similar outcomes. In other 
words the processes conducted to achieve policy goals are uniform and always bring the same 
outcomes.  
This thesis showed that far from being uniform, residential relocation processes differ significantly 
not only between Pathfinders but within them, on local authority and project level. Formal rules are 
not always strictly followed, they may be „bent‟ or even ignored. Emerging processes change at 
different rates and in different directions, reflecting local circumstances, the network structure and 
relationships delivering any given project.  
Most importantly, residential relocation possesses are carried out in advance of redevelopment and 
regardless of the success or failure of that redevelopment. In the HMR case it is hard to argue for 
repopulation of the intervention areas by the „middle class‟ as the Pathfinders underperformed in 
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terms of new housing provision (Audit Commission, 2011), in some cases they failed to sell 
commercial properties and attract any population (see Chapter 7). Nonetheless, some of the around 
50,000 residents relocated by the intervention had good residential relocation outcomes while 
others, not as lucky, did not.  
The account of residential relocation experiences and the dynamics of relocation processes 
presented in this thesis reinforces the claims of policy analysts that „policy is not a settled end 
product and the significance of the moment and place of delivery is that policy can be and usually 
is remade during implementation‟ (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:245).  
9.4.3 Position of the state in residential relocation  
The findings of this study challenge the idea of the centrality of the state in the residential 
relocation process as put forward by HMR critics (Cameron, 2003; Allen, 2008; Macleod & 
Johnstone, 2012). The use of a critical state-led gentrification paradigm implies that residential 
relocation outcomes on the household level can be understood simply as the result of a structural 
shift in state activity, which takes place on a grander scale. The findings presented in this study 
showed that residential relocation in the HMR framework was delivered by a complex network of 
actors, whose members came from beyond the Pathfinder and local council, from other public, 
private and community organisations.  
Central government launched and provided key funds for HMR. It had a role in approving the 
plans proposing planned demolition. It can be therefore argued to have had a role in inducing 
relocation in general terms. However, in terms of residential relocation processes that ultimately 
shaped residential relocation outcomes (e.g. location, size, quality of the properties, proximity to 
old neighbourhood or neighbours) the central government had little or no influence. The residential 
relocation processes were developed on the project scale and variably shaped by relocation 
networks.  
Pathfinders and local authorities were dependant on myriad actors from public, private and 
community sectors to deliver residential relocation. In this sense it is better to think of residential 
relocation as a process of negotiation inside a complex system of organisations and agencies rather 
than a state-crafted outcome.  
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9.4.4 Position of the affected residents in the residential relocation process 
In critical gentrification literature the residents affected by demolition and relocation are more 
often than not presented as victims of powerful actors and structural forces that they can do little to 
influence (Allen, 2008; Slater, 2006, 2010). In contrast to the claims in the literature critical about 
HMR, the case of BNG showed that communities and third sector organisations were more than 
able to take a stand and achieve their goals in the process.  
The majority of Pathfinders resorted to negotiation with relocatees of different tenures rather than 
legal force. Purchase by compulsion was used as a last resort for owner occupiers (For example, in 
Scotswood only 6 out of over 1,200 demolished properties were purchased by compulsion).  
This study showed that the „governance of relocation‟ networks operate on the basis of 
dependency. Demolition or new building is not possible as long as the properties are occupied. 
Many of the residents affected by residential relocation in BNG seemed to be well aware of their 
bargaining position and used it to their advantage. For example, the reduction in the number of 
properties planned for demolition (Scotswood) or delay of the entire project (Bensham & Saltwell); 
relocation into new homes or refurbished homes of relocatees‟ choice (Scotswood and Walker); 
change of the residential relocation practice in the Pathfinder (Scotswood). From the perspective of 
the Walker team leader at NCC, rather than being a matter of ‗force‘, ‗relocation is an art of 
persuasion‘ (CS-NCC East Team2). 
  





Table 9-1:  Debate points: State led gentrification versus governance of relocation  
 State-led Gentrification (in HMR)  Governance of Relocation  
Relocation 
definition  
Displacement caused by rent 
increase, housing price increase, 
housing taxes increase, planned 
demolition. 
Other: housing built for taste of the 
middle classes, arrival of the middle 
classes.  
Relocation caused by redevelopment 
plans/projects, where statutory 
compensation along with other forms of 
support is available to residents affected by 
demolition and relocation.  
Relocation 
cause  










Development Project or Scheme 
(defined project boundary with planned 





Number of residents affected by 
displacement cannot be precisely 
known.  
Number of residents affected by demolition 
(of the property they occupy) and relocation 
is known. Relocatees‟ details including their 
tenure, are a part of the compulsory project 
documentation needed for plan approval.  
Based on this information the residents are 
eligible to statutory compensation and other 




State. Complex network of actors. 
Leading 
Actor/s 
State (central and local).  




Multitude of actors from private and 
public sector.  
Multitude of actors from private, public and 




Victims of the process. Actors in the network.  
Relocation 
Outcomes 
Negative, harmful for the residents. Mixed. 
Process Gentrification. Planning Strategy, Community 
Involvement, Resident Support, Financial 
Assistance Provision and Alternative 
Property Provision. 
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9.5 New Questions Raised and New Directions for Residential 
Relocation Research 
The nature of the research purpose determined a unique choice of research design in order to 
accommodate such analysis. The grounded theory methodology (comprising mixed qualitative 
methods and techniques) allowed in-depth exploration of residential relocation practice, building 
conceptual models about residential relocation processes and linking them to wider theoretical 
concepts of governance theory. However, this thesis is only a beginning in a research shift from 
focus on relocation outcomes to that of relocation process. Further work is required. 
Grounded theory as qualitative methodology has its limitations and available evidence can only 
take the study so far. The nature of qualitative methodology allows for consideration of limited 
numbers of cases. Based on the in-depth analysis of the HMR case with special attention to the 
BNG Pathfinder, this study suggests that more research is needed to develop understanding about 
the nature of residential relocation processes, the structure of networks delivering residential 
relocation, the ways these come to being, evolve and behave in other policy, political and housing 
market contexts. 
The conceptual models built in this research based on the HMR case need further testing in other 
contexts. As the HMR initiative has been cancelled, the possibilities of testing the conclusions in 
other Pathfinders would be challenging and require historical analysis. However, the anecdotal 
evidence shows that many of the former Pathfinder areas are left with a half-finished project and 
that relocation is continuing. Examination of these cases would be beneficial, as the new 
partnerships take over the projects Pathfinders left unfinished.  
The findings based on the English case would benefit from further testing and application in other 
differentiated polity contexts, such as the USA and Western Europe where programmes similar to 
HMR have been developed. It is quite possible that the decentralisation and fragmentation of 
service delivery that the governance theorists point to (see Kickert et al., 1997; Kjær, 2004) now 
affects aspects of residential relocation in these contexts. However, these issues have not been 
explored. While addressing the issue of wider relocation research internationally Curley and 
Kleinhans (2009:371) point out that „the majority of the literature … is connected to an outdated 
institutional context of „traditional‟ urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s‟. The „governance of 
relocation‟ offers a fresh perspective to residential relocation research. 
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Neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation studies (see Allen, T., 2000; Cole & Flint, 
2007; Goetz, 2003; Kleit, R. G. & Manzo, 2006; Kearns, 2002) would benefit from further 
examination of relocation processes (Rosenfeld, 2013). At the moment the studies in this domain 
show an overwhelming focus on residential relocation outcomes (Kearns & Kleinhans, 2013). 
Based on the results presented here, the author suggests further exploration of the capacity of 
governance network concepts, ideas and theory to contribute to the development of relocation 
studies (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997).  
The outcomes of state policy induced residential relocation can be improved only if the details of 
the processes shaping them are well understood, the actors delivering them are known and their 
interaction mapped. The potential could be examined for managing relocation networks so as to 
produce more appropriate and certain residential relocation outcomes in the future. The theoretical 
work developed by Kickert et al. (1997) may be of use in this endeavour.  
9.6 Reflections on the HMR Initiative and Recommendations for Future 
Policy Induced Mixed-tenure Residential Relocation 
In April 2011 HMR was cancelled by the Conservative government as the financial reality in 
Britain (and the rest of the world) changed. While the cancellation of the policy was not envisaged 
at the commencement of this research (the initiative was planned to run until 2018), the thesis 
seems to be in a unique position to reflect on the last four years of residential relocation practice in 
the HMR framework and give recommendations  for future policy development in terms of 
residential relocation.  
Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders‟ implementation strategy was envisaged to be „learning by 
doing‟ (Cole & Nevin, 2004). The evidence presented in this study shows that some residential 
relocation practices and processes were truly innovative. However, the time it took to develop 
these, their availability and distribution will ultimately be the results upon which this initiative will 
be judged for the years to come. Table 9-2: Pros and cons of HMR in residential presents a brief 








Table 9-2: Pros and cons of HMR in residential relocation 
Pros  Cons  
 Innovative residential relocation practices 
development in response to local 
circumstances.  
 Community involvement in development 
of plans concerning demolition (not 
required by CPO).  
 Development of specialised financial 
assistance packages to facilitate residential 
relocation.  
 Development of resident support for all 
tenures (previously mandatory only for 
social tenants).  
 Development of alternative property 
provision for owner occupiers 
(Homeswap, affordable properties)  
 Improvement of the housing conditions for 
the private sector tenants by accreditation 
of private landlords.  
 Valuable learning material for future 
policies inducing residential relocation.  
 No guidance.  
 Time and resources needed for mixed-
tenure residential relocation severely 
underestimated.  
 Partial legislative framework supporting 
residential relocation. 
 Conflict between HMR vision of „tenure 
blind‟ approach and CPO legislation 
underpinning demolition and relocation for 
different tenures.  
 Conflict between the HMR goals and the 
CPO legislation – low demand areas 
considered as an exception by CPO.  
 Long delays. Relocation taking up to 8 
years to complete. 
 Limited output.  
 Uncertainly for all partners involved. 
 Living blight and limbo.  
 Limited availability of innovative solutions. 
 No relocation specific community 
involvement.  
The value of evidence about HMR residential relocation practices lies in the fact that they were 
developed without much central guidance and in response to local circumstances. Over eight years 
of HMR implementation the Pathfinders crafted their approaches from having few skills and tools 
to tackle relocation in low demand areas, to some state of the art strategies such as the Walker 
Promise in BNG. The evidence about these practices and their mode of delivery provide a valuable 
insight into the challenges, possible approaches and solutions in state policy induced mixed-tenure 
relocation in a differentiated polity. It is situated knowledge about residential relocation developed 
in response to local circumstances.  
The future policies proposing residential relocation should consider the lessons that can be learnt 
from the HMR example recorded in this study. At the moment the former Pathfinders face two 
challenges, the first is finishing the projects that have been left unfinished, the second is recording 
the learning that has developed through HMR implementation.  
At the moment there is nothing to capture the technical expertise and good practice and 
make sure it is not lost. Because it is at the end of the Pathfinder process you end up not 
clearing and then clearance is necessary again. … To go through that entire learning 
process again, it is very expensive, very stressful and it slows things down. It means that 
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mistakes are done which are stress for the residents, stress to authority and cost … So 
investing in maintaining these skills, I think, is well worthwhile (MSP Respondent S1-4). 
Based on the work on residential relocation delivery completed in this research, together with the 
conceptual advancements developed, the recommendations this thesis puts forward for policy 
development are as follows. 
9.6.1 Residential relocation in low demand housing markets 
The case of HMR suggests that future policy makers should take into consideration different types 
of housing markets when planning for interventions inducing residential relocation. It is no longer 
sufficient to rely on the available legislation (CPO) that assumes the existence of homogenous 
housing markets.  
Failure to factor-in specific housing market characteristics and market change in redevelopment 
may lead to adverse results for residents affected as well as jeopardise efforts for policy 
implementation and redevelopment. In the HMR case, lack of consideration of market differences 
and market dynamics in residential relocation resulted in adverse results for the residents. At the 
beginning of HMR implementation owner occupiers faced an affordability gap and were in danger 
of losing home ownership in the process. Lack of market consideration in residential relocation 
also endangered financial sustainability of the programme on Pathfinder level. Even though HMR 
rested on the idea of market renewal, the change of prices was not considered for properties 
earmarked for demolition. As the market started to recover, the price of the properties planned for 
demolition increased as well, however this was not factored into the Pathfinders‟ budget at the 
outset.  
Residential relocation costs along with FAPs suitable for specific market conditions should be 
planned in advance of residential relocation, possibly in the planning stage of projects proposing 
housing demolition. Considering market fragmentation is required not only in planning about 
demand and supply of housing but residential relocation as well. Market intelligence should be 
used for modelling the potential prices of residential relocation and FAPs in the early planning 
stages as well as for their adjustment at the time of project delivery. This kind of planning may 
provide more realistic estimates about residential relocation costs for the partners as well as the 
residents and help prevent or at least reduce adverse results for the residents and partners. 
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9.6.2 Decision making process: demolition vs residential relocation 
There is a need to delineate between the decision making process behind demolition and the 
decision making process shaping residential relocation, especially in terms of actors involved in the 
two.  
The networks delivering and ultimately shaping the outcomes of residential relocation come into 
being only after the demolition is approved and set in action. Because of the timeframes needed to 
carry out redevelopment (up to a decade in BNG), this also means that actors or networks that 
approve demolition and set relocation in action may not be the ones delivering relocation; they 
may not be interested in residential relocation practicalities nor be in a position to steer the 
operation of relocation networks or ultimately be present at all. In Newcastle for instance (part of 
BNG case study), the HMR funding was won by the Labour administration that ruled the city in 
2002. In 2004, Labour was heavily defeated in Newcastle by the Liberal Democrats, not least 
because of criticism of Labour‟s demolition plans. In the first days of their rule the Liberal 
Democrats symbolically proclaimed the cancellation of HMR plans in Newcastle. However, the 
prospect of losing lavish HMR funding that supported part of the NCC staff seemed too a big a loss 
for the city council. The two parties reversed their position on demolition after the local elections. 
The Liberal Democrats became demolition ambassadors while Labour opposed them (the same 
plans their party approved). Backstage of these local political battles, relocation networks 
(operational or working networks of practitioners, planners, community associations and ALMOs) 
led by a small council team were trying to deliver what was agreed and promised to the residents. 
Policy designers and researchers alike should take into consideration that the actors and agencies 
approving demolition and carrying out relocation may not be the same, nor operate in the same 
way. 
9.6.3 Project Scale and Timing   
The findings in this thesis showed that the respondents involved in residential relocation practice 
conceptualised their actions at a project scale. However, regardless of a very small scale of 
redevelopment (in comparison to the sub-region or local authority) the key problems encountered 
by the residents affected by demolition and relocation were long delays or simply long periods 
between the time that the demolition was first announced to the moment of relocation. This 
resulted in residents living in blighted half boarded up streets where maintenance and services were 
systematically cut for up to a decade. The size of the projects and the staging of redevelopment has 
to be taken into consideration in projects that propose demolition. 
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  proposing land assembly and large scale demolition (e.g. 1,500 residential units in Scotswood) to 
be completed before the site is delivered to developers are not appropriate  for the effective 
management of residential relocation. They are hard to manage and are bound to take several years 
to complete because of their size.  
This approach should be at all costs avoided, for the following reasons: first it results in long 
waiting periods for the residents; second, it requires considerable resources for neighbourhood 
management, maintaining empty properties and costs of policing the neighbourhood in order to 
protect the waiting residents from crime until the demolition is carried out. Most importantly 
because of the sheer size of the projects the rate of non-completion in large scale projects 
(accompanied with blight) is much higher than in smaller more manageable ones.  
Smaller projects of between 50-100 residential units are more appropriate in order to minimise 
waiting periods for the residents and the added costs for the partners. Larger projects proposing 
demolition and residential relocation should be staged and phased, each phase should involve 
demolition of no more than 100 residential units. Each stage should include plans for relocation 
(whether via alternative property provision or FAPs), with a clear vision as to where relocatees 
could move to. Lastly, in cases where redevelopment has to be stopped for any reason (e.g. 
financial crisis) smaller projects are easier to maintain while allowing the rest of the 
neighbourhood to function relatively intact.  
9.6.4  Residential relocation processes in cross-tenure relocation 
The development of diverse relocation practices identified in this research stand witness not only to 
the innovation that Pathfinders achieved during HMR implementation, but to the need to develop 
residential relocation practice and relocation options that go far beyond available statutory 
compensation and support. Future policy makers should take into consideration that residential 
relocation consists of several processes that are linked and mutually influencing. These processes 
differ for three tenures (owner occupiers, social and private tenants). Based on the findings in this 
study it is recommended that the relocation processes and their interaction should be planned in 
order to provide relocation outcomes acceptable to the relocatees, and to reduce delays and 
unplanned costs for the partners.  
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9.6.4.1 Planning strategy  
Planning strategy sets out broad relocation prospects within a project. The plans define whether 
part (or all) of the relocation could take place within the redeveloped area or would have to take 
place outside it. At the moment providing strategy for residential relocation is not required in plans 
inducing residential relocation. However, the findings of this research showed that it is no longer 
sufficient to assume that residents affected by demolition can find alternative properties in the 
market without help. 
The recommendation deriving from this research is that planning strategy should incorporate 
residential relocation whether the residents are relocated back into the redeveloped area or 
relocated out of  it, to other neighbourhoods. . Failure to do so results in unnecessary delays, 
feelings of uncertainty for the residents, a difficulty in estimating the real duration of project 
implementation and potential financial losses for the project implementers.  
Planning for residential relocation within the planning strategy should be based on in-depth 
knowledge about the community potentially affected by demolition. Understanding which 
proportion (and tenure) of residents wish to stay in their old neighbourhood (and where) and what 
proportion wish to leave, can help the planners design planning strategies that cater for the needs of 
the affected community, bring potentially better residential relocation outcomes, avoid unnecessary 
delays (that arise when relocation matters are dealt with post planning approval) and protests 
against the plans.  
This said, planning strategy in itself is not sufficient in order to achieve positive residential 
relocation results. For instance, planning strategy that incorporates residential relocation, is not 
sufficient to achieve planned results without effective alternative property provision. In order to 
support planning strategy other residential relocation processes should be developed.  
9.6.4.2 Community involvement 
After the publication of Planning and Compulsory Purchase Order 2004 community engagement 
became a compulsory part of planning. While PCPA 2004 made a significant change in the 
planning system and brought improvements to the planning process in general terms, the statutory 
engagement it requires it is not sufficient for residential relocation purposes. Development of 
relocation specific community engagement is needed in order to cater to the specific needs of 
relocation affected residents, for three reasons. 
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First, statutory engagement requires inclusion of a wide group of residents (not necessarily affected 
those by demolition or relocation) that can outnumber the residents affected by demolition and thus 
skew discussions away from demolition and relocation issues facing potential relocatees. In those 
cases, as presented in Chapter 6, the feelings of fear and uncertainly (about the intervention) 
among the residents, and in extreme cases protests against the intervention resume regardless of 
community engagement (see Chapter 6).  
Second, relocation specific consultation is needed prior to the planning stage in order to collect 
intelligence about the residents‟ position on demolition, and to avoid intervening in 
neighbourhoods where the majority of residents are against the intervention outright. Demolition in  
areas where the affected communities are against demolition should be avoided at all costs. More 
often than not interventions in such areas are significantly delayed, rarely completed and offer little 
value for the money. In these cases the resources are not invested in redevelopment but costly court 
battles around compulsory purchase.  
Third, in areas where residents agree with the intervention in general terms, relocation specific 
consultation is needed prior to the planning stage in order to collect intelligence about the residents 
who wish to stay in their old neighbourhood (or at least near to it) and those who wish to leave. 
This can allow more effective development of planning strategy and other residential relocation 
processes needed to cater for these two groups.   
Finally, policy designers and practitioners alike must acknowledge authorities‟ dependence on 
relocatees to deliver residential relocation and consider them as an important part of the relocation 
network, that has the capacity to delay and reshape residential relocation practice and should 
therefore be involved early on in the project in order to avoid unnecessary delays, conflicts, 
financial loss and adverse residential relocation outcomes. 
9.6.4.3 Financial assistance provision  
Housing Market Renewal has been a major source of proliferation of innovative Financial 
Assistance Packages (FAPs). Development of financial assistance packages by the HMR 
Pathfinders suggests, that (a) statutory compensation guaranteed by the state is not sufficient (b) 
that additional financial assistance for relocation is needed in low housing demand areas.   
The findings presented in this study showed that simple reliance on statutory compensation and 
lack of planning for FAPs can result in an affordability gap for the residents (owner occupiers), 
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adverse relocation outcomes, refusal to relocate, delays and unplanned costs of relocation. 
Therefore, FAPs should be planned in advance of the relocation commencement preferably in the 
planning stages of redevelopment.   
9.6.4.4 Alternative property provision 
Alternative property provision (APP) in the case of housing demolition is variably required by law 
depending on the tenure. The present study showed that alternative property provision is important 
for all tenures. Planning and delivering alternative properties for relocation allows residents to stay 
in their old neighbourhood or in close proximity to it. It allows relocatees to stay near their old 
neighbours and preserve their local social networks. Most importantly, alternative property 
provision of newly built or refurbished properties (e.g. „Homeswap‟) allows achieving relocation 
outcomes that are seen as positive by relocatees (see Chapter 7).  
Contrary to the common perception, alternative property provision offers value for money to the 
acquiring authorities in several ways. First, it guarantees investing the state supplied statutory 
compensation and FAPs in the properties provided within the project. In case empty properties are 
refurbished (Homeswap) it guarantees secure owner occupation of empty properties and saves 
maintenance and policing costs otherwise needed to secure empty properties. In the case where a 
large segment of the neighbourhood is rebuilt, alternative property provision (new housing) 
guarantees first-time buyers (using FAPs). As pointed out in the Walker case, residents who 
express a wish to stay in the neighbourhood often create a good base for developing a sustainable 
community in their area because  they are committed to it. Affordable properties that are now a 
compulsory part of most of developments can be successfully used for this purpose.  
Most importantly, effective alternative property provision that combines community involvement 
can help reduce residents‟ fear about the intervention, resistance towards redevelopment plans and 
acceptable relocation options for relocatees. Future policy designers should factor in alternative 
property provision for all tenures in plans proposing demolition and most importantly provide 
mechanisms that guarantee delivery of planned alternative properties.  
9.6.4.5 Resident support  
Future policy and redevelopment plans proposing housing demolition should provide resident 
support for relocation to all tenures. It is not sufficient to assume that residents affected by 
demolition are able to find an alternative property somewhere else with the statutory compensation. 
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In cases where residential relocation is induced by policy intervention, the planning authority 
should be obliged to provide resident support (either directly or by contracting another agency).  
Resident support should guarantee engagement with potential relocatees from the moment 
demolition plans are approved to the moment residents are relocated and settled in their alternative 
property. In some cases support will be needed in order help residents through the settling process, 
especially in the case of vulnerable groups such as the elderly and BME population. 
 
9.6.5 Residential relocation governance arrangements 
Mixed tenure residential relocation in differentiated polity is delivered by a complex network of 
actors. Therefore, it is no longer sufficient to assume that the local authorities are able to steer 
relocation practice only because they have statutory powers to intervene in the built environment. 
To the contrary, local authorities are dependent on other actors, including the affected community 
to do so.  
Future policy makers should take into account the practices of delegation and contracting out, and 
would benefit from an awareness of networking practices found to exist in mixed tenure residential 
relocation delivered by complex partnerships. In this context the accountability and responsibility 
for the residential relocation process and outcomes should be clearly defined. Future policy would 
benefit from considering ways to enforce delivery of agreed relocation aspects, especially related 
to alternative property provision.  
This would enhance strategic intercalation between the actors and possibly manage the complex 
networks in order to achieve residential relocation outcomes acceptable to the residents, minimise 
development and relocation delays and avoid additional development costs.. 
9.7 Conclusion  
Institutional fragmentation, multiplicity of agencies and complex webs of relationships, the 
breakdown of established networks, the disparity of powers and responsibilities across different 
tiers and departments, private, public and community sector bodies and confusion over „who does 
what‟ are the reality of  spatial governance (Albrechs & Balducci, 2009:66) but not only, as this 
study has showed they are present in residential relocation processes in a differentiated polity as 
well. These findings should not be taken lightly. They point to the need to craft different policy 
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solutions for residential relocation delivery and to develop a new line of research with the capacity 
to tackle the complexity of residential relocation process and outcomes in a differentiated polity. 
In the 2000s demolition has forcefully re-emerged as an important strategy to renew decayed 
neighbourhoods in the UK as well as in the USA and Western Europe. The example of Housing 
Market Renewal in England presents a vital source of information about the way mixed-tenure 
relocation can be delivered in differentiated polity. The HMR Pathfinders developed their practice 
with very little central guidance, in response to the local drivers of change and local contexts. 
While it has taken some time for the new practices and new residential relocation processes to take 
root, in the last years of HMR implementation Pathfinders had advanced residential relocation 
practices in innovative ways.  
This thesis provided a conceptual innovation to researching residential relocation. It argued for a 
procedural approach to residential relocation research, where the complex governance networks are 
seen as the context in which residential relocation processes are shaped. Having shown that 
residential relocation is delivered by complex networks of actors, rather than by structural shifts in 
the state or the market, the thesis argues that there is a need for more studies to test these results as 
well as further advancement of residential relocation studies through ideas about governance. The 
work of governance theoreticians such as Rhodes (1997) and Stoker (1997) in the UK, or Kickert 
et al. (1997) in the Netherlands could be of special significance. 
Future policies could benefit from acknowledging the existence of residential relocation networks 
and exploring possibilities of their management in order to achieve residential relocation outcomes 
that are acceptable to relocated residents. Kooiman et al. (1993), in their book Modern 
Governance, point out the importance of „co-governance‟, a new form of steering which they 
describe as „doing things together instead of doing them alone, either by „state‟ or „market‟ 
(1993:1). Further advancement and testing of the idea of „governance of relocation‟ may be one 
step forward to „doing things together‟ in relocation. 
Given the dynamic complexity of the residential relocation process in the HMR framework, it is 
believed that the approach taken in this thesis has considerable potential both to reveal the 
contingency of residential relocation outcomes on governance processes in other contexts and to 




Appendix 1. Pathfinders’ Boards  
Examples of the Pathfinder Board Memberships  
Bridging Newcastle Gateshead  Gateway Hull  
Local: 
2 Board Members nominated by Gateshead Council 
2 Board Members nominated by Newcastle Council 
2 Board Members nominated by the Newcastle Local 
Strategic Partnership 




1 Board Member nominated by Homes and 
Communities Agency (this replaces the Board 
Member representing English Partnerships 
 
National: 
1 Board Member nominated by One NorthEast 
 
Board Observers: 
1 person proposed by the Audit Commission 
1 person proposed by the Government Office North 
East 
1 person proposed by the New Deal for 
Communities 
Local: 
4 Board Members nominated by Hull City Council 
4 Board Members nominated by East Riding of 
Yorkshire Council 
1 Board Member nominated by Hull Local Strategic 
Partnership 
1 Board Member nominated by East Riding of 
Yorkshire Local Strategic Partnership 
1 Board Member nominated by Preston Road NDC 
1 Board Member nominated by Hull Forward 
Regional: 
1 Board Members nominated by Yorkshire Forward 
National: 
1 Board Member nominated by the National Housing 
Federation 
1 Board Members nominated by English 
Partnerships 
1 Board Members nominated by the Housing 
Corporation 
Other: 
2 lead developer representatives 
2 community sector representatives 
Manchester Salford Pathfinder  Partners in Action Pathfinder  
Board Members: 
Chair: Vice-Chancellor of the University of Salford. 
Vice-Chair: Alliance and Leicester plc. 




Executive Member for Neighbourhood Services, 
Manchester City Council. 
Lead Member for Housing, Salford City Council. 
Regional: 
North West Development Agency. 
National: 
Homes and Communities Agency representative (to 
be appointed) 
Non-voting members: 
Government Office North West. 
Representative from the Department for 
Communities and Local Government. 
Board Members: 
Chair - independent 
 
Local: 
3 Rochdale Council 
3 Oldham Council 
Rochdale Divisional Commander, Greater 
Manchester Police 
Rochdale Centre for Diversity and Rochdale Local 
Strategic Partnership 
Great Places Housing Group 
 
Regional: 
North West Development Agency 
 
National: 
Homes & Communities Agency 
 
Independent: 
Private Sector, independent 
Based on the Pathfinders Prospectuses and secondary date provided by the respondents in 2009.  
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Appendix 2: List of Respondents 
Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 
in the thesis  
National Level Inquiry 
1.Director Nevin Leather 
Associates LLP 
Public e-mail N/A March 2008 e-mail notes N/A London (no permission to 
quote) 














Public Face to Face 
Interview 
01.08.01 08.05.2008 Recorded  CABE Offices  
1 Kemble 






Housing &  
BNG Board, TV 
Board & EEL 




Public Face to Face 
Interview  















5.Head of HMR 
Division 











Office (NAO)  
Research Unit 
Public Face to Face 
Interview  
cca. 1 hour 12.03.2009 Notes 
(No 
permission 
to record)  











Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 
in the thesis  
7.Head of HMR 
Team 
HCA Public e-mail N/A April 2010 e-mail notes N/A London  (no permission to 
quote) 
8.Professor/Head 





N/A July 2011 e-mail notes N/A Edinburgh (no permission to 
quote) 
Pilot Study Pathfinder Level Inquiry 
9.Head of Research 
And Strategy 
Bridging Newcastle 






N/A April 2008 e-mail notes N/A Newcastle 
upon Tyne 
 
BNG Head of 
Research And 
Strategy 
10.Head of Finance  BNG  Pathfinder 
 BNG Team 





Coordinator (West)  
 
BNG  Pathfinder 
BNG Team 





















BNG  Pathfinder 
BNG Team 
Public  Face to Face 
Interview 









Coordinator (East)  
BNG  Pathfinder 
BNG Team 
Public Face to Face 
Interview 











Property Services  
Previously NCC  
Public Face to Face 
Interview 




















00.52.02 19.05.2008 Recorded YHN Offices 
YHN House, 
Benton Park 








Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 
in the thesis  
16.Relocation 
Officer 2 
(R&RT Team) by e-mail) CS-YHN 
Relocation Team2 





















































cca. 2 hours 03.07.2008 Recording 
lost due to  
computer 
crash, 
Notes used   
  
RNS Offices  
Civic Centre 






Strategy Officer   











(for Tees Valley 
Pathfinder) 
 

















cca.30 min. 19.01.2009 Recording 
lost due to  
computer 
crash, 
Notes used   






Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 
in the thesis  
23.Area Initiatives 
Manager  
Sandwell Council  
(for  Urban Living  
Pathfinder)  
Public  Phone 
Interview 




N/A Sandwell UL- Respondent 
S1-10 
































Gateway Hull  
(Hull & East 














Public e-mail  N/A Feb. & March 
2009 






Pathfinder   
 
Public e-mail  
(documents 
by e-mail) 
N/A Feb. & March 
2009 
e-mail notes  N/A Liverpool NHL- Respondent 
S1-5 
In-depth Case Study Pathfinder (BNG) and Local Level Inquiry (Phase 1) 
29.Head of 
Development 




Face to Face 
Group 
Interview  











Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 














Director (West End 
Newcastle)   
(NCC)  Area Based 
Regeneration (West 
End)  
Public Face to Face 
Interview 














Team Officer 1  
YHN ALMO    
Resettlement and 
Relocation Team 
(R&RT)   
Public 
 
Face to Face 
Group 
Interview  
02.04.06 25.11.2009 Recorded YHN Offices 
YHN House, 
Benton Park 


















(resigned as Area 
Director for East 
End Newcastle)  




Face to Face 
interview  

















Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 
in the thesis  






North East  
(Private Developer)  
 
Private  Face to Face 
Interview  























02.03.30 26.11.2009 Recorded Gateshead 
MBC  
Civic Centre 
















Public Face to Face 
Interview 
01.12.44 26.11.2009 Recorded Gateshead 
MBC  













Face to Face 
Group 
Interview  

























Face to Face 
Interview  










for East End 
Newcastle  
(resigned)  
 (NCC) Area Based 
Regeneration 
(East End) 




01.08.28 27.11.2009 Recorded University of 
Newcastle  
Newcastle 
upon Tyne  





Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 
in the thesis  

















(total time of 
recorded 
material, 
total time of 
the visit 3 
hours, 
including 

















































Officer 1 (West 























Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 
in the thesis  









Face to Face 
Interview  





Armstrong Rd.  
Newcastle 
upon Tyne 








Walker Riverside  
(Resigned)  
(NCC) Area Based 
Regeneration 
(East End) 
Public  Face to Face 
Interview  
01.35.38 26.01.2010 Recorded  Sunderland 
City Council 
Civic Centre 
Burdon Rd.  
 
Sunderland  





(East End)   
(NCC) Area Based 
Regeneration 
(East End) 
Public Face to Face 
Interview 
02.00.00 25.01.2010 Recorded Newcastle 
City Council 
Civic Centre  
  
Newcastle 
upon Tyne   
NE1 8PD  
CS-NCC East 
Team3 
Joint Working Group Observation 
54.Training 


























































































































Role/Position  Organisation & 
Department  











City   Respondent code 
in the thesis  










































































































Director (West End 

























Appendix 4 In-depth Case Study Interview Schedule and Questions  
Meeting: BNG Pathfinder Team 
(Name 1 Deleted see Ethics Section)   
(Name 2 Deleted see Ethics Section)   
Meeting details:  
Date & Time: 25.11.2009 at 11.00 till 12.30 (next Your Homes Newcastle).  
Address: 1st Floor, Central Exchange Buildings, 128 Grainger Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 
5AF 
AIM: This research aims to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation and 
their impact on residents in Housing Market Renewal areas, using a case study of Bridging 
Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder.     
1) What are the main issues that the Pathfinder is facing nowadays especially regarding 
projects that involve demolition and relocation? 
2) At the beginning I would like to ask you what are the developments in the projects in the 
BNG where the demolition is planned / carried out/ completed demolition and relocation.   
3) How many homes have been demolished? How many residents have been relocated?  
4) What is the starting and ending date of each project?  
5) What is the length of each project?  
6) When are the residents usually informed about demolition? How long before the actual 
demolition/relocation?  
7) What is the average process length in each project?  
8) Why does it vary? 
BNG Pathfinder has 13 separate neighbourhoods that are under HMR intervention (see Figure 3). 
This research focuses on eight among them where demolition and relocation of residents has been 
executed, is in process or planned.  
BNG demolition areas are:  
5) Pathfinder Priority Areas:  
 Scottswood (800 demolished – 1400 planed),  
 Walker (Newcatle) (299 demolished – map) 
 Bensham (Gateshead) (440 for demolition planned/done?). These areas are at the same 
time the ones where the clearance has been the highest.  
 
6) Other strategic and mixed demolitions:  
 Ouseburn (Newcastle) (strategic demolition?) 
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 Taeams (Gateshead) (93 acquisitions, planned for demolition?) 
 
7) Private Housing Stock Clearance:  
 Felling (Sunderland Road and Brandling) (Gateshead) (400 for demolition planed/done?) 
 
8) City Council Stock Clearance:  
 Cowgate (50 council flats demolished), Blakelaw, Kenton (Newcatle) (what is going on 
here?) 
 
Figure 3. Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder intervention areas 
 
Source: BNG Visioning Document, 2008:16.  Neighborhoods in which demolition is carried out or 
planned: Newcastle: Scotswood, Walker, Ouseburn, Cowgate, Blakelaw, Kenton, Gateshead: 
Bensham, Taeams, Felling (see Annex 4).  
OBJECTIVE 1: To determine the processes shaping residential relocation and the strategies 
adopted by delivery agencies. 
1) What are the main issues the projects in BNG face in the new economic climate? What are 
the main issues that you face relating to residential relocation?  
2) What do you mean when you say residential relocation? What processes do you think 
about? Is that something you feel is partially your responsibility?  Something that you have 
to take into account? What does residential relocation entail, in your Pathfinder? What 
processes does it consist of?  
3) What are the processes commonly associated with residential relocation?  
4) What is the main guidance for relocation? What do you base the strategy for relocation on?  
5) To what extent is residential relocation included in planning of the urban regeneration 
process? How do you relate to that issue when planning your strategies?  
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6) Is the residential relocation considered an integral part of urban regeneration? If yes, why? 
If no, why? What about the delays and the financial losses because of delays or 
opportunistic behaviour of residents?  
7)  
8) Show figure 4. Are there any other processes that shape the outcomes of residential 
relocation to your knowledge?  
9) Who are the actors involved in each intersection?  
10) Please relate these processes and actors to the mapped network: governance of relocation 
(Figure 5). 
11) Is there a written guidance on National; Pathfinder; Local Authority; Project level? (use 
the Matrix to systematise the information). Which one of these processes and actors have a 
written policy/guidance about residential relocation? Who among the delivery bodies has a 
relocation policy? 
12) Who do the existing strategies for relocation involve?  
13) What are the unwritten guidelines and rules (like priority to the residents from the 
demolished areas and the distance)?  
14) Are there any standards that need to be meet in relocation in terms of process length, 
quality of housing, location, other categories? 
15) What is the influence of the tenure mix on this?  
OBJECTIVE 2: To determine and evaluate governance arrangements within HMR with 
special regards to residential relocation.  
1) Show the map of governance of relocation, ask for the comments based on the answers 
related to the residential relocation processes.  
Figure 4. Processes involved in residential relocation 
Name:  Description: 
 
Area Development Phasing: includes 
master planning and phasing development 
of each area within the project in terms of 
timelines for clearance, demolition, 
relocation and new building. 
Community consultation: entails 
engagement of the residents in various 
stages of the project development. 
Financial Assistance Allocation:  is 
distribution of the financial assistance 
packages to the affected residents across 
tenures. 
Alternative housing provision: is a 
process of building and/or refurbishing 
properties that will serve as alternatives to 
demolished ones.   
Matching residents with alternative 
properties: involves guiding demolition 
affected residents (owner occupiers, private 
tenants, RSL and council tenants) through 
the process of search for the alternative 
property. 
Based on axial coding of Pilot Study data  
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2) Please fix the graph according to each project (Walker, Scotswood). Are there 
different/additional players involved?  
3) Please explain relations between these actors for each project.  
4) How are the relations defined based on what? In the case of the main policy goals the 
governance structures are put in place in order to deliver a certain goal. What is the case 
with residential relocation that is not a main policy goal?  
5) Why is there a difference in the number and type of the actors involved? What are the 
main reasons for that difference?  
6) Why do the governance arrangements change on the Pathfinder level and project level? 
How does that influence the project?  
7) How does the frequent change of personnel influence delivery of the project and 
residential relocation? (delays, costs, outcomes for the residents)?  
8) What is the core group of actors? What are the actors that usually change? What is the task 
of the core team/changing actors?  
9) Are there governance arrangements directly made to deliver residential relocation? If yes 
what are they? 
10) Who is held accountable for residential relocation outcomes, and by whom? What are the 
standards if any?  
11) What is the manner in which these teams work together (from your perspective)? Who do 
you usually work with?  
12) What are the links with residents? A) direct consultation? B) contact because they need to 
be informed about the options? How many residents are involved in each case? What are 
they usually consulted about? Who are the representatives, and what %?  
Figure 5. Bringing Newcastle Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure  
 
Designed based on pilot study and secondary data analysis.  
All – refers to all tenure groups within a community affected by relocation; Owners – refers only to 
owner occupiers  
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OBJECTIVE 3: To understand how decisions that influence relocation processes are made and 
their impact in terms of re-housing and relocation of the existing residents.  
13) What is the manner in which these actors are connected and work with each other in 
different relocation processes?  
14) How are the decisions being made? Who makes the decisions? What decisions are made – 
relating to which process? (use the Figure 4 and 5). 
15) Who has the most influence in decision making process about residential relocation? Is this 
a subject of debates among these bodies at all?  
16) Who makes the decisions about overall strategy of residential relocation? What process is 
that decision usually related to?   
17) What are the main reasons different approaches to relocation have been taken in different 
projects?  
18) How are the decisions relating to residential relocation being made on the: national 
(approval for demolition comes from the secretary of the state), Pathfinder, Council 
(approval of the master plan); Project (Walker, Scotswood), Household level?  
19) Who has the most influence in each these? 
20) What information is the one that shapes the decisions the most? (Community pressures, 
Financial Constraints, Election Interesets, Technical Constraints, Other?).  
21) What are the pressures, opportunities and constraints that most influence the decision 
making process.  
22) How does the decision making process work considering that there is: a) no consensus as 
to what residential relocation is; b) there is no set goal apart from HMR; c) RR doesn‟t 
have a defined network.  
23) What is the manner of the decision making process? Are there cases of conflict and/or 
bargaining (who with whom?) 
24) How does the power manifest in these networks and how does it travel? Who has the 
power?  
25) Who wins and who loses? By which mechanisms of power? How can be these mechanisms 
be changed? Assumption: if there is no clear goal, and clearly defined governance system 
in the way the actors can interact with each other, power exertion, conflict and bargaining 
is more possible.  
Changeability:  
1) When were the rules/guidelines/standards for relocation set considering the HMR policy 
design and implementation in BNG?  
2) When were the actors delivering relocation appointed? When were specific tasks/processes 
defined?  
 
Interview closing:  
Are there any additional comments you would like to make?  
Thank you very much for your help.  
Questions related to the respondents‘ background (names deleted)  
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(Name Deleted see Ethics Section)   
1) Has the CPO process been introduced in Newcastle since my last visit? In which areas has it 
been introduced?  
2) How did that change (if at all) the practice of residential relocation?  
3) Can you give me the areas where the residents from each area relocated (use the map). So I can 
visit them – the areas.  
4) Are the delays in the projects caused by residential relocation accounted for? Is this something 
that the phasing of the projects is dealing with? Or the practitioners usually for the site to be 
cleared?  
5) DO you delay the demolition because of the waiting lists? How does that influence plans and 
delivery? What are the alternatives?  
6) How to recognise the genuine refusal to move and game play to get better price or home? How 
if at all are these costs accounted for?  
7) Are the plans adjusted around the residents that do not want to move? If not why?  
Tied into spending money on housing related activities. What aspects of relocation are counted into 
that (FAPs, alternative property discount, demolition, new building).  
Focus: Scotswood, Walker, Bensham & Saltwell. What changed since then? Did the acquisition in 
any other area begin? Were residents informed about the plans in any other area planned for 
demolition?  
Ask for the Area Action Plans that cover the demolition areas. (p. 3 of the interview). The secretary 
of the state approves the plan (which plan). Are residential relocation and expenses included in that 
revision? What are the criteria for the approval regarding residential relocation? What evidence is 
needed?  
(Name Deleted see Ethics Section)   
1) What are the governance arrangements in Scotswood (limited liability partnership that 
included English Partnership among other actors) and how do they differ from Walker or 
the situation in Gateshead? What are the main reasons they differ? 
2) How does this influence the approaches to residential relocation if at all?  
3) Are the developers waiting for the sites to be cleared or they are involved in the process 
and relocation?  
4) Why is Walker different?  
5) The tenders for these large sites are done though European Procurement Process. Is there 
any clause that relates to relocation – and the ways it is delivered if these things are done 
locally. Are sites given to this process only after they are cleared?  
6) Are the costs related to residential relocation in terms of delays, legal costs (CPO), housing 
price raise, bargaining price (higher for those who wait), accounted for in the development 
process? Are these accounted for in any way? Are you aware of the differences for the 
project itself? Can you compare different projects in BNG?  
7) What are the solutions according to your opinion? What are the good examples? What are 
the solutions: smaller sites; master developers?  
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8) You mentioned that in Walker there was an involvement with the master developer so that 
the issues have been resolved more efficiently.  
9) Are there new buildings in Scotswood since the Oct 2008 now the developers have been 
appointed? Which ones?  
 
Interviewees Background and details:  
(Name Deleted see Ethics Section)  leads on strategic development issues for BNG and contributes 
towards project appraisal delivery. He leads on the setting up of developer panels and design 
quality for BNG. 
E-mail: (Deleted see Ethics Section)   
Tel: (Deleted see Ethics Section)   
 
(Name Deleted see Ethics Section)   is involved in developing and coordinating the Bridging 
Newcastle Gateshead schemes in the West End of Newcastle, and he appraises schemes which 
request funding in the East and North of Newcastle. He also responds to planning issues which 
may affect BNG, and he produces maps to assist with strategy or project development. 
E-mail: (Deleted see Ethics Section)   
Tel: (Deleted see Ethics Section)   
 
Map and Directions:  







Appendix 5 Secondary Data Sources 
BNG Board Meeting Minutes and Annual Reports  
BRIDGING NEWCASTLE GATESHEAD PATHFINDER BOARD MEETINGS MINUTES:  
BNG BOARD 18/03/11 - MINUTES 
 
AVAILABLE AT:   
HTTP://WWW.BRIDGINGNG.ORG.UK/SITE/INDEX.PHP?OPTION=C
OM_CONTENT&TASK=BLOGCATEGORY&ID=50&ITEMID=120 
BNG BOARD 18/03/11 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 21/01/11 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 19/11/10 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 24/09/10 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 16/07/10 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 21/05/10 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 26/03/10 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 29/01/10 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 20/11/09 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 18/09/09 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 10/07/09 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 15/05/09 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 13/03/09 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 23/01/09 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 21/11/08 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 18/09/08 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 11/07/08 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 16/05/08 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 14/03/08 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 25/01/08 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 23/11/07 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 21/09/07 - AGENDA AND PAPERS 
BNG BOARD 13/07/07 - AGENDA 
BNG BOARD 18.05.07 
BNG BOARD 23.03.07 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 06.10.06 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 14.07.06 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 07.06.06 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 28.04.06 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 17.03.06 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 27.01.06 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 16.12.05 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 11.11.05 
BNG BOARD COMMUNIQUÉ 09.09.05 
 
BRIDGING NEWCASTLE GATESHEAD PATHFINDER ANNUAL REPORTS LIST 
ANNUAL REPORT 2009-2010 AVAILABLE AT:  
HTTP://WWW.BRIDGINGNG.ORG.UK/SITE/INDEX.PHP?OPTION=C
OM_CONTENT&TASK=BLOGCATEGORY&ID=87&ITEMID=165 
ANNUAL REPORT 2008-2009 
ANNUAL REPORT 2007-08 
ANNUAL REPORT 2006 - 2007 
BNG ANNUAL REPORT 2005-06 
BNG ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05 




Audit Commission http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk 
Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council www.blackburn.gov.uk 
Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder http://www.bridgingng.org.uk 
Burnley Borough Council http://www.burnley.gov.uk/site/index.php 
East Riding of Yorkshire Council www.eastriding.gov.uk 
Elevate East Lancashire http://www.elevate-eastlancs.co.uk/ 
Find a Property http://www.findaproperty.com/searchresults.aspx?edid=00&salerent=0&areaid=7474&sp=2 
Gateshead Council www.gateshead.gov.uk 
Gateshead Housing Company www.gatesheadhousing.co.uk 
Gateway Pathfinder http://www.gatewayhull.co.uk/about-gateway/ 
GVA Grimley http://www.gva.co.uk/  
Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) http://www.homesandcommunities.co.uk/housing_market_renewal 
Hull City Council www.hullcc.gov.uk 
Hyndburn Borough Council http://www.hyndburnbc.gov.uk/site/index.php 
Keepmoat  http://www.keepmoathomes.co.uk/news/designs-on-scotswood/ 
Lancashire County Council http://www.lancashire.gov.uk/ 
Newcastle City Council www.newcastle.gov.uk 
Newcastle City Council online:  http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/planning-and-buildings/planning/benwell-scotswood-area-action-plan 
Newcastle upon Lyme Borough Council http://www.newcastle-staffs.gov.uk/ 
No To Demolition In Saltwell and Bensham http://www1.sbresidents.org/ 
Partners in Action Oldham & Rochdale http://www.oldhamrochdalehmr.co.uk/ 
Pendle Borough Council http://www.pendle.gov.uk/site/index.php 
Renew North Staffordshire http://www.renewnorthstaffs.gov.uk/ 
Rossendale Borough Council http://www.rossendale.gov.uk/site/index.php 
Save Britain‟s Heritage http://www.savebritainsheritage.org/news/campaign.php?id=191 
Shelter http://england.shelter.org.uk/ 
Stoke-on-Trent City Council http://www.stoke.gov.uk/ccm/navigation/housing/housing-renewal/ 
Tees Valley Living http://www.teesvalleyliving.org.uk/ 
Urban Living http://www.urbanliving.org.uk/ 
Your Choice Homes www.yourchoicehomes.org 




Gateshead MBC Video Library  - Gateshead No Stranger to Change, 
http://www.gateshead.gov.uk/Building%20and%20Development/LiveGatesheadLoveGateshead/NoStrangertoChange/home.aspx  
Vimeo - Streetfighters - Joan Diggle, Oldham Derker, http://vimeo.com/19262960 
Vimeo -  Streetfighters-Empty Homes Agency, http://vimeo.com/18387594 
YouTube - Bootle's Klondyke estate demolition starts, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Z2SWwzeZTw&feature=related 
YouTube - Demolition of Dukinfield 1969 – 1970, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xobtIRRdjFA 
YouTube  - Housing Market Renewal http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=housing+market+renewal&aq=f 
YouTube - Regeneration Game - Nigel Pivaro - Part One, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ernghhU_uAg&feature=related 
YouTube - Regeneration Game- Nigel Pivaro-Part Two, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iVyAxZxFyss&feature=related 
YouTube - Rotherham Housing Market Renewal, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bx7fxrv9FZc 
YouTube - salford slums- langworthy road, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdPoB71rNP8&feature=related 
YouTube - spirit of the streets, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKpDjdnhYks 
YouTube - Street Fighters Nina Edge - Liverpool Welsh Streets, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbenyZKBMDk&feature=related 
YouTube - The Regeneration Game, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gfbjQinNbQ&feature=related 
YouTube - The Strand Demolition - Liverpool Oct 10, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bi9M6Wj_6MU&feature=related 
YouTube - The Welsh Streets, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8ZvPHsAp3E&feature=related 
YouTube - Where the Streets Have No Name, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0olQRaIR-pM&feature=related 
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